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                                      The Grief of Nations 
                                                  Abstract 
 
This dissertation is concerned with the question of whether nations grieve, 
whether the behaviour they exhibit in the wake of loss can be said to constitute 
grief. Initially exploring the concepts of both grief and nation in order to 
establish the feasibility of national grief as a notion, it goes on to examine the 
applicability of grief theory, traditionally developed in the context of the 
individual suffering bereavement, to large-scale national collectives which 
have undergone significant shared loss.  
The investigation is conducted with reference to two case studies: the 
Palestinian people in the aftermath of the loss of their land to the creation of 
Israel in the nakba of 1948; and Israel itself, as a manifestation of the 
European Jewish response to the holocaust and the centuries of loss and 
suffering which led up to it. In both cases, the relevant periods of history are 
scanned to see to what extent, if any, historical accounts reflect the contours 
and parameters of the grieving experience as the latter is described and 
defined in the grief theory literature. In addition, and serving to triangulate the 
evidence thus gleaned from national history, the contemporary visual arts of 
both nations, with their observation of and comment on the dominant features 
and issues of current national identity, are employed as data sources and 
explored with a view to ascertaining whether they reflect any themes 
expressive of or pertinent to collective historical loss and grief. 
The findings from this research into national history and identity within a grief 
experience framework may serve to open up a new direction for the further 
development of grief theory. They may also, in revealing the insights afforded 
by a grief theory perspective on long-term interactions within the global 




“Scholarly research is often motivated by personal experiences”  
                                                                            (Sand 2009, p.1)                                         
                                                                                                                              
The motivation for this particular piece of research into national grief certainly 
fits into that category. It arose from personal experiences gained in the 
context of a career overseas in the field of international cultural relations. Not 
perhaps so inherently prone to either the power-games which can plague 
international relations per se, nor the inequality in relationships which can 
bedevil international development programmes, international cultural 
relations, at their most professional, involve the genuine attempt, from a 
position of respect and equality, to understand another way of life, to work 
out what makes another people tick.  
Cultural relations are often used in the service of the political or economic 
agendas of international relations practitioners; they can equally be employed 
in the furtherance of international development strategies and the facilitation 
of development projects. At their worst and most naive, international cultural 
relations can amount to little more than tub-thumping a nation’s opinions and 
showcasing their achievements. But at their best and most effective, they 
entail engagement and dialogue with another society to an extent that 
enhances the understanding of how that society functions; of its hopes and 
fears, its values and concerns; of what makes it proud and what gives it 
cause for shame and embarrassment; of what problems it has faced during 
the course of its history and how it has coped with those problems.  
For well over three decades, I worked at this international coal face, arriving 
in a new country every three or four years, trying to get to grips with its 
society and culture so as to more easily and relevantly present our own, and 
thus embark on a meaningful interchange conducted in cultural terms.  
Arriving at an appreciation of another nation’s way of life was my bread-and-
butter, with the result that the acquisition of such an appreciation through 
everyday experiences and interactions became second nature over time, as 
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taken-for-granted as breathing. So much so that, whenever experience 
presented a challenge in terms of understanding, whenever some puzzling 
instances of collective conduct did not seem to easily fit into any previously 
acquired patterns, I could do nothing other than sit up and take notice.   
The specific experiences which gave direction to this research date from my 
time in the Lebanon, six years in the nineties from shortly after the Taif 
Accord which brought the fifteen year multi-faceted civil war there to an end. 
But they did not concern the Lebanese themselves. During my time in 
Lebanon, I learned a great deal about the highly complex and sophisticated 
society in which I was living (or, rather, societies, plural, since every bend in 
the road seemed to lead to another distinct culture in this tiny nation of over a 
dozen different ‘confessions’, or religious groupings). I slowly got to grips with 
its complicated demography and equally convoluted history, and grew to love 
it as no other country I had ever worked in. While fully aware that one can 
never completely understand another nation, in the same way as one can 
never wholly comprehend another individual, I managed to peel away a few 
layers of obfuscation in Lebanon and gain some degree of understanding of 
what makes the Lebanese tick. But what really intrigued me, and what I could 
not so readily explain, was the behaviour of two other peoples that I did not 
have such easy access to: the Israeli neighbours, and the Palestinians living 
around Lebanon, for the most part in various refugee camps.   
When I first arrived in Beirut, Israeli planes would fly over the city every day 
around lunchtime, breaking the sound barrier, presumably just to remind the 
inhabitants, if they needed any reminding, that Israel was there. After a few 
years, these regular daily forays were discontinued, and replaced by more 
irregular fly-overs, often at two or three in the morning, and frequently 
resulting in shattered windows in many parts of the city. These muscle-
flexing, threatening  gestures were accompanied by actions intended as 
reprisals for Hizbollah attack from the south of Lebanon, actions which from a 
Beirut-based perspective seemed way out of proportion to what in the mid-
nineties amounted largely to the firing of old Katyusha rockets into the fields 
of northern Israel.  The Israelis, for example, would send F16s up the coast 
on an almost annual basis to take out the main power station for Lebanon, 
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situated in the north of Beirut, and leave half the country in the dark, reliant 
on private and neighbourhood generators, for several weeks.  Once, I 
remember, these planes even turned back, halfway home to Israel, so that 
they could take out the fire engines racing up the highway from central Beirut 
to put out the fires at the bombed power station. 
I was there in 1996 when thousands of refugees streamed up the main road 
to Beirut from Sour and Saida (Tyre and Sidon) to escape Israeli attacks in 
the south. The infamous Qana massacre took place at this time, with the 
Israeli shelling of the UNIFIL Fiji Battalion base resulting in the deaths of 
many Lebanese civilians who had taken shelter there, along with the Fijian 
soldiers who had offered them refuge. 
In 1998 I visited the south of Lebanon, liaising with the UN on an educational 
project there, and staying at the various UNIFIL battalion bases dotted 
around the area. For the first couple of days in what was at that time an 
Israeli occupied region, where the Lebanese required official permits to get in 
or out, our UN-plated vehicle was closely tracked by an Israeli unmanned 
drone, monitoring our every movement and meeting. Evening meals at the 
UNIFIL bases were sometimes interrupted by warning sirens, alerting 
everyone on the base to take shelter as Israeli F16s flew overhead on some 
bombing mission in the neighbourhood. 
The contrast, at the double-fenced security border between Israel and 
Lebanon, was vivid: the white-walled, red-roofed Israeli houses, with their 
lush, green, well-tended lawns, on the other side of the fence, metres away 
from the dusty, stone-walled Lebanese villages on their dry pockets of land. 
At a couple of spots, huge holes had been gouged out of the Lebanese 
landscapes, reportedly as a result of attempts to divert the waters of 
Lebanon’s Litani River on a course more advantageous to the Israelis. 
I failed to understand the Israeli behaviour. Israel was a prosperous, 
technologically advanced country, with highly trained armed forces and state-
of-the-art military equipment. Lebanon was still in a state of chaos, recently 
emerged from a fifteen year long war which had destroyed its infrastructure 
and scarred its people. The Lebanese army could not be taken seriously as a 
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professional fighting force, and the Lebanese people just wanted to get on 
and rebuild their lives after “the events” of the civil war. Lebanon at that time 
could offer no real threat to anyone. Hizbollah, not exactly under Lebanese 
control, were clearly determined to provide a source of irritation to Israel, but 
what was perceived as disproportionate Israeli retaliation for this irritation 
only succeeded in strengthening Hizbollah’s hand and garnering them more 
support amongst the Lebanese. In this context, I found Israel’s actions 
incomprehensible, and could almost understand why the Lebanese largely 
viewed them as cold, cruel, scheming monsters, an alien species that had 
taken up residence to their south and would give them no peace.  
While the presence of the Israeli neighbours was evident from my first few 
hours in Beirut, that of the almost 400,000 Palestinians living amidst the 
Lebanese took me longer to discover. But as I got to know people better, I 
would find that a number of the professional, middle-class Lebanese I came 
across in the daily course of events were actually Palestinians, who had fled 
across the border in 1948, or, having seen the writing on the wall, decamped 
to Beirut en famille even earlier. In some cases, Arab Americans I met, 
dipping a toe back into Beirut to see if they could settle there again now that 
peace had broken out, turned out to be Palestinians who had sought refuge 
in Lebanon in 1948, then left in the seventies because of the civil war.  
But the great majority were the less fortunate, less well-heeled Palestinians, 
living in the refugee camps, over twenty of them, mainly dotted up and down 
the coast, from Nahr-el-Bared beyond Tripoli in the north to Rashidieh near 
Sour in the south, with the largest concentrations of population in camps 
around Beirut and Saida. By the time I was living in Lebanon in the nineties, 
this population was well into its third generation since 1948, still refused 
Lebanese citizenship, still with little in the way of job prospects given an 
unemployment rate of around 70%, still mainly supported by UNRWA, and 
generally detested by the Lebanese, who regarded the Palestinians as 
largely responsible for their troubles during the civil war. A few of the second 
generation had managed to make a living as taxi drivers or street traders and 
thus gain a precarious foothold in mainstream Lebanese society. Some of the 
young third generation were seeking a way out of the whole situation through 
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education or marriage to a foreigner, while many were increasingly turning to 
fundamentalism and militancy, thus stirring up more trouble with their 
Lebanese hosts.                        
What struck me in my contacts with this Palestinian component of Lebanese 
society was its preoccupation with the past. There were the keys, for a start. 
In the luxury downtown flat of an American passport holder, in the 
comfortable villas of middle class university lecturers and business people, in 
the modest rooms of camp-dwellers in Bourj-el-Brajneh and Dbeyeh, I was 
shown, at some point of my visit, the key to the house that had been left 
behind in Palestine. This was, in each case, treated as a precious family 
heirloom, kept safe in some corner of the home, and unwrapped with a 
ritualistic solemnity on special occasions. It was passed down from 
generation to generation, though it was never clear to me at what point the 
owners had accepted, if indeed they ever had, that it would never be used to 
herald their entry to that particular Palestinian house again.  
And then there were the plants. I came across an old lady in the camp at Ein-
el-Helweh who told me that the plants growing round her door had come from 
her garden in Palestine, that her late husband had gone back over the border 
one night in 1948, in defiance of Israeli laws, and brought back cuttings with 
him. They had nurtured and tended those plants ever since, and had in turn, 
over time, presented cuttings from them to their relatives, friends and 
neighbours, so that now a great many people could boast of a little bit of 
Palestine growing around their houses. I have since read so many similar 
accounts from writers and researchers in the camps, coming across people 
cherishing bits of their former Palestinian gardens in Lebanese soil, that I 
must assume this is not an uncommon practice. 
And, finally, there was the annual art competition in camp schools for nakba 
day, the winning entries in which would usually end up on the walls of 
UNRWA officials around the country. This competition, encouraging young 
children to imagine the catastrophe that befell their grandparents some forty 
years before they themselves were born, invariably elicited violent images of 
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bomb blasts and ruined buildings, of Israeli tanks pursuing fleeing Palestinian 
hordes, or crushing Palestinian corpses as they lay on the ground. 
I never quite understood this enthrallment to the past. While sympathising 
with the old-timers’ wish to hang on to their keys and their trees as reminders 
of the lives they had lost, I simply could not see why these were being 
transferred across generations, accompanied by what I could only perceive 
as morbid reflections on the past. Nor could I grasp why children at school 
were being asked to ponder and imagine events which had taken place over 
half a century before and could have little immediate relevance to their 
current situations. Perhaps I expected the Palestinians to behave more like 
the Lebanese, to dust themselves off and throw themselves into some sort of 
entrepreneurial assault on their futures, to be alert to present and future 
opportunities in education or business or both, and to take advantage of 
these for the betterment of themselves and their families. 
Many years later, post-overseas career and, with a completely new direction, 
studying for a Masters in Sociology at the University of Bath, I stumbled 
across grief theory, in the context of bereaved individuals grieving the death 
of a loved one. I found this theory both powerful and fascinating as a 
perspective on loss and the reaction to it. It explained in retrospect two very 
difficult and uncharacteristic periods in my own life that had been occasioned 
by significant losses, one of a person, the other of a country, the one 
“overseas posting” out of a whole string that had really left its mark on me. I 
liked the way grief theory was linked, from the psychological angle, to a 
fundamental loss of self, the incurring of substantial damage to the self-
identity and personal life-world. And I liked the way it was seen as subject, 
from the sociological angle, to the influences and pressures of a society keen 
to either keep the lid on the boiling pot of emotions that characterises 
grieving, or to exploit that same emotional force for its own ends. I particularly 
appreciated the way grief theory had shifted, over the course of the twentieth 
century, from an almost prescriptive preoccupation with the norms of 
“healthy” or “normal” grieving, to a far healthier, to my mind, recognition of 
the infinite variety of individual and cultural differences involved in what 
people grieve and how they grieve.  
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Grief theory, beneath the myriad manifestations of individual grieving, 
seemed to me to touch on a universal of the human condition: our difficulty in 
accepting the transience and impermanence of life and our tendency to cling 
to a perceived stability, ultimately illusory, in the face of the inevitable 
changes that transience entails. As soon as some significant and unwelcome 
change destroys our carefully crafted individual world and sense of who we 
are, we are knocked off our metaphorical feet for a bit, and then put all our 
energies into rebuilding that world with a new self-identity at the heart of it. 
Instead of going with the flow, we want to cling on to the river bank. Instead 
of risking the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”, we prefer to seek the 
refuge of castles literally built in the air. 
Captivated by what I saw as the explanatory power of grief theory with 
reference to so much human behaviour, I began to muse on how it might 
apply at a collective level, and not just an individual one. I began to wonder if 
the Israeli behaviour I had judged as aggressive and disproportionate in 
Lebanon might be related to a collective adaptation to Jewish loss in the 
holocaust, and in the centuries of discrimination and persecution leading up 
to it; if the Palestinian intergenerational clinging to the past that I had 
witnessed in Lebanon, particularly in the camps, might not perhaps be 
attributable to a natural collective grief reaction to the loss of their lands in 
1948. Could grief theory, traditionally developed in the context of bereaved 
individuals, usefully apply at a collective, national level? Could it provide a 
framework that might sophisticate and enlighten our perception of 
international relations? And, equally, might a study of how nations behave in 
the wake of collective loss in any way add to our understanding of individual 
grieving?  
These questions have informed this research. The first chapter is an in-depth 
analysis of grief itself, within a theoretical framework that, by covering the 
personal and social aspects of the grieving phenomenon, caters for both 
psychological and sociological approaches. The second chapter examines 
the concept of collective grief in terms of the fundamentals of grieving as 
identified in chapter one. The study of grief as it affects various groups, such 
as the family, the work team, and the local community, is explored, but the 
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main focus is on the nation, with an emphasis on defining the national 
collective in such a way as to render the concept of national grief an entirely 
feasible notion. 
In chapter three, the methods adopted for the research purposes are 
discussed, with an explanation of the rationale underlying the approach to the 
two case studies of national grief, namely, the Palestinians in the wake of the 
loss of their land to the creation of Israel in 1948; and Israel, as a 
manifestation of European Jewish grief in the aftermath of the holocaust and 
the centuries of loss and suffering that led up to it. The data to be used for 
these case studies derives from national histories covering the periods in 
question, and, in order to reinforce findings from the past with evidence in the 
present, from modern visual art works – largely photography, video and 
visual arts installations – produced by international standard Israeli and 
Palestinian artists. 
Chapters four and five cover the relevant histories of the Palestinian people 
and of Israel respectively, approaching them through the lens of grief theory 
with a view to identifying any features and events which might correspond 
with the fundamental elements of the grieving experience. Chapter six 
investigates the major themes and trends in both the Israeli and Palestinian 
contemporary visual arts, examining to what extent these might be regarded 
as reflecting historical grief through their current social comment and 
observation. The final chapter draws conclusions from the foregoing research 
as to if and how grief theory might usefully apply at a national level, and as to 
whether this study of national grieving might also have some bearing on the 








 1.  THE NATURE OF GRIEF 
“Your pain is the breaking of the shell that encloses your understanding” 
                                                                         (Khalil Gibran, The Prophet) 
This initial chapter examines the concept of grief and explores the nature of 
the grieving phenomenon. It starts off by looking at definitions of grief, and at 
the associations the term carries in current everyday common usage. These 
associations can be seen to derive largely from academic constructions of 
grief when the development of grief theory over the past century, and its 
influence on both pragmatic attitudes towards and the practical management 
of grief, are considered. The main contributions of the various theoretical 
approaches to grief, from the personal angle, viewing grief as an interior 
process, as well as the social angle, emphasising the griever’s social context 
and relationships, are reviewed in some detail. 
Taking a holistic perspective which caters for the insights on grief afforded by 
both psychological and sociological approaches, an in-depth analysis of the 
grieving experience in terms of its fundamental elements is undertaken. 
These fundamentals would seem to boil down to four essential features: the 
significant and damaging loss which triggers the grieving; the emotional 
response to that loss; the attempt to make some sense of the post-loss 
situation, to create meaning from the void which the loss leaves in its wake; 
and, finally, the specific social context in which the griever finds himself, and 
the influence of that context on the shaping of the way in which the grief 
experience unfolds and of its ultimate consequences for both the griever and 
those around him. 
The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an appropriate definition and 
comprehensive description of the grieving experience. Once the terms of the 
discourse surrounding the concept of grief are clearly established, the next 
chapter will go on to investigate how they might meaningfully be used to 




The terms “grief” and “grieving” have been in common usage for several 
centuries. The Oxford English Dictionary (www.oed.com), the recognised 
authority on the evolution of the English language over the last millennium, 
records instances of their use in the sense of suffering or distress, both 
mental and physical, from as early as the mid-fourteenth century. Although 
the preponderance of recorded uses refers to mental or emotional suffering, 
the field of reference within that sphere is wide, encompassing a continuum 
from sorrow and sadness to vexation and annoyance: 
   1350 – So glad was he then, that no grief under god gained to his joy. (Will. 
Palerne 2473) 
   1413 – How may my eyes restrain them for to show by weeping my heart’s 
grief. (Pilgr. Sowle iv.xx.66) 
   1568 – Grief, as saith Cicero, is a disease which vexeth the mind. (P. 
Martyr’s Comm. Rom. Lx.237b) 
   1632 – Before my arrival in Aleppo, the Caravan was from thence 
departed, which bred no small grief in my heart. (Lithgow, Trav. V. 198) 
From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, usage begins to narrow 
down, and the term is increasingly recorded in the context of the death of a 
family member or close associate. By the twenty first century, this collocation 
with death and bereavement, along with a location of the distress involved at 
the more extreme suffering end of its historic continuum of reference, 
characterise the accepted definition of grief: 
   Oxford Dictionary of English – intense sorrow, esp. caused by someone’s 
death (www.oxfordreference.com) 
   Merriam-Webster Dictionary – deep and poignant distress caused by or as 




The internet, regardless of the various pros and cons over its use for 
research purposes, provides a readily accessible database for up-to-date 
language usage, and entering “grief” into any reputable web-search engine 
(e.g. Google, Yahoo) throws up strong support for the dictionary definition in 
the first few pages of results, as well as referencing further aspects which 
serve to flesh out the overall concept. Thus grief variously “describes the 
feelings, thoughts and behaviour gone through after bereavement” 
(www.netdoctor.co.uk), involves “the loss of a loved one” (www.healthyplace. 
com), entails “coping with bereavement” (www.bbc.co.uk/health), and is “a 
multi-faceted response to loss” (www.lifepaths.org). Some entries widen the 
loss reference from death alone to “death, divorce, pet loss and moving” 
(www.good-grief.org), or to loss of job, of health, of financial stability or even 
of “a cherished dream” (www.helpguide.org). 
The grief engendered by such loss is clearly no trivial matter. It is described 
as “difficult” and “challenging”, and requires “coping” and “dealing with”; the 
efforts involved form part of a “process” or “cycle” with set “stages” (www. 
crusebereavementcare.org; www.facingbereavement.co.uk; www.terminal 
illness.co.uk). A variety of negative emotions, such as anger, guilt, sadness, 
anxiety and despair would appear to accompany grieving, and physical 
symptoms like stomach pains and insomnia can be part of the experience too 
(www. hospicenet.org; www.crusebereavementcare.org). Grief is evidently a 
medical issue, with references to websites such as “netdoctor.com”, 
“yourtotalhealth.ivillage.com”, “BUPA health fact sheets” (www.bupa.co.uk), 
and “channel4.com/health” or “bbc.co.uk/health”. Like an illness or a disease, 
grief has to be “got over” or “removed”. In order to achieve this “recovery”, 
“help” and “support” are necessary, expert professional support at that, in the 
form of “grief counsellors” (www.netdoctor.co.uk; www.facing bereavement. 
co.uk), a “grief recovery handbook” (www.grief-recovery.com), the “Grief 
Journal” (www.griefjournal.com), and the advice proffered on websites like 
“myproblemsgone.com”. There are hints that grief, like death and taxes, is 
unavoidable, in statements like “the grieving process is one of the most 
difficult and challenging certainties in life” (www.grief-and-bereavement.com), 
and in the Grief Journal’s promise “to help you with the loss in your life”. 
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The contemporary concept of grief that confronts us from these definitions 
and associations is a highly complex bundle of semantic components, 
involving loss, suffering, undesirability, effort, recovery and support, all with 
the overtones of universality and inevitability. And an examination of the 
development of grief theory, with its attendant academic constructions of 
grief, over the past century, can reveal how this concept has been arrived at. 
While many excellent overviews trace this development in some detail 
(Becker and Rothaupt 2007; Howarth 2006; Silverman and Klass 1996, pp. 
3-27; Small 2001; Valentine 2006), this chapter will concentrate on reviewing 
the major defining contributions to grief theory covered by these studies, with 
a view to exploring how they have fashioned the current concept of grief and 
the understanding of what grief is and how it operates. 
 
Approaching Grief 
The Personal Angle 
It is perhaps not surprising that in the twentieth century, the era of modernity, 
with its unrelenting focus on the individual, the grief phenomenon should be 
largely viewed from a personal angle, as a private and interior process. As 
such, its study fell squarely within the field of psychology, and all accounts of 
the development of grief theory begin with Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia 
(1917/1961). This work was originally intended as an examination of the 
difference between grief (‘mourning’, in Freud’s original terms), involving a 
recognition of absence and loss, and depression (Freud’s ‘melancholia’), 
entailing an attachment to the void left by that loss (Leader 2008). It was set 
within the context of oedipal love attachment, not of bereavement (Silverman 
and Klass 1996). But Freud’s description of the grieving process as a goal-
directed activity aimed at disengaging and severing ties, at managing sorrow 
and restoring inner equilibrium, along with his distinction between “normal” 
and pathological grieving, caught the professional imagination, and came to 
dominate subsequent thinking in the grief and bereavement field.  
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Archer (1999) argues that A.F. Shand’s “laws of sorrow” (1914) would have 
provided a sounder basis for the development of grief theory in that his work 
better anticipated many of the conclusions achieved by subsequent research 
into grief, particularly with regard to different types of grief reaction, to the 
importance of social support during grieving, and to the continued tie to the 
deceased. But Freud’s psychoanalytical framework fit the time and the place, 
and served as the basis of “grief work” research and practice for much of the 
ensuing century. Within the field of psychoanalysis, the work of Abraham 
(1924), Deutsch (1937) and Klein (1940), all built on Freud’s foundations, 
with their themes of cutting ties in order to move on in the context of 
bereavement, of the need to disengage from the projective identification of 
the deceased, and of the potential for psychiatric illness if these goals of 
grieving remain unmet.  
The metaphor of illness is much in evidence throughout the development of 
grief theory. Lindemann‘s (1944) work was the first real piece of empirical 
research into grief, based on interviews with various samples of bereaved 
people, and his study resulted in the elaboration of a symptomology  of grief. 
Engel (1961) portrayed grief as a disease, maintaining a medical focus on its 
diagnosis and treatment. Marris (1958), Hobson (1964) and Gorer (1965) 
studied grief responses and reactions, both psychological and physical, 
among community samples in Britain, mainly widows, and added another 
dimension to their clinically based accounts by taking account of the social 
context of the bereaved. The severity of grief symptoms was measured along 
psychometric scales such as The Texas Inventory of Grief (Faschingbauer et 
al. 1977) or the Grief Experience Inventory (Sanders et al. 1985), devised to 
assess the needs of the bereaved on their path to recovery. 
A distinction between “healthy” and “unhealthy” grieving was central to 
Bowlby’s (1969, 1973, 1980) biologically-based attachment theory of grief 
and bereavement, developed by analogy with separation anxiety in the 
context of the mother-child relationship. “Healthy” grieving, in his view, could 
be traced back to childhood experiences of sympathetic attitudes towards 
attachment behaviour, while “unhealthy” grieving derived from childhood 
experience of impatience with such behaviour and perceptions of it as 
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something to be quickly outgrown.  His observations of young children’s 
reactions to separation led him to propose three “phases” of grief: protest, 
despair and detachment (1961). In later work with Parkes (1970), an initial 
phase of numbness and disbelief was added. Parkes further developed this 
phase-model of grief in his early work (1970, 1972), identifying the main 
stages as: 
      - numbness and disbelief, punctuated by distress or anger 
      - yearning and pining, accompanied by anxiety 
      - depression and despair, along with hopelessness and apathy 
      - recovery and reorganization 
He also recognised the occurrence of other emotional states such as guilt, 
self-reproach, aggression, and preoccupation with thoughts of the deceased, 
during the grieving process. This view of grieving as a phased process 
became the dominant model, enhanced by further elaboration of the specific 
stages involved. 
Kubler-Ross’s (1970) five stages of dying: denial, anger, bargaining, 
depression and acceptance, followed the phase-model pattern, and were 
taken over wholesale and applied to grieving.  Sanders (1989) suggested five 
definitive stages of grief: shock, awareness of the loss, conservation or 
withdrawal, healing and renewal. Worden (1991), following in this grief-as-a-
staged-process tradition, proposes a series of tasks, rather than stages: 
accepting the reality of the loss, working through the pain, adjusting to life 
without the deceased, moving on with life. Rando (1993) lists six component 
processes of grief: recognizing the loss, reacting to the separation, 
recollecting the deceased, relinquishing former attachments, readjusting to 
the new world, and reinvesting in new relationships. 
Despite the fact that this orderly, phased model of grief became a norm-
based prescription for progress towards recovery in the “clinical lore” of 
bereavement therapy and counselling (Walter 1993, 1999a; Wortman and 
Silver 1989), the original proponents of these stage theories took pains to 
14 
 
point out that the phases are by no means clearcut, and do not occur in a 
linear fashion. Bowlby himself (1980, p. 85) notes that “any individual may 
oscillate for a time back and forth between any two of them”. And this is 
precisely what  Stroebe and Schut’s (1999) “dual-process” model describes, 
a more chaotic grief experience in which the griever finds himself continually 
oscillating between two orientations: that of dwelling on the past and 
mourning what is lost; and that of accepting the post-loss situation and trying 
to create a new life for the future. The balance between what Stroebe and 
Schut term “the loss and restoration orientations” is seen as changing over 
time with the unfolding of the grief process, and across cultures according to 
which of the two concerns traditionally receives greater emphasis in the 
particular griever’s society. 
The sensitivity of grief to culture has not always been recognized in the 
development of grief theory. The influential early work of Bowlby and Parkes, 
after all, was rooted in a biologically-based approach, seeing grief in 
evolution from the animal to the human species, and thus implying 
universality throughout the latter. Even at the end of the century, Archer, 
viewing grief as an entirely natural human reaction, asserts its “universal 
occurrence in the human species, whatever the culture” (1999, p.249). 
As cross-cultural studies of grief began to emerge in the second half of the 
century, the general consensus seemed to be that the expression of grief 
might vary with culture, but that the underlying experience was pretty much a 
human universal. Rosenblatt et al (1976) examined grief in a wide variety of 
cultures, and concluded that the general reactions were not dissimilar to 
those reported in western societies, but that cultural traditions and habits 
tended to emphasise different aspects of the grieving process, heightening 
some and reducing others. Raphael (1983) took into consideration the 
“transcultural aspects” of bereavement, but decided that they served to 
underline the universality of grief and reflect its basic processes. Stroebe and 
Stroebe (1987) determined that there were no evidenced instances from 
ethnographic accounts of loss being met with emotional indifference, 
although the nature of the expression of the emotions involved will vary from 
culture to culture. But, as Currer (2001, p.51) points out, Parkes himself 
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shifted his stance somewhat on the universality of grief over two decades, 
from a confident assertion that “the experience of grief is nearly universal” 
(Glick et al. 1974, p.11) to a distinctly more qualified speculation that, despite 
the strong influence of cultural context, “there may still be fundamental 
consistencies, themes and truths that appear in one culture after another” 
(Parkes et al. 1996, p.6). And Rosenblatt (1993, 2003) too was to modify his 
earlier views over time in favour of greater cultural variability  
These contributions to the development of grief theory from the field of 
psychology over the course of the twentieth century are clearly perceptible in 
the commonly held concept of grief today, with its themes of illness and 
medicalisation, of a staged process leading to recovery, and of universal 
applicability. They advance a model of grief which displays many of the 
values and features of western modernity, and which reflects the dominant 
discourse of that society, “a medical, scientific discourse, encouraging the 
separation of spheres” (Howarth 2000, p. 135). The implied world-view is one 
of clear-cut boundaries between sick and healthy, between absence and 
presence, between the living and the dead, between the past, the present 
and the future. The almost mechanistic nature of the grieving process, with 
an integral series of stages leading to a final outcome, fits with a scientific, 
rational ethos that assumes all problems have a solution if dealt with in a 
logical and expertly advised manner. The ultimate personal responsibility of 
the griever for the progress of their own internal grief process reflects the 
modernist principles of autonomy and independence. And in the notions of 
“griefwork” and “grieving tasks”, we have echoes of the work ethic so 
fundamental to progress in modern western society. 
Grief as a temporary condition, an illness with an embarrassing and 
debilitating set of symptoms, is a necessary construct in a society whose 
members are expected to be continually fully engaged in economic activity, 
either production or consumption. And casting off the old in order to make 
room for the new, as the bereaved are encouraged to do, imitates the pattern 
of consumption behaviour necessary for the maintenance of a modern 
consumer society. In such a world, where the pursuit of individual personal 
happiness is the universally agreed aim, sanctioned opportunities for 
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unhappiness have to be severely restricted. Thus grief is accepted as a 
legitimate reaction to bereavement and death, the one loss scenario that still 
renders the modern world of science and technology impotent, but is less 
commonly recognized as an acceptable response to other types of loss. 
Finally, this model of grief, assuming universal applicability bar only a few 
tweaks of adjustment to suit background culture, reflects the ethnocentric 
tendencies of twentieth century western society, imagining its various 
economic, political and social structures to be appropriate for any society 
anywhere in the world, and attempting to fashion the global community in its 
own capitalist, liberal, democratic image. 
 
 The Social Angle 
 In the last decade of the twentieth century, the model of grief outlined above 
was seriously challenged. Wortman and Silver’s (1989) article on the “Myths 
of Coping with Loss” marked a turning point. They argued that the evidence 
for the “griefwork” hypothesis did not stand up and that there was “a 
perpetuation of unrealistic assumptions about the normal process of coping 
with loss” (p.354). These assumptions included the inevitability of depression 
and distress in grief, the necessity of “working through” a loss until “recovery” 
is reached, and the treatment of alternative patterns of grieving as deviant or 
pathological. Their conclusion stressed the variability of individual reaction to 
loss, and the need to recognize this variability in an open and non-judgmental 
way. 
The social location of the griever became the new focus of attention, and 
grief theory now embraced many new ideas that served both to challenge 
and expand the previous paradigm. The grieving individual was viewed in 
relation to his society and social networks, and to the effects of these on his 
grieving experience. The importance of the social context had not exactly 
been ignored previously, as evidenced in the work of Gorer (1965), Marris 
(1958) and Hobson (1964), who had all taken account of social factors in 
their studies of the bereaved. Parkes too (1971) had made references to the 
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"psychosocial transitions" of the grief process in his work. But this new wave 
of socially oriented input was deeper and more far-reaching than anything 
that had gone before, involving a reappraisal of the understanding of loss, a 
new appreciation of the make-up of individual identity, and a focus on the 
grieving individual through the lens of the culture and society from which that 
identity is derived. 
The notion of “disenfranchised grief" (Doka 1987, 1989, 2002) is based on 
the premiss that society only accords "the right to grieve" (2002, p.5) in 
certain specific situations. Every society has norms or rules laying down what 
sort of losses can be grieved, how and for how long they can be grieved, who 
can do the grieving, and how much support they should receive from others 
while grieving. Grief occurring outside these socially sanctioned situations is 
not always acknowledged or validated. As Walter (1999a, p.120) puts it, 
"Grief is regulated, controlled, patrolled, policed” in all societies. Doka (2002) 
proposes five broad categories of disenfranchised grief. The first is where the 
relationship between deceased and bereaved is not considered to be socially 
acceptable, as with extramarital lovers or homosexual partners. The second 
is where the loss is not deemed significant, as with the death of a pet animal, 
or the loss of a job. The third is where the griever is not considered capable 
of grief, as in the case of the very young, or the mentally incapacitated. The 
fourth centres on the circumstances of the death being grieved, as in suicide, 
capital punishment, or AIDS-related cases. And the final category concerns 
the way in which the grief is expressed, certain modes of expression, such as 
wailing or loud lamentation, going against the grieving norms of many 
societies (Doka and Davidson 1998, pp. 7-105). 
Earlier work on the effects of job loss on the chronically unemployed (Jahoda 
et al. 1932), or of change of residence on people forced to move through 
slum clearance, or for the purposes of employment or higher education 
(Marris 1974), had noted the grief-like nature of the reactions to the changes 
involved. But the concept of disenfranchised grief now served to extend grief-
triggering loss far beyond the traditional bereavement context to a variety of 
situations such as the loss of a pet (Kellehear and Fook 1997; Straub 2004); 
the loss of a job through redundancy, retirement or business failure (Archer 
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and Rhodes 1995; Shepherd 2003); the loss of a relationship through 
breaking up, divorce, fostering  or adoption (Baum 2003; Boals and Klein 
2005; Edelstein et al. 2001; Haight et al. 2002); the loss of a country through 
migration, enforced exile or relocation (Chamove and Soeterik 2006; Doron 
2005; Mirdal 2006; Ward and Styles 2003); the loss of physical capacities 
through age or illness (Grimmer et al. 2004; Niemeier 2008; Roman 2008); 
the loss of a childhood and innocence (Boothby et al. 2006; Robinson 2005); 
or the loss of a hope or dream through termination, miscarriage or neonatal 
death (Lovell 1997; McCreight 2004; Riches and Dawson 2000; Thachuk 
2007). The general tendency  to underestimate certain categories of loss is 
well exemplified by Footman (1998), who, in the context of her own grief over 
the death of her daughter, writes “reactions to the loss of an object are - on 
the whole - but an approximation to the reactions experienced after the loss 
of a loved person" (p.292). But the wide range of grief-engendering situations 
outlined in the above references demonstrate that the significance of any 
loss, be it of person, object, capacity or aspiration, is only for the individual 
experiencing it to know, regardless of any judgement made by society.   
The significance placed on any loss would seem to be determined by the 
effect that loss has on an individual’s self-identity. Marris (1974, p.32) argues 
that "the fundamental crisis of bereavement arises not from loss of others, 
but the loss of self". He defines this “loss of self” as the shattering of identity, 
the disruption of continuity, the invalidation of purposes learned and 
consolidated through a lifetime's experience. Such a turn of events 
necessitates adaptation to the unpredicted and unwelcome changes that 
have occurred, the adaptation involving a profound conflict between 
contradictory impulses to preserve the past, and to accept the reality of the 
loss. Grief can therefore be seen as being about damage to the sense of self, 
and the attempts to repair that damage. Significant loss undermines 
ontological security, the basic confidence about being in the world that is an 
essential foundation for the fashioning of self-identity, and which is largely 
derived from taken-for-granted routines, learned in childhood and maintained 
thereafter through everyday social interaction (Giddens 1991). Taking a 
Foucauldian (1972) view of social reality as the product of historically and 
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culturally specific discourses, every society can be seen as having a 
repertoire of "cultural scripts" available for projects of self-identity, for the 
construction of personal narratives within the overarching social and cultural 
framework. Significant loss involves a rupture in the personal narrative, and 
grief relates to that discontinuity and to attempts to reconstruct the narrative 
so as to restore meaning and purpose to life (Seale 1998, pp. 193-211; 
Walter 1996).  
If loss, from this angle, implies a dislocation from the complex and intricately 
woven social moorings that stabilise individual identity, grief is increasingly 
understood as manifesting in a variety of forms related to that identity, to the 
individual's social and cultural location. Who we are influences how we 
grieve, and grieving styles are consequently seen to differ in accordance with 
social categories. Gender, for example, is associated with a spectrum of 
grieving styles, from intuitive and feeling-based at one end, to instrumental 
and thinking-based at the other, representing for western society the typical 
female and male responses respectively (Doka and Martin 1998). Many 
studies further elaborate on the gendered nature of grieving (e.g. Cline 1997; 
Riches and Dawson 2000, pp.48-73; Sanders 1998; Staudacher 1991; 
Stillion and MacDowell 1997; Thomas and Striegel, 1995; Thompson 1997). 
Age is another variable bearing on grieving style (eg. Corr 1998; Payne et al. 
1999, pp. 54-69; Sanders 1992), and while the psychologist might relate this 
variability to different developmental stages of the lifespan, the sociologist will 
recognize social norms as to how different age groups, young children, 
teenagers, adults and the elderly, are expected to react to bereavement and 
to go about their grieving. 
Thus the big social picture, the dominant cultural discourse, can be seen to 
dictate the scripts available to different gender, age and other social 
groupings, and to influence the various styles of grief response. This has 
been increasingly recognised from the latter years of the twentieth century, 
as evidenced by the amount of literature dealing with crosscultural aspects of 
grief and the enormous diversity of grief responses across cultures (e.g. Firth 
2001; Irish 1997; Irish et al. 1993; Kalish and Reynolds 1976; Klass 1996; 
Lofland 1985; Parkes et al. 1996; Rosenblatt 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003; Wikan 
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1988). While, as mentioned above in the previous section of this chapter, 
most of this literature suggests the presence of a universal core to the 
bereavement experience, it acknowledges wide differences across cultures 
with regard to what a bereaved person might actually think or feel, and to 
how he might behave.  
Within western culture, this social approach to grief has also affected one of 
the original tenets of grief theory: the need to disengage, to let go and move 
on. Klass, Silverman and Nickman's (1996) theory of "continuing bonds" 
challenged the decathectic model which had been dominant throughout the 
twentieth century, arguing that evidence points to many bereaved people 
remaining connected to the deceased, continuing their relationship to the 
dead person beyond bereavement. The maintenance of such continuing 
bonds appears to facilitate grieving "and support healthy ways for the living to 
be in the world" (Goss and Klass 2005, p.4). By internalising a representation 
of the deceased, the bereaved can preserve an interactive and evolving 
relationship, different to but based on the relationship enjoyed before death. 
And in addition to such psychological introjections, more overtly social ties 
can be nurtured through acknowledgement of and reference to the deceased 
in everyday conversation, and in discussion at meetings of self-help groups 
for the bereaved. Walter's (1996) "biographies" also fulfil the function of 
sustaining ties, in that they enable the living to integrate the memory of the 
dead into their ongoing lives, and thus refashion the web of social relations 
essential to their own self-identity. 
This perspective of individual identity and sense of self as being rooted in a 
network of shifting relationships with others, in social location in the world, 
has had a profound impact on grief theory in recent years. It has been 
enthusiastically adopted in the psychological domain, as can be seen from 
many of the references noted above, with research on grief "symptoms" 
associated with different types of loss, and on the grieving styles and 
trajectories of members of a variety of different social groupings. Its influence 
in the psychotherapeutic sphere is evident in the increasing use of narrative 
as therapy in post-loss "meaning reconstruction" (Attig 1996; Neimeyer 2001; 
Walter 1996); and in the proliferation of support and self-help groups for 
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specific communities of the bereaved where “continuing bonds” is at the core 
of their communal grieving (Klass 1999; Walter 2007).  
The mainstream concept of grief as outlined at the beginning of this chapter 
still centres on the psychologically based principles which dominated 
twentieth century grief theory. But we can already see the influence of newer 
socially based approaches in the recognition that grief can be triggered by a 
wider range of losses than the traditional bereavement through death, and 
that there has to be allowance for individual variations in the grieving 
experience. It seems inevitable that many of the other ideas stemming from 
this social perspective will also be absorbed into the common understanding 
of grief and create a semantic shift sooner rather than later. Small, for 
example, argues (2001, p.36) that "continuing bonds" is likely to become the 
new orthodoxy among bereavement practitioners.  
The dominant model of grief is changing to better reflect contemporary 
trends, themes and values, and the nature of its transformation fits with the 
dismantling of boundaries that Howarth (2000) sees as marking the transition 
from modern to post-modern, or late modern, society. Increased mobility and 
advances in technology and communications have led to a blurring of cultural 
boundaries, a more global world in which diversity is the norm, and 
ethnocentrism increasingly impractical. Personal identity in such a world is 
more fluid, more fragmented and subject to constant change, as new social 
groups, based on religious conviction, political opinion, leisure interests or 
sexual orientation, connect people across traditional class and ethnic 
boundaries, and as a lifetime of episodic portfolio posts replaces a job for life. 
A discernible diminution of faith in science and rational thought, a 
disappointment in their ability to deliver the promised happiness of the 
consumer age or to ensure continued progress and improvement, opens the 
door to a less clearcut, if more intriguing, world: a world where the past 
exerts more fascination than an uncertain future, where stories are 
considered more engaging than processes, and where basic human 
relationality is perceived as having more potential than scientific method. 
Walter (2007) may see a "normative vacuum" in post-modern grief, but 
perhaps this very normlessness is in itself the new social norm. 
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Analysing Grief: The Fundamentals 
Probing beyond the different approaches to grief, without discarding or 
ignoring the various insights they provide, is it possible to discern any basic, 
essential features which can be said to characterise the grieving 
phenomenon? What are the constituent elements of the “core experience” 
that so many studies of grief refer to while they are engaged in elaborating on 
the diversity of the myriad manifestations of grief? 
The rest of this chapter explores in some detail what appear to be the 
fundamentals of grief, the definitive components of the grieving experience 
that can be teased out from the plethora of studies on grief reviewed above. 
These are, firstly, the initial identity-damaging loss which triggers the grief; 
secondly, the griever’s emotional reaction to that loss; thirdly, the griever’s 
attempt to make some sense of the loss and to construct a new self-identity 
in the changed circumstances of the post-loss situation; and, finally, the 
social context in which the griever finds himself, and the influence of the 
interaction between the griever and that context on the shaping of the 




All grief arises from loss. But not all loss gives rise to grief. Loss involves a 
transition from the presence of something to its absence, from having 
something, to no longer having it. If what is possessed is perceived as 
undesirable, then its loss is to be welcomed, and may even come about as a 
result of purposeful action. If what is possessed is perceived as desirable, or, 
at the very least, not undesirable, then its loss will be unwelcome. The 
significance of any individual instance of loss is a matter of perception, 
dependent on the value placed upon what is lost. Values are social 
constructions; hence the perception is ultimately dependent on social location 
and particular social context.  
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For example, weight loss will be welcomed by an overweight young woman 
in western society trying to appear more attractive, while it will be unwanted 
in a society where plumpness is considered a feature of sexual 
attractiveness. Loss of wealth is considered a calamity in a materialist 
society, but may be seen as a developmental step by someone on a spiritual 
path. The loss of virginity for a young man is viewed in many societies as a 
cause for celebration, a coming of age rite; whereas for a young unmarried 
woman in a conservative society it will be perceived as shame and 
humiliation, for herself and her family. The death of a small child is regarded 
as a very painful loss for a western mother (Davis 1996; Finkbeiner 1996; 
Rosof 1994); while a mother from a society where resources are scarce and 
pregnancies numerous, and where the religious culture translates dead 
babies into “little angels”, would be more likely to treat such a death with 
relative indifference or equanimity (Scheper-Hughes 1993). The impact of 
any loss can only be understood in terms of its unique significance to a 
particular loser in a specific context, in terms of the value placed on what is 
lost.  
But there would appear to be more to loss than attributing value to the object 
of loss on a scale of desirability, and essentially characterising the loss 
experience with reference to a pleasure/pain continuum. For it seems that the 
radical change to the status quo which loss entails might be intrinsically 
undesirable in itself. Marris (1974) argues that conservatism is a fundamental 
human impulse, and that the change involved in loss presents a threat to the 
deep-seated need for continuity, to the principles of regularity which govern 
the predictability of life. Maintenance of the status quo is the default position, 
any innovation being driven by motivations of identity enhancement, “by the 
incompatibility of present life with our self-conception, rather than by its 
intrinsic disadvantages” (p.123). The investment of effort and energy in the 
construction of a world-view, based on an accumulation of meaningful 
perceptions drawn from years of experience, must be safeguarded, and the 
continuity of the familiar patterns of life afforded by this world-view preserved. 
The concept of loss aversion, central to prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1979), supports this view. Prospect theory, developed as an 
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alternative to expected utility theory (Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), 
seeks to explain the motivations underlying decision-making processes that 
involve evaluation of risk, and is widely used in finance, economics and 
marketing. It has also been applied to strategic decision-making in other 
spheres. For example, Lynn (1999), a military historian, argues that prospect 
theory can provide a framework for understanding the later foreign policy of 
Louis XIV, whose main drive was to defend what he already possessed, 
undertaking greater risk and expending more effort in pursuit of this aim than 
in the acquisition of new possessions. Prospect theory has also been applied 
to more recent strategic decision-making, including situations of international 
conflict (Farnham 1995) and issues of American foreign policy (McDermott 
1998), illustrating how greater risks are always taken in retaining what is 
already owned than in acquiring something new.   
Gal (2006) argues that the concept of loss aversion is superfluous. He sees 
the loss/gain trade-off which prospect theory regards as central to decision-
making scenarios as less relevant than a basic status quo/change trade-off. 
His proposal of a psychological law of inertia as more fundamental to human 
behaviour than loss aversion, chimes well with Marris’s arguments, 
confirming an innate proclivity to prefer maintenance of the status quo over 
change. 
Essentially, there is no difference between loss aversion and status quo bias, 
any apparent divergence between the two resting on a superficial distinction 
between the states of being and of having. For all practical purposes, who we 
are equates with what we have, inasmuch as our identity is defined by things 
that we possess. These possessions are not only tangibles, like wealth or 
power or beauty; they are also the beliefs, values, assumptions, memories, 
habits, predispositions, passions, expectations, prejudices, resentments, 
affections, and so on, which we have acquired over years of experience and 
to which we become attached as a self-conception and a personal world-
view. So attached are we to these intangibles, that we carry most of them 
unquestioningly and almost unconsciously, taking them to be concrete givens 
about ourselves and the world around us, rather than constructions that we 
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retain on a fluctuating, temporary and socially and culturally contextualised 
basis. 
And these intangible constructions are every bit as susceptible to loss as our 
tangible possessions, their disappearance leaving us in a minimal biological 
state of “bare life” (Agamben 1998), a condition to which we are all ultimately 
reducible. The more attached we are, the more unquestioningly an 
assumption, a value or a belief is held, the greater impact its loss is likely to 
have. In the most extreme cases, such loss will be perceived as traumatic, as 
“threatening the intactness of the person” (Cassell 2004, p.32), as “a 
personal sense of violation” (Wilkinson 2005, p.28), as a “painful awareness 
that the infrastructures of life, which provide the foundation for feelings of 
security or protection, rest purely on social construction” (Fierke 2007, 
p.138). 
Trauma itself is essentially a social construction, formally entering the 
vocabulary of psychology in 1980, in the context of the Vietnam War 
(American Psychiatric Association 1980). The shell-shock of the first world 
war and the battle-fatigue of the second were given a new label, a set of 
symptoms and a recommended treatment programme, and the problem of 
American veterans whose understanding of their country and themselves had 
been turned upside down by their war experiences, was neatly medicalised 
(Edkins 2003; Tal 1996). The diagnosis of post-traumatic stress syndrome, 
which turns distressing life events into a pathological condition, is now 
routinely applied worldwide (Edkins 2003; Summerfield 1998). 
But no event is traumatic per se: it is only perceived as traumatic if it involves 
an inability to place the experience within the schemes of prior knowledge, to 
allocate meaning to it (Blanchot 1986; Bracken 1998; Caruth 1995; Edkins 
2006; Shay 1995; Tal 1996; Van der Kolk and Van der Hart 1995; Van der 
Veer 1998). Tal (1996) sees the basic wound of trauma as the drastic 
uprooting of belief, since trauma is enacted outside the bounds of what the 
trauma sufferer might consider to be ‘normal’ human experience.  Or, as Van 
der Veer (1998, p.57) simply puts it, “Victims of traumatic experiences have 
undergone an experience……..they did not imagine could happen”. The 
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traumatic event questions fixed assumptions and affronts the established 
understanding of self and world. Being outside the ‘normal’ range of 
experience, language cannot be found to describe it; it resists 
conceptualisation. “All words seemed inadequate, worn, foolish, lifeless, 
whereas I wanted them to be searing”, says survivor Elie Wiesel (1978, 
p.201) of his attempts to communicate his holocaust experiences. Equally, 
the traumatic event resists the continuity imposed on ‘normal’ life: Edkins 
(2003) refers to “trauma time” as opposed to linear time; Fierke (2006) 
contrasts “a dissociated traumatic present” with linear narrative time; and 
Langer (1997) sets the “durational time” of trauma against the norm of 
“chronological time”.  
While Newmark (1995) suggests that use of the term trauma could well be 
expanded so as to make it representative of the whole state of modernity, 
some feel that its currency is already debased enough through overuse with 
reference to a wide variety of distressing events (Bell 2006; Gray and Oliver 
2004). Certainly, the term is widely used in collocation with grief in academic 
literature: a basic search of the Web of Knowledge for articles on grief, for 
example, throws up numerous references to “grief and trauma”, “traumatic 
grief”, “post-traumatic grief” and “complicated grief after traumatic loss”.  
Definitions of trauma, such as “Traumatisation refers to extreme painful 
experiences which are so difficult to cope with they are likely to result in 
psychological dysfunction in the short and the long term” (Van der Veer 1998, 
p.4); or “Trauma is a transformative experience, and those who are 
transformed can never entirely return to a state of previous innocence” (Tal 
1996, p.119), could equally apply to grief. There is clearly a degree of 
overlap. 
Simpson (1997), writing in the context of traumatic bereavements and death-
related PTSD, highlights the commonality of symptoms between grief and 
post-traumatic stress. But it is also in terms of symptoms that any differences 
between the two are generally drawn. Thus grief is deemed to have sadness 
as a key emotion, trauma tending to fear or horror; grief involves yearning for 
what is lost, trauma prefers avoidance; grief can talk, trauma is silent; grief is 
able to get on with life to some extent, trauma disfigures identity and shatters 
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world view; grief is preoccupied with who or what has been lost, while trauma 
is obsessed with the event itself, the scene of the trauma (Jacobs 1999; 
Mitchell and Everly 2001; National Institute for Trauma and Loss in Children, 
www.starrtraining.org/tlc; Raphael and Martinek 1997). 
Fierke (2004) places trauma on a continuum with grief, the latter at the social, 
community end, the former at the isolated, individual end. This argument, 
based on her view of trauma as a form of human insecurity, underlines the 
liminal space in which traumatic events occur, outside of the normal social 
context. The concept of betrayal trauma (Freyd 1996), involving violation by 
the people or institutions on which survival depends, stems from the same 
premiss of underlying social trust and interdependence as the bedrock of 
meaningful existence. The loss of that trust, the realisation that the world 
does not always play by these rules, serves to set the trauma sufferer apart 
from the society to which he previously thought he belonged. 
Rando (1997) attaches trauma to loss, rather than to the grief that arises 
from it, when she observes that in all trauma there is loss, and that in the 
majority of losses there is significant trauma. And perhaps trauma is best 
viewed in this way, as an attribute of the grief-triggering event, belonging 
properly to the perception of the loss that inspires grief and marking that loss 
as being of the most unwelcome and deeply damaging kind. In its original 
physical sense, trauma is the hurt, the initial wound that gives rise to 
subsequent pain and suffering. Loss can similarly be seen as the first step on 
the grief trajectory, its significance determined by the extent to which it 
affects the bearings whereby we normally locate ourselves in time and place; 
the world-view we have built up over years of accumulated experience and 
effort; the image we carry with us of who we really are. Any loss substantial 
enough to inspire grief involves the apprehension of “a mode of 
dispossession that is fundamental to who I am” (Butler 2004, p.28). At the 
most extreme, traumatic end of the spectrum, it may entail a confrontation 
with “bare life” (Agamben 1998), but, at whatever point along the scale, it will 





The immediate response to significant loss, as reflected in both the grief and 
trauma literature referenced above, is one of numbness and disbelief (Parkes 
1972), denial (Kubler-Ross 1970), and shock (Alexander 2004a). The natural 
reaction to radical change and disruption, and to the inability to make sense 
of it, seems to be a state of bewildered disorientation, apparently indicating 
that the full impact of the loss fails to register. This initial response, typified by 
a lack of feeling, has been described as a psychological interim defensive 
coping measure that serves to protect the griever from that impact (Stroebe 
et al. 1993).  
The subsequent reaction, however, is characterised by a turmoil of emotion: 
sadness, anger, aggression, guilt, regret, self-reproach, fear, anxiety, 
yearning, powerlessness, loneliness, hopelessness, despair, all feature in the 
grief literature, often alongside concomitant physical ‘symptoms’ such as 
crying, poor concentration, lack of appetite, inability to sleep, and so on. The 
occasional admixture of positive emotions, relief, for instance, when a death 
finally takes place after a long, trying and painful illness, or happiness arising 
from good memories of the pre-loss situation, is recognised. But in general 
the response is described in terms of negative emotions, even apathy, the 
“emotion of emotionlessness” (Barbalet 1998, p. 24), being put into this 
category because of its intrinsic unnaturalness in the face of the disruptive 
loss experience.  
Emotions are defined as internal mental processes, often accompanied by 
physiological changes, which help the individual to make subjective meaning 
of the world (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990). They are elicited by events or 
situations that are evaluated as either advancing (positive emotions) or 
threatening (negative emotions) the individual’s interests, goals or ‘concerns’ 
(Frijda 1986); and they occur as a result of a rational, if often automatic and 
sometimes even unconscious, appraisal of the meaning and significance of 
such events and situations (Lazarus 1991). From this definition, emotions 
can be understood as essentially socially constituted and configured, as 
regulated by social constraints and values (Leach and Tiedens 2004). 
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Emotional experiences are determined by social interactions, by the 
structural relations of power and status which elicit them, and these 
experiences serve, in turn, to motivate courses of action which are capable of 
bringing about a change of status in those relations (Barbalet 1998). 
Whether emotions are subject to cultural variability, or are biological 
commonalities for all of humanity, is a debate beyond the scope of this study. 
Ekman (1972) initially set out to disprove the Darwinian biologically-based 
evolutionary theory of emotion, convinced that he would find emotions to be 
determined by culture. But after documenting emotional expression and its 
recognition across a number of cultures, he concluded that certain basic 
emotions, namely, anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise, are 
universally encoded in facial expressions. Nussbaum (2001) steers a middle 
course between the two positions by arguing that while “all known societies 
have some variety of the major emotion types: love, fear, grief, anger, 
jealousy, envy, compassion and some others” (p.163), emotional taxonomies 
vary widely across societies, and language and cultural differences serve to 
shape emotional life and experience. 
Certainly, when it comes to the display of emotional response to loss, 
anthropologists and ethnographers attest to wide cultural variation. For the 
tribes of Papua New Guinea, anger and an assertive drive for compensation 
are associated with bereavement (Rosaldo 1980; Schieffelin 1985); in Iran, 
sadness, despair and guilt are dominant (Good et al. 1985); in Japan, sorrow, 
along with regret at not having done enough for the deceased while alive, are 
the prominent emotional overtones (Goss and Klass 2005). In some 
societies, emotional reaction must be contained: in Bali, cheerfulness has to 
be maintained for the sake of others (Wikan 1990); in Buddhist Thai villages, 
emotional displays are kept low-key, subdued and short-lived, as an 
indication that  loss, death and suffering are accepted as a normal part of life 
(Keyes 1985). Amongst the Amazonian Wari, for whom both thought and 
emotion are located in the physical body, with no Cartesian mind/body split, 
the response to loss is crying and refusing food and drink (Conklin 2001). 
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Wierzbicka (2004) argues that the anglocentricity intrinsic to much of the 
theorising about emotion underestimates how emotional experience itself is 
filtered through the concepts of a linguistic framework and the shared cultural 
and social expectations encoded in a common language. She proposes a 
basic metalanguage of universal concepts that might help to capture the 
commonalities of human emotional experience which underlie these cultural 
differences. For example, culture-specific bundles of semantic components 
like ‘grief’ or ‘sadness’ would be translated in this metalanguage into 
statements like: “Something bad is happening to me. I don’t want this to be 
happening. I feel something bad now.” (p. 590). This analysis pares the 
emotional descriptor down to the basics: a negative evaluation of an event or 
situation; the consequent marking of that event or situation as undesirable; 
and the evocation of unpleasant feelings by that event or situation. And from 
this analysis, Wierzbicka suggests, a concept of pain emerges that is more 
universally relevant and more fundamental to common human experience 
than the original culture and language-bound descriptors of emotion. 
Certainly, pain, in tandem with suffering, a term with which it is so frequently 
collocated that the two have become mutually defining, would seem to 
function in a very similar way to grief and trauma, though pain and suffering 
are equally applied to the physical as to the emotional and mental spheres. 
Cassell (2004), writing about pain and suffering within a strictly medical 
context, sees pain, in this physical setting, as the original injury, located in 
the body. The perceived meaning of this pain influences the occurrence, 
amount and quality of any subsequent suffering. If the pain is perceived as a 
threat to the wholeness or intactness of the person, fear enters the picture 
through the perception of anticipated future events, along with self-conflict, 
encompassing guilt, anger, self-reproach and sadness, over the perceived 
new reality of the injured self vis-à-vis the forces of society and group life that 
shaped the old reality. This emotionally charged distress amounts to 
suffering, which engulfs the whole person. In Cassell’s view, bodies have 
pain, people suffer. And loss is the source of this suffering, with injury or 
disease entailing a concomitant loss of roles, abilities, behaviours, dreams, 
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hopes, aspirations, and so on: the loss of any one or combination of the parts 
that go to make up a whole person. 
Moving from the realm of the medical to the social, suffering brought about by 
conditions of social marginalisation and political powerlessness can also be 
seen as based on loss, and on a negative evaluation of the dispossession 
involved. Wilkinson (2005) draws attention to social conditions which render 
people superfluous by removing roles, aspirations, behaviours and dreams 
that might in other circumstances be considered legitimate for them to 
possess. The loss of a meaningful sense of social inclusion, the chronic 
assault on what might be regarded as necessary for personal wholeness, 
leads to anguish, misery and distress. Bourdieu’s (1999) formidable 
catalogue of social suffering details the lived experience of this distress, 
brought about by a painful confrontation of social differences, by a 
perspective on a privileged world from a position of obscurity and inferiority 
within it. Unable to self-identify as worthwhile members of society, the 
socially marginalised speak through the many interviews and brief 
introductions of this work with an expressive intensity, giving voice to the 
powerlessness, hopelessness, pathos and despair that characterise their 
lives. 
Illness, injury, political powerlessness and social exclusion are part and 
parcel of the human experience, in the same way as bereavement and loss 
are inevitable facts of life. But the way in which they are met appears to differ 
across time and culture according to the meaning placed on pain and 
suffering, their evaluation as negative or positive, as representing threat or 
opportunity. The main role of world religions has perhaps been to provide the 
societies whose culture they have shaped with a meaningful and positive 
interpretation of suffering (Bowker 1997). Jewish scripture, for example, 
teaches that pain and suffering are to be borne with an acceptance of God’s 
purpose, and that this endurance can effect atonement for oneself and 
others. The Christian view, based on the suffering of Christ himself, is of pain 
and suffering as ennobling and purifying experiences, a path to virtue and 
goodness. Islam also sees a redemptive quality in suffering as a test of 
submission to God’s will and as a chastisement for sins committed. While the 
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Abrahamic religions tend to convert pain and suffering into a form of sacrifice, 
Hinduism’s concept of karma presents suffering as a just consequence of 
previous actions and an opportunity for spiritual development. Buddhism 
similarly regards suffering as a condition we bring on ourselves through our 
own deluded desires for and attachments to ephemeral worldly things, but a 
condition we can free ourselves from by waking up to the illusory nature of 
so-called reality and consciously ceasing our craving and clinging (Bowker 
1970). 
Western philosophy, meanwhile, has sought to respond to suffering through 
understanding and rationality, based on a view of man as self-determining. 
For the ancient Greek philosophers, suffering was senseless and 
inexplicable. It was a consequence of disorder in the cosmos, and man’s role 
was to work at achieving order. The Stoics regarded affective response as 
volitional, and advocated the perfection of the rational mind through the 
taking of responsibility for judgements made, and thus for the emotions 
arising as a result of these judgements (Bakalis 2005, pp. 217-34; Graver 
2007).  Epicurus advanced the notion that the greatest good for man could 
be achieved by pursuing a life of mental tranquillity, free from fear, pain and 
similar emotional disturbance (Bakalis 2005, pp. 190-217). But it was with the 
enlightenment of the eighteenth century that love of man completely replaced 
love of God and the autonomy of the human order took over from a cosmic 
order in which suffering had a place (Gonzalbo 2006, pp. 45-64). Utility, 
reducing the spectrum of human experience to pleasure and pain, became 
the supreme principle of moral value and suffering ceased to have much 
worth (Amato 1990, pp. 75-102): the elimination of all forms of pain and 
suffering, whether in the physical body or the body politic of society, became 
the moral imperative. The nineteenth century witnessed Marxist attempts to 
eradicate suffering through a change in the power relationships within 
western capitalist society. And the twentieth century heralded the wholesale 
medicalisation of pain and suffering, their complete eradication now viewed 
as an increasingly attainable goal. 
Hence the medical framing of trauma, as a pathology of the late twentieth 
century, followed the somewhat earlier medicalisation of grief, as a condition 
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that “isolates the pain associated with a loved one’s death as a kind of 
anomaly in human life” (Wierzbicka 2004, p. 582). In this way, different terms 
are introduced for different instances of what can be regarded as essentially 
the same phenomenon, and these words act as filters for our experience: 
“Each change in terminology is accompanied by a change in the internal 
content of the notion signified by the descriptive category” (Cassell 2004, 
p.5). Strip the terminology away, and, whatever descriptors are applied, grief, 
trauma, pain and suffering all appear to boil down to the same thing. They 
centre on an experience of loss, actual or anticipated, that is interpreted 
negatively as presenting a threat to the wholeness or intactness of the 
person and that, on the basis of this judgement, gives rise to a variety of 
negative emotions. 
 
Making Sense of Loss: Meaning-Making and Memory 
There would seem to be general agreement amongst writers on pain and 
suffering that pain entails the necessity to make some sense of it, to attribute 
to it some positive meaning. Amato (1990) sees pain as compelling us to 
self-interpretation. Ricoeur (1995) defines suffering as the experience of 
perpetually failing to make sense of pain. Wilkinson (2005), recognising that it 
is the interpretation of an injurious event that determines whether suffering or 
distress is experienced, views suffering as dependent on how “such events 
subsequently leave their mark upon the meanings of self and society” (p.93). 
In this context, suffering becomes “a compulsive struggle to reconstitute a 
positive meaning for self and society” (p.11). 
Certainly, a major element of the grief experience, according to the literature 
reviewed in earlier sections of this chapter, appears to be the construction of 
a meaningful new sense of self in the changed circumstances of the post-
loss world. Whether characterised as healing or recovery in a medicalised 
context; as resolution or outcome in a goal-oriented, problem-solving 
framework; or as repair and reconstruction, in the sense of re-forging the 
fundamental-to-identity social bonds damaged in the loss experience, the 
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griever has somehow to make sense of his loss and to create for himself a 
coherent new reality in its wake. 
Marris (1992) observes how the loss of a significant relationship involves the 
disintegration of the whole structure of meaning centred upon it, and how this 
structure of meaning has to be renewed in some form. Riches and Dawson 
(2000, pp. 15-47) see grief as incorporating this renewal process, with the 
bereaved attempting to establish order on the chaos caused by the loss of a 
significant relationship. They argue that the ability to give meaning to the 
death, using the various personal, cultural and social resources available for 
meaning-making, is essential to successful post-bereavement adjustment. 
Nadeau (2001) demonstrates the importance of positive meaning-making to 
this adjustment, by showing that the way in which family members attach 
meaning to a death within the family, as, for example, a blessed release, or 
as a preventable accident, is critical to their adaptation to bereavement. 
Neimeyer and Keesee (1998) underline the fact that this meaning 
reconstruction at the heart of grieving is a dynamic, active process. Attig 
(1996) describes it as “relearning the world”. And Riches and Dawson (2000, 
p.72) liken the experience to the culture shock of migrants, suddenly 
banished from their familiar landscape and forced to adapt to a strange and 
frightening new environment. 
Narrative is regarded as a central feature of this recreation of meaning, 
based on a view of humans as “inveterate meaning-makers, weavers of 
narratives that give thematic significance to the salient plot structure of their 
lives” (Neimeyer and Keesee, 1998, pp. 226-7). Neimeyer (2001) argues that 
important losses in our lives disrupt our taken-for-granted narratives and 
present a challenge to the narrative coherence which configures our 
experience. The meaning reconstruction involved in grieving is therefore 
necessarily rooted in language and narrative. Romanoff (2001) underlines 
the practical role of narrative as the raw material of analysis and healing, 
advocating the telling of stories as therapy for the bereaved. Harvey et al. 
(2001) suggest that in cases of deeply damaging loss, as with holocaust 
survivors, for example, there may actually be an inbuilt human need to tell 
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the story, to give an account of the experience in a socially interactive 
context.   
The storytelling strategy gives experiences the continuity and coherence 
necessary to making sense of them. The construction of a durable biography 
of the deceased in conversation with other survivors (Walter 1996), and the 
maintenance of continuing bonds with the deceased in a context of social 
interaction (Klass et al. 1996), both utilise story-telling to integrate loss into 
the ongoing personal narratives of the bereaved. Moving from loss through 
death to loss through illness or disease, Cassell (2004, pp. 105-7) talks of the 
sick making sense of their illness by turning it into a story, one that features 
at least two protagonists, the sick person and his body. Frank’s “The 
Wounded Storyteller” (1995) develops this theme in some detail, arguing that 
the sick “need to become storytellers in order to recover the voices that 
illness and its treatment often take away” (p. xii). The various illness narrative 
types he describes are all played out on the ground of the body. 
The resources for this storytelling, the scripts for making sense of loss, are 
provided by culture, religion, community or family custom, and personal 
experience. Riches and Dawson (2000, pp. 15-47) categorise these as social 
resources, provided by family, community or groups of like-minded people; 
and personal resources, constituting philosophy, faith experience and 
personality. Neimeyer and Keesee (1998, pp. 229-38) refer rather to three 
dimensions which contribute to the storytelling process of meaning 
reconstruction: the cultural, including the language itself, beliefs and 
practices, and popular culture; the spiritual, covering religious and 
cosmological beliefs, and also encompassing humanistic frameworks; and 
gender, referring to masculine and feminine styles and approaches. However 
these resources may be characterised, stories are told, narratives 
constructed, by grievers drawing on a fund of discourse that is consensually 
validated within their communities and cultures. If this discourse fails to 
provide adequate resources for the interpretation of any experience of loss, 
that experience registers as traumatic, essentially resistant to integration into 
the continuity and coherence of the ongoing narrative.  
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The continuity of narrative involves memory, fundamental to the drawing of 
the time-line necessary to identity.  Who we are is a result of what we have 
done and experienced, a personal history being a prerequisite of a personal 
identity, "the proof as well as the record of the self's existence" (Young 1995, 
p.221). The construction of the self involves the configuration of personal 
experiences into a historic unity. Our experience of the present depends on 
knowledge acquired in the past; our expectations of the future are based on 
recollections from our past. Significant loss interrupts this continuity, 
damaging the personal identity which has been fashioned over time, and 
requiring its creative refashioning in order to repair the rupture. Walter (1999a 
p.70) describes bereavement as a “state of being caught between the 
present, a past and a lost future”. Hence a radical rewriting of the past to 
make sense of the new present is essential to recovering the future. And 
memory plays a vital role in that rewriting, in the meaning-making integral to 
the reconstruction of the personal narrative. 
Hallam and Hockey (2001) point out how memories in western culture are 
reified and perceived as static objects which are related to, or even identical 
to, the experiences from which they arise. Memory, from this angle, is a 
capacity, a storehouse for these objects, and remembering involves the lifting 
of veils, or the excavating of layers, in order to rediscover a pre-existent past. 
But memory can also be regarded as a means of reinventing the past, as a 
utility rather than a capacity, with remembering seen as an act of creation 
rather than of discovery. Winter (2006) views memory not as a product but as 
a process, one that is inherently unstable, synthetic, and open to continual 
reshaping. This reshaping is inevitably carried out from the perspective of the 
rememberer’s present situation and in connection with his current systems of 
ideas and frameworks of meaning, since, as Empson (2007) observes, the 
rememberer is always part of the remembering.  
Lambek (2007) suggests that remembering occurs in the space between the 
stream of embodied experience and the objectified narrative, itself being 
neither the one nor the other, and thus attributes to memory a vital role in the 
production of identity and personal narrative from lived experience. The 
dynamic and creative view of memory which this theoretical frame of 
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reference presents underlines the separation from experience involved in 
remembering. As Ricoeur (1992) points out, the act of remembering is the act 
of seeing oneself as another. Moreover, the use of language involved in 
memory and recollection distances us from the immediate lived experience: 
"language is the amber which preserves relics of past feelings and ideas" 
(Skultans 1998, p.24). Past events thus become free-floating signifiers, open 
to revision and reinterpretation as memories are constantly renegotiated.  
And this renegotiation implies selectivity. As Derrida (1983) logically 
observes, a limitless memory would not, in fact, be memory, but rather infinite 
self-presence, therefore we are obliged to choose what to remember and, 
equally, what to forget. These choices are governed by the concerns or 
interests of current identity: there is a selective reconstruction and 
appropriation of those parts of the past that respond to the needs of the 
present (Wood 1999). The “interpretive labour of memory work” (Carsten 
2007) involves a social intentionality in which who we are and what we 
remember are closely linked, each serving to bolster the other in the ongoing 
business of constructing a coherent personal identity and creating a usable 
past to go with it. 
Memory is an integral element of the meaning-making that takes place 
following identity-damaging loss, but the memories which are conjured up for 
the stories told in the attempt to make sense of that loss are never simple 
records of the past. They are interpretive reconstructions, bearing the imprint 
of social and cultural assumptions and practices, and influenced by the 
parameters of the context in which they are recalled. The bereaved can 
choose to retain fond memories of a deceased spouse or relative which bear 
little trace of the latter’s more habitual behaviour or character traits, while 
conveniently sweeping any of the less fond memories under the carpet of 
forgetting. The forced exile can decide that the country left behind, for all its 
obvious-to-others faults, is a paradise the like of which will not be easily 
found elsewhere on this earth. The dismissed employee can prefer to dwell 
on the negative aspects of his previous position, choosing to forget those 
features of the work he actually enjoyed or those qualities of the organisation 
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that he had come to appreciate. The past is always interpreted in the light of 
the present, refashioned to fit the current situation. 
However, where an event is perceived as so traumatic that it defies 
comprehension and resists interpretation, that event appears to remain at the 
level of lived experience. Hence trauma sufferers seem condemned to replay 
the past through intrusive flashbacks and surprisingly literal dreams (Van der 
Veer 1998), their experience frozen in a painful, dissociated, traumatic 
present (Fierke 2006). As Winter (2006) puts it, in the context of shell-shock, 
"the link between memory and identity is severed" (p.52), and memory takes 
over the life of the shellshocked man because he cannot get the memories to 
fit the narrative. He cannot, in Lambek's terms, move from the lived 
experience to an objectified narrative that supports his sense of identity. The 
emotionally-charged struggle to do this, to achieve a fit between the lived 
experience of loss and a coherent personal history and identity, would seem 
to be a universal component, a fundamental dynamic, of grief. 
 
Context and Consequences 
The struggle for meaning, the effort to make sense of loss, does not take 
place in a vacuum. Every griever experiences grief within a social context. 
And every society regulates and polices grief by establishing norms for what 
can be grieved and who can do the grieving, and by drawing a difference 
between “healthy” grief, which is expressed and worked through in the 
consensually validated and prescribed way, and “unhealthy”, (www. cruse 
bereavementcare.org.uk), “complicated” (Rando 1993) or “pathological” 
(Stroebe et al. 1993, pp. 23-74) grief, which has gone wrong and requires 
intervention and assistance. This is no less the case in multicultural societies, 
where information and guidance on the grieving norms of the various cultural 
sub-groups of society is widely available (eg. Dickenson et al. 2000; Morgan 
and Laungani 2002; Parkes et al. 1996; Parry and Ryan 1995; Rees 1996; 
Rosenblatt and Wallace 2005), the implication being that any grieving 
behaviour which fails to accord with these descriptions is somehow aberrant. 
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Resilience is recognised as the key to coping with grief, as the attribute which 
makes the difference between “healthy” and “unhealthy” grieving. And a 
variety of factors, ranging from personality traits to social and economic 
background, are seen as contributing to resilience, or lack thereof, in the face 
of grief (Bonnano and Mancini 2006, 2008; Davis et al. 1998; Folkman et al. 
1996). These “risk” or “vulnerability” factors are listed as: the nature of the 
pre-existing relationship with the deceased; the nature of the death; 
availability of family and social support; concurrent stress and crises; age; 
gender; social class and economic status; religious background and beliefs; 
personality (Stroebe and Stroebe 1987). As Bradbury (1999, p.167) 
observes, “This list seems to describe the culture or society within which the 
bereaved person lives”. Basically, if the bereaved is located in a strong social 
position, the grief trajectory is likely to follow a “normal” path: but the more 
social factors there are weighing against the bereaved, the more vulnerability 
there is to a pathological grief reaction. 
Most of these “risk” factors relate to what the grieving individual brings to the 
grief experience, to aspects of the griever’s pre-loss identity. In Kaufmann’s 
words (2002 p.68) "The self does not meet loss empty-handed but rather with 
psychological history and identities that contribute to the way the loss is 
experienced and to what the loss means". Two of them, however, relate 
more directly to the ongoing post-loss situation: namely, availability of family 
and social support; and concurrent stress and crises. These "post-disposing" 
(Jordan 2005) factors characterise the immediate social context of the grief 
trajectory itself, and in so doing exert enormous influence on how it plays out.   
Social support is widely recognised (Figley 1986; Herman 1992; Lennon et 
al. 1990; Lindy 1988; Payne et al. 1999; Raphael 1983; Riches and Dawson 
2000; Vachon et al. 1982) as an important contributory factor in recovery 
from bereavement or trauma. It can be provided by informal networks of 
family and friends, more formal mutual self-help groups of people who find 
themselves in similar situations, or by the professional services on offer from 
medical experts, counsellors and therapists. Higgins (2002) suggests that 
one of the most important contributions religious belief can make to recovery 
from grief is the support of the religious community during the grieving 
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process. Stroebe et al. (2005) find limited evidence for social support 
buffering the bereaved against the impact of loss itself, but concede that it 
does appear to mitigate depressive post-bereavement symptoms. This fits 
with the findings of McCrae and Costa (1993) that resilience to grief displays 
largely in terms of the amount of time required to adapt to the post-loss 
reality, a speedy adaptation denoting a high level of resilience. 
Wilsey and Shear (2007) argue that it is the perceived value of the social 
support to the griever that matters, rather than its mere availability. However, 
while proffered support is not always perceived as particularly helpful, lack of 
support, characterised in terms of absence, rudeness or aggression, is 
without exception perceived as unhelpful and distressing. Their finding 
perhaps simply reflects the fact that "Bereavement .... makes necessary .... a 
reliance on others for support, and in the process people can be gratified or 
disappointed in the response they receive" (Tedeschi and Calhoun 2006, 
p.107). 
Concurrent crises or stressors, meanwhile, are seen as potential inhibitors of 
"normal" grief and recovery (Hansson and Stroebe 2007; Levy et al. 1994; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 1994; Payne et al. 1999). The fewer "negative life 
events" (Moos and Schaefer 1986), such as other deaths, job loss, financial 
problems or relationship difficulties, happening at the same time as or in the 
wake of bereavement, the more likely the bereaved will be able to cope. But 
the simultaneous occurrence of other stressful life events will only compound 
the distress of the bereavement and undermine any potential resilience, 
serving both to complicate and exacerbate the grief experience. 
These “post-disposing” factors of social support and concurrent stress neatly 
lend themselves to bereavement counselling tick-box questionnaires. But 
perhaps they represent an over-simplification of the context of the grief 
trajectory, a brushing over of the fact that the interdependency of social 
interaction persists beyond the moment of loss and that grief plays out in a 
highly complex and fluid dynamic of interwoven events and perceptions. The 
very vulnerability of the grief-stricken lays them open to manipulation or 
exploitation, but it is newspaper features rather than academic articles that 
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tell of the confidence tricksters who move in on solvent widow/ers, or of the 
redundant and long-term unemployed who are lured into crime. Equally, the 
grieving are prone to make enormous errors of judgement on entirely their 
own account while in the state of disequilibrium that grief engenders. This 
can be seen in the headlong rush into a new marriage following death or 
divorce, or in the acting out of the notion that death, for oneself and one's 
dependants, is the only option to the perceived disgrace of losing a fortune or 
even a livelihood. The daily news bears witness to the fact that any grief 
trajectory takes place in a complicated and convoluted web of causes and 
effects, that grief does not play out in a vacuum or against a neat list of 
variables, but as one strand in the tightly and intricately intertwined 
interactions between several lives.  
Thus the context of any grief experience, in terms of both the social location 
of the griever and of the ongoing post-loss social interaction in which the 
griever is involved, serves to influence and shape the consequences of that 
experience. And, as a result, the consequences of grief are infinitely more 
wide-ranging, varied and unpredictable than the states of "recovery" or 
"resolution" proffered as "outcomes" by the traditional grief models. All three 
terms, the first redolent of medicalisation, the second of a problem-solving 
approach, and the third implying a mechanistic view of grieving as a 
contained process, signify a degree of closure, finality and stasis, that is at 
odds with the chaotic, messy dynamism and the perpetually unfinished 
business of lived experience. Corr, Nabe and Corr (2003) criticise the 
appropriacy of the term “recovery” because of its medical associations with 
return to the pre-morbid condition, and suggest possible alternatives, 
including healing, adjusting, managing or coping. Balk (2004) interprets 
recovery differently, as, in Feifel's (1977) terms, the redefinition and 
reintegration of the self into life following bereavement. Paletti (2008) outlines 
the various concepts of recovery as defined in different  grief models, and 
concludes that basic to all of them is a fundamental notion of self-
transformation following loss.  
What all of these arguments share is recognition of the impossibility of any 
return to the status quo ante. There may be a return to a "culture of 
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normality" (Riches and Dawson 2000), or to "previous levels of functioning" 
(Weiss 1993), but any expectations of  returning to "normal", in the sense of 
once again inhabiting the pre-loss world, are false (Payne et al. 1999). 
Bereaved research subjects themselves are cynical about the concept of 
"resolution" as a feasible or even desirable goal (Littlewood 2001), dismissing 
the aim of "recovery" as both inappropriate for and highly insensitive to their 
post-loss situations (Bennett and Bennett 2000).  
Grief is clearly, by its very nature, transformative. For some grievers, the 
transformation may be judged as producing largely negative results, 
manifesting in long-term mental disturbance, physical deterioration or 
increased risk of mortality (Lannen et al. 2008; Payne et al. 1999; Prigerson 
et al. 1997; Stroebe et al. 2007), with all the inherent dangers these imply.  
For others, the grief experience may seem to bring about mainly positive and 
beneficial effects, for example: increased strength of purpose and sense of 
self-worth; deepened understanding of self and others; stronger social bonds 
and relationships; heightened spirituality; enhanced appreciation of life 
(Berzoff 2006; Calhoun and Tedeschi 2001; Frantz et al. 2001; Richards 
2001). For most, the changes wrought by the transformative properties of 
grief will be evaluated as entailing a fair mix of both positive and negative 
consequences. But in every case one thing seems certain: the person who 
steps off the grief bridge is not the same person that stepped on it at the 
moment of loss. 
And this transformation occurs as an unfolding experience in which the 
griever is still very much linked to a social world. The ultimate consequences 
of the grief experience therefore reflect the dynamism of the chains of cause 
and effect those links imply; they are sensitive to the specific situations 
thrown up by that social world; and they can arise quite independently of 
intention, in line with the general unpredictability of lived experience. Grief 
should perhaps then be considered not only in terms of the eventual 
psychological and social outcome for the griever himself, but also with regard 
to the ongoing social context, to how the griever affects others as much as to 




The study of grief developed over the course of the twentieth century 
principally in the context of bereavement. Grief was seen largely from the 
personal perspective, as an interior process, and much of the contribution to 
grief theory came from the field of psychology. Research concentrated on 
investigating reactions to bereavement and describing the psychological 
processes involved in accommodating the loss involved. The general 
approach to grieving was medicalised and problem-solving, with description 
soon turning to prescription in terms of the practical treatment and 
counselling of individuals suffering bereavement. 
Towards the end of the century, grief was also increasingly viewed from a 
social angle, focussing on the web of relationships in which the griever is 
enmeshed, stressing his location in society. This approach, utilising 
contributions from sociology, served grief theory by introducing notions like 
disenfranchised grief, whereby society is recognised as regulating and 
policing both occasions and modes of expression for grief; by expanding the 
loss which triggers grief to a far wider set of circumstances than the 
traditional bereavement alone; and by establishing the cultural, social and 
individual variability of the grief phenomenon. 
Examining grief within a holistic frame of reference which caters for the 
personal and social aspects together and encompasses the insights provided 
by both psychology and sociology, there appear to be some basic elements 
which can be considered characteristic of the grief experience. The first is the 
initial loss, the dispossession and resultant change in the status quo that 
inspires the grieving. The significance of this loss, its potentiality as a trigger 
of grief, lies in the perceived threat it presents to personal identity and sense 
of self. Secondly, the change in circumstances heralded by the loss is highly 
unwelcome, being negatively evaluated as an assault upon established self-
identity, as a disruption in the continuity of the self’s existence, and a welter 
of negative emotions arise to underline and support this adverse reaction. 
Thirdly, the only way out of this unfavourable situation is to work at making 
some sense of it, to attribute some positive meaning to life in the new post-
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loss world and thus repair the damage to the sense of self caused by the 
changes the loss introduced. And finally, this entire experience of loss, 
negative evaluation and emotional reaction, with subsequent attempts to 
make some meaning from the post-loss situation, takes place within a 
specific context, in terms of the griever’s own social location and of the social 
interactions in which he is involved during the course of his encounter with 
grief. This context serves to both influence and shape the grieving 
experience and its ultimate consequences for the individual griever himself, 
and also for those with whom he interacts. 
As a study of human behaviour, whether approached from the personal angle 
as an interior process, or from the social angle with an emphasis on the 
griever’s position and interrelationships in society, grief has been largely 
perceived as the domain of the individual. The fundamentals of the grieving 
experience outlined above have been predominantly drawn from studies of 
individual experience. The next chapter investigates the applicability of these 














   2.    COLLECTIVE GRIEF: THE GRIEF OF NATIONS 
   “A nation is a thing that lives and acts like a man and men are the 
particulars of which it is composed.”  
                                                                                     (Josiah Gilbert Holland) 
   
The first chapter concentrated on defining and describing the grief 
phenomenon, analysing it in terms of those fundamentals which appear to be 
basic to the grieving experiences examined in the literature. Whether 
approached from a psychological or a sociological angle, these experiences 
are predominantly of an intensely personal nature, framing grief firmly within 
the context of the individual. This second chapter moves grief from the 
domain of the individual to that of the collective, and investigates how grief 
might be understood to operate at the level of the group. 
In seeking to arrive at a definition of the concept of collective grief, the nature 
of the relationship between the individual and the larger group to which he 
belongs is explored. There is also discussion of the difference between public 
mourning and communal grieving, and a clear distinction is drawn in the latter 
case between “collected” and “collective” grief, to use Olick’s (1999) terms, 
the former referring to the individual responses to loss of the members of a 
group, and the latter pertaining to the reactions of the group as a whole. The 
emphasis is on the way in which collective grief appears to operate, affecting 
the group in aggregate, rippling out to its edges and down in time through its 
generations. 
A variety of studies of grief as it affects groups are examined, although these 
are few by contrast to the many that deal with the individual grieving 
experience. The collectives which provide a focus for this body of research 
are the family, the work group, the local community, the interest-based group, 
the ‘first nation’ (i.e. Native American Indian communities in North America 
and aboriginal groups in Australia and New Zealand), and the nation. While 
many of these studies adopt a “collected” approach to their group of choice, a 
few, particularly in the fields of family bereavement and of the problems of 
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first nation communities, take a more authentically collective perspective with 
regard to their research subjects.  
One fact that emerges from this survey of work on group reaction to loss is 
the apparent necessity for the group to present two specific features before 
the occurrence of collective grief can be established: namely, the 
containment of the group within fairly clearly delineated boundaries, and the 
continuity of the group over a reasonable stretch of time. Despite the fact that 
nations exhibit these features, being contained by borders and boasting long-
term histories, there appear to be no studies of large-scale national groups 
reacting to loss which can be said to take a truly collective, as opposed to 
collected, approach to the ensuing grief experience. 
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the concept of the nation, exploring 
various definitions and descriptions of what a nation actually is, how it is 
composed and functions, and how national identity is experienced and 
understood by its members. The fundamentals of grief, as outlined in the first 
chapter, are re-examined with a view to how they might conceivably apply in 
a national context; how loss, emotional response, meaning-making, and 
context and consequences, can be understood to manifest at a collective 
national level.  
The aim of this chapter is to determine to what extent grief, as defined in the 
first chapter, might feasibly predicate nation, as defined here. Answers are 
sought to the questions: Can nations grieve?  Does the concept of national 
grief make any sense? 
 
Collective Grief 
In post-enlightenment western culture and tradition, the perspective of the 
individual has been unfailingly privileged over that of the group. The 
relationship between the autonomous individual and the larger group, 
between subject and society, is a theme which has provoked much debate 
and given rise to large amounts of literature, to an extent which goes well 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the purposes of the argument here, 
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it is sufficient to establish the collective as a reality, and to comment on a few 
of the main theories accounting for the way in which that reality manifests. 
 
Collective Consciousness 
Durkheim (1893/1947) established the importance of the collective in social 
theory with his emphasis on “collective consciousness” as “the totality of 
beliefs and sentiments common to average members of the same society ..... 
an entirely different thing from particular consciences, although it can only be 
realised through them “ (pp. 38-9). Collective consciousness was posited as 
a reality external to the individual, yet critically involved in his formation and 
his assimilation into the social sphere. Fascinated by the manner in which 
individuals achieve solidarity, that degree of consensus which is the 
necessary condition for social existence, Durkheim viewed social coherence 
as dependent on the existence of collective beliefs and common sentiments. 
In ‘Rules of Sociological Method’ (1895/1982), he laid out his theory of the 
social environment as presenting a reality separate and distinct from the 
individuals who make up society, and of a social fact as “recognised by the 
power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over 
individuals” (p.8). The theory was demonstrated empirically when he applied 
it in ‘Suicide’ (1897/1951) to what would seem to be a characteristically 
individual phenomenon, arguing that suicide rates are entirely dependent on 
social context. 
Durkheim’s perspective of society in the individual, his view of the subject as 
an aggregation of external processes and societal conditions, was to prove 
extremely influential in the fields of both social and anthropological theory 
and research over the course of the twentieth century. His notion of the 
collective consciousness was reinforced from the field of psychology by 
Jung’s concept of the “collective unconscious”, a set of pre-experiential 
archetypes, motifs, myths, images and ideas which provide “a collective 
meaning, a meaning which is the common property of mankind” (1970, 
p.322). These inherited, pre-existent forms constitute, in Jung’s view (1968), 
a second psychic system, after the immediate personal consciousness, of a 
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collective and impersonal nature, and are available for the individual’s 
formulation of meanings, contexts and patterns, for the making sense at a 
personal level of self and world. 
The concept of a pan-human unity contained in Jung’s theory of the collective 
unconscious can be linked with the idea of the unity of all life on earth found 
in Teilhard de Chardin’s philosophical and spiritual arguments for “cosmic 
consciousness” as an evolutionary destination, and for the attainment of the 
“noosphere” (coined from the greek nous, meaning mind), as a 
quintessentially human level of pure thought, a stage above the animal 
biosphere (1959). Vernadsky (1945), coming from a scientific and biocentric 
angle rather than a philosophical and anthropocentric one, promotes a similar 
view of evolution as leading from the biosphere to the noosphere, where the 
interaction of human and nature will be consciously balanced. What seems to 
be described here is the development of the mother of all collective 
consciousnesses, the emergence of a planetary mind. 
Media theorists have latched on enthusiastically to these notions, using them 
as the foundation of studies which regard advances in technology, mass 
media and communications as opportunities for the operation of collective 
consciousness on a scale and at a speed never before possible. The internet 
in particular is viewed as a perfect medium for delivery of the prophesied 
noosphere. Zizek (1998), on the subject of virtual reality, refers to this 
collective approach to cyberspace as “a neo-Jungian idea that we live in an 
age of mechanistic, false individualism and that we are now on the threshold 
of a new mutation... we all share one collective mind”. In the same interview, 
however, he also acknowledges another approach to cyberspace, “the 
deconstructionist .... post-Cartesian one; each of us can play with his/her 
identities”.  The latter angle privileges the individual perspective over the 
collective one, focussing on how virtual reality offers real possibilities for 
Cartesian subjectivity in a context which not only permits but actively 






Moving the focus from the overarching framework of the group to the 
individual members who compose it, from the social to the personal, brings 
the issue of identity to the fore. And if personal identity correlates with ‘I’ and 
social identity with ‘you’, then collective identity corresponds to ‘we’. Personal 
identities are “self-designations and self-attributions regarded as personally 
distinctive” (Snow 2001, p.1). They refer to “characteristics of the self that are 
believed to be unique to the self” (Ashmore et al. 2004, p.82). Social 
identities, typically grounded in social roles and categories, are “attributed or 
imputed to others in an attempt to situate them in social space” (Snow 2001, 
p.1). They are “socially constructed and socially meaningful categories that 
are accepted by individuals as descriptive of themselves or their groups” 
(Thoits and Virshup 1997, p.106). 
Collective identity is “first and foremost a statement about categorical 
membership” (Ashmore et al. 2004, p.81). This identity is shared with a group 
of others who have, or believe they have, certain characteristics, attributes or 
experiences in common, particularly by comparison with real or imagined 
sets of “others”. The commonality, the basis of “we-ness”, may be grounded 
in ascribed characteristics, such as gender or race, or in achieved positions, 
such as profession or political party (Ashmore et al. 2004; Sedikides and 
Brewer 2001; Simon and Klandermans 2001). But, importantly, collective 
identity is self-identified and not imposed externally by society. This feature 
renders social and communal goals intrinsic to collective identity, giving it a 
quality of self-direction which distinguishes it from the orientational markers 
of social identity. Despite clear overlap between personal, social and 
collective identity, and a degree of ambiguity surrounding these terms in the 
literature, to the extent that several theorists (e.g. Ashmore et al. 2004; 
Sedikides and Brewer 2001; Simon 1997; Simon and Klandermans 2001) 
advocate doing away with social identity as a term, collective identity would 
seem to differ from social identity by dint of its more dynamic and fluid nature. 
There is a sense of collective agency embedded within the “we-ness” (Snow 
2001, p.1), and an emphasis on collective identity as process rather than 
property (Melucci 1989, p.34). 
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Collective identity is multi-dimensional, involving the cognitive, emotional, 
behavioural and moral aspects of shared ideas and beliefs, feelings and 
attitudes, values and judgements, actions and activities (Ashmore et al. 2004, 
p.82; Snow 2001, pp.5-6). It is created and sustained through the generation 
and employment of symbols which serve to bind the group internally and 
bound it externally, and to render it distinct from other groups through an 
expressed accentuation of commonalities and divergences (Eisenstadt and 
Giesen 1995; Snow 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Dress, gesture, 
language, songs and stories, are among the symbolic resources drawn on for 
the expression of collective identity. 
Finally, with regard to what Snow and Macadam (2000) term “identity 
correspondence”, or the link between the individuals comprising the group 
and its shared, overarching identity, collective identity needs to be reconciled 
or aligned with other identities that individual group members may possess. 
This seems to be achieved in two major ways. One is through identity 
convergence, whereby the espousal of a particular collective identity provides 
the opportunity for an individual to act in accordance with his personal 
identity. The other is through identity construction, which involves various 
types of identity work, such as changing the salience order of multiple 
identities by shifting a lower-order one to a more prominent position, as when 
a woman becomes part of a feminist movement or a homosexual actively 
identifies with gay pride; or, at the other end of the scale, a complete and 
dramatic transformation in which an individual sees himself as radically 
changed, as in the case of a road-to-Damascus type conversion to a religious 
or political group (Snow 2001). 
And in the same way as a variety of processes appear to be involved in 
achieving congruity between collective and other identities, a variety of 
degrees of congruity are achieved. The blanket of collective identity does not 
cover all members of a group equally snugly: there are variations in the 
intensity of adherence to that identity over different individuals within the 
group, and in the same individual over different situations and periods of 
time. Shils (1957) notes the distinction between “intense and attenuated 
attachments” (p.141) to the central system of values within a group, an 
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unequal participation in that system in terms of both intensity and continuity. 
He refers to the phenomena of “over-participation” and “under-participation” 
in group value systems, but concludes that a normal distribution of 
attachment to the central symbols of any collective presents as a minority at 
either extreme, and the majority in varying degrees of attenuation or dilution 
in between (pp.143-4). 
The definition of collective arrived at from the above involves collective 
consciousness, an overarching interpretive framework which is both formed 
by and in its turn serves to form members of the group; and collective 
identity, the binding and bounding sense of “we-ness” which is both 
embracing of and embedded in individual members of the group. Can the 
notion of grief, as defined in the first chapter, be understood in these terms? 
Collective grief would seem to presuppose a loss that critically affects the 
entire group, though obviously with variable intensity of affect across its 
individual membership. That loss would involve damage to the collective 
identity and a discontinuity in the ongoing narrative of the group as a whole. 
The sense of loss would be shared by the group in aggregate, the 
subsequent grief trajectory presenting a path to be followed by all its 
members. And the total grieving experience would register with significant 
impact on the overall collective consciousness of the group. 
 
Collective Grief and Public Mourning 
Before embarking on a survey of various studies which purport to examine 
grief at the collective level, it is perhaps necessary to make a note of what 
collective grief is not, and to comment on the distinction between collective 
grief and public or communal mourning. There is a tendency in common 
usage to overlap between the terms “grief” and “mourning”, particularly in a 
collective context, to an extent that the two are often used interchangeably. 
But “mourning” is associated by definition with the expression of sorrow or 
grief, rather than the grief itself (Oxford Dictionary of English; New Oxford 
American Dictionary). Academic convention also separates grief from 
mourning, the former seen as private, internal, and  imbued with emotion; the 
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latter as public, observable behaviour (Hockey 2001; Howarth 2006; Lofland 
1985). Grief concerns the internal feelings we have; mourning the external 
things we do. Grief occurs naturally in reaction to loss; mourning does not 
happen on its own. Didion (2005), in “The Year of Magical Thinking”, 
strikingly describes grief as passive, something that creeps up on you, and 
mourning as an active process of remembering. 
The concept of mourning involves socially shaped and sanctioned actions 
undertaken in the wake of bereavement, a formalised process of responding 
to a death. It involves a social obligation which is binding on the sympathisers 
as well as the grievers, on the community as well as on the immediately 
bereaved. This concept informs anthropological studies of mourning, where 
the death rituals and customs of different groups and cultures are observed 
and examined, with subsequent attempts at interpretation on the basis of an 
assumed inherent symbolism (Bloch and Parry 1982; Danforth 1982; 
Huntingdon and Metcalf 1979; Radcliffe-Brown 1964). Such ethnographical 
studies have served to underline the social construction of bereavement and 
the resultant diversity of ritual in different societies, and have also served to 
reinforce the division between the “outer world” of mourning, and the 
psychological “inner world” of grief. 
Examples can be drawn from recent national and international events to 
illustrate the difference between the two at a large group collective level. The 
reaction in England to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, for instance, is 
clearly categorisable as an example of public mourning. In whatever way the 
Diana phenomenon is explained, in terms of social change, reshaping of 
national identity, new ways of mourning, or media over-exaggeration (Kear 
and Steinberg 1999; Taylor 2000; Walter 1999b), it is obvious that for most, if 
not all, of the members of the public who turned out, signed condolence 
books, left flowers at the palace gates, and wept at the funeral, Diana’s death 
did not cause a shattering of their assumptive worlds, either personal or 
collective. It signalled no break in the continuity of the English collective 
narrative, nor appears in retrospect to have had any perceptible effect on the 
English collective consciousness. 
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The events of 9/11 in the USA, however, would seem to present a more likely 
case of collective grief. For many Americans, especially those New Yorkers 
who witnessed the events, there was a definite rupture of assumed patterns, 
a breakdown of ontological security, in that never before had the USA 
suffered an attack by a foreign enemy on civilian targets on its own soil. 
Certainly, counselling was in great demand in New York post 9/11, from 
people who were neither escapees from the towers, nor relatives of the 
victims. And an important part of that counselling process was the telling of 
personal stories, the reconstruction of disrupted personal narratives (Cohen 
2002). Compelling televised coverage of the dramatic incidents served to 
spread a collective sense of shock and sorrow throughout the USA, and to 
create a sympathetic community of “virtual” mourners around the world 
(Walter 2007). Within weeks, the collective American emotional response 
had turned to outrage, anger and patriotic fervor: the stage was set for the 
Iraq war (Engle 2007; Smith 2005). Time will ultimately reveal further 
progress along this particular grief trajectory. 
 
Studies of Grieving Groups 
Studies of grief as it affects groups have been few and far between relative to 
the number dealing with individual grief. Even where a collective unit is in 
focus, the approach has largely been to view that group as a collection of 
separate individuals rather than as an aggregate entity in its own right. The 
emphasis has been on “collected” rather than “collective” grief, to use Olick’s 
(1999) neat distinction. This section provides an overview of the general 
trends in research into groups experiencing grief, covering the family, the 
work-group, the local community, the interest-based community, the ‘first 
nation’, and the nation.  
 
Families 
Studies of families reacting to loss have traditionally concentrated on 
bereavement situations, although, more recently, examples can be found in 
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the literature of family reaction to other triggers of grief, including disablement 
(Lee and Gardner 2010), mental illness (Penzo and Harvey 2008), drug 
addiction (Oreo and Ozgul 2007), homosexual “coming out” (Martin et al. 
2010), unemployment (Hayhoe 2006) and family business failure (Shepherd 
2009). Although the focus in such studies has been predominantly on the 
grief responses of the individual family members involved, there has long 
been recognition of the fact that the family can also be regarded as an 
independent unit in its own right. Bowen (1976) talked of the family as a 
collective whole, and Paul and Grosser (1965) examined the effects of 
“shared grief” between one generation of a family and the next. Walsh and 
McGoldrick (1991) were probably the first to adopt a wholeheartedly 
collective perspective in treating the bereaved family as an interactional 
system, a functional unit, with “loss rippling out into the extended reaches 
….and down into the next generations” (p. xvii). They underlined the shared 
adaptational challenges and the changes in group identity and purpose 
following a family bereavement.  
This recognition of the validity of a collective approach has remained a 
consistent feature in studies of family grief. Byng-Hall (1991) introduced the 
notion of “family scripts” whereby whole families respond to bereavement 
with “scripts” inherited from other, previous scenarios, and may find they 
have to change those scripts to make progress in their grieving.  Nadeau 
(1998) emphasised the importance of “family worlds” in grief, whereby family 
members interactively make sense of their experience through strategies 
such as story-telling, comparison-making, and characterization of the 
deceased. Kissane and Bloch (2002), in their family focused grief therapy, 
propose cohesiveness, expressiveness, and conflict as determinants of 
family types, and categorise each family unit they treat on a spectrum from 
supportive to hostile. Shapiro (2008) underlines the interdependence of 
family bereavement processes, defining “recovery” from the death of a family 
member in terms of evolving, interdependent, adaptive responses within the 
family. Baddeley and Singer (2010), in their reflections on identity 
reconstruction or maintenance following a loss within the family, refer to the 
shared set of memories which contribute to the overarching family narrative 
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as well as to the individual family member’s narrative embedded within it. 
Shepherd (2009), in the context of family grief arising from the loss of a 
family business, introduces the notion of “emotionally capable” families, with 
norms and routines for effectively dealing with their grief, somewhat on a par 
with, but distinct from, the emotional intelligence possessed by individual 
family members.  
 
Work-Groups                                                                                                                   
Moving from the family to the business environment, grief theory has also 
been applied to the work-group, not so much in terms of actual bereavement, 
although guidance is available to managers on how to handle this in the 
workplace (Charles-Edwards 2005), but rather in a management studies 
context in order to explain response to organisational change. Such events 
as mergers, site closures, business failures, downsizing and restructuring, 
are characterised as organisational death (Blau 2006, 2007, 2008; Hazen 
2008; Marks and Mirvis 2001; Zell 2003), and psychologically-based stage 
models of grief are employed to describe worker reactions. The Kubler–Ross 
model of the five stages of dying, for example, is consistently referenced in 
such studies (Blau 2007; Cunningham 1997; Henderson 1996; Marks and 
Mirvis 2001; Sutton 1987; Zell 2003). 
The focus in these studies is invariably on the individual employee. As Bell 
and Taylor (2011, p.8) confirm “analyses of organisational grief have focused 
on how organisation members respond to these events….. Organisational 
grief is therefore portrayed as an individual level phenomenon”. They go on 
to argue for the equal validity of a collective perspective on organisational 
grief so that it “can be understood intersubjectively as a shared experience” 
through an approach that “emphasizes the symbols, language, events, social 
and cultural experiences of bereavement”. However, they provide no 
examples of such an approach, and none leap out from the management 
studies literature. 
Perhaps Bell and Taylor’s assumption that collective grief in the event of 
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organisational change is a feasible concept needs to be questioned. 
Although parallels have been drawn between work team and family 
relationships (Hyde and Thomas 2003; Verity and Jolley 2008), the work-
based community, by its very nature a shifting, porous, temporary entity, 
cannot lay claim to either the same containment or continuity as the family 
unit. People leave, people join; organisations expand and shrink, relocate 
and merge, all at an increasingly accelerated twenty-first century pace. 
Moreover, there are no ties of blood or kinship as serve to bind and bound a 
family unit.  So, to what extent can we talk of a solid collective identity being 
damaged by organisational change, or of an integrated and unified workforce 
sharing the painful process of reconstructing that identity? Do all 
organisations have a collective consciousness? And how many organisations 
last long enough for change to impact on that? 
Certainly, some individuals, particularly those whose personal identities are 
tightly bound up with their work status, will engage with a personal grief 
trajectory in the wake of organisational change, but there seems to be little 
evidence for collective grief in the workplace being similarly triggered. Rather, 
the stage model of grief appears to have been adopted as a suitable analogy 
for reaction to organisational change, and as a convenient managerial 
pseudo-psychological means of controlling that reaction. The aim of research 
into work group grief in the management studies context is, after all, to 
enable efficient managerial handling of organisational change and to 
minimize any negative impact it might have on employee or organisational 
performance. The emphasis is on control and regulation of employee 
reaction, the “policing” of grief. And the stage model approach, with its 
prescriptive emphasis on “normal” grieving and on individual responsibility for 
working through grief to achieve “recovery”, fits the bill perfectly. 
 
Local Communities 
The location-based group can be subject to common loss through natural 
disasters, accidents or purposeful attacks. Studies of community grief in the 
wake of such calamities deal with individual responses, either in the 
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immediate aftermath of the traumatising event or several years later as a 
follow-up. Post-traumatic stress disorder provides the framework for the bulk 
of these studies, informing the approach in the cases of accidents such as at 
Aberfan (Furedi 2002; Johnes 2000; Morgan et al. 2003) and Hillsborough 
(Sims and Sims 1998; Wright et al. 1994), of natural disasters like Hurricane 
Katrina (Knapp 2007; Rhoads et al. 2006; Salloum and Overstreet 2008; 
Salloum et al. 2009) and the South East Asian tsunami (Johannesson et al. 
2009; Kristensen et al. 2010; Romano et al. 2006), and of terrorist attacks, 
including 9/11 in New York (Neria et al. 2007; Shear et al. 2006; Waizer et al. 
2005) and the train bombings of 2004 in Madrid (Miguel-Tobal et al. 2007; 
Val and Linley 2006). 
Although Erikson (1976), in his classic work on the destruction of a 
community in the Buffalo Creek flood, devotes a whole chapter to the 
“collective trauma” of the flood, what he is essentially dealing with are the 
reactions of individual survivors. He concludes that most of the traumatic 
symptoms experienced by the Buffalo Creek survivors are a reaction to the 
loss of communality as much as to the event itself, since the disaster and its 
effects would appear to have demolished any collectivity the Buffalo Creek 
residents might have professed to beforehand. By contrast, Kayser et al. 
(2008) refer to how the collective context of South Indian society provided 
mechanisms for coping with shock and grief in the wake of the tsunami. The 
very fabric of the community, interrelational and interdependent, provided 
support for and encouraged resilience in individuals dealing with the effects 
of that disaster. 
Even when the collective nature of the local community is acknowledged, the 
focus remains on the collected individual responses to the shared loss. The 
individual is naturally the primary concern in disaster situations affecting large 
numbers of people, where short to medium term assistance is required to 
cope with the immediate effects. The study of longer term effects on the 
overall local community may seem less compelling in this context. Moreover, 
many such communities, certainly in most of the western world, are neither 
as contained nor as continuous as they once were, given the highly mobile 
nature of contemporary society and the subsequent distancing of people from 
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any reality or sense of rooted community (Erikson 1976; Seabrook 2008). 
 
Interest-Based Groups 
The collective perspective is far more central to studies of communities 
whose shared grief is based on common interests, background and type of 
loss. For example, the mobilised grief of Latin American mothers of the 
“disappeared” (Holst-Warhaft 2000; Tully 1995; de Volo 2006) or of the Israeli 
“women in black” (Gabriel 1992) becomes a powerful force for political 
change in their respective contexts. Similarly, the grief occasioned by AIDS-
related losses amongst the gay community in the USA (Nord 1998) is viewed 
as having provided the solidarity necessary to protest their marginalised and 
vulnerable role in society (Holst-Warhaft 2000) and to exert political pressure 
for change.  
Such movements harness the potential for agency which is embedded in 
collective identity (Snow 2001, p.1). A group formed on the basis of shared 
experience, with shared feelings and perceptions resulting from that 
experience, is motivated to act together in the pursuit of common interests 
and goals. The collective identity may emerge from an existent social identity, 
like mothers or gay men in the examples cited above, its emergence 
activated by strength of emotion and purpose. And it may be a very 
temporary affair, the group dissolving back into the larger society once the 
purpose is fulfilled and the feelings have subsided.   
Although the emphasis in such studies is on the collective, it is on the 
collective power which can be energized by grief, and not on the collective 
nature of the grief itself. This power can mobilise any size of group 
confronting shared loss, from small cliques through class or occupational 
groupings to gender categories or whole nations. And it can coalesce around 
a variety of factors: dispossession and deprivation of social rights by virtue of 
class, race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity or religion; material losses of 
life and land; or less tangible ones of honour and dignity. A variety of social 
and political movements of the last century, including the Bolshevik 
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revolution, the rise of Nazi fascism, the struggles of colonial territories to 
achieve independence, the civil rights movement in the United States, the 
anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, and the feminist and gay pride 
movements, can demonstrate the effects of such power unleashed 
 
First Nations 
By contrast, studies of “first nation” communities, the indigenous peoples of 
Australia, New Zealand and North America, deal with grief manifesting as 
powerlessness. The dispossession of land, culture and identity, suffered as a 
direct result of genocidal colonisation, triggered a grief which has discernibly 
transferred from one generation to the next (Seale et al. 2006; Wesley-
Esquimaux 2007). Whole communities display an array of social, health and 
psychological problems regarded as stemming from the original historical 
trauma. Poor general health, impoverished and sub-standard living 
conditions, high rates of suicide and violent accident, widespread violence 
and substance abuse, extensive mental illness, are all taken as indicative of 
the depressed state of indigenous groups living within the dominant “second 
nations” (Gracey 1998; Morgan and Freeman 2009; Seale et al. 2006). Alford 
and Muir (2004, p.101) refer to “the magnitude of indigenous despair and ill-
health in Australia”, while Morgan and Freeman (2009, p.85) talk of the 
history of the Alaskan native people as “a tale of broken families, broken 
traditions and broken hearts”. 
Deprived of self-respect by dint of their substantial losses, these groups 
display low levels of community and self-esteem, not helped by the inequities 
they suffer in terms of health care, education provision and employment 
opportunity. Their grief has effectively been disenfranchised, never fully 
recognised or acknowledged (Braveheart and De Bruyn 1998). Monture-
Angus (2000) talks of “the need for historical honesty” in dealings between 
dominant cultures and first nation groups. Alford and Muir (2004, p.105) refer 
to “historical myopia” in Australia, and describe relations between indigenous 
and non-indigenous populations as being “infused with historical overtones 
because of the failure of wider society to acknowledge and come to terms 
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with this history” (citing from the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islanders 
Commission, ATSIC, 1999). 
Braveheart (2000, 2003, 2005, 2007) defines historical unresolved grief, or 
historical trauma, as a collective and cumulative emotional wounding across 
generations. She identifies six phases, from the shock of first contact with the 
colonisers, through economic competition, conflict, confinement, destruction 
of culture and family systems, to ultimate designation as second-class, 
racially inferior members of the dominant colonial society. This collective 
perspective on the phenomenon is reinforced by the more collected approach 
of Whitbeck et al. (2004), who, in the tradition of mainstream psychological 
grief theory, have conducted a longitudinal study of American Indians, 
measuring their individual historical trauma along a “historical loss associated 
symptoms scale”, to conclude that the current generation of adults have 
frequent thoughts about their historical losses, with concomitant negative 
feelings.  
But the overall picture is perhaps not as bleak as painted above. In Australia 
the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, in 2008 made a historic and generally well-
received apology to the aboriginal people, acknowledging their profound 
grief, suffering and loss at the hands of the non-indigenous Australian 
people. And Nagel (1996) gives an account of ethnic renewal and resurgence 
of pride amongst American Indians, citing the rise in population over the last 
few decades, the greater willingness to profess to Indian ethnicity, and the 
rise of “red power” as a social movement influenced by the civil rights 
movement.  Her outline of the historical shift in collective self-definition 
whereby myriad tribes became a unified plurality, and tribal associations 
turned into pan-Indian consciousness, begs the question as to what part 
grief, as an energising force, might have had to play in this metamorphosis, 
given that post-war conditions in the United States provided a climate 






At the level of the largest social grouping, the nation, studies of grief are rare. 
The Mitscherlichs’ (1967/75) examination of Germany’s “inability to mourn” 
following defeat in the second world war and the death of Hitler, argued that 
the Germans could not resolve their grief over the loss of their dream of 
Teutonic mastery, and threw themselves into huge efforts of reconstruction in 
a bid to block out their guilt and shame. Based on interviews with hundreds of 
Germans, the case is made in terms of psychic energy, ego-depletion and 
collective denial. Similarly, Lifton’s study of the grief-inspired rise of the 
Nazis, following Germany’s humiliating defeat in the first world war and 
subsequent economic problems (1990), is, like his work on the grief of 
Hiroshima survivors (1968), psychologically based, explaining historic events 
in terms of trauma, psychic numbing and states of dissociation. Volkan uses 
a similar “psychohistory” approach in his analysis of the conflict on his 
divided native island of Cyprus (1979, 1988), viewing the accumulated losses 
and accrued griefs of the struggle between the two ethnic groups as feeding 
the ongoing conflict. In these studies the focus on the individual is 
unrelenting: a nation is seen as a collected group of citizens.  The 
intergenerational nature of national grief seems to be implicitly recognized, 
but no real attempt is made to explore the mechanisms of how the transfer is 
made from one generation to the next.  
Some recent studies have approached national grief and trauma with a more 
collective orientation. Faust’s “Republic of Suffering” (2008), for example, 
aims to show how the shared loss and grief of the American civil war served 
to shape subsequent national structures and commitments. The way in which 
the trauma of this war revolutionised the military’s approach to caring for the 
dead and their families is clearly demonstrated, but any case for the war’s 
permanent transformation of American beliefs, values or character, or for any 
substantial reconstruction of the national narrative, is less convincingly made.  
The refashioning of national narratives in the wake of loss is the theme of 
Schivelbush’s (2003) historical study of reaction to military defeat in the 
cases of the collapse of the Confederacy at the end of the American civil war, 
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the defeat of France by Prussia in 1871, and the victory of the allies over 
Germany in 1918. He shows how blame in each instance was collectively 
shifted away from themselves by the defeated group, who thereby translated 
defeat into victory. This creation of myth as a collective means for coming to 
terms with defeat is described in general terms of mass psychology 
surrounding a specific event, however, with little detail on how the myth 
enters collective memory or on what sort of longer term consequences it 
might have for subsequent national history.  
Neal’s (1998) examination of traumatic events affecting America in the 
twentieth century is set in a promising theoretical framework of national 
trauma as social disruption, necessitating subsequent discourse directed at 
repair, and impacting on collective memory. Detailed accounts of the Great 
Depression, Pearl Harbour, the Cuba missile crisis, the assassinations of J.F. 
Kennedy and Martin Luther King, and the Vietnam War, amongst others, are 
accompanied by discussion of the criteria which render an event traumatic. 
But, again, there is little consideration of how such events are collectively 
internalised by the culture, or of how the collective sadness, fear and anger 
expressed in their wake differs from these emotions experienced individually. 
It is not, perhaps, enough to draw a general analogy between individual and 
collective trauma, the sole difference lying in the “shared-ness” of the latter. 
 
This review of the literature on grief as it affects groups throws up several 
issues. Firstly, it is clear that grief has enormous power at a collective level: it 
can disrupt and depress; equally, it can create and energise. But it has these 
effects at an individual level too, and the focus of this chapter is on 
establishing grief as a collective phenomenon, not on further exploring the 
various properties of the grieving experience. Collective grief certainly comes 
across as a reality at the family level, and in the case of “first nation” groups, 
but does not appear to have the same validity in local communities struck by 
disaster, or in workgroups affected by change, both of which are treated as 
collected groups of grieving individuals rather than as collectives in their own 
right. This is understandable in view of the fact that most such groups based 
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on location are, by virtue of the nature of fast-changing, ever-moving 
contemporary western society, temporary and shifting entities. Families, 
along with those “first nation” groups artificially contained within the dominant 
culture, have clearer boundaries which persist with greater continuity in time. 
They both, in addition, are internally bound by common blood or kinship links.  
The nation presents a more ambiguous picture. Earlier studies approached 
national grief from an individual, psychologically-based, collected 
perspective. More recent studies refer to the collective nature and 
consequences of national reaction to loss, but in often superficial broad brush 
strokes which raise more questions than they provide answers. How exactly 
does grief operate within a nation? What does it mean to talk about collective 
emotion and myth-making at a national level? What binds a nation internally? 
A nation may demonstrate continuity through its history, but how does the 
idea of national containment sit in a contemporary globalised context? The 
remainder of this chapter attempts to tease out answers to these questions 
and to explore the feasibility of collective national grief as a concept.  
 
The Nation 
Modernist and Perennialist Perspectives 
Preceded by tribes and by empires, the nation as a form of large-scale social 
grouping is presented by some theorists as a relatively recent phenomenon. 
The modernist approach to defining the nation views nationalism, a 
movement which began in Europe in the eighteenth century and proved so 
successful that the world is now, some three centuries later, composed 
entirely of nations, as a process operating in tandem with the 
contemporaneous key processes of modernity, namely, industrialisation and 
capitalism. Gellner (1983) regards nationalism as an essentially political 
principle “which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent” (p.1), its rise marking a phase of human development between 
the agrarian and industrial orders, essential to the efficient functioning of the 
latter. A modern economy needed a uniform culture, achieved by the 
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fabrication of nations which served to integrate societies that were highly 
differentiated socially, culturally and institutionally.  
Maintaining an emphasis on the political aspects of nation-formation, 
Hobsbawm (1983), a Marxist historian, considers the nation a thoroughly 
modern invention, an illusion utilized in the service of class interests for 
economic and political ends. He sees the nation-state as providing a setting 
for individual lives, the course of which it largely determines. Althusser 
(1971), a Marxist philosopher, supports this view with his theory of 
“ideological state apparatuses”, the mechanisms whereby these lives are so 
determined, and which include the family, the media, religious organisations 
and the education system.  
Giddens (1985) also underlines the elements of political and administrative 
control in his definition of nationalism as an “affiliation of individuals to a set 
of symbols and beliefs emphasizing communality among the members of a 
political order” (p.116). He points out that only within modern nations does 
the administrative scope of the state apparatus correspond directly with 
territorial boundaries (p. 18). While regarding the nation as a modern 
phenomenon stemming from the aftermath of the French revolution, he 
acknowledges that European nationalism is perhaps to be categorized in a 
class of its own and that theories based on it are not readily generalisable 
elsewhere (1981). 
Another school of thought contends that nations are not mere inventions of 
the modern era, but have their roots in pre-modern ethnic groups. Armstrong 
(1982) posits the existence of nations, in the sense of people sharing an 
ethnic identity, prior to nationalism, the movement which created ethnic 
boundaries around these peoples. Focusing on Europe and the Islamic 
Mediterranean, he argues that the rise of nations and the territorialisation of 
identity can be traced to pre-modern secular and religious developments in 
these regions. Smith (1986, 1999) also sees medieval and ancient 
communities as providing a springboard for modern nations. He contends 
that ethnic communities developed into nations through “a heightened sense 
of collective distinctiveness and mission” (1999, p.130). Myth-making 
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enabled the establishment of a collective consciousness and identity, a joint 
purpose for the group, and nationalism served both to strengthen existing 
myths and initiate new ones. Without such an “inherited store” of myths, 
memories, customs and symbols from the original ethnic community, Smith 
sees no basis for the founding of a nation. In his definition (1999, p.104) a 
nation is  “A named cultural unit of population with a separate homeland, 
shared ancestry myths and memories, a public culture, common economy, 
and common legal rights and duties for all members”. This perennialist 
approach, which stresses cultural continuity and developmental process, 
regards modern nationalism as part of a long cycle of ethnic consciousness.  
 
Imagined Community 
By contrast, Anderson’s (1991) distinctly modernist perspective on the nation 
as “an imagined political community” sees it as a socially constructed cultural 
artefact emerging in response to and as a definitive break from the past. In 
Anderson’s view, as those large cultural systems based on religious faith and 
dynastic hierarchies, which had previously provided security, began to 
decline, membership of the nation, with its clear boundaries and inherent 
sovereignty, provided an alternative form of security, akin to that of belonging 
to a large, extended family. In addition, concepts of time began to change to 
a more linear, serial mode, as evidenced in the continuity integral to the new 
literary forms of the novel and the newspaper. The nation could thus be 
conceptualised as a “solid community, moving steadily down history” (p.26) 
and, thanks to the rise of the printed word, this conceptualisation could be 
shared by people who had never met, yet were confident of their community 
in “a deep, horizontal comradeship” (p.6). 
The phrase “imagined community” has proved sufficiently seductive as to 
have become ubiquitous in academic discussion of nations and nationalism. 
However, Anderson’s theories have not been so well received in themselves. 
He has been criticized (Breuilly 1996; Chatterjee 1993; Smith 1991) for 
neglecting the importance of the ethnic and the political aspects of nation 
formation, and for presenting an over-ambitious theoretical generalisation in 
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both historical and geopolitical terms. His major contribution should perhaps 
be considered as lying in the description of how nationhood is brought into 
being, of what preconditions increase the potential for the creation of a sense 
of national belonging, and of how modern communications developments 
have enabled the widespread sharing of collective national identity. 
Billig’s (1995) concept of “banal nationalism” adds to this perspective of the 
nation from the angle of collective identity. The endless, routine reproduction 
of national values, assumptions and symbols leads to their becoming taken-
for-granted elements of everyday living, operating beyond the level of 
conscious awareness. National identity thus becomes embodied in the habits 
of social life, going unquestioned and unchallenged, and provides a 
background against which individual identities are constructed. This 
essentially performative view of nationhood is echoed in the work of post-
colonial theorists like Bhabha (1990) and Chatterjee (1993), who underline 
the lack of homogeneity in most third world nations, arguing that their 
national identities are negotiated through a contestation of dominant and 
minority discourses, and that national narratives are constructions emerging 
from the hybrid interaction of contending cultural constituencies within the 
nation. 
 
Multiculturalism, Globalism and Territorialism 
Multiculturalism poses a challenge to “the daily plebiscite” (Renan 
1882/1990, p.19) which is the negotiated and agreed foundation of any 
nation, and much multiculturalist policy is specifically devised to accomodate 
the assimilation and absorption of immigrants into the dominant national 
framework (Kymlicka 1997; Sabbagh 2004).  Parekh (1999) cautions against 
attempts to define national identity in a multicultural society, since there will 
always be a dominant group which seeks primary identification with the 
country and adoption of its own identity as national. He sees the delinking of 
ethnicity and citizenship as the critical precondition for the accommodation of 
multiculturalism within the national mainstream. In the United States, as 
Walzer (1992) points out, the challenge of rendering nationalism and 
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multiculturalism more compatible has been met through the creation of 
“hyphenated Americans”, who retain a cultural, ethnic identity while 
professing a political, civic allegiance to the state.   
Appadurai (1996) looks to a deterritorialised “postnational” world in which 
cultural hybridisation is the norm, and where the twin forces of media and 
migration create global flows and cascades of people and of images. But 
globalisation does not seem likely to render notions of nationalism redundant 
quite yet. If there is an inbuilt  tension between the idea of the “global village” 
with its different members pursuing their own interests, and the aspiration to 
“one world values” (Day and Thompson 2004), the reactions to the economic 
crises arising at the end of the first decade of the twenty first century have, if 
anything, emphasized the former. And although there is an increasing flow of 
social relations across national borders in our Jihad versus MacWorld 
(Barber 1996) times, resulting in a growing membership of international 
communities of sentiment or interest, the nation appears likely to remain a 
remarkably resilient category of identity for the foreseeable future.  
Whereas Marx regarded class as the major social category, dismissing the 
nation as ephemeral and insubstantial, Deutsch (1967, p.217) sums up the 
case for the nation’s enduring success: “the nation-state offers most of its 
members a stronger sense of security, belonging or affiliation, and even 
personal identity, than does any alternative large group”.  Even Appadurai 
(1996), arguing for recognition of a new relationship between subjectivity, 
location, political identification and social imagination as a result of the forces 
of globalisation, acknowledges that national identity, if not the physical 
nation-state, still has a strong enough grip on the imagination to inhibit the 
ability to think beyond the nation. 
For Grosby (1995), there is no such clear distinction between the physical 
and the imagined. He views territoriality as a fundamental feature of all 
human societies, the territory which is perceived as one’s “own” being life-
sustaining in biological terms through the provision of the necessary physical 
nutrients, and also in mental, emotional and spiritual terms “by providing the 
locus for those memories and psychic patterns necessary for the ordering of 
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life” (p. 158). The territory which makes up a homeland and provides the 
base for a nation is not simply a delineated space, but is equally the 
“transcendental significance of that space”, the meaningful and temporally 
deep structure it represents for the individual and the collective living there 
(p.149).  Citing medievalist Susan Reynolds (p.154) in her observations that 
words like “populus”, “natio” and “gens” were used just as approximately in 
the middle ages as their equivalents “people” and “nation” are today to refer 
to “a community of custom, descent and government”, Grosby counters the 
mainstream modernist theories with a perspective on territorialised identity as 
incorporating a historically persistent primordial pattern of attachment to a 
structure more extensive than that of family or locality. 
 
Defining the Nation 
This brief overview of some of the theories on nations and nationalism 
reflects the wide debate surrounding the topic, centring not only on definition 
of the terms, but also on when nations first appeared and on how they 
developed prior to their debut on the world stage. To enter into this debate is 
neither necessary nor justifiable in the context of this dissertation, where no 
single definition as given above will suffice, but all definitions are regarded as 
offering some pertinent perspectives or elements of relevance. If this 
approach risks the charge of imprecision as levelled at both medieval 
commentators and contemporary theorists on the nation, it also provides for 
recognition of the multidimensional complexity contained within the concept.  
A nation, for the purposes of this dissertation, is taken as a group of people 
which both views itself and is viewed as collectively sharing a common set of 
parameters, at once physical, cultural and political. Territory and boundaries; 
symbols, myths and memories; ideological frameworks, economic structures 
and legal systems; ethnicity and citizenship, are all important constituents of 
nationhood, though perhaps not all equally nor simultaneously, with varying 
salience across different nations and at different points in time. A nation can 
be a state, but the two do not always coincide, either spatially or temporally, 
and the latter has to be viewed as a legal and political concept rather than in 
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terms of social community (Tivey 1980).  
An essential feature of nationhood highlighted in the arguments that follow is 
its dynamic, ongoing nature as a collective project created, maintained and 
negotiated through the participation and interaction of its members. At the 
heart of this process is the symbiotic relationship between the individual and 
the group: the collective national consciousness and the overall collective 
identity manifest through individual members of the nation who, in their turn, 
nurture, modify or recast these overarching phenomena, and so on, from one 
generation to another. In addition, a prerequisite for the nation, as a category 
of identity which, like that of the individual, is based on difference and alterity, 
is the existence of other nations, providing an international framework, a 
global context in which individual nations themselves participate and interact.  
 
The Grieving Nation 
Taking the characterisation of the nation outlined above together with the 
description of grief laid out in the first chapter, can sense be made of the 
concept of a grieving nation? A nation suffers a significant loss, as a result of 
an event such as war, genocide or occupation. Whatever individual losses of 
bereavement or destruction are incurred by the nation's members in the 
course of the relevant event, there is shared loss at the level of collective 
national identity. For example, the security promised by membership of the 
nation is no longer to be taken for granted in a situation of conflict and defeat; 
the dignity involved in exercising what have hitherto been considered normal 
rights of citizenship evaporates under foreign occupation; the assumed 
affiliation of nationhood becomes illusory in genocidal civil war. Expectations 
are shattered, assumptions questioned.  
The resultant grief impacts strongly on the immediately affected generation, 
colouring the collective national identity which is so basic to and so 
intertwined with personal identity. Through everyday interaction in the family 
and the workplace, through the media, through legal and administrative 
processes, this grief manifests and permeates society, entering the collective 
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consciousness of the nation. It is then transferred to the next generation, 
communicated through the words of school history books and family 
conversations, through the images seen in films and on view in museums 
and exhibitions, through television programmes and newspaper articles, 
through attitudes, moods and body language, through prejudices, taboos and 
resentments. For the grief has now become a major component of overall 
national identity, a part of the nation's assumptive world, absorbed by the 
next generation as they are brought up within the framework of the nation's 
institutions. And so the cycle goes on, the grief becoming interwoven with the 
newly reconstructed national narrative, and, from that essential background 
against which all personal narratives play out, with the individual narratives of 
all the nation's members.  
The trajectory of a nation’s grief crosses generations, unfolding in its own 
unique and particular way, with efforts to adapt and adjust, or with continued 
lamentations over loss. Nor does this take place in a vacuum: membership of 
the global village locates the grieving nation in a network of relationships with 
other nations. In the same way as the individual grieves within a social 
context, the nation grieves within an international one. And the way in which 
any particular nation deals with its grief, in terms of rebuilding identity and 
reconstructing the national narrative in order to accommodate its loss, will 
have an effect on its interaction with other nations, and will also be affected 
by that interaction. Consequences are bound to flow, in both directions. 
The concept of nation appears to provide for the conditions which render the 
grief experience feasible: susceptibility to loss, mechanisms which ensure 
continuity in time, and containment as a limited, discrete unit existing in a 
dynamic context of interaction with similar units. But can the fundamentals of 
grief as outlined in the first chapter, namely: the grief-triggering loss; the 
emotional response; the attempt to make sense of the post-loss world; and 
the specific context and its influence on the shaping of the ensuing 
consequences, be regarded as applicable at a national level? And if they 





Grief-triggering losses affecting national identity seem to occur in relatively 
specific situations, a few of which are touched on above. In conflict contexts, 
defeat, along with the material losses entailed, brings about loss of pride, 
loss of confidence, loss of a particular national vision for the future. 
Germany’s defeat in the first world war, and even more humiliatingly in the 
second, provide illustration, as does the surrender of Japan after the atomic 
bombings at the end of the second world war. Occupation by a foreign power 
means loss of autonomy and independence, the underpinnings of both 
national and personal identity. The Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Israeli 
occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, and the occupation of Iraq by the 
United States and its allies, are all recent examples. Cases of genocide, as in 
the Jewish holocaust, the Cambodian and Rwandan civil wars, and the ethnic 
conflict in Sudan, involve loss of any perception of self-value and security in 
terms of having a place in the world, along with loss of trust in fellow-
humanity. Partition, as experienced on the Indian sub-continent, and in other 
parts of the world where lines drawn by colonial powers through the middle of 
homogeneous tribal and ethnic territories necessitated the mass movements 
of people, results in loss of land and home, along with a loss of any sense of 
belonging or of autonomy in determining the future. 
All these scenarios entail radical damage to collective self-image, and a 
dispossession of fundamental elements of collective self-identity. They 
involve the undermining of the basic sense of ontological security that 
membership of a nation can provide: Volkan’s (1999) “big tent” of nationhood 
fails to provide the taken-for-granted protection, or compatriots prove signally 
lacking in any assumed affiliation. Moreover, lack of agency or 
powerlessness is characteristic of the national loss experience, while 
causative agency is attributable elsewhere: someone else is held 
responsible. The sense of impotence and insecurity created by natural 
disasters does not appear to present as significant a loss as that perceived to 
be caused by another nation or group (Van der Veer 1998; Zinner and 
Williams 1999). It is the breakdown of expectations of the social order, the 
rupture of assumptions of social cohesiveness resultant from the 
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intentionality of others, whether viewed as a betrayal of trust (Edkins 2003) or 
as the issue of relationship to a destructive social world (Fierke 2007), that 
appears to inspire grief at a national level. Although grief-triggering loss, for 
the nation as for the individual, is fundamentally concerned with the web of 
social meanings underlying existence, with changes in the way of relating to 
self and others, the issue of agency would appear to play a more crucial role 
at the national level. 
 
National Emotional Response 
In world politics, “emotion is implicit and ubiquitous, but undertheorised” 
(Crawford 2000, p.118). The tendency to ignore the role of emotion in 
international affairs can be seen as resulting from a long tradition in 
modernity of separating emotion from rationality (Elster 1999), the former 
viewed as dangerously countering the ability to make rational and ethical 
judgements, causing confusion, and leading to impulsive, violent acts; the 
latter assumed as fundamental to justice and effective, cool-headed, 
decision-making. The actions of nation-states in a modern, liberal, 
democratic world have therefore to be seen to be based on rational 
considerations. Increasingly, however, the significance of emotions in global 
politics is being recognised. Lebow (2005) argues that emotions are central 
to world politics, and that reason and emotion are not as mutually exclusive 
in this sphere as has previously been assumed. Mercer (2005, 2006, 2010) 
echoes these themes and criticises the academic enthusiasm for purging 
emotion from explanations of international affairs. Bleiker and Hutchison 
(2007, 2008a) lament the lack of research into the role of emotion in global 
affairs, arguing the need to accept that such research “can be insightful and 
valid even if it engages unobservable phenomena, and even if the results of 
such inquiries can neither be measured nor validated empirically” (2007, p.4).  
Collective emotion is a dimension of the relations between groups, arising 
from their evaluatively charged interactions. Where group membership is a 
fundamental component of self-identity, the individual strongly identifying with 
a group, collective emotions can be elicited through intergroup interactions in 
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the same way as individual emotions are through interpersonal interactions. 
Independent of personal outcome, any event or situation perceived as 
threatening or advancing the group’s interests, will give rise to an emotional 
response: “Even when the self has clearly played no causal role in an event, 
depending on the meaning that event has for a valued social identity, 
differential emotional reactions can occur” (Branscombe and Miron 2004, p. 
314). Resentment, for example, based on a perception of undeserved 
advantage, is traditionally associated with relations between class groupings 
in society (Barbalet 1998). Collective shame or anger emerges in response to 
intergroup prejudice or discrimination (Kaiser and Major 2004). Collective 
guilt is elicited when a group is confronted with and acknowledges the 
illegitimacy of its own negative actions towards another group (Branscombe 
and Miron 2004).The collective schadenfreude which arises from intergroup 
envy can create a climate in which more direct aggression is tolerated 
(Spears and Leach 2004), as, for example, in the case of Europe’s Jews in 
the early twentieth century, or of the educated classes of Cambodia in the 
mid-twentieth century. 
Collective emotions play a significant role within the structural relations of 
power and status characterising the global political scene, both as 
consequences of foreign policy situations and as triggers of policy-making 
behaviour (Alexieva 2008). International interactions throw up events or 
situations which are variously interpreted as either threatening or advancing 
what are perceived to be the interests or concerns of the respective nations 
involved, and emotions are elicited in the course of these appraisal-laden 
interplays. The specific assessments of potential threat or benefit arising from 
any particular situation, and the judgements on where the national interests 
lie, are, of course, open to negotiation and contestation, to strategic political 
or ideological manipulation, within any given interaction (Aaltola 2009; 
Ahmed 2004; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008b; Butler 2009; Fattah and Fierke 
2009; Moisi 2007, 2009; Saurette 2006). 
Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain how emotion is shared 
by a group: emotional contagion, the automatic and unconscious “catching” 
of emotions from others, through mimicry, synchronisation and feedback in 
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everyday interaction, (Hatfield and Rapson 2004); emotional convergence, 
the tendency to modulate emotions to match and coincide with others, thus 
forming closer relationships with stronger bonds (Anderson and Keltner 
2004); and, in the context of traumatic events, a process of dissemination 
whereby the immediately affected “carrier group” communicates their feelings 
to the rest, until the entire collective is participating in the trauma discourse 
(Alexander 2004a). In these various ways, emotion can pervade the group, 
leading to the creation of an overall collective emotional climate.  
Ross (2006) views emotions as belonging strictly neither to the individual nor 
the collective, but existing as strata of the constructed self alongside 
memories, habits and beliefs. His description of the American response to 
9/11 as “a synthetic process that crystallised a variety of memories and 
emotional states into a public mood... conducive to militarist response” 
(p.213), implies an affective aspect to collective consciousness that is 
available for mobilisation in reaction to events, enabling the combining of pre-
existent affect with contemporary response. This is not inconsistent with De 
Rivera et al.’s (2007, p.255) definition of emotional climate as “a social 
construction created by people in the ways that they interact with one 
another”,  brought into being by feelings filtered through a society’s emotional 
conventions, and  grounded in the ways in which that particular society 
regulates the expression of emotion. 
There will be variation in contribution to and experience of any collective 
emotion: “An emotional climate is not a blanket which equally covers each 
member of the group associated with it” (Barbalet 1998, p.160). And a 
distinction between emotional climate and emotional atmosphere can be 
made, based on the gravity of the event eliciting the emotion: “If the event 
has lasting consequences, emotional conventions can affect the emotional 
climate of a society. If not, the event produces short- or medium-term 
emotional atmospheres” (Fernandez-Dols et al. 2007, p.342).  
On the basis of the above, emotional response would seem to be feasibly 
attributable to nations, although not in terms of direct emotions as they are 
understood to be felt by individuals. There is clear academic support for the 
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significance of emotion at an international level, and for the recognition of 
collective emotional reaction, variously conceptualised as an overall 
emotional climate arising from the collected emotions of the nation’s 
individual members; or in terms of the mobilisation of emotional energies 
derived from an affective component of collective consciousness; or, 
reflecting the inherent complexity of the phenomenon, some mixture of the 
two. 
 
Making Sense of Loss: National Meaning-Making and Memory 
The stories nations tell about themselves answer questions of identity and 
purpose at a collective level in the same way as personal narratives do at an 
individual level. And collective memory, the memory shared by the nation’s 
members, constructed and passed on by the group, is essential to the 
national narrative creation process. Halbwachs (1925/1992) argues that 
human memory can only function within a collective context since people are 
always operating in a social arena. Consequently, collective memory is 
selective, dependent on the particular social perspective of the group doing 
the remembering. Thus memory functions as a mechanism of social 
differentiation among groups, and leads to the formation of distinct 
“communities of memory” (Bellah et al. 1985; Wood 1999).  
For Halbwachs, collective memory is a social framework onto which all 
personal recollections of past events are woven. History is what would be left 
after all the social layers were removed from these individual accounts. He 
argues that the selective reconstruction and appropriation or discarding of 
parts of the past that collective memory involves, always respond to the 
needs of the present. Such exploitation of the past by the present, the 
mobilisation of memory for contemporary purposes, can be illustrated by the 
American Jewish use of the holocaust to silence critics of Israel (Chomsky 
1988); or by the late twentieth century burst of academic interest in and 
commemorative activities around the Irish famine, an event previously 




Halbwachs defines collective memory, but leaves it to others to elaborate on 
the mechanisms whereby it is transmitted from one generation to the next, 
always up for renegotiation, sustaining social solidarity yet simultaneously 
contestable and containing the potential for conflict (Bell 2006). Nora’s (1984-
92) comprehensive cataloguing of “lieux de memoire” lists numerous 
symbolic sites or realms which powerfully evoke a set of values that 
configure the nation and draw its citizens together in social collectivity. These 
sites, “where memory crystallises and secretes itself” (1989, p.7), and which 
include institutions, texts, flags, commemorative events, national heritage 
locations, and specific dates for celebration, represent the shared meanings 
and values fundamental to national identity. They act as temporal conduits by 
operating as signifiers: one generation invests them with meaning, and the 
next can interpret them as they will, or even discard them and establish new 
sites with new meanings. 
Connerton (1989) proposes the centrality of “acts of transfer” to the 
intergenerational transmission of collective memory. These are essentially 
communicative acts between different groups in society, and comprise 
narratives, commemorative ceremonies and rituals, and bodily practices such 
as posture and gesture. He regards museums, libraries and academies as 
the store-rooms of collective memory, but stresses the vital role of dynamic 
acts in conveying and sustaining that memory. Numerous means are cited by 
various theorists for this active transmission of collective memory: war 
memorials and commemorations; film, visual art, literature and poetry; 
educational textbooks and official histories; popular culture and tourist sites 
(Eley 2008; Tal 1996; Winter 1995). Moreover, Cushman (1995) observes, in 
the context of trauma, how patterns of interaction, particular configurations of 
self-other relationships, are passed on intergenerationally.  
By means of this apparatus for remembering and forgetting, one generation 
of a nation ensures the continuity of the national narrative by transmitting  its 
memories to the next, the transfer effected by a process of communication in 
which “collective memory is a representation of the past embodied in both 
commemorative symbolism and historical evidence” (Schwartz 1997, p.471). 
Within this communicative context, history can be seen as a system of 
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referential symbols and commemoration as a system of condensation 
symbols (Sapir 1934), expressing moral sentiments inspired by historic 
events. Thus history disenchants the past while commemoration re-enchants 
it, although the latter is always kept within bounds by the former.  
When a nation suffers identity-damaging loss, through “critical events” which 
distort the national narrative (Das 1995), or trauma which undermines the 
collective sense of stability and creates perceptions of danger, chaos and 
crisis (Neal 1998), it has to make sense of the situation. The national 
narrative must be reconstructed to accommodate the new knowledge the 
nation’s members have gained about themselves, their values, their social 
integrity, their capacity for violence or vulnerability to harm, their assumptions 
and beliefs (Gray and Oliver 2004, pp. 1-12). Usable pasts, into which this 
new knowledge can be integrated, or from which it can be omitted, are 
created by governments, opinion formers and political elites, and enter into 
the collective memory. 
This process can be illustrated by the ways in which various European 
countries re-established their identities in the aftermath of the second world 
war. East Germany, for example, completely forgot the holocaust. By 
dismissing it as the product of the workings of capitalist forces, any 
responsibility was sloughed off and neatly shifted westwards over the border 
(Giesen 2004; Smelser 2004). Austria, meanwhile, positioned itself as a 
liberated country, laying the blame for the past at the doors of its occupiers 
(Giesen 2004). France, which had succumbed to German occupation in a 
matter of weeks, and, on liberation, had to cope with a history of collaboration 
and profiteering, blacked out those negative factors with visions of a united 
resistance which entered into the collective memory and remained there 
unquestioned for the next thirty years (Kitson 2008). In addition, the Allies’ 
immediate post-war concerns did not include recognising the holocaust as 
such (Alexander 2004b): Dimbleby’s radio broadcast from a liberated Belsen 
was censored so that no reference was made to the Jewishness of the 
inmates (Kushner 2008); at Nuremberg there was no specific reference to the 
Jews (Bloxham 2008); and the camps of Aktion Reinhard, unambiguous 
Jewish extermination facilities, received little publicity by contrast to the 
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concentration camps of Belsen and Auschwitz (Bloxham 2004). 
Tal (1996) outlines three strategies employed for collective meaning-making 
in the re-establishment of national identity and reconstruction of the national 
narrative after trauma: mythologisation, medicalisation and disappearance. 
The first, involving narratives of redemption, rescue and conquest, is seen in 
the romantic myth of heroic sacrifice constructed to account for the enormous 
number of British military deaths in the first world war (Winter 1995); and in 
the justification of the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States 
and its allies as a necessary step in the rescue of the Iraqi people from 
oppressive dictatorship (Edkins 2003). The second, involving a process of 
rehabilitation and return to “normal” life, features in American reaction to the 
Vietnam War, in the aftermath of which the post-traumatic stress syndrome 
diagnosis of veterans sought to medicalise their experiences away (Tal 
1996); and in the huge programme of trauma therapy run during and after the 
war in Yugoslavia by organisations like Doctors without Borders (Richters 
1998). Tal’s third strategy, entailing a refusal to acknowledge the existence of 
events or  their effects, is exemplified by the Japanese blocking out of 
uncomfortable facts like the Nanking massacre or the comfort women (Black 
2008, p.16); and by the Turkish refusal to countenance any notion of a state-
sponsored Armenian massacre (Giesen 2004, p.151; Hovannisian 1999). 
Edkins (2003) argues that producing any sort of narrative is in itself a form of 
forgetting, since narrative obscures, conceals and domesticates the actual 
experiences it sets out to recount. Hence silence is the norm in the 
immediate aftermath of identity-damaging events. But the need to make 
meaning, to produce a usable past for the collective national memory, is 
urgent, since “when memory is not in question, neither is identity” (Lambek 
and Antze 1996, p. xxii), and functional existence without identity is 
dangerously vulnerable to external influence and manipulation, let alone 
being a questionable concept in its own terms. 
In any nation, those in power will always try to construct a narrative of the 
past legitimising their own authority, but they are not the only ones engaged 
in remembering and forgetting. The struggle over memory, the politically 
79 
 
motivated competition for the dominant discourse in the reconstruction of the 
national narrative, can result in a lengthy process of collective groping, 
negotiation and contestation before a definitive response is established. Even 
then, this response will be subject to revision over  time as events once 
deemed as having major impact are forgotten in the foregrounding of newer 
experiences, and as pressing requirements for fresh usable pasts arise to 
meet the needs of the next generation (Mannheim 1952).  
 
International Context and Consequences 
In the same way as the individual is located in a social context by categories 
like gender, age, class and ethnicity, indicating relationship to other members 
of society, the nation is defined by categories which establish its status in the 
global order and reveal its differences from and similarities to other members 
of the international community. Nations can be categorised according to size, 
population, wealth, and economic, technological or industrial achievement. 
Global organisations like the United Nations employ a variety of economic 
and governance classification indicators, including levels of income 
production, human and economic development; human rights records and 
degree of press freedom; status of democratic processes and institutions, 
and levels of transparency and corruption. Nations can also be identified in 
terms of cultural values (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), or in terms of 
dependency and exploitation (Wallerstein 1987). 
Being a nation in the global community implies positioning and engagement 
in a network of international relationships. The basis for these collaborations 
can be economic, as with membership of the G8 or the G20, or of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (www.opec.org); regional, as 
with ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations), the OAU 
(Organisation for African Unity) or ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States); or security-oriented, as in the case of NATO, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or ECOMOG, the intervention force which grew 
out of ECOWAS. 
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When any nation suffers significant loss, the subsequent repairing of identity 
and reconstruction of national narrative does not take place in isolation, but in 
a dynamic context of interaction and interrelationship with other nations. The 
nation, like the individual, does not meet loss empty-handed, but comes to 
the experience with its own distinctive history and identity, developed and 
established within this international context. This suggests that the axiom that 
who we are dictates how we grieve might have some validity at an 
international level. Certainly, nations which perceive or wish to perceive 
themselves as strong, appear to adopt a hard, problem-solving, action- 
oriented response in grief. The American reaction to 9/11 in terms of an 
anger and hatred that found an outlet in the Iraq war has already been 
mentioned above. The “iron fist” policies of Israel, the Jewish nation which, in 
order to survive, had to differentiate itself from the victim status of the 
holocaust Jews, also demonstrates the point. By contrast, a weaker nation 
might seem unable to reconstruct its post-loss narrative, consistently harking 
back to the pre-loss past. In Cambodia, for example, there is a lack of official 
history dealing with the recent past, perhaps reflecting a preference to revert 
to the glories of the centuries old Khmer kingdom and forget more unsettling 
up-to-date events. 
Post-loss, the grief trajectory of the nation will be influenced by the ongoing 
interaction of the global context, and may well have an effect on it in turn. In 
many instances, the international reaction is one of ignoring loss and 
disenfranchising the grief. As already mentioned, the Jewish nation’s loss in 
the holocaust was not immediately recognised at the end of the second world 
war, but only some years later as a result of pressure from the American 
Jewish pro-Israeli lobby. The realisation that  the humiliating losses endured 
by Germany after the first world war were largely responsible for the rise of 
Nazism and Germany's expansive ambitions in the thirties, came too late to 
prevent a second world war. The nakba of 1948, where Palestinians lost their 
homeland to the creation of the Jewish state, though recognised as a loss by 
the Arab world and many African and Asian nations, has remained largely 
unacknowledged in the west.  
In some cases, of course, self-disenfranchisement of grief may be in 
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operation, with shame acting as a self-regulator (Kauffman 2002). Given that 
so much pride comes from national identity, it seems appropriate that shame 
should function at this level too, and such collective disallowing of grief might 
explain phenomena like Germany’s “inability to mourn” after 1945, or 
Cambodia’s insistence that theirs is not a traumatised nation in the aftermath 
of their killing fields. Pride, dignity and the saving of face may play a larger 
part in the self-policing of national grief than they do in western theoretical 
models of individual grief.  
For admitting to grief and accepting support has a price. As Fierke (2007, 
p.9) observes, "International responses to violence or suffering tend to 
assume a responsibility to 'fix' problems". The “fixer” comes from a position of 
strength, and the support available to a grieving nation is normally in the form 
of western style therapies which require it to comply with the role of the 
“needing to be fixed”. Post-traumatic stress counsellors are sent in to 
medicalise problems away, since "The impact of responses to death and 
trauma, ignored in political settlements of social violence, can cause further 
damage to survivors and prejudice lasting peace" (Simpson 1997, p.5). 
Although practical help can often serve more purpose than psychiatric 
counselling (Giller 1998) by helping to mend the social fabric of the 
community, which will have its own time-honoured ways of supporting 
individuals (Summerfield 1998), the truth and reconciliation processes, the 
legal proceedings and court cases are set in motion. These ostensibly offer 
psychological closure, but also perform the function of re-presenting the past 
and creating a narrative from it, moving the situation on. The international 
organisations swing into action with their various agendas, resourcing and 
restructuring the grieving nation to enable it to return to normal functioning as 
a member of the global community. 
The only option to this fixer-sanctioned return to a culture of normality would 
seem to be the downward spiral to failed state or economic basket case 
status, even to oblivion or ultimate disappearance as a nation. And  although 
the empowerment of the injured through legitimised grievance has led to the 
rise of a new international politics of grievance (Black 2008), in which grief 
might be seen as providing an opportunity for rebalancing global power 
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structures, in reality it changes nothing. It simply means that with regard to 
roles like fixed and fixer, injured and injuring, which become established as 
social positions and rooted in national identities (Brown 1995), the injured 
and needing to be fixed now have a vested interest in maintaining these 
positions. Grief appears to be well regulated and efficiently policed for 
maintenance of the status quo in the global community. 
 
Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to shift grief from its traditional domain of 
the individual to that of the collective, more specifically, to that of the nation. 
After a consideration of the relationship between the individual and the 
collective, and the ways in which that relationship has been theoretically 
conceptualised, various studies of grief as it affects groups were reviewed. 
Whereas collective grief, affecting the group as a whole, is recognised in 
family and first nation group studies, work-groups and local communities, by 
contrast, lend themselves more to an individual-member-oriented, collected 
grief perspective. The nation too, though displaying the same properties of 
continuity and containment as family and first nation groups, has been 
approached largely in terms of the collected grief of its members in the wake 
of loss, with little more than lip-service paid to any collective aspects of the 
phenomenon. 
In seeking to establish any feasibility for collective national grief as a 
meaningful concept, various definitions and descriptions of nation and 
nationhood were examined, and an exploration undertaken of how the 
fundamentals of grief, as outlined in the first chapter, might apply collectively 
to the nation, as characterised in this one. The best way of ascertaining 
whether nations grieve, however, is through a detailed study of an actual 
nation undergoing and reacting to significant, identity-damaging loss. The 
next chapter will set out the strategy for just such an undertaking, detailing 
the design and methodology for an investigative exploration of the behaviour 
of two particular nations in the wake of loss. 
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   3.  TRACING THE CONTOURS OF NATIONAL GRIEF: METHODOLOGY 
    “The function of research is not necessarily to map and conquer the world    
but to sophisticate the beholding of it”. 
                                                            (Stake 1995, p. 43) 
 
The first chapter considered the nature of grief, expanding it from the 
traditional context of bereavement to a wider variety of identity-damaging 
experiences of loss, while keeping it within the domain of the individual. The 
second chapter sought to shift grief from that domain, examining its feasibility 
as a collective phenomenon, in particular at a national level. This third 
chapter sets the scene for a “plausibility probe” (George and Bennett 2004) 
into national grief, laying out a research design for the gathering of empirical 
evidence which might go some way towards answering the question of 
whether nations grieve or not, in terms of the definitions of grief and of nation 
as outlined in the preceding chapters. 
The research exercise involves capturing data from both national history and 
national identity. Since the narrative of the events in a people’s past, their 
national history, cannot be divorced from the narrative they tell themselves 
about who they are in the present, their national identity, the two are 
inextricably intertwined and mutually defining. And although the events of 
history might appear to qualify as “facts”, and as such lend themselves to an 
“objective” positivist approach; while the features of identity would seem to 
gravitate more toward the realm of “values” or “feelings”, stemming from 
subjective perceptions of the world (Taylor and Bogdan 1984, pp. 1-2), this is 
not the place for a debate on the nature of “reality” as either a given to be 
known, or a construction to be interpreted. Realism and idealism, as Seale 
(1999) suggests, are philosophical positions best understood as resources 
for thinking about a problem, and that is how they will be applied in the 
design of this research. 
The approach to the data will be determined by a framework of grief theory, 
but applied in as flexible a way as possible. An exercise in strict pattern-
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matching involving an attempt to reconcile a template for the elements of the 
grief experience with events of national history and characteristics of national 
identity, can imply a degree of rigidity. But an engagement with pattern-
comparison, involving a grief-oriented perspective on the national trajectory 
through history, can lead to a fruitful dialogue between the latter and grief 
theory, with a view to exploring how, if at all, each might illuminate the other. 
And an examination of current national identity, approached as a fluid and 
evolving process of negotiation rather than a static attribute, with a view to 
ascertaining the presence of any discernible traces of the grief experience 
amongst its features, can serve as a check on the findings which result from 
this comparing of patterns. 
The chapter goes on to provide a comprehensive description of the overall 
research design, with specific detail on the data sources to be exploited and 
the methods to be employed, along with consideration of the selection criteria 
and trade-offs involved at each stage of the decision-making. It includes a 
discussion of pertinent ethical issues, and an assessment of both the 
limitations and the potential of the proposed design. Finally, since “every 
research tool or procedure is inextricably embedded in commitments to 
particular versions of the world” (Hughes 1990, p.11), reference to the 
Introduction is relevant at this point, so as to permit some transparency on 
the particular version of the world framing this research. “Qualitative research 
is a complex interaction between the researcher and the researched” 
(Williams and May 1996, p. 9), and the reader deserves as much information 
on the former as on the latter in order to make a reliable judgement on the 
quality of the research and the ultimate credibility of its findings. 
 
Research Design 
Grief is a time-consuming phenomenon, unfolding over years of an 
individual’s lifetime and traversing generations in the case of collective 
groups. It seems fair to assume that at a national level, the grieving 
experience would occupy an indefinite period of time in a nation’s history, 
constituting a sequence of events that begins with a significant national loss 
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and continues through the subsequent lived experience of at least two 
generations, the one directly affected by the loss and its immediate 
successor. For all practical purposes, this means a minimum of between 
thirty and sixty years, a period of time which can be “cased” (Bearman et al. 
1999) with the loss at the beginning and, to ensure contemporary relevance, 
the present moment at the end, in order to give meaning to the sequence of 
events it contains. 
Given the necessity of a longitudinal unit of analysis, the only appropriate and 
feasible research strategy would seem to be a case study, pattern-comparing 
the essential grief theory trajectory with the event sequences of the specific 
“cased” periods of national history. Yin (2009 p.18) makes a distinction 
between a case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context”, and a 
history as dealing with “the entangled situation between phenomenon and 
context”. He associates case studies with the present, thus amenable to 
direct research methods such as observation and interview; and histories 
with the past, and consequently reliant on secondary sources of data. This is 
a neat, but perhaps over-simplified, distinction, and one which goes against 
the theoretical framework of identity and memory outlined in previous 
chapters, where the diachronic relationship between past and present was 
shown to be as relevant to the research issues as any synchronic 
interconnection between phenomenon and context. 
The case study approach allows for such levels of complexity. By catering for 
sequences of events through time as well as descriptions of current 
situations, it permits the retention of the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events. In the same way as studying an individual 
biography does not bring with it the picture of an isolated individual, but 
rather an awareness of that individual in society (Plummer 1983), so the 
examination of a national history will involve an awareness of that nation in 
an international context. As Stake (2006, pp. ix-x)  puts it, “Many phenomena 
take on different lives or forms depending on the particular hosts or local 
conditions....It is important to examine the common characteristics of these 
phenomena, but it is also important to examine situational uniqueness, 
86 
 
especially complexity and interaction with background conditions”. An 
appreciation of this interaction, on both the synchronic and diachronic levels, 
is achievable with a case study approach, which can preserve the multiple 
realities at play in any situation, and allow for the many different and often 
contradictory perspectives on what is actually going on. 
A major decision to be made in any case study is how many cases to cover. 
Silverman (2006) argues that in any qualitative research it is better to say a 
lot about a little rather than vice versa, and that depth is preferable to 
breadth. Yin (2009), however, reminds us that a single case study could turn 
out to be putting all the research eggs in one basket, and that a multiple case 
study is generally more robust. King et al. (1994, pp. 208-9) argue that “The 
more evidence we can find in varied contexts, the more powerful our 
explanation becomes, and the more confidence we and others should have 
in our conclusions”. Stake (2006) focuses on the function of any case study 
analysis, seeing the multiple case study as primarily instrumental, aimed at a 
better understanding of the particular phenomenon in the research spotlight. 
Since the primary aim of this particular piece of research is to establish the 
existence of the national grief phenomenon in the first place, with any gains 
in the understanding of it coming as secondary benefits or as means to the 
overall research end, the inclusion of multiple cases seems superfluous. Yet 
a single case study might pose too much of a risk: the case selected might 
not turn out to be anything like what it was anticipated as being at the outset; 
and, whether it provides positive evidence supporting the argument, or 
negative evidence refuting it, the findings could be all too easily dismissed as 
based on a one-off example. Two cases are clearly better, with the proviso 
borne in mind that a pairing should not lead to comparison where comparison 
is neither the purpose of the research, nor necessarily an appropriate means 
of arriving at answers to the research question. Klotz’s (2008) category of 
“more than two, but not a lot” would seem ideal, but the ultimate decision on 
two or more than two, has to be tempered by considerations of time and 
resources, and can perhaps only be taken in the light of which particular 




The process of case selection in a qualitative research design of this nature 
clearly has to be intentional rather than random, the intention being to assess 
the argument for national grief by studying nations which have endured 
significant loss and their subsequent reactions to that loss. Obviously, not 
every nation is a suitable candidate, but the identification of contenders which 
appear to fit the bill is not a difficult task. The world in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, to pin down the time scale for the required longitudinal unit 
of analysis, abounds with wars, genocides, partitions and occupations. The 
researcher into national grief would, unfortunately, appear to be spoilt for 
choice.  
So, how to select from the plethora of possibilities? Two important criteria are 
foregrounded in the literature on case study research methods: variance and 
falsification. Causality needs variance, as Leuffen (2007) points out, and 
cases should be selected with a view towards guaranteeing sufficient 
variance in terms of the research question. This makes for better 
understanding of the phenomenon, and more powerful explanations (Stake 
2006). The potential for falsification is also deemed desirable. Negative 
instances and deviant cases that might serve to falsify emerging causal 
propositions need to be sought out and examined, thus providing greater 
validity for the research (Seale 1999), which might otherwise be open to 
criticisms of selection bias.  
How might these criteria apply to this particular researcher’s personal 
selection bias towards the cases of Palestine and Israel, as explained in the 
Introduction? With regard to variance, despite their current geographical 
proximity, we are looking at two very different peoples undergoing two 
different kinds of loss. In the case of Palestine, an Arab people lost its lands 
to the creation of Israel in the nakba of 1948, and has endured enormous 
difficulties ever since, fragmented as a nation, its original loss largely 
unacknowledged by the west, its plight regularly exploited by its regional 
neighbours. With Israel, the focus is on the loss suffered by European Jewry 
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in the holocaust, and on the emergence of the state of Israel in the wake of 
that loss.  
The principle of variance might indicate a need to move away from Europe 
and the Middle East and seek out cases of nations from a wholly different 
culture, with a completely different approach to loss and suffering. The 
Kingdom of Cambodia in the thirty year aftermath of its genocidal killing fields 
initially came across as a good candidate, as did Tibet following the Chinese 
invasion and occupation. These cases, both with a strong Buddhist 
background, could provide a good degree of variance from the already 
sufficiently different Israeli and Palestinian national post-loss trajectories. But 
a cursory appraisal of the volume and complexity of the data involved in even 
one of these four possible national case studies quickly put paid to the idea 
of the inclusion of the latter two. Only the degree of economy of effort 
afforded by the fact that the national histories of Palestine and Israel are so 
intertwined, if so different, led to the decision to retain both of them as case 
studies. 
With regard to the principle of falsification, none of the four cases mentioned 
above gave the impression, on initial investigation, of being able to provide 
any negative instances. Where might be found a nation which had clearly 
undergone significant loss of the war, genocide, or occupation variety, and 
yet did not seem to display immediately visible traces of the collective 
reactions and behaviours which such loss typically appears to entail? Right 
next door to Israel and Palestine, a likely candidate presented itself in the 
shape of Lebanon, a nation which had experienced a complex, multi-faceted, 
fifteen year civil war between 1975 and 1990, but which seemed to 
collectively pick itself up and dust itself off after that war and get on with life. 
A great deal of individual grief, pain and suffering resulted from the Lebanese 
“events” of those years, but any collective picture is far less clear than it 
would appear to be in either Palestine or Israel. Moreover, the very ascription 
of a national collectivity to the Lebanese people, with their eighteen different 
official religious confessions and their numerous conflicting sectarian 
interests, might seem like a contradiction in terms. 
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However, despite Lebanon’s inherent potential for the elusive falsifiability, 
and despite the economy of access and effort permitted by the geographical 
proximity of Israel and Palestine, along with the extensive interweaving of all 
three national histories throughout the period in focus, it has not been 
included as a study. Practical considerations surrounding the wealth and 
complexity of data available for thorough and in-depth exploration of each 
case, in relation to the limitations of time and words imposed by the 
dissertation format, ultimately ruled out its inclusion.  
Finally settling, after due consideration, on the original two cases of Palestine 
and Israel, any remaining concern about selection bias on the basis of 
preconceived notions can perhaps best be allayed by taking into 
consideration Flyvbjerg’s (2004 p.429) comments on case study research 
design in general, “The case study contains no greater bias towards 
verification of the researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of 
inquiry. On the contrary, experience indicates that the case study contains a 
greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward 
verification”. 
In addition, with regard to overall strategy, the aim is to view the selected 
cases from as many perspectives as possible. As Nagel (1986) points out, 
there is no view from nowhere, and, if this inquiry into national post-loss 
trajectories is to succeed in illustrating and illuminating the research issues, it 
must view them from a variety of angles.  Accounting for the multiplicity and 
contestedness of the various discourses surrounding these cases over space 
and time may go some way towards offsetting the potential influence of any 
preconceptions. A central theme of the approach is the decentring of the 
studies, in the sense of de-emphasising the privileged centres of narrative 
and analysis which propagate the predominant western view (Gienow-Hecht 
2007). History and identity are only encountered through representation, but 
an awareness of whose representation and for what purpose, on what 
authority and against what resistance (Dunn 2008), can be a helpful 
companion, guiding the researcher to inhabit the “lived border between reality 
and representation” (Gubrium and Holstein 1997, p.102), and, ultimately, to 
construct their own representation of the various representations examined. 
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History Data Sources 
When dealing with periods of history, the use of secondary sources in the 
form of texts and documents is inevitable. They serve as substitutes for 
records of activity that the researcher is unable to observe directly (Stake 
1995). Neumann (2008), in fact, sees little difference between documents 
and ethnography, inasmuch as we “read” societal processes as the functional 
equivalent of texts, utilising the same interpretive skills and employing the 
same levels of cultural competence. In addition, text-based sources provide 
the benefits of stability, in that they can be reviewed repeatedly; usually, of 
accuracy, in terms of names, dates and similar verifiable details; and of broad 
coverage with regard to time and place (Yin 2009). They are, for the most 
part, readily accessible, rich sources of data, demonstrating through their 
very existence the properties of relevance to and consequence in the world; 
and they present accounts of what people actually do, not just what they say 
they do (Silverman 2006).  
However, the use of texts and documents has, as with any data source, its 
pitfalls and limitations. They cannot be scanned in terms of direct 
correspondence to reality, since there is a need for constant vigilance over 
the restrictions, constraints and fallibilities of data collected and presented at 
the hands of others (Lee 2000). What has to be consistently borne in mind is 
where the author or compiler is speaking from, as regards his social, political, 
historical and cultural position; to whom the document is addressed; and for 
whom and for what purpose it has been written (Leander 2008; May 2001). 
Such inherent bias will be reflected as much by what is not included as by 
what is actually presented. And the problem of bias is compounded by the 
problem of reliability with regard to comprehensiveness, in that a text may 
present a fragmented or incomplete picture either as a result of deliberate 
authorial choice or simply through limited availability or accessibility of data 
or information (Tafoya 1984). 
For each of the case study nations, a collection has been assembled of some 
twenty odd reputable, authoritative narrative histories covering, either wholly 
or partially, the period in question. These sources were identified through 
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exhaustive internet searches of reading lists from universities with strong 
political history or Middle East studies departments in the United Kingdom, 
the United States, other Anglophone countries like Australia and Canada, 
and the region in study focus itself. In addition, the websites of organisations 
with a long-standing and widely recognised interest in and agenda for the 
case study nations, such as the Institute for Palestine Studies, the Institute 
for Global Jewish Affairs, Jews for Justice, the many centres and 
associations for Israel and Jewish studies and for Middle Eastern studies in 
general, provide lists of relevant books and publications which served to 
complement the more academic recommendations. The aim was to build up 
a concise but authoritative data source representing as many different 
perspectives in cultural and political terms on each of the case studies as 
possible, limited only by language, time and availability. In addition, the effort 
was made to achieve a degree of diachronic spread, so as to give some 
variation of viewpoint in terms of historical point of time. 
With these data sources in place, they can be scanned in a process-tracing 
(George and Bennett 2004) exercise for any definable and commonly 
recounted patterns in the big-picture chain of events and occurrences 
following the loss. As Stake (1995) observes, all research is a search for 
patterns and consistencies, and whatever patterns are found in the histories 
of the case study nations can then be compared to the typical pattern of the 
grief trajectory. This comparison is effected by examining the national 
histories through the lens of grief theory, within a framework of the 
fundamentals of the grief experience, namely: the initial, identity-damaging, 
grief-triggering loss; any discernible emotional response; the attempt to make 
some sense of the post-loss situation involving memory in this meaning-
making activity; and all this woven into and influenced by the concurrent and 
ongoing interactions between the loss-sufferers and the specific contexts in 
which they find themselves. The greater correspondence in these terms 
between the patterns of the post-loss national history and of the grief 
trajectory, the stronger the argument for national grief becomes. 
There is general agreement in the methods literature, however, that the 
credibility of any research exercise can be enhanced by the provision of 
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additional ways of generating evidence. The employment of multiple sources 
of data can lead to a convergence of corroborating lines of inquiry, thus 
rendering the study more robust, especially if these additional methods are 
approached with a readiness to revise any tentative claims in the light of what 
they reveal (Seale 1999; Yin 2009). Methodological triangulation, in getting a 
bearing on the research question from two distinct points, can serve to 
increase confidence in the interpretations and overall conclusions of the 
research: it can help to “minimise misperception and the invalidity of our 
conclusions” (Stake 1995, p.134). 
 
Current Identity Data Sources 
Focus Groups 
If current identity depends on the presence of a coherent narrative of the 
past, if history is the “proof and record” (Young 1995, p. 221) of present 
existence, then traces of this history should be discernible in current identity. 
Bringing them to light is the research problem. Participant observation in the 
case study societies might be considered one method of acquiring the 
relevant data, but this would demand impractically long periods of time and 
the surmounting of formidable linguistic barriers. Moreover, personal 
experience of living and working in foreign countries for periods of up to six 
years at a time has proved to this particular researcher that, even with a good 
command of the language and general immersion in the culture, the ability to 
see things from the host nation perspective can remain a challenge. 
Interrogation is the generally accepted alternative to observation. As 
Kellehear (1993, p.1) notes “There is today in social science circles a simple 
and persistent belief that knowledge about people is available simply by 
asking”. However, since national identity tends to be such an unquestioned, 
almost unconscious, background strand amongst the multiple personal 
identities any individual holds and displays, its features could prove difficult to 
elicit from people who may be generally unaware of their national identity 
characteristics at a conscious level. Moreover, the whole notion of national 
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grief is not one that is easily accessible without a certain amount of 
explanation and illustration. Any attempts to capture data in these areas by 
means of questionnaires or interviews would therefore require a degree of 
directive focus and structure that could prove counter-productive to the 
research aims, firstly, by linguistically setting in stone concepts that need to 
remain relatively fluid in order to be meaningful in the different national 
contexts; and secondly, by pre-setting the agenda for and the terms of any 
potentially enlightening unstructured conversation that might arise from them. 
In addition, these techniques privilege the individual perspective when the 
focus of study is a collective phenomenon. 
Initially, it seemed as if the focus group, “a group of individuals selected and 
assembled by researchers to discuss and comment on, from personal 
experience, the topic that is the subject of the research” (Powell et al. 1996, 
p.499), might fit the bill. As an organised discussion or group interview, it is a 
way of gaining a variety of views and experiences on a research topic from 
several perspectives at once, and is recognised as particularly useful for 
triangulation and validity checking (Morgan 1988). In particular, given the 
collective nature of the phenomenon being examined here, the focus group, 
by crucially relying on interaction to produce insights and data (Kitzinger 
1994, 1995; Morgan, 1997), can get at shared understandings and reveal 
collective values and beliefs, as well as some of the contestations 
surrounding them.  
On the negative side, focus groups are time-consuming to organise, and the 
outcome particularly unpredictable when organised from a distance. They are 
difficult to control, since the participants can easily take the lead, although 
this feature can be seen as a positive methodological advantage if that lead 
happens to produce worthwhile, authentic, independent data. And crucially, 
due to the small numbers and inherent lack of representativeness, focus 
group findings are not generalisable, since the group views cannot be 
attributed to a whole population. Despite these drawbacks, the focus group 
technique seemed to present the only real possibility for a direct encounter 
with current national identity and a reality check on the findings from the 
secondary sources historical data.   
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Plans were drawn up, contacts made, and arrangements set in train for 
conducting two sessions, one in Tel Aviv, one in the West Bank, each with a 
group of ten to twelve English-speaking university students. These sessions 
would comprise a brief initial presentation of the general concept of national 
grief, followed by a group discussion on how the phenomenon might refer, if 
at all, to the groups’ own respective situations. But the more advanced the 
preparations became, the more uneasy I felt about the whole project.  
The lack of representativeness was a real issue. Given the fragmented 
nature of Palestinian society, in the West Bank, Gaza, the refugee camps in 
Lebanon and Jordan, not to mention the huge diaspora in the USA, Europe, 
and other Arab countries, most of whom still regard themselves as essentially 
Palestinian, how could any meaningful conclusions be arrived at from a 
discussion amongst some young, middle-class West bankers? Equally, given 
the enormous ethnic range within Israel, from European Ashkenazi Jews, 
through oriental Jews and Ethiopian Falasha to recent Russian immigrants, 
along with the increasingly widening social class distinctions there, how could 
any of this national complexity possibly be reflected in a one-hour discussion 
with a small group of, again, largely middle-class well-educated university 
students? Of course, more focus groups could have been arranged in order 
to achieve a greater level of representativeness, but the planning and long-
distance logistics involved in just these two suggested that expansion of the 
focus group approach might well entail an investment in terms of time and 
effort out of all proportion to any conceivable results. 
In any case, I had other concerns. Language was a major one. Obviously, a 
good command of English was a necessary criterion for selection to the focus 
groups. I have some Arabic, but no Hebrew, and, in any case, capture of the 
original data in English meant less effort put into translation and less room for 
doubt, when it came to the findings, as regards the quality and reliability of 
that translation. But national identity, as already discussed in previous 
chapters, can be a highly emotive issue, and even more so in contexts like 
the Middle East where people have been put on the defensive about that 
very aspect of their identities. Could I really expect such emotive matters to 
be discussed in a second language, a language that even where mastered 
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would normally be used for the formalities of business or study rather than as 
a medium for expressing the passions of personal or emotional life? 
Finally, and most importantly, I was beginning to feel a great sense of 
discomfort about the actual handling of these focus group sessions, and how 
the dynamics of the interaction between researched and researcher might be 
affected by the way in which my role, whether as moderator or as observer, 
could be perceived by the focus group participants. Firstly, I thought the set-
up could be seen as exuding more than a whiff of colonialism, particularly 
given my nationality and the part played by the English-speaking western 
world in general in historic developments in the region. Secondly, given the 
focus on loss, grief and suffering, and the sensitivities involved in discussing 
identities to which these might be central, it struck me that any probing might 
conceivably be viewed as smacking of amateur psychiatry. However 
sensitively, diplomatically, or obliquely I planned to approach these sessions, 
however well prepared and presented they might be, there seemed to be an 
enormous risk of coming over as a self-appointed fixer to focus group 
participants, who would thus perceive themselves as cast in the role of the 
needing to be fixed. Perhaps something less obtrusive (Kellehear 1993; 
Webb et al. 1966) was needed. 
 
Visual Arts 
The arts in general have not played a mainstream role in social science 
research, which is surprising given their prevalence in the social enterprise of 
making sense of the human condition and the surrounding world. The virtual 
absence of the arts from the research scene can probably be put down to the 
fact that they have not been considered as a form of knowledge by a 
positivist tradition which views them as primarily emotive rather than 
informative (Eisner 2008). This same tradition sees art as a form of individual 
expression, quintessentially subjective and privileging imagination over fact: 
“Art is me, science is us” (Daston 1999). But increasing appreciation of the 
need for a more richly textured way of understanding ourselves and our 
societies, one which embraces feelings as much as facts, appears to be 
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creating the beginnings of a paradigm shift. Social science research involving 
the arts is an emerging and expanding genre, extending well beyond the 
approach of using artistic works as data which I am proposing here, to the 
use of arts-based methods in eliciting information from individual 
interviewees (Bagnoli 2009; Knowles and Cole 2008). 
Concepts of art and the artist vary according to the specific time period and 
society in question, and different cultures will hold different views on what art 
is and what the role of the artist entails. But in any society, the artist functions 
essentially as a form-giver to the most pervasive ideas of his time. As Pollock 
observes, “Art is both a mode of thought and a searching for a form for the 
as-yet-unthought”, suggesting that a study of art history  “articulates through 
formal and signifying processes a means of our understanding a singular, 
situated yet social relation to (the) changing texture of collective life” (2007, 
p.171). This social nature of artistic production is highlighted by many writers. 
Bourdieu (1991, 1993) sees artists as forming part of an elaborate social web 
that directly shapes their work. Becker (1982) argues that every instance of 
artistic production is the result of an inherently collective effort. Wolff (1993) 
regards the artist as a locus for the mediation of different aesthetic codes and 
societal processes, his work an expression of that mediation and a site where 
values can be negotiated and critical consciousness developed. 
The artist can thus be viewed as a powerful cultural agent, a myth-maker 
who participates in the social construction of reality by playing an active role 
in society. Gaztambide-Fernandez (2008) defines the range of roles available 
to the artist in contemporary western or western-influenced society as the 
cultural civiliser, the border-crosser or the representator. The first, born of 
enlightenment values and liberal humanism, involves producing works of 
beauty that will continue the civilising tradition of modernity. This approach of 
art for art’s sake firmly positions the artist as a promoter of the traditional 
values of his culture. The border-crosser, more a case of art for politics’ sake, 
seeks to challenge boundaries and expectations, disturbing the established 
order so as to stimulate and encourage social transformation. The 
representator, reflecting the intrusion of the marketplace into art, produces 
artistic works as part of a discourse of cultural populism, these works serving 
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as representations of larger struggles over meaning and identification. This 
type of art is only important in terms of the audience response and reaction, 
not by virtue of any inherent qualities of its own. Groys (2008), who views art 
works essentially as thought-provoking props for popular imagination, would 
seem to argue that only the latter two roles, border-crosser and 
representator, are valid for the artist of today when he writes that “Under the 
conditions of modernity an artwork can be produced and brought to the public 
in two ways: as a commodity, or as a tool of political propaganda” (pp.6-7). 
While all of the above points regarding the social relevance of art and the 
nature of the art work as a complex venue for the process of collective self-
definition are applicable in varying degrees to the arts in general, the 
particular art form selected for research purposes here is that of the visual 
arts. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the visual medium obviates 
the need for concern about language issues, as already referred to above. 
Secondly, initial investigations suggested a level playing field in that both the 
Israeli and Palestinian peoples can boast a strong, vibrant, internationally 
acclaimed, visual arts scene, operating through similar media. This would not 
be the case with literary or dramatic art forms, where the research approach 
might be impeded by the fact that Israel presents a more western tradition 
and Palestine a more oriental one, in addition to the inbuilt language 
problems these art forms present. And in the case of films, a potentially rich 
vein of data and professionally enough subtitled in English to accommodate 
linguistic concerns, although the underlying difference in tradition would 
generally prove no obstacle to appreciation or understanding, the Israeli 
canon of production is significantly larger and more varied, for obvious 
reasons, than the Palestinian one.  
Thirdly, the artists of both societies, by dint of living in situations where 
politics is an inescapable feature of everyday existence, tend to be border-
crossers, challenging the status quo by raising controversial issues. This 
means that although the views they present may not always accord with the 
dominant or mainstream ones held by their society, their work, in focussing 
on points of contention and areas of negotiation within that society, should 
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provide some indications of both the dominant and contending viewpoints in 
current interplay over the issues in question. 
And finally, in the spirit of Albers’ ethics of perception, looking at art can 
provide an opportunity for “direct seeing”, whereby the experience of the 
attention being drawn to perceptual habits allows for the recognition of 
routine cognitive associations as social constructions and permits these 
associations to be influenced, challenged and possibly transformed (Diaz, 
2008).  Sourcing data from works of visual art might thus serve to challenge 
any stagnant perceptual habits that this particular researcher, or my readers, 
might have with regard to the research topic in focus. 
A handful of studies have successfully employed the visual arts as a source 
of data for historical and cultural analysis by using them to shed light on a 
people and what makes them tick at any particular point in time. Some focus 
on the ways in which visual art interacts with and informs social processes, 
for example: Leoussi’s (2004) coverage of the rise of national art between the 
late eighteenth and twentieth century in Europe, illustrating how artists 
participated in “the formulation, crystallisation and celebration of the ethno-
cultural roots and identities of modern societies” (p. 156), thus aiding the 
transformation from ethnicity to nationality that was a social feature of the 
times; or Connor and Rhode’s demonstration (2003) of how photographs and 
paintings of amputees, wounded soldiers and victims of disease from the 
American Civil War, served to construct contemporary ideas of war and 
ultimately functioned as sites for the interpretation and negotiation of 
American self-identity. Others use visual art primarily as a means of 
understanding social processes, for example: Kivelson and Neuberger’s 
(2008) “Picturing Russia”, which uses visual culture, including the visual arts, 
to explore aspects of Russian society over the entire span of Russian history, 
adding a new dimension by putting visuality at the core of the approach; 
Aries’ (1985) tracing of changing social attitudes to death over two thousand 
years of western Christianity as reflected in over four hundred visual 
representations, including paintings, woodcuts, lithographs, tombstones and 
funerary medallions; or McGregor’s (2003) thesis of a Canadian “garrison 
mentality”, supported by reference to the constant reproduction of boundaries 
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in painting, television and film, this imposition of limits in art echoing the way 
in which Canadians go about constructing their space in life. This particular 
piece of research belongs in the latter category, trying to gain from visual art 
works some appreciation of what is going on in the respective case study 
societies, some indication of what particular issues of national identity might 
be up for negotiation in such sites as artists provide. 
 
Palestinian and Israeli Contemporary Visual Arts 
Visual art works produced by contemporary Palestinian and Israeli artists are 
employed as data sources to triangulate the findings from the textual sources 
which provide the data on the respective histories of the two nations. These 
works are scanned for evidence of the grief trajectory in much the same way 
as the history texts, “read” for traces of collective loss, emotional reaction, 
and attempts to make sense of the post-loss world, which might relate to or 
be explained by what is found in the texts. Since the emphasis in this part of 
the research is on current identity, contemporariness is a key selection 
criterion: the art works under consideration belong largely to the past decade, 
the first ten years of the twenty-first century, with the occasional exception 
made for a particularly seminal or iconic work belonging properly to the mid 
or late nineties. 
The artists in focus are those whose work is routinely featured in the 
collections of their own national museums and major art galleries (obviously 
more relevant in the Israeli than the Palestinian case) and is regularly 
selected to represent their nations in prestigious overseas exhibitions, in the 
likes of London, Paris, and New York, or at the Venice Biennale. In both the 
national and international spheres, their names are known and their art is 
acknowledged by the professional art world as embodying the highest levels 
of current artistic practice. The fact that the international art world, 
traditionally based on the ownership of works by a few wealthy individuals 
and institutions, is widely perceived as commercial and elitist in nature, might 
seem to cast doubt on the use of those art works which it endorses as 
sources of authentic data for understanding social processes. Certainly, in an 
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increasingly globalised art market, major international art festivals and 
institutions wield enormous power and influence with regard to both the 
positioning and pricing of art works. But the art world is equally subject to the 
forces of globalisation and consumerism as any other domain, and these 
forces can be viewed as beneficially having contributed a hybrid vigour to 
artistic practice through enabling the fluid and anarchic mixing of media, 
techniques and ideas, and having encouraged an anti-elitist blurring of the 
boundaries between “high art” and popular culture. Moreover, art is generally 
expensive to produce, to transport and to display, so the money generated by 
the art world is necessary to underwrite the activities of both artists and 
exhibitors. 
In the final analysis, however, the art has to be valued on its own terms, 
regardless of the art world which supports and endorses it. This world may 
privilege artists in its own image, with an educated background and liberal 
democratic leanings; it may favour art-that-makes-you-think over other types 
of art. But the essential authenticity of the works of internationally recognised 
artists is not affected by any perceived inauthenticity or partiality of the world 
which rates, markets and nurtures them. “Artists are part of a sort of 
community of inquiry” (Wright 2004, p.535): they have something to say. 
Galleries and festivals get audiences, largely middle-class and educated with 
critical faculties and views of their own. The basic imaginative interaction 
between artist and viewer that is at the core of every effective artistically 
creative work may be mediated, exploited and manipulated by the art world, 
but it cannot be fabricated or counterfeited. 
By the very nature of the history of the two peoples under the spotlight, 
several of the artists in the above category belong to their national diasporas, 
or at least are not living full-time in their countries, with the result that some of 
their art may be focussed on the country that is their chosen home or their 
enforced place of exile, and not on Israel or Palestine itself. Artists who have 
living arrangements of this sort, such as Israelis now based in America, or  
Palestinians from the Gaza Strip living in Paris, are included in the selection if 
a substantial amount of their work deals with their Israeli or Palestinian 
identity and is regularly exhibited under that heading. In one or two cases, 
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specifically of Arab Israelis or Israeli Palestinians, whichever term is preferred 
usage, the situation is even more complex: their work may be exhibited 
overseas in exhibitions of Palestinian art, while being simultaneously shown 
in the gallery for contemporary Israeli art at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. 
The main art forms included are video, photography, and various types of 
visual art installation. Painting is not excluded, but seems to be less central to 
the current visual arts scenes in both countries, for reasons which will be 
gone into in chapter six, which deals in detail with the art work. Use of the 
same media which characterise major art works at the western epicentre of 
the global art market, could be interpreted as indicating a slavish following of 
international trends when employed by artists working at what might be 
perceived as the edges of that market. But it comes across clearly in any 
viewing of Israeli or Palestinian contemporary visual art that though the 
media used may conform to the dominant trends of the international art 
world, the messages conveyed through them are distinctly local, and serve to 
render the artistic product all the more vibrant for that fact.  
Locating and identifying the relevant art work involved a certain amount of 
travel. Given the fragmented nature of the Palestinian community throughout 
the Middle East region, Europe and the United States, the Palestinian art was 
the more difficult to access.  France, however, has always made much of 
Arab culture, particularly through the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris, so 
attendance at a couple of large exhibitions there, as well as at the city-wide 
Paris Photo exhibition which had an Arab theme in 2009, provided enough 
leads to follow up at smaller galleries in both Paris and London, and on the 
internet. Israel’s main exhibitions and most prominent artists tend to favour 
American audiences over European ones, so a trip to Israel to take in the 
major galleries and museums in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, along with 
relevant smaller, private galleries, facilitated the necessary viewings and 
information-gathering for the Israeli art work. 
In addition to seeing a lot of visual art firsthand, and following some up on the 
internet, it was also necessary to collect a fair amount of catalogues and 
critical material about the work viewed. For in sourcing data from the visual 
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art works selected, account needs to be taken of informed interpretations as 
to what these works actually mean, what the artists are saying. In some 
cases, the message may seem startlingly obvious, but there are always 
nuances and alternative readings which can only be perceived by those au 
fait with the visual art world in general and with the relevant national art 
history in particular. This particular researcher’s reading of the various art 
works under consideration will not necessarily be withheld, but will always be 
preceded and informed by professional comment from within the visual arts 
world so as to guarantee some degree of reliability as regards interpretation. 
 
Ethical Issues 
“Researchers have ethical responsibilities to anticipate the impact of the 
study on those studied, and to ensure that, at very least, the benefits of 
investigations outweigh any possible negative effects that they might have.” 
(Smyth and Robinson 2001, p. 208) On the face of it, this statement, typical 
of the many cautions against doing harm found in the research methods 
literature, can be seen, in philosophical terms, as perhaps raising more 
questions than it answers. Who is to judge whether effects are beneficial or 
harmful?  On what basis is such judgement to be made? And what about the 
risk factor involved in the occurrence of unintended consequences?  
As with any undertaking which involves interaction with other people, 
engagement in research implies inherent consequences for both the 
researched and the researcher. While this is not the place for a philosophical 
inquiry on the nature of ethics or a debate about the absolutism or relativism 
of moral truth, it is clear that the researcher needs to adopt a responsible 
approach by giving serious and informed forethought to what he perceives as 
the likelihood of any adverse effects arising from these consequences. And 
due consideration of the potential ethical issues involved in the overall 
research design and process, to the extent that the researcher’s own 
perception, knowledge and experience permit, can go some way towards 
forestalling any such adverse effects.  
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Denscombe (2002) suggests that the ethical principle of doing no harm, or at 
least minimising potential harm, in the course of the research process, can 
be maintained by continually keeping in focus the rights and interests of 
those affected by the research in terms of impact, intrusion and 
confidentiality. With regard to this particular piece of research, the fact that 
the idea of using focus groups has been discarded in favour of reliance solely 
on secondary sources in the form of texts and visual arts works, might 
suggest that these considerations are redundant since no-one is being 
directly questioned or interviewed for any part of the data-gathering. But 
although confidentiality becomes less relevant in a research design which 
employs published texts and publicly exhibited art works as data sources, 
impact and intrusion can still be regarded as legitimate issues for 
examination. The research findings and the way in which they are written up 
will presumably have an impact on whoever reads them, and if any of these 
readers profess to Palestinian or Israeli identity, or have, for whatever 
reason, strong views about the history, the treatment or the behaviour of 
either people, then that impact is likely to be even more forceful. In addition, 
a piece of research on one of the most complex situations in geopolitics 
might well be perceived as intrusive by those who live it on a daily basis, by 
those who have given years of their lives to attempting to find a solution to it, 
or by those who have built up an acknowledged expertise on the region, its 
history and its peoples.  
For these reasons, although the research design does not cater for any direct 
human interaction as a data-capturing technique, the study still has to be 
considered as belonging in the category of sensitive research. Lee (1993, p. 
4) defines sensitive research as “research which potentially poses a 
substantial threat to those who are or have been involved with it”. By straying 
into areas considered private or controversial, such research involves 
potential costs to the researched, and, on occasion, to the researcher.  And 
the central topic of this particular piece of research, the grief of nations, 
contains, in those four small words, two conceivable areas of sensitivity.  
The nation, as defined in the previous chapter, can be viewed as a strand of 
identity, and dealing with identity is always tricky, even more so in a region 
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bristling with sensitivities as a result of how people there feel they have been 
regarded and treated by the rest of the world. Offering comment on any 
aspect of identity can be perceived as threatening loss of face, and, although 
national self-criticism, and even self-ridicule, is a recognised British trait, this 
relaxed approach is not universal, nor even wide-spread. Other people’s 
national identities usually have to be approached along a path of eggshells. 
In the cases of Israel and Palestine, this rings particularly true, since their 
respective national identities appear to be adhered to with a particular 
tenacity. Those caught up in conflict situations, as Armakolas (2001) 
observes, often have a very stable and fixed conception of their identities.  
Moreover, the notion of grief, as noted in the previous chapters, can carry 
connotations of weakness. Admitting to grief, to being completely bowled 
over by loss, may be acceptable in some western societies where there are 
traditions of psychiatric counselling and where the open expression of 
emotion is viewed as good and healthy. But this is not universally the case, 
and there are societies where the need for counselling services or any form 
of similar social support would be regarded as a sign of weakness and 
source of shame (Hammoud et al. 2005). The very suggestion of national 
grief in such a context could easily be interpreted as a slur on national pride. 
The experience of loss may be ubiquitous to the extent that, as Buddhists 
believe, it serves to define the human condition given the essential 
transience and temporariness of our physical environment. But popular 
understanding of the grief which accompanies the experience has developed, 
as noted in the first chapter, from earlier psychologically-based theoretical 
models and is, by definition, a fundamentally western construction. In non-
western settings, therefore, the term is open to being construed negatively, 
unless the way in which the idea of grief is conceived of and employed in this 
particular dissertation is fully apprehended. 
The research topic thus presents a veritable minefield in terms of 
sensitivities, since sensitivity is culturally determined. What a westerner might 
view as intrusion, for example, is not intrusion for an Arab. Hall (1966, p.15) 
points out the essential differences in terms of physical space, with the Arab 
experiencing no discomfort in terms of close proximity and actual physical 
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contact with strangers, while the westerner needs to preserve a private 
bubble around himself in public. This difference appears to apply equally at a 
mental level: subjects like politics and religion might be regarded as 
sensitive, but are freely and frequently discussed, as long as the discussion 
does not include frank disagreement with or directly negative comment on 
the opinions proffered (Nydell 2006, ps. 34-50). The unwritten rule of 
interaction is not to cause anyone to lose face (Patai 1976, ps. 108-113) by 
blatantly disputing or attempting to disprove their position.  
It is difficult to generalise about a society as multicultural and pluralist as 
Israel has become, but it is quite definitely also a “contact culture”, with less 
regard for the maintenance of personal space than most westerners can 
easily accommodate. The difference here is that there is something of a “me-
first” approach to the proxemics (Brill 2010). Again, this quality would seem to 
extend to the non-physical sphere, where what is often perceived by other 
cultures as abrasiveness, arrogance and bad manners in everyday 
interaction and discussion, is regarded by Israelis themselves as admirable 
directness and honesty, indicative of their no-nonsense manner in getting 
down to the business in hand. In fact, the list of characteristics attributed to 
the archetypal “sabra” (a term denoting a local cactus plant  - tough and 
prickly on the outside, but with a soft heart – and used to describe the native-
born of the originally more homogeneous Israel) includes “a rough and direct 
way of expressing themselves” and “a native sense of supremacy” (Almog 
2000, p.7).  
Collectively, however, Israel can display enormous sensitivity. Loss of 
aggregate face would appear to be threatened by any external criticism that 
might be interpreted as betraying an anti-Israeli stance, as with their 
repudiation of the international condemnation of their treatment of the 
inhabitants of Gaza; or with their vociferous complaints about work like that of 
the Spanish artist, Eugenio Merino, who featured in one sculpture a menorah 
emerging from the barrel of a machine-gun (Haaretz 18 February, 2010). And 
collective sensitivities are equally offended by any reminders of an era when 
Jews were regarded as weak and victimised underdogs, as with the 
controversies that surround Israeli involvement in or association with the 
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performance of Wagner’s music (Sheffi 2002); or with the inevitable official 
complaints over any incident, anywhere in the world, that might be perceived 
as trivialising or normalising the Nazi regime. 
All these sensitivities have to be catered for in the research process as far as 
possible, so as not to unduly cause offence or create misunderstanding. 
Intrusion does not appear to be a major problem with either culture, as long 
as the approach is honest and respectful. There have certainly been enough 
comments on, books about, inquiries into and research concerning the 
region, to lead to the conclusion that probably both Israelis and Palestinians 
must be somewhat immune to intrusion by now. If not actively welcoming it, 
they most likely have learned to disregard it. But impact remains an issue: 
how to walk a tightrope between coming across as anodyne for fear of giving 
offence, and presenting ideas with such a lack of delicacy as to impede any 
appreciation of their substance.  
Given the region of the world and the peoples in focus, it would be unrealistic 
to aspire to a goal of universal approval. But the risk of causing affront and 
indignation can perhaps be minimised by a sustained conscious effort to 
practise tact and discretion at every stage of the research process. This 
implies a high level of vigilance in the approach to the data sources, both as 
regards the ethical implications of the hierarchies of knowledge these texts 
and visuals represent, with their intrinsic patterns of power and exclusion 
(Ackerly 2008); and as regards the ethical implications of the researcher’s 
own inbuilt biases and predispositions. The best a researcher can probably 
do with regard to the latter is identify his own particular affiliations and 
commitments (Stake 2006), while recognising that sides are taken simply by 
virtue of being a member of society (Hammersley 2000), and to approach the 
whole research exercise in as much of a spirit of reflexivity as possible. This 
calls for a heightened awareness of self, and a continual questioning of why 
we notice what we notice, and why we interpret as we interpret (Elliott 2005).   
Sensitivity, humility and self-reflection need to be constant companions 
during the reading, the viewing, the analysis, and the writing up, all equally 
engaged with the researcher in a relentless scanning for and continual 
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alertness to any unquestioned assumptions, alternative interpretations,  
optional perceptions, or potential susceptibilities to charges of disrespect or 
disregard in either substance or style. It is to be hoped that through the 
employment of such measures an overall ethic of caution can inform both the 
approach to and the conclusions of the research; and an ethic of 
consideration can enable the researcher “to sustain a deep respect and 
concern for all ...... overriding any dictates of research procedure” (Bell 2001, 
p. 190) and, indeed, any tendencies to personal prejudice or partiality. 
 
Limitations and Potential 
The proposed research design has obvious limitations. The argument for 
national grief centres on a big-picture concept, occurring over generational 
stretches of time, at a macro-level of the nation within a global context. Yet 
only two cases, of relatively small and neither especially typical nor traditional 
nations, are being examined. In addition, for the sake of reduction of 
complexity and economy of effort, on behalf of both the reader and the 
researcher, these cases are selected from within such tight regional 
parameters that there is no case independence: to a great extent, they 
interrelate. However, to echo Smith (2005, p.212) in the context of his own 
case studies on the causes of wars, “These problems are neither greater nor 
lesser in magnitude here than in other studies that have attempted to derive 
generalisable results from the messy stuff of history: to identify cases that 
conform to the requirement for deep analogy from a mire of unique, 
unfolding, but also interconnected events”. 
Similarly, with regard to the data, and the small sample, relative to the large 
phenomenon in study focus, of data sources proposed along with the 
attendant issues of representativeness, there is an inherent risk of sample 
bias. But again, given the necessary restrictions imposed by the doctoral 
dissertation format on both time and material resources, this risk is perhaps 
no greater than in any similar study, and can to a certain degree be 
countered by the purposeful attempt to utilise sources which offer as many 
different perspectives on the subject of study under scrutiny as possible.  
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This same deliberate search for and awareness of alternative viewpoints can 
also go some way towards offsetting the obvious limitation of one pair of 
researcher eyes, viewing the evidence from one personal angle. This 
inevitable disposition, however, is somewhat mitigated by the fact that this 
particular researcher, as explained in the Introduction, enters the research 
field after a thirty five year career in cultural relations overseas, working and 
living for most of that time in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, with only 
seven years spent in Europe (London and Paris). The net result is a 
perspective on the world which is not always, indeed, not often, in tune with 
the predominant western one. 
Finally, the general academic research tradition aims at reliability and validity 
through adherence to the principles of scientific method, and this particular 
study attempts to conform to that tradition as much as possible. Thus, 
variance is catered for in the particular case selection, given the very different 
circumstances of loss and response to loss presented by the two situations; 
and in the different perspectives on these situations presented by the data 
sources. In addition, the triangulation of the evidence on history supplied by 
textual sources with that on current identity provided from visual arts sources, 
aims to get at national response to loss as lived and felt experience as well 
as historical narrative. 
But scientific method in itself can be regarded as a limitation. The importance 
of inspiration, chance, accident and sheer curiosity in the history of science, 
is underlined by Feyerabend (1975) in his anarchistic theory of epistemology. 
Gould (1981) observes that science can be seen as a socially embedded 
activity, influenced by changing cultural contexts, which “progresses by 
hunch, vision and intuition” (pp.21- 22). Bearing this in mind, the design for 
this particular piece of research, while aiming to comply with scientific 
principles, is not intended as a straitjacket which prevents a spontaneous 
reaching out to the unavoidable and unpredictable opportunities and 
intuitions which the research process may present. In fact, the decision to 
discard the idea of focus groups and use the visual arts as data sources 
instead, stemmed from one such accidental opportunity. Walking into an 
exhibition of Palestinian art at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris, more by 
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chance than purpose, and with the general aim of seeing if it could provide 
useful background on Palestinian history, I was struck halfway through my 
viewing by the realisation that here was an ideal focus group of sorts. The 
collection of art works expressed views that were more articulate, more 
openly emotional, more nuanced, and far more wide-ranging in terms of 
where the various respective Palestinian artists came from, than any real-life, 
real-time conventional focus group that I managed to assemble would be 
likely to come up with.  
In conclusion, this study, given both its limitations and the measures 
employed to counteract them, can be seen as offering potential benefits in a 
number of areas. Firstly, it might serve to open up a new direction for grief 
research, engaging with large-scale national collectives rather than remaining 
restricted largely to the domain of the individual with the occasional 
application to smaller groups like the family. Grief theory itself could achieve 
a more powerful status when applied on the wider scale and with the broader 
range of relevance afforded by taking on this whole new area of research. 
Secondly, there could be spin-offs for the field of international relations. The 
grief theory perspective might provide fresh insights on aspects of national 
identity, national behaviour, and, by association, international relations. In 
particular, given the strongly affective nature of the grief experience, this 
perspective should be able to shed more light on the somewhat neglected 
area of the role of emotions in national interactions within a global context. 
And thirdly, by exploiting contemporary visual arts forms as data sources, this 
research adds substantially to the very small body of work which has used 
visual art as a way of accessing social meanings. If successfully employed, 
this approach could become more accepted as a valid means of 
understanding social concerns and attitudes, giving visual art a potentially 
more substantive role in the social sciences and helping to strengthen 
functional interdisciplinary links between the latter and the humanities. 
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  4.   PALESTINE: A CASE OF DISENFRANCHISED GRIEF? 
       “We have triumphed over the plan to expel us from history.” 
                                   (Mahmoud Darwish, New York Times, 15 May, 1998) 
 
This chapter uses the lens of grief theory to explore the history of the 
Palestinian people, from the loss of their lands as a result of the creation of 
Israel in 1948 up to the present day. As a prerequisite for this exploration, the 
status of the pre-1948 Palestinians as a people, a group with a collective 
consciousness, has to be established. For the very notion of a Palestinian 
nation or quasi-national community prior to the existence of Israel has been a 
highly contentious issue over the years, and one which is central to the 
disagreements and negotiations over territorial rights and compromises in the 
region. Certainly, if any case is to be made for discerning a pattern of 
collective loss and subsequent shared grief trajectory in the history of the 
Palestinians from 1948 on, there has to be some evidence of collectivity prior 
to those events. 
Given, subsequent to this initial discussion of status, that the Palestinian 
people can be deemed to have possessed sufficient unity and collective 
identity to have suffered a shared loss in 1948, their ensuing history is 
examined with a view to how any discernible patterns of collective behaviour 
might fit with the pattern of the grieving experience as outlined in grief theory, 
particularly in terms of the fundamental elements of the grief trajectory laid 
out in the first two chapters, namely: the identity-damaging, grief-triggering 
loss; the subsequent emotional reaction; making sense of the post-loss 
world; and the ongoing interactions of the wider context surrounding the loss 
and its aftermath. The ways in which the events of the nakba (disaster) of 
1948 damaged collective Palestinian identity, through the interrelated losses 
of land, of the social fabric of everyday life, and of aspirations to nationhood, 
are dealt with in some detail. Historical evidence for what might be construed, 
at a collective and an intergenerational level, as emotional reaction to these 
losses, and as attempts to attribute some meaning to the post-loss world, is 
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explored. And the influence of the specific international and historical context 
on the manner in which the Palestinian post-loss trajectory has played out 
and on its ultimate consequences is analysed. The most prominent feature of 
this context, and one which reverberates throughout the study, is the way in 
which the Palestinian perspective has been so consistently ignored and 
downplayed. 
The historical data used in this attempt to build a meaningful conversation 
between grief theory and national history, is taken from a variety of sources: 
books and articles written by Palestinians themselves, by Israelis, by 
Americans and Europeans, both Jewish and non-Jewish. In addition, these 
were written at different points in time during the historical period under 
examination. For in a field where every “fact” is open to contentious 
argument, it seems important to make an effort to see the picture from as 




The History of Palestine 
In the seventh century, Jerusalem was captured from the Byzantines by Arab 
tribes, and the Byzantine province of Palaestina Prima became the military 
district of Filastin, the first area to be conquered by the Arab Muslims 
following the emergence of Islam. The Arab empire, stretching from Spain 
through North Africa and the Middle East to the borders of China in its 
heyday, retained its power for over six centuries of caliphate rule, although it 
was riven by revolts and dissension throughout that period, becoming 
increasingly internally fractured. In addition, from the eleventh century on, it 
suffered major external attack from the Seljuk Turks, the Mongols, and 
Christian crusaders. Jerusalem, given its significance for all the Abrahamic 
religions, was a prime focus for all these invading groups, and the crusaders 
established a Christian kingdom of Jerusalem in the Levant from the end of 
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the eleventh until the end of the thirteenth centuries, the city of Jerusalem 
itself being retaken for the Arabs by Saladin in 1187.  
After the defeat of the Mongols and overthrow of the last remaining crusader 
castles, power gravitated to the Egypt-based Mamluks, Turkish sultans who 
ruled the region for the next two and a half centuries. From the sixteenth 
century, during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, the region was 
incorporated into Turkish Ottoman rule, where it remained, bar a few minor 
interruptions such as Egyptian conquest and rule from 1831 to 1840, for the 
better part of the next four hundred years. In the overhaul of Ottoman 
administration, the tanzimat, which took place in 1873, the region of Palestine 
was split into three separate administrative units: the northern part was 
assigned to the vilayet of Beirut; the central and southern Negev to the 
vilayet of Hijaz; and the rest formed the independent sanjak of Jerusalem, 
reporting directly to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul. 
During all this time, throughout the pre-nationalistic era of empires, Palestine 
was by turns a region, a province, a district or series of sub-districts, for 
administrative, taxation and military purposes, incorporated for the most part 
in a greater Syria, along with the areas now known as Lebanon and Jordan. 
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the first world war, the 
western European great powers, Britain and France, took control of the 
whole region, dividing up the spoils of war between them. They drew frontiers 
around new states, which they held and administered under mandate from 
the League of Nations with a view to preparing them for eventual 
independence. Greater Syria was thus fragmented by an Anglo-French split: 
Syria and Lebanon in the north came under French mandate, Palestine and 
Transjordan in the south under British.  
This is a quick run-through of what historical evidence (Gelvin 2005; Harms 
and Ferry 2005; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003; Lewis 1995; Smith 2007) tells 
us about Palestine and the people who lived there prior to the early twentieth 
century. Though its borders may have been vague and fluid over the 
centuries preceding the mandate period, the continuity, in terms of a 
recognised territorial integrity, of this particular region of the middle east 
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centred on the city of Jerusalem, is not in doubt. It might be presumed that 
continuity in terms of a cohesive population, essentially Arab, living their lives 
in Jerusalem, in the nearby coastal towns and cities, in the villages and farms 
of the surrounding countryside, generation after generation, through all the 
tumultuous changes outlined above, would be equally undeniable. 
 
The Disappearing of the Palestinians 
However, the early Zionist slogan “a land without a people for a people 
without a land”, formulated by Israel Zangwill at the end of the nineteenth 
century, and widely used thereafter to encourage the immigration of 
European Jews to Palestine, painted the latter as an empty land crying out  
for cultivation and development (Khalidi 1997, p.101; Said 1979, p.9). This 
“disappearing” of the Palestinians became central to the Zionist project 
(Segev 2001, p.405), and features as a recurrent theme throughout the sixty 
odd years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On occasion, the “disappearing” 
was quite literal, as exemplified by the work of Joan Peters (1984), who, with 
a huge display of research and erudition, purported to prove through a study 
of demographics and migration that the “Palestinians” were no more native to 
Palestine than the Zionist immigrants of the early twentieth century. She 
argued that they only arrived there in the immediately preceding years, 
attracted by the opportunities of work and prosperity created by the 
industrious Zionists already settled in Palestine. Peters’ writing out from 
history of the Palestinian people, though initially well received in America, 
was deemed academically worthless when the book came out in Europe 
(Finkelstein 2003b, pp.21-50; Hirst 2003, p.11). 
For the most part, the inhabitants of Palestine were “disappeared” by not 
being recognised as in any way distinct from other Arabs of the mashreq 
region, or as a unified people regarding themselves as Palestinians. Moshe 
Dayan, for example, opined “I do not think that a Palestinian should have 
difficulties in regarding Jordan, Syria or Iraq as his homeland” (Kapeliouk 
1975, p.32). Ben Gurion asserted that “the Jewish nation is not in Palestine 
and the Palestinians are not a nation” (Flapan 1979, p.134).  Golda Meir 
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famously stated “It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in 
Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw 
them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.” (Sunday 
Times, June 15, 1969) By her logic, the “Palestinian problem” was mere anti-
semitic propaganda. 
And Israeli actions were consistent with their words. The Abandoned Areas 
Ordinance and Absentee Property Regulations of 1948, enabling the 
confiscation and disposal of Arab lands in Palestine on the basis of 
somewhat unusual definitions of “absence” (Hadawi 1991, pp.165-7); 
persistent Israeli refusals to deal with the Palestinians or to accord them any 
negotiating role in various peace settlements (Cooley 1973, p.197); the more 
recent building of a gigantic wall to keep the inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza literally out of sight, and therefore hopefully out of mind, are just 
three examples of the wilful blindness of Israel to the existence of the 
Palestinian people.  
That Israelis and Zionists should prefer to acknowledge a status of non-
existence for the Palestinians is perhaps understandable considering the 
fragility of and contention surrounding their own claims to the land of Israel. 
But they were not the only ones to exhibit a purblindness to the peoplehood 
of those Arabs who inhabited Palestine prior to the creation of Israel. The 
League of Nations mandate for Palestine, issued in 1922 and constituting the 
legal basis for British rule there, did not mention the Palestinians per se, 
referring to them only as “a section of the population”, “natives”, “non-Jewish 
communities” or “people and communities”. By contrast, “the Jewish people” 
living in Palestine did merit specific reference (Khalidi 2006, pp. 32-33). 
Balfour, who had signed the 1917 Declaration committing Britain to support 
of the Zionist cause, openly acknowledged this bias in his view of British 
obligations in Palestine: “Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted 
in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder 
import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit 
that ancient land”. (Ingrams 1972, p.73) 
115 
 
This playing down of the rights, interests, and even legitimate existence of 
the Arabs in Palestine as being of secondary or negligible importance, has 
been attributed to a variety of factors. Nineteenth century “orientalist” views 
(Said, 1978) of the Arabs as backward, dirty, mentally aberrant, unhealthily 
sensual, and generally inferior, accorded with the racist sense of white 
western superiority that informed the unexamined assumptions behind the 
dispossessing projects of modern European colonialism (Said 1979). In 
addition, given the significance of the holy land to western Christianity, the 
west tended to view Palestine’s Arabs and Muslims, extraneous to 
preconceptions of the biblical setting, as aliens in their own land, thus 
symbolically dispossessing them of that land (Christison 2001, pp. 19-20). 
Finally, general ignorance with regard to the whole region and its history and 
inhabitants served to muddy the waters in the minds of the general western 
public, particularly in the far-removed United States. Thus a popular 
confusion between Turks and Arabs, together with the anti-Turkish sentiment 
generated by the first world war, served to impact badly on the way in which 
Arabs were perceived, despite the fact that their support had been critical in 
the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire (Christison 2001, p.38). 
 
Palestinian Self-Perceptions 
Regardless of the perceptions of others, how did the Arab inhabitants of 
Palestine see themselves prior to 1948? Did they regard themselves as 
Palestinians? Given that “history is written by the victorious” (Khalidi 1997, 
p.89), and rarely from the point of view of the vanquished, few sources deal 
with this perspective. The Palestinians for a long time had no audience, no 
“permission to narrate” (Said 1994); no lips, of the political sort, with which to 
whistle and make themselves heard above the louder Jewish story (Abu-
Lughod and Sa’di 2007, p.10).  
What is clear is that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine in the early twentieth 
century, emerging from the wide-reaching embrace of the Ottoman Empire, 
identified themselves according to a variety of collective groupings. They had 
many layers of loyalties, and a bewilderingly complex array of overlapping 
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allegiances and multiple identities, dependent on context: immediate family, 
clan (hamula), local community or village, Islam, Arabism, Ottomanism, as 
well as a choice of the various political or occupational organisations and 
associations on offer at the time (Khalidi 1997). Whether their devotion to or 
feelings about the land they lived in can be classed as nationalism in a 
modern sense, or are better thought of as “wataniyya”, a focus of sentiment, 
affection and nostalgia rather than of loyalty or primary identity (Lewis 1992; 
Sayigh 1997, p.xii), is arguable.  
But Khalidi (1997) holds that the development of an undeniably distinctive 
sense of Palestinian identity, rooted in the notion of Palestine as a separate 
entity, a sacred holy land centred on the city of Jerusalem, can be traced, 
albeit sporadically and unevenly, from the times of the crusades through to 
the early twentieth century. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, the 
challenges of external threats, embodied in the Egyptian occupation of the 
1830s, the late nineteenth century incursions of European powers, and the 
rise of Zionism, offered a focus of identity central to local Palestinian 
patriotism, one that began to cut across social divisions between the rural 
peasants and the urban notables. In addition, the simultaneous spread of 
education, and the rise of the press in the new urban centres of intellectual 
and business life, helped to reinforce this identity and strengthen “the 
imagined community” (Anderson 1991) of Palestine.  
As Khalidi argues, while not perhaps qualifying as nation-state nationalism in 
its full modern sense, since the prerequisites for this simply did not exist at 
the time, this situation still presents a core collective Palestinian identity, a 
“community-as-nation”. He somewhat underestimates the obstructive role of 
the neighbouring Arab countries when he asserts that without this core 
collective identity, the Palestinians dispersed at the creation of Israel would 
simply have been assimilated by them. Moreover, he neglects to take into 
account the fact that the enforced accommodation of thousands of 
Palestinians in refugee camps could only have served to heighten any 
shared sense of common identity that went beyond the narrower 
identifications with clan and community. But his logic is flawless when he 
indicates that without this core collective Palestinian identity, the events of 
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1948 would not have constituted the significantly identity-damaging loss for 
the Palestinians that they actually did; ironically, to the extent that the shared 
losses of the nakba ultimately resulted in a fortification and strengthening of 
the previous core identity, bringing Palestinians even closer together in terms 
of collective consciousness. 
 
The Loss 
The analysis of grief in the first chapter highlights the key features of the loss 
that typically triggers the grief experience. It characteristically involves a 
radical change to the status quo, a dispossession in terms of both tangible 
and intangible elements of life that have previously been taken for granted. 
This change is perceived as identity-damaging, threatening the intactness of 
the person in cases of individual loss, or of the group where a collective loss 
is concerned. The greater the difficulty encountered by the loss-sufferer in 
allocating any meaning to this change in circumstances, the weaker the 
sense of basic security about being in the world that the loss situation 
engenders, the more traumatic the whole experience becomes. Scanning 
Palestinian history over the course of the earlier parts of the twentieth 
century, the question is to what extent any collective losses suffered by the 
Palestinian people can be said to fit these criteria. 
 
Territorial Dispossession 
In 1947, the population of Palestine is estimated to have been between 1.75 
and 2 million people, with the Jewish component, the Yishuv, comprising 
some 30% of that total, ie. between 500,000 and 600,000. The Jews owned 
about 6% of the land, the remaining 94% being in Arab possession, although 
a proportion of that belonged to absentee landlords living in other parts of the 
Arab world. By 1949, two years later, the Zionists had appropriated for the 
new state of Israel an overall 78% of the land, leaving 22% for the Arab 
population. Between 800,000 and 900,000 of the total Palestinian Arab 
population of approximately 1.3 million had been displaced, with thousands 
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fleeing to the Arab-held West Bank (300,000) and Gaza (170,000), and 
thousands more to Lebanon (150,000), Jordan (100,000), Syria (80,000) and 
Egypt (7,000). Between 400 and 500 Arab villages disappeared forever, 
either physically destroyed or erased from memory by being taken over by 
Jews and renamed in Hebrew, while the demographic make-up of coastal 
cities like Jaffa and Haifa altered drastically with the mass exodus of Arabs. 
Of the approximately 800,000 Arabs who had lived in the area of Palestine 
now called Israel, less than 150,000 now remained. By the end of 1949, the 
Jewish population of Israel had doubled to a million as a flood of immigrants, 
mainly from post-war Europe, entered the newly-declared state. 
Precise statistics for the period are not available, the British not having 
carried out a census since the 1930s. The population figures for 1947 
Palestine are therefore based on informal mandate records from the different 
districts, which would not have captured various groups such as new 
immigrants or temporary workers, and which would also have included a 
certain element of estimated projection as regards annual population 
increase. The United Nations provided figures for the refugees, estimated at 
the time as being around three quarters of a million people, and later revised 
upwards by both the United Nations and the British. But most authoritative 
references to historical sources (Berry and Philo 2006; Flapan 1987; Gelvin 
2005; Hadawi 1991; Harms and Ferry 2005; Hirst 2003; Khalidi 1997; 
Kimmerling and Migdal 2003; Lewis 1995; Morris 1987; Pappe 1992; Shlaim 
2000; Smith 2007) would in general concur with the figures given above, any 
divergence in their respective accounts being in terms of relatively narrow 
margins.  
Imprecise as these figures might be, they still give a clear indication of the 
cataclysmic change undergone by the people of Palestine within a brief 
period of time. In 1947, the United Nations, in order to deal with escalating 
Arab-Jewish tensions, had proposed a partition plan which would have 
divided the mandate territory of Palestine into three: 55% of the land for a 
Jewish state; 45% for the Palestinian Arabs; and Jerusalem to be 
administered by the United Nations as a separate unit. The Arabs rejected 
this proposal, and ended up after the ensuing wars with less than half of what 
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they had been offered, subsequently losing even that small percentage some 
twenty years later as a result of the 6 Days’ war of 1967.  
 
One Way Flight 
Moreover, the way in which the exodus and dispersal of the Palestinian 
Arabs unfolded can only have compounded the traumatic nature of their 
territorial dispossession. Both phases of fighting in 1948, the initial civil war 
between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine, and the subsequent 
international war between the Arab armies and the newly-declared state of 
Israel, were characterised by the flight, expulsion and evacuation of 
Palestinian Arabs. During the civil war, the Jews put Plan Dalet into action, a 
strategic campaign to clear Arab villages on the coastal plain of “hostile 
elements” so as to ensure security for Jewish settlements. And as Haifa, 
Jaffa, West Jerusalem and other major towns and cities were taken by 
Jewish forces, the great majority of their Arab population fled or was 
expelled. 
The international phase of the war saw the evacuation of Arab villages in 
areas where battles took place, and the mass exodus, during the short period 
of truce, of Palestinian Arabs to Arab-held territory or neighbouring Arab 
countries. The Israelis for their part expelled Arabs from land they conquered, 
and any Arab population remaining within their territory was shifted around 
according to perceived security requirements. By the time of the armistice 
agreements of 1949, the Arab population of Palestine lay fragmented, 
dispersed between Israel, the Jordanian-controlled West Bank, the Egyptian- 
occupied Gaza strip, refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, 
and some, with the resources, education and contacts to travel further afield, 
in the Gulf States, Europe and the USA. 
Whether the Arab flight from their home towns and villages was voluntary or 
forced, a subject of some contention in the literature, is not relevant to this 
argument. Pappe (2006) has called Plan Dalet “a blueprint for ethnic 
cleansing”. Certainly, killings and massacres occurred, as at Deir Yassin, 
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where the cold-blooded abuse and murder of more than 90 men, women and 
children became emblematic of the darkest incidents of the wars. Morris 
(2008) has painstakingly recorded details of many such incidents of terror 
and massacre in Arab villages during 1948. But the contention arises over 
whether the exodus was “population transfer”, a premeditated Zionist 
intention, or whether it came about largely as a result of fear and panic 
spreading through the Arab population, a normal reaction to war exacerbated 
by accounts of atrocities like Deir Yassin. The evidence is equivocal, and the 
truth probably encompasses both motivations (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 
p.163; Lewis 1995, p. 364). 
Arab Palestinian flight, whether forced, nudged or voluntary, took place for a 
variety of reasons, including “the threats, the bombs, the rumours of 
massacres, the death of close ones ... the fear of rape, the traditional 
...anxiety about the loss of honor” (Al-Quattan 2007, p.203). Flight, however, 
is not to be equated with abandonment. In a land which had seen numerous 
communal and economic crises, most recently in the Arab Revolt of 1936-9, 
movement to home villages in the mountains had become an established 
pattern of self-defence for city and citrus plantation workers. The rich, for 
their part, would flee in troubled times to second homes in Lebanon, Jordan 
or Syria, which is precisely what the elite did in 1947 before the wars 
commenced. In the past, return had always followed as things calmed down, 
and the normal routines of everyday life would be resumed, albeit under a 
new regime or controlling power. The novel element this time was the Israeli 
ban on return, preventing Arabs from going back for any reason to the towns 
and villages they had evacuated. “For those accustomed to a pattern of 
leaving trouble through a swing door that would soon bring them home, the 
Israeli ban became a disaster” (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, p. 165). Any 
attempts to return to collect belongings, tend to fields and crops, get the store 
of bridal gold that had been buried for safety in the garden, were regarded by 
Israel as infiltration, punishable by death.  
This was the shock of the nakba; this was why “our exodus from the country 
in the year 1948 was a great surprise to us” (Jayussi 2007, p.120). Hitherto, 
tragedies had occurred within this world – deaths, losses, injustices, 
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massacres. But nothing had essentially happened to this world as a whole. 
Now, with no possibility of return to a way of life that had gone on, with some 
minor interruptions, for centuries, the carpet was literally ripped out from 
under Palestinian Arab feet. The reality they had known and come to take for 
granted was shattered; life could never be the same again. 
 
An Unimaginable Experience? 
Perhaps the nakba should not have come as quite such a surprise to the 
Arab population of Palestine. From the late nineteenth century, waves of 
Jewish immigration, along with increased Jewish acquisition of land and 
gradual replacement of Arab with Jewish labour, had become a fact of life in 
Palestine. Any hopes the Arab population may have entertained of British 
support for an Arab kingdom in the Middle East, in exchange for the 
assistance the Arabs had provided in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire, 
were dashed by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, endorsing the aims of the 
Zionist project. The subsequent mandate period saw increasing conflict and 
tension, frequently erupting into violence, as the Arab and Jewish 
communities of Palestine grew progressively more polarised. 
The violence escalated throughout the 1920s and 1930s till the Great Arab 
Revolt of 1936-9, which started as peaceful resistance through general strike 
action, but soon degenerated into extensive clashes between the Arab and 
Jewish communities, amidst Arab demands for democratic elections and an 
end to Jewish immigration. The British, with the active support of Jewish 
forces, instigated a harsh military campaign to break the rebellion, and, at the 
same time, the notion of partition was floated by the British government. Lord 
Peel’s appeal to the Palestinian Arabs “Considering what the possibility of 
finding a refuge in Palestine means to many thousands of suffering Jews, is 
the loss occasioned by partition, great as it would be, more than Arab 
generosity can bear?” (Khalidi 1992, p. 90) fell on unreceptive ears, and the 
1937 Peel Commission report proposing partition only served to inflame the 
situation and extend the revolt.  
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In 1939, with the rebellion quelled, and the MacDonald White Paper 
launching a new British policy for Palestine more in tune with the Arab 
position, the second world war broke out. British attention was now focussed 
elsewhere, and the Zionists began a campaign of sabotage and terror in 
Palestine against both the British and the Arabs. Post-war, international 
sympathy for the Jewish predicament, coupled with British preoccupations 
elsewhere in the Empire, led to increasing calls for partition as the solution to 
the “Palestine problem”, and, in 1947, to Britain’s decision to hand over its 
troubled mandate to the United Nations. 
In hindsight, the seeds of what happened in 1948 are clearly visible in the 
events of the preceding decades. Khalidi (2006, p.23) views the nakba as a 
postlude to the defeat of the Arab revolt in 1939, as the outcome and 
conclusion of a series of failures that left the Palestinian Arabs leaderless 
and disorganised, no longer in control of their own fate, which was now in the 
hands of a nascent Israel, neighbouring Arab countries and a variety of 
international actors. But Nusseibeh (2007, p.45) highlights the inability to 
comprehend what was happening, to fit events into a familiar frame of 
reference, as he describes how, in 1948, the Palestinian Arabs “went into the 
fray with a great store of illusions and misplaced pride ..... (they) had no 
shadow government ready to take over, no leader, no weapons, no armed 
forces....even more fatally, they had no clear understanding of what the 
fighting was all about. In the earlier rebellions against the Turks, territory was 
never the bone of contention. The Turks didn’t take over a village in order to 
drive out its people and replace them with settlers. With the Zionists, the 
struggle was for every inch of soil”. 
Less than twenty years later, as a result of Israel’s victory over the armies of 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the 6 Days’ War of 1967, the entire territory of the 
former Palestine mandate came under Israeli control, including populations of 
about 650,000 Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and 
some 350,000 in the Gaza Strip. As this acquisition was taking place, about 
200,000 Palestinian Arabs, from within Israel as well as the West Bank, 
became refugees, either fleeing or being expelled into Jordan. Thousands of 
residents of the Gaza Strip were also forced to leave their homes. For many, 
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this was a second exodus, as they had originally sought refuge in the West 
Bank and Gaza after leaving their homes in 1948-9. Villages were destroyed. 
Attempts by villagers to return to their property, for whatever reason, were 
regarded as infiltration by the Israelis, and infiltrators were shot. (Hirst 2003, 
pp. 350-6; Morris 2001, pp. 302-46; Smith 2007, pp. 289-93) It was 1948 all 
over again: a second instalment, an after-shock, of the nakba, serving to give 
Israel authority over all of the territory of historical Palestine, and to 
completely reverse, from two decades previously, the proportions of the two 
communities, Arab and Jewish, that lived there.  
Israel had also taken the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula 
from Egypt in 1967, so that its borders now extended well beyond the original 
mandate boundaries. This new situation meant that the issue of Palestine’s 
loss of territory to the creation of Israel in 1948 was no longer politically 
centre stage in the Middle East: the return of the territories occupied during 
the 1967 hostilities became the overriding concern. Land for peace was 
Israel’s new bargaining chip, recognition and security being the price for the 
return to Syria and Egypt of the territories taken in 1967. Israel, it seemed, 
was now not only a fact on the ground, but also a force to be reckoned with. 
 
The Multiple Losses of Territorial Dispossession 
The collective significance of the deterritorialisation of the Palestinian Arab 
people in the nakba of 1948 was profound. As Grosby (1995) observes, 
territoriality is about much more than physical space: it encompasses the 
“life-ordering and life-sustaining significance of a space” (p.149), the network 
of social relationships and framework of meanings in which life is conducted, 
the collective consciousness of the people living in that space. Even in the 
case of nomadism, and some of the inhabitants of Palestine, certainly in the 
Negev area, could have been classed as nomads, the norm in this part of the 
world was one of “enclosed nomadism” (Rowton 1974). This implies a clear, 
persistent attachment to a particular locality, and an established link between 
nomadic tribe and sedentary town within that locality. To deprive the 
Palestinians of their territory was not just to take away their land; it was to 
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take away everything that gave form, structure and sustenance to their daily 
existence in both tangible and intangible ways. 
Many of them lost, in material terms, their homes, their land, and the 
livelihood which that land had assured them. A not insignificant number had 
lost loved ones and extended family members, killed in the violence or 
exhausted by the stresses of conflict and flight. The dispersal and 
fragmentation of the population entailed the loss of the whole fabric of society 
which had underpinned life in the region over centuries: differences of class, 
wealth and background were to some extent levelled by the exodus for those 
who left (Khalidi 1997, p.194), and by the new Israeli masters for those who 
stayed; different branches of clans and of extended families found 
themselves separated from each other, living in distant, often mutually 
inaccessible locations (Humphries and Khalili 2007, pp. 215-23). 
Collective memory was tied up with the land and the society that lived in it. 
As Nusseibeh (2007, p. 43) writes of his father’s objections to partition, it 
“wasn’t just about a piece of real estate to be haggled over at the UN; what 
was at stake was his heritage, stretching back well over a millennium”. Pappe 
(2006, pp.225-34) refers to the “memoricide” involved in the nakba, with the 
eradication or Hebrew renaming of Palestinian villages literally erasing their 
history and replacing it with another. Slyomovics (1998) offers a detailed 
account of this phenomenon in her work on the history of the village of Ein 
Hod, previously the Arab Ayn Hawd. 
Not only the collective past, but any collective hopes or aspirations for the 
future were also affected. In 1948, several historic processes were playing 
out in the region; the formation of independent national states; the 
emergence of a distinct Arab state system; and the replacement of colonial 
domination by US-Soviet rivalry (Sayigh 1997). The Palestinians might, in 
other circumstances, have hoped to benefit, like their neighbours, from these 
processes, but their aspirations for any form of statehood were thwarted by 
their collective dislocation. They lost the potential to operate as independent 
actors, surrendering agency to the Israelis, their Arab neighbours and 
interested world powers. Far from achieving statehood, they now faced the 
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challenge of retaining any sense of collective consciousness as a people, 
fragmented as they now were into “the refugees, the remnant and the 
occupied” (Said 1979). 
The situation of territorial dispossession entailed the loss not only of political 
agency but also of basic freedom of movement. Palestinians were now 
guests, often unwelcome, in neighbouring Arab lands, or subject to the rule of 
other states, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, in what they had previously considered to 
be their own land. “As outcast, as transnational, as extraterritorial being, as 
oppressed nonentity inside Israel” (Said 1979, p.169), they lost the previously 
taken-for-granted ability to travel around, both in their own territory and to 
others. It is because of this that Khalidi (1997, p.1) locates the “quintessential 
Palestinian experience” at borders, checkpoints, and barriers, all the places 
where identities are checked and verified and where movement is controlled. 
Finally, in terms of effects on the Palestinian collective consciousness, the 
events of the nakba must have led to a loss of trust, both in others and in 
themselves. The British had walked off from their mandate responsibilities 
and left them to their fate at a critical point; their fellow-Arabs had come to 
their aid, but slowly, in disorganised fashion, some with dubious motives, and 
ultimately ineffectively; the international community, as represented by the 
United Nations, America, and the European powers, seemed unwilling or 
unable to give attention to what was going on, or to understand the 
Palestinian Arab perspective on events.  
In addition, trust in their own capacity to maintain their honour, a key value in 
Arab society (Nydell 2006, p.150), must have been dented by the events of 
the nakba, since Arab male honour is totally bound up with “the possession 
of land and the maintenance of kin women’s virginity” (Hasso 2000, p. 495). 
Interestingly, the loss of honour implied by the events of 1948 is signified by 
the common use of the term “al ightisab” (the rape) to refer to the nakba; as 
well as of metaphors of rape to characterise the loss of the homeland to an 
aggressive, invading Israeli enemy, these perhaps also masking occasions of 
actual rape that occurred during the course of events (Slyomovics 1998, pp. 
302-46; Slyomovics 2007, pp. 37-8; Pappe 2006, p.211). 
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Hirst (2003, p.398) provides examples of articles from Fatah’s early 
magazine “Our Palestine – the Call to Life”, produced in Beirut from the late 
1950s and addressed to “the children of the nakba”, in which land and 
honour are clearly linked. They contain statements like “the loss of land and 
honour moulds you in the crucible of the nakba”; “the land... whose loss we 
deem not merely material, but, above all else, a national dishonour, a badge 
of ignominy and shame”. It was clearly this same sense of dishonour that 
reverberated for a lifetime with Abu-Lughod’s father in his story of how, 
fleeing Jaffa by ship in 1948, a Belgian sailor on board confronted him with 
the words “How could you leave your country?” (Abu-Lughod 2007, p. 90) A 
sense of shame at having permitted themselves to suffer these losses, a lack 
of trust in their own abilities to live up to their values and preserve their 
honour, would appear to have been not uncommon as a result of the 
territorial dispossession of 1948, and of the significant rupture that 
dispossession represented in terms of Palestinian self-perceptions and of the 
overall framework of meaning which structured their lives. 
 
The Emotional Reaction 
History and Emotions 
In chapter two, attention was drawn to the fact that there would not be much 
history without emotions, since these serve to motivate human behaviour and 
foster the formation of social groups and movements. History, however, 
tends to deal with events and characters rather than emotional experiences, 
leaving emotional content as implicit, or brushing over it in a few words. 
Sayigh (2007) observes how most writing about the Palestinian nakba is in 
this tradition of “history”, which she describes as a Euro-American mode of 
writing about the past, dependent on knowledge of “facts” and chronology, 
and aimed at a rational “knowing” or “seeing the world”. She advocates 
“heritage”, by contrast to “history” a more experiential mode of “being in” the 
world (Daniel 1996), as more inclusive, catering for the voices of women and 
rural populations, who are normally excluded from “history” by its very nature. 
Her research with the individual stories of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is 
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based on this “heritage” approach, and highlights emotional aspects of the 
nakba and of subsequent refugee existence as experienced and recollected 
by women in the camps. Similarly, relevant art forms, particularly the wide 
field of Palestinian “resistance poetry” (Darraj 2006; Parmenter 1994; 
Suleiman and Muhawi 2006, pp. 31-99), or the relatively few films dealing 
with the nakba (Bresheeth 2007), would seem to place greater emphasis on 
the emotional quality of the happenings of the time than historical accounts.  
The individual “heritage”-type story or the artistic representation can no doubt 
appreciably add to the picture of the emotions involved in historic events, but 
may ultimately give no more complete or accurate a view of the collective 
emotional aspects of these events than can be inferred from historical 
accounts in mainstream texts. All of these sources are subject to the same 
moulding by memory, and, in addition, to the pressures of academic or 
artistic genre, tradition and trend, which are bound to come between the felt 
emotions and their subsequent recall and representation. While recognising 
that all experience is mediated in this way, historical accounts can still be 
usefully scanned for clues that might give some indication of the emotional 
climate or atmosphere prevalent amongst particular groups of people at 
specific points of time. These clues might lie in specific actions taken, in the 
way in which events and actions are described, or in the particular language 
used by protagonists and authoritative commentators at the time of the 
events in focus. 
For the purposes of the arguments of this dissertation, indications are sought 
of the major emotional reactions associated with grief, as outlined in chapter 
one. While remembering that emotional display is variable across cultures, it 
seems generally accepted that an initial lack of emotion, a numbness or 
confused sense of disbelief is a general feature of the grieving experience. 
Subsequent to this, there ensues an emotional turmoil, encompassing 
sadness, yearning, self-reproach, guilt, anger and so on, a mix of emotions 
essentially characterised as negative. These may not all occur, and those 
that do are unlikely to present themselves in a linear, orderly progression. 
Rather, the oscillation between a backward-looking orientation to what has 
been lost and a forward-looking motivation to get on with life (Stroebe and 
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Schut 1999), as part of a process “that reflects the realisation of loss, on the 
one hand, and the fight against the reality of loss, on the other” (p.202), 
implies a somewhat unpredictable shifting between seemingly contradictory 
emotional states. 
 
The Initial Disorientation 
The emotions surrounding the nakba itself are explicitly referred to in several 
narrative accounts, which mention the mass fear and panic elicited by its 
events. Kimmerling and Migdal (2003) talk of the general Palestinian “fear of 
what the Jews would do to them” (p.163). Hadawi (1991) quotes Glubb 
Pasha, the British commanding officer of the Arab Legion, when he describes 
the Palestinians leaving “in panic flight, to escape massacre” (p.95); and he 
also refers to Childers’ research on Arab radio broadcasts of April 1948 that 
explicitly acknowledged the spread of fear and consternation amongst the 
Arab population of Palestine (p.96). The very act of the mass Palestinian 
hurried flight, leaving behind possessions which many later tried to retrieve, 
and, in several cases, even losing sight of close family members while fleeing 
(Humphries and Khalili 2007, p.222), indicates a heightened atmosphere of 
panic and alarm pervading the events of 1948. 
But once the panic had subsided and the conflict and flight were over, the 
Palestinian Arabs, with the armistice of 1949, found themselves facing a new 
reality. They were now fragmented between the newly declared State of 
Israel, the Transjordan-controlled West Bank, the Egyptian-ruled Gaza Strip, 
and various refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Moreover, 
those finding themselves outside the territory now called Israel were banned 
by the Israeli government from returning there for whatever reason. Their 
collective world shattered by their territorial dispossession, the Palestinian 
people entered what appears to be a period of bewildered disorientation. 
Kimmerling and Migdal (2003) refer to these years, from 1949 to the mid-
sixties, as “the crucial disorienting period” (pp.216-7). Khalidi (1997) talks of 
“the lost years, with no centre of gravity” as a period of hiatus in Palestinian 
identity (p.178). Abu-Lughod and Sa’di (2007, p.9) refer to the experience of 
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the nakba leaving the Palestinian people “in disarray, politically, economically 
and psychologically”. And as Fatah, in its “Our Palestine – the Call to Life” 
magazine of the late 50s and early 60s, was later to remind the “children of 
the nakba”, they had from 1948 till that point in time “remained scattered, 
without honour, or personal or collective identity” (Hirst 2003, p.400). 
While a “forced public amnesia” (Bresheeth 2007, p.175) regarding the nakba 
and loss of the pre-nakba world might be expected in the case of the remnant 
of Palestinians left in the newly declared state of Israel, an apparent loss of 
memory or inability to verbalise the situation seems to have been more 
widespread. Karmi (2007), discussing the experiences of Palestinian men 
who had been in the forced labour camps set up by the new Israeli state from 
1948-55, describes the phenomenon as follows, “It was as if no-one could 
articulate for years the enormity of suffering that the experience of loss, 
insecurity and dislocation had caused. So people got on with the business of 
survival and did not look back” (p.20).  
Reduced by the events of the nakba to a level of “bare life” (Agamben 1998), 
the Palestinians concentrated on strategies for survival. For the most part, 
once basic food and shelter were secured, these centred on education. As 
Aburish (1988, p.129) observes “Details of our reasons and reaction to the 
defeat (of 1948) have been given and they differ, but a single response came 
out of it: educate, educate, educate”. The Israeli military success was 
perceived as due to superior levels of education and organisation, factors 
which the Palestinians now saw as holding the key to their own suddenly 
precarious future. In the refugee camps, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency), established in 1949 to supply humanitarian assistance to 
their inmates, took on responsibility for the provision of basic education, in 
response to general demand, along with healthcare and social welfare. 
These early years of dispossession for the Palestinians, characterised by 
fragmentation, bewildered confusion and an apparent inability to fully 
articulate their suffering, can be viewed as reflective in many ways of the 
immediate post-loss period of disorientation and emotional numbness typical 
of the grief experience. Grief theory identifies this initial response as an 
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interim coping measure, serving as protection from the full overwhelming 
impact of the loss (Stroebe et al.1993). Moreover, the practical preoccupation 
with survival during this period falls into the category of “problem-focused 
coping” (Stroebe and Schut 1999), implying an avoidance of any 
confrontation with feelings.  
 
The Emotional Turmoil 
 A variety of emotions emerged in the wake of the initial shock of the nakba, 
and these presented themselves perhaps most intensely in the refugee 
camps, where the Palestinians were contained as separate units, segregated 
from their host societies. There was sadness and nostalgia, a yearning for 
what had been lost, expressed in many ways:  the retention of the original 
Palestine house keys as almost sacred family heirlooms; the planting of trees 
from the original Palestinian garden at the door of the camp dwelling (Pappe 
2006, p.184); the insistence of families from one generation to the next that 
their provenance was a specific village in Palestine, and not a camp in an 
entirely different area or country (Hass 2000, pp.150-84; Karmi 2007, p.227); 
the recounting of personal memories to an extent that certain images of the 
pre-nakba world were never forgotten, but passed on as an “imagined 
geography” to the next generation (Shammas 1995; Slyomovics 1998). Each 
of these acts can be viewed as a manifestation of a collective emotional 
climate of nostalgia, each occurrence of such an act in turn contributing to 
the maintenance of that climate (see pp.74-5 above). 
This longing for the land that had been lost took on a collective form in the 
concept of “The Return” (al awda), discussed at some length in the next 
section of this chapter. This notion became an obsession, suffusing 
Palestinian poetry and novels for decades (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 
pp.135-7; Parmenter 1994), and reinforcing a seemingly stubborn 
determination to hang on to the past. The consequent refusal to accept camp 
life as anything more than a temporary arrangement (Hirst 2003, p.393) 
informed not only quotidian life but also the politics of exile. Hadawi (1991, 
p.136) quotes the 1965 Commissioner-General of UNRWA’s recognition of 
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this general climate of yearning in the camps, “Their longing to return home is 
intense and widespread ...... (it) remains unabated”.  
Along with this sorrow and clinging to the past, there also appears to have 
been a collective Palestinian embitterment, encompassing a hatred for the 
Israeli usurpers, and a sense of betrayal as regards their Arab neighbours 
and the world at large, particularly the western powers, who had let the 
catastrophic events of 1948 happen (Hadawi 1991, p.136; Hirst 2003, p.396; 
Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, p.233). This bitterness doubtless also derived 
from feelings of humiliation caused by the camp life degradations of poverty 
and powerlessness (Hadawi 1991, pp.137-8). Thus UNRWA, established to 
provide the refugees with support and alleviate their hardship, was not 
altogether favourably regarded, since a proud and formerly self-sufficient 
people considered it demeaning to accept charity, particularly at the hands of 
an international community seen as partly responsible for allowing that 
hardship to come about in the first place, and of an international agency 
whose very existence reinforced the potential permanence of their 
predicament. To add to the sense of embitterment and humiliation, there was 
also the self-reproach and shame involved in the perceived dishonour of 
being unable to prevent their territorial dispossession from taking place, 
already referred to in the previous section of this chapter (pp.126-7 above). 
As time passed a whole generation grew up in this emotional climate, 
imbibing through everyday social interaction the sorrow and longing, 
humiliation and bitterness that appear to have characterised it. And the rise 
of this new generation seems to have been accompanied by the rise of a 
collective sense of anger in the camps, along with a growing realisation that 
the Palestinian people would have to be responsible for their own futures, 
since no-one else seemed willing to shoulder that burden for them. The 
subsequent armed struggle, represented by the rise of Fatah and, eventually, 
the PLO from the early 1960s, can be seen, in grief theory terms, as 
indicating a collective shift in a more future-oriented direction, an attempt to 
reconstruct the collective world, or, in Sayigh’s (1997, p.668) terms, “the 
beginning of the search for the suppressed and subjugated identity”.  
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The generation which had witnessed the nakba as teenagers and young 
adults and had lived through an emotional climate of sadness and 
embitterment, chose to turn these into a more positively directed, identity-
affirming anger, thereby aiming to regain a place in the world for themselves 
and also some of the dignity and pride their parents’ generation had 
surrendered. This anger fuelled a powerful new sense of Palestinian 
nationalism that developed in the late 1950s and 1960s: “We only desire life 
insofar as life enables us to begin the battle for our land, our earth, our 
freedom and our dignity” (Our Palestine, September, 1964, cited in Hirst 
2003, p.399). Ironically enough, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in 1967, after their victory over the Arab armies in the 6 Days’ 
War, united these two Palestinian blocs under Israeli military rule just as this 
renewed sense of national purpose and identity appeared to be gaining 
ground amongst the Palestinian people, channelled through and centred on 
the activities and personalities of the PLO. 
The different emotions characterising the collective Palestinian emotional 
climate in the years following the nakba are broadly similar to those listed in 
the descriptions of the grief experience outlined in chapter one: sadness, 
yearning, self-reproach, powerlessness, despair, anger and so on (see p.29 
above). The anger, however, is a later feature in the case of the collective 
Palestinian reaction: it does not seem to appear in alternation with the other 
emotional states like sorrow and self-reproach as part of a general emotional 
turmoil, but rather arises from them or replaces them at a later stage in the 
grieving. Perhaps in this instance, the anger can be regarded as an example 
of the collective power which can be energised by grief: the Palestine 
liberation movement succeeded in harnessing the potential for agency 
contained within a newly emergent Palestinian collective identity fashioned 
by the shared experience of loss and grief (see p.59 above).  
In addition, shame, humiliation and hatred do not figure among the emotions 
commonly associated with grief in the theoretical literature, although they are 
clearly part of the emotional climate in the Palestinian post-nakba situation. 
The last, of course, provides a useful outlet for the negative feelings 
surrounding loss in cases where it is possible to attribute causative agency 
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for that loss to somebody else, whether justifiably or not. And the occurrence 
of the self-conscious emotions of shame and humiliation can perhaps be 
attributed to the fact that honour is a more central value in the Arab world 
than in the western societies where grief theory was developed. . 
 
Multiple Losses and Incremental Grief 
Since 1967, the emotional climates associated with the Palestinian people, 
both taken as a whole and within their geographically separate collectives, 
seem to have oscillated between extremes of despair and hope, frustration 
and optimism, anger and resignation, throughout the various cycles of peace 
processes and road maps. Each time a positive forward-looking move is 
made, or even anticipated, hope and optimism rise, and when that move is, 
almost inevitably, thwarted, pessimism and despair hold sway. For example, 
accounts of the eruption of the first intifada suggest an emotional climate 
encompassing anger, hope and determination. Hass (2000), in her portrayal 
of everyday life on the Gaza Strip in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
describes how “rage finally washed over Gaza” (p.41) in December 1987, as 
word spread around the community regarding the successes of different 
forms of rebellion. Chomsky (1999), writing of his experiences in the West 
Bank during this period, describes a mood “higher than the wind” in the 
occupied territories: “The sentiments are common, expressed without rhetoric 
or anger; people lacking means of self-defence, having endured much 
suffering and facing more, have stars in their eyes, and a sense of inevitable 
victory” (p. 491). Kimmerling and Migdal (2003) refer to the “revolutionary 
fervour” and “self-reliance” (p.300) that characterised this intifada.  
Post-intifada, a few years later, the residents of the Gaza Strip are described 
as “totally abandoned, increasingly helpless, and very fearful ..... Daily life is 
impossibly oppressive and people genuinely despair of protection.” (Roy 
1991, p.67) Sacco’s extraordinary comic books series (2001) on the occupied 
territories at the end of the first intifada captures, with a poignant mix of 
humour and humanity, the minutiae of oppression in such a way as to 
convey, without the need for recourse to words, the atmosphere of 
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frustration, humiliation, hopelessness and desperation permeating everyday 
Palestinian life. Yet only a couple of years after that, in 1994, there is once 
again “optimism in the air” (Hass 2000, p. 103), this time surrounding Arafat’s 
return to set up the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, and manifesting in a 
carefree environment where men freely play football in the streets and mixed 
bathing beach outings take place in the evenings. 
As time moves on in the Palestinian narrative, the emotions evoked and 
described can no longer be said to be directly elicited by the nakba of 1948. 
But in a very real sense, all of the subsequent losses are related to that 
original event, all of the subsequent emotional reactions to that original loss, 
“the very first link in a chain of loss that goes on” (Hass 2000, p.352), thereby 
forming a “continuity of pain” (Bresheeth 2007, p.161), “a long-running sore 
of dispossession” (Karmi 2007, p.231). In grief theory terms, this situation 
suggests the concept of “incremental grief”, originally developed by Cook and 
Oltjenbrun (1998) to describe how lack of congruence in grieving among 
bereaved family members can change the relationships between them, 
leading to further loss in the form of breakups. Such a grieving experience is 
complicated by “the additive factor of grief due to multiple related losses” 
(p.160), the primary loss serving to precipitate other losses, so that the 
overall effects are cumulative, with an escalation of problems and an 
intensification of emotional reactions. 
 
 
Making Sense of the Loss 
Central to the grief experience, as outlined in the first chapter, is the attempt 
to make sense of, and attribute some coherent meaning to, the post-loss 
world. This involves, at the national level, the reconstruction of the collective 
narrative, a picking up of the threads broken by the disruption of the loss and 
a reweaving of them into a credible, continuing story, along with the 
reformulation of collective identity on the basis of that story: “The story is the 
anchor for identity – personal and national” (Bresheeth 2007, p.174). For the 
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Palestinians, post 1948, this might seem an insurmountable task, given their 
geographical dispersal and the need “to rebuild their sociological space” 
(Sayigh 1997, p.666). But, ironically enough, the shared experience of 
statelessness and exile seemed to bind them, forming the glue of their 
“imagined community”, and providing the basis for a new, stronger, national 
story, “the narrative that would connect Palestinians to one another in their 
minds.” (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, p.394) 
 
The Lost Paradise 
This story first focussed on what had been lost, looking to the past and to life 
in an idyllic pre-nakba Palestine. The village and the happily close-knit rural 
community were central to this vision. But cities too were remembered as 
places of unusually harmonious peace, love and brotherhood, somewhat in 
contradiction of the many recorded instances of tension and violence 
between the various confessional and ethnic groups on the ground. The olive 
tree, the vine, the crops, fig, almond and lemon trees, rich soil, fragrant 
orange blossom and roses, all figure frequently in post-1948 poetry 
(Parmenter 1994, pp. 70-85); as do the minutiae of routine daily life in rural 
farming communities. The same images figure in numerous individual 
accounts of how this collective memory of Palestine was transferred from one 
generation to the next. Hass (2000, p.150), for example, writes of Abu Ali, 
born in a refugee camp, who “had assimilated all his parents’ memories, 
down to the colours of the wheat and corn, the sight of the plums and 
oranges and grapes, the smell of the fertile earth”; and Shammas (1995) 
recounts how a Palestinian refugee grandmother would tell her American 
Palestinian granddaughter about the fragrant lemon tree in her garden in 
Jaffa, which for her symbolised all she had lost in 1948. This rurally idyllic 
conception of pre-nakba Palestine is referred to by Kimmerling and Migdal 
(2003) as the “Lost Garden”, while Gelvin (2005, p.156) terms it “Palestine as 
Paradise Lost”.  
The loss of this pastoral paradise was viewed from a perspective of 
victimisation, as a sort of cosmic injustice meted out against the Palestinian 
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people. The frequent use of the term “al hijra” to denote the exodus of 1948 
underlines the cosmic dimension of the expulsion, since this is the word used 
of the forced migration of Mohammed with his followers from Mecca to 
Medina, breaking away from his tribe in order to set up the first Islamic state. 
In the new Islamic calendar, this was the first day of the first month of the first 
year. For the Palestinians, the nakba similarly marked the beginning of an 
epoch. 
Victimhood, even of a cosmic status, needs victimisers, and blame was 
immediately cast on the Israelis as the villains of the piece. This soon 
widened, however, to include the neighbouring Arab nations who had failed 
to protect their Palestinian brothers, the British who had walked off from their 
mandate responsibilities and left them to their fate, the United States who 
had unwaveringly backed Israel, and the world at large which seemed 
indifferent to the Palestinian predicament. Khalidi, however, balances this 
view by arguing that the Palestinians themselves must shoulder some of the 
blame for the chronicle of failures that culminated in the nakba.  He highlights 
(1997, pp.180-92; 2006, pp.1-139) the lack of leadership, judgement and 
organisation within pre-1948 Palestinian society, and criticises the inability of 
the elite to foresee or forestall the problems Zionism might create. To borrow 
Said’s (1996, p.27) succinct phraseology, where the Israelis had the plan, the 
Palestinians had the wish. 
And that wish in the post-nakba years was for paradise regained. Hirst (2003, 
pp.392-7) describes the mystique of “The Return” and its various modes of 
expression, particularly in the refugee camps where the destitute majority of 
the Palestinian community-in-exile lived. There was “the masochistic 
obstructionism of the camp dwellers”, involving automatic rejection of projects 
aimed at improving their lot if these smacked of rendering their temporary 
status more permanent. There were “the camp rituals and regalia”, whereby 
the decoration, ceremonies and titles appertaining to schools and other 
community organisations were infused with references to Palestine and the 
determination to get back there. And there was “poetic fancy”, the passionate 
declaration of intent to return that permeated both Palestinian poetry and the 
militant rhetoric of many Arab regimes. At a later stage, the “right of return” 
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became both a political demand and a moral statement, but, in the early post-
nakba years, “al awda” was essentially an expression of longing for what had 
been lost.  
Ways were found for keeping the lost world of Palestine alive, several 
already touched on in the preceding section of this chapter. Keys to the 
Palestine house and original Palestinian birth certificates were passed on 
from the nakba generation to the next (Abu-Lughod 2007, p.77). Trees and 
plants from the original Palestinian garden were planted by the camp home 
door (Pappe 2006, p.184). The inhabitants of many of the refugee camps 
were organised according to their original Palestinian village-based 
communities, and, within those communities, along clan and family lines; 
they would be recognised, down the generations, as having come from a 
specific village in Palestine, even if actually born in a camp in Lebanon 
(Karmi 1999, pp.55-6; Karmi 2007, p.227; Sacco 2001, p.167). Memories of 
the original village, from its sights and sounds to its physical layout and daily 
routines, were passed on inter-generationally through stories and family talk. 
In later years, and where possible, older children would be taken to see 
where that village had been, and given a guided tour, even if the village was 
completely erased by the time of the visit (Sacco 2001, p.15). And, before the 
nakba generation dies out, their detailed memories have been recorded in 
village memorial books (Slyomovics 1998; Davis 2007).  
This phenomenon relates, in grief theory terms, to the notion of continuing 
bonds, a recognised part of the grieving experience whereby the bereaved 
find ways of remaining connected to the deceased (see p.21 above). 
Through the investment of effort in memory work, their relationship continues 
beyond death. In a similar way, the Palestinian community might be regarded 
as finding various means of creating such continuing bonds with their lost 
land. Through the operation of collective memory, a representation of 
Palestine was developed and maintained in the collective consciousness, a 
place found for it in the collective sense of self. Lacking any apparatus of 
state, in the form of an education system or organised media, to conduct a 
transfer of collective memory, the Palestinians achieved it largely through the 
channel of the family, in which the nakba generation “reared their 
138 
 
descendants on a detailed knowledge of their towns and villages of origin in 
the old Palestine” (Karmi 2007, p.227). Thus the perceptions of Palestine as 
a lost paradise, of the Palestinians as a people unjustly expelled thence, and 
of the Israelis as representative of the demonic forces responsible for the 
expulsion, persisted in the collective Palestinian consciousness over many 
years. 
 
The Armed Struggle 
Towards the end of the 1950s, a new paradigm emerged: armed struggle 
aimed at recapturing the lost paradise. The Palestinians by now realised they 
could rely only on themselves to do something about their situation, and that 
action had to replace talk and lament. Fatah grew out of this understanding. 
By 1964, Arafat and his Fatah co-founders had assembled the nucleus of a 
guerrilla organisation, based in Syria and enjoying wide support across the 
Palestinian diaspora. In 1965, it began a campaign of attacks, initially the 
sabotage of military infrastructure, within what it regarded as the occupied 
territories. The goal, as declared in the Palestinian National Covenant of 
1964, was the elimination of Israel from those territories: “Armed struggle is 
the only way to liberate Palestine ..... (Every Palestinian) must be prepared 
for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and life in order to 
win back his homeland” (cited in Hass 2000, p.116).  
This spirit of sacrifice was exemplified by the battle of Karameh in 1968, 
when three to four hundred Fatah guerrillas stood firm at Karameh refugee 
camp, near Israel’s eastern border, against a reprisal Israeli attack 
comprising some 15,000 men and a substantial number of tanks. In this first 
battle between Jews and Palestinians since 1948, the Palestinians lost five 
times as many fighters as the Israelis, but the latter failed to achieve their 
objectives and were forced to withdraw. (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.61-2; 
Gelvin 2005, p.199; Hirst 2003, pp.411-4; Khalidi 1997, pp.196-7; Smith 
2007, p.312) Karameh was a psychological and political victory for Arafat and 
Fatah. The myth of the fedayeen, the heroic warrior, was established, and a 
revolutionary fervour swept through the refugee camps, and through the 
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youth of the greater Arab world, resulting in volunteers flocking to Fatah 
recruitment centres.  
The Palestinian story was taking a new turn, one that involved the restoration 
of both agency and dignity (by coincidence, karameh means honour or 
dignity in Arabic). By turning failure into triumph, and defeat into victory, the 
Palestinians could begin to make some sense of their troubled past. Though 
still largely absorbed in that past, this was a new and forward-looking 
orientation. The generation which had been in their formative years at the 
time of the nakba took matters into their own hands, reacting to the victim-
status passivity of their parents, but still with the image of Palestine in their 
minds. Their identity as Palestinians was now based on “loss plus liberation 
from nonentity, oppression and exile” (Said 1979, p.135). And the Israeli 
victory in the Six Days’ War of 1967, resulting in Israel’s acquisition of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, served to concentrate their focus on the reunited 
territory of the former Palestinian mandate, now all under Israeli occupation. 
For the next twenty years, the PLO, the centre of gravity for Palestinian 
nationalism, operated in exile, first from Syria, then Jordan, Lebanon and 
Tunisia. As the non-territorial equivalent of a state, it came to be recognised 
internationally as representative of the Palestinian people. And despite 
various internal problems between its different factions, an inevitable degree 
of friction with the people and governments of its successive host countries, 
and increasing criticism of the violent methods used by some of its elements 
to attract world attention to the Palestinian cause, the PLO succeeded at an 
international diplomatic and political level in driving forward the idea of a 
formal Palestinian state. The narrative of armed struggle thus proved to be a 
source of both political legitimacy and national identity for a dispersed people 
lacking a single territorial, social and economic base. It provided a common 







During the period of PLO ascendancy, the focus of the struggle shifted 
perceptibly from a backwards-looking preoccupation with return to the lost 
paradise, to a future-oriented aspiration to the establishment of a Palestinian 
state. Said (1979, p.179) talks of a growing realism, a coming to terms with 
the situation, that resulted in greater political effectiveness. The shift was  
substantial, from the 1964 Palestinian National Covenant which aimed at 
restoration of the status ante 1948 and the eradication of Israel; through the 
utopian vision of a democratic, unitary Palestinian state, where Arab, Jew 
and Christian would live side by side, endorsed at the 1970 Palestinian 
National Council and elaborated on in Arafat’s famous 1974 gun and olive 
branch speech to the United Nations; to the acceptance of a two-state 
solution, announced at the 1988 Palestinian National Council session in 
Algiers, recognising Israel as a fact on the ground, and declaring an 
independent state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. From a 
declared intention to reclaim all of their land, the Palestinians were now 
conceding most of it by settling for pre-1967 rather than pre-1948 borders. 
Over twenty years the armed struggle had arrived at compromise, 
accommodating political realities. The Palestinians seemed to be adapting to 
the post-loss status quo, and moving on with a view to the future. 
The clamour for a Palestinian state became more urgent, and its focal point 
moved back to the occupied territories with the outbreak of the first intifada in 
1987. This grass roots movement, starting in the refugee camps of Gaza and 
spreading quickly through the Strip and into the West Bank, was born of 
frustration and exasperation at two decades of Israeli occupation and the 
attendant personal, economic and social hardships. Years of restricted 
movement, diminishing employment prospects, the suppression of political 
activity, and increasingly punitive encounters with both Israeli settlers and the 
military, had taken their toll. “People were asking hard questions, not just 
about their political future but about their very existence. They were asking 
how much their lives were worth” (Hass 2000, p.49). 
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There was increasing disillusionment in the occupied territories with the 
capacity of the political process, as typified by the various peace accords, 
and of the PLO, with its various rival factions, to make a substantive 
difference to everyday life or to drive out the occupying power. Popular, 
collective action now replaced the quasi-military approach; the warrior with 
his arms and explosives was superseded by the youth throwing stones, a 
fresh generation’s response to the Palestinian predicament. It was still 
struggle, but a wide-spread democratised struggle, no longer in the hands of 
a few fedayeen, but engaging all sections of Palestinian society. And its aim 
was not a return to some lost paradise of the early twentieth century, but the 
freedom to live normal lives in the bit of land they had now. The very word 
“intifada”, which means “shaking off” as a dog might vigorously shake drops 
of water from its coat after getting wet, gives a sense of the power and the 
felt natural justice of this rebellion. 
Arafat, though like everyone else taken by surprise at this sudden turn of 
events, was quick-witted enough to align the PLO with the intifada, thus 
providing more leverage for his subsequent negotiations over a Palestinian 
state. The Oslo Process ensued, leading to “a peace that buried 1948 and its 
victims” (Pappe 2006, p.24), and that saw the establishment of Arafat and his 
Palestinian Authority in the occupied territories in 1994, in what looked at the 




The Palestinians seemed to have “moved beyond a sense of victimisation 
and debilitating nostalgia” (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, p.351) and into a 
future of self-determination: they had started “the inevitable march towards 
statehood” (Hirst 2003, p.22). But that progress appears to have stalled.  Two 
decades later, the Gaza Strip is universally recognised as a large, 
overpopulated prison camp, teetering on the edge of an economic and 
humanitarian abyss. Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon are still 
politically and economically disadvantaged, living in a stateless twilight zone. 
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The West Bank is a cantonised series of Palestinian towns and communities, 
cut off from each other by a matrix of roads linking Israeli settlements, and 
separated from Israel by the recently-constructed security wall. Israeli Arabs 
are still largely second-class citizens within Israel. And diaspora Palestinians 
have no easy access to relatives living in the West Bank or Gaza. There is 
still no freedom of mobility for Palestinians and, for many, no change in their 
political, economic or social status since the 1980s. For some, particularly in 
the Gaza Strip, the situation has markedly deteriorated. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to expand on what hampered 
progress, to detail the failures of the Oslo Peace Process, the reasons 
behind the second intifada, or the errors of judgement which rendered 
Arafat’s Palestinian Authority increasingly less credible as the energising 
force for a new state. The asymmetrical power relations of the US-led Oslo 
negotiations; the apparent determination of Israel to continue founding 
settlements in the occupied territories; the internal political situation in Israel 
which swung the right wing Sharon, associated by Arabs with Sabra and 
Shatila, the refugee camps in Lebanon where Palestinians had been 
massacred after the Israeli invasion of 1982, into power  at a crucial moment; 
the barely alleviated conditions of occupation despite the agreement to self-
rule and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority; the complete 
destruction by the Israelis in 2002 of the nascent state infrastructure 
painstakingly built up by the Palestinian Authority since 1994, were all 
contributory factors. 
So too was the inability of the Palestinians to solidly unite in a vision of the 
way forward. Sayigh (1997, p.23) notes the duality in Palestinian nationalism 
between the path of compromise and openness and that of denial and 
preoccupation with the past. Arafat’s concession in the Oslo Process, for 
example, literally ceding the 78% of Palestine lost in the 1948 nakba, was not 
universally welcomed by his compatriots, especially when it resulted in no 
discernible economic or social benefits for the vast majority of Palestinians. 
Meanwhile, Hamas, in 1988, at the beginning of the first intifada, had 
declared their aim of regaining the whole of Palestine as a holy land sacred 
to the Muslims. By the time of the second intifada, in 2000, their stance had 
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increased in popularity, particularly in the overcrowded and underprivileged 
Gaza Strip. For a generation brought up in a state of mental war with Israel, 
the shahid, the martyr of the suicide bombings, replaced the feday, the heroic 
warrior of Arafat’s generation. The struggle to recover the lost paradise of 
Palestine was now being seen in terms of Islamic jihad rather than militant 
nationalism. 
This tension between past and future orientations, between holding on to 
what is lost and accepting the new post-loss situation, is central to the dual-
process model of grief (Stroebe and Schut 1999). The norm is for the two 
orientations to gradually shift balance over time from a predominant focus on 
the past to an ever greater focus on the future, until the past is, if not largely 
forgotten, at least integrated meaningfully and non-detrimentally into a fully 
functional new status quo. For many Palestinian individuals, this may well be 
the case, exemplified by Israeli Arabs integrated into Israeli society, 
Palestinian refugees integrated into Jordanian society, and, amongst the 
younger generation in Lebanon’s refugee camps, attempts to acquire foreign 
passports so as to integrate into some European society (Allan 2007, p.274). 
But for the vast majority, the collective core, of the Palestinian people, the 
grief trajectory appears to have stalled. They know they cannot go back. But 
they cannot go forward either. The path to any meaningful, normal, collective 
future in economic, social and political terms appears to be blocked, with 
attempts at collective meaning-making stuck between memories of the past 
and unrealised aspirations for the future. 
Nevertheless, the Palestinian people are still there. At the creation of Israel 
the Zionists may have seen the Palestinians as a minor irritation and 
temporary inconvenience, imagining that within 60 to 80 years of the initial 
“transfers”, they would all have left, or been absorbed by neighbouring Arab 
countries (Berry and Philo 2006, p.111). Given the pan-Arabist ideology that 
was at its height around that time, this was perhaps not an unjustifiable 
calculation. Contrary to all expectations, however, they have continued, 
displaying the tenacity and perseverance of the “samid” (the steadfast or 
resilient one) (Shehadeh 1982). Even those elements of the diaspora whose 
families left Palestine long ago, and who are thriving in Europe or the US, 
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display strong bonds of sentiment with their country, their compatriots and 
their heritage. The Palestinian people may be stuck in their grief trajectory 
between an irretrievable past and an unrealised future, but they definitely and 
markedly exist, arguably stronger as a nation now because of the shared loss 
and grief arising from the nakba. As Said observes, “we have recreated 




Context and Consequences 
Meanwhile, the larger context within which this Palestinian history played out 
could scarcely be considered conducive to supporting their collective 
adaptation to a post-nakba world. Two important factors recognised as 
contributing to resilience in dealing with grief are the presence of social 
support and the absence of concurrent stressors (see pp.40-1 above). An 
examination of the regional and global contexts surrounding the events of 
1948 and the subsequent experiences of the Palestinian people, as detailed 
in the following pages, would seem to indicate rather the opposite: a lack of 
support and a variety of stressors. The predicament of the Palestinians, often 
their very status as a people, has been largely ignored or misunderstood at 
an international level, while their plight has afforded their regional neighbours 
numerous opportunities for manipulation and manoeuvring. The relationship 
with Israel, and the significance of this relationship within a broader global 
framework of political interaction, has had a consistently negative impact on 
Palestinian efforts to move forward. Their progress towards practical 
accommodation with the post-nakba world has been effectively blocked by 
what amounts to an international disenfranchisement of their grief, an 
unwillingness or inability to recognise the full severity and impact of their 





The Mandate Period 
During the mandate period, the British consistently played down or ignored 
the rights and interests of Palestine’s Arab population (see pp.115-6 above). 
Having solicited Arab support in bringing down the Turks with indications that 
independence might be granted in exchange, the British secretly drew up 
with the French the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. This divided the spoils of 
the former Ottoman Empire between the two colonial powers, an 
arrangement ratified at the 1920 San Remo Conference. (Kimmerling and 
Migdal 2003, pp. 82-4; Khalidi 2006, pp. 95-8; Smith 2007, pp. 82-9) The 
subsequent League of Nations mandate for Palestine, incorporating the 
Balfour Declaration, made explicit the aim of establishing a Jewish homeland 
there. Many British Jews were appointed to senior administrative positions in 
the mandate government, including Herbert Samuel, the first British High 
Commissioner in Palestine. 1920, marking the beginning of the British civil 
administration in Palestine, has been described  as “a year with an evil name 
in the Arab annals” (Antonius 1946, p.312), since it saw a British colonial grip 
on the country, a dashing of Arab hopes for self-determination, and the 
emergence of a policy of intensive Zionist development. 
Palestine was anomalous within the system of British and French mandates 
in the region. Others had a king, president or prime minister in nominal 
authority under the colonial power’s high commissioner, thus recognising the 
independent sovereignty of a nascent state supposedly under only temporary 
foreign control. In Palestine, the British High Commissioner was the sole 
source of authority. Moreover, unlike other mandates, none of the top 
appointees of the administration in Palestine, apart from in the judiciary, were 
ever Arabs. And while the Jewish Agency was guaranteed quasi-official 
status under the mandate, enabling the development of a political, economic 
and military infrastructure in the yishuv, the Palestinian Arabs were provided 
with no such opportunities to evolve their traditional social and economic 




While British views on the ground became increasingly sympathetic to the 
Arab position, the government in London, mindful of domestic political 
considerations, remained committed to support of the Zionist cause as the 
main reason for its imperial presence in Palestine. But as tensions in Europe 
grew throughout the 1930s, with the ascendancy of Nazism in Germany and 
Italy and the build-up to the second world war, the government had to rethink 
its position. Palestine was considered strategically essential to continuity of 
oil supplies, and to military support for the defence of Egypt and the Suez 
Canal, should war break out. Equally important was the co-operation of the 
Arab world once war began, and the harsh British treatment of Arab 
Palestinians in the 1936-9 Revolt was not exactly conducive to that. Hence it 
was only with the Macdonald White Paper of 1939 that any official British 
acknowledgement was given to Arab complaints about the increasing Zionist 
presence in Palestine. 
 
World War Two 
The immediate post-mandate period saw the world powers too preoccupied 
with their own interests, and the new Arab regimes too distracted by their 
own struggles towards stable self-determination to pay much heed to the 
Palestinians. With the British war focus on Europe and Japan; Palestine’s 
role as a haven for Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Europe; the Zionist 
campaign within Palestine to drive the British out; the new involvement of the 
United States government with Zionism and the plight of European Jews, 
setting it in opposition to British policy in Palestine; and the war-weakened 
British domestic economy compelling a review of all its imperial 
responsibilities, the burden of colonial power in Palestine had become too 
much for the British to bear. The post-war Labour government handed the 
issue over to the United Nations. . 
While a weakened and impoverished Britain declined from its powerful  
position on the world stage, America was in the ascendant. The Zionists had 
cannily foreseen this change in the international order, lobbying and 
promoting their cause in the United States since the first world war, and 
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America had been supportive of the British mandate’s nurturing of a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine throughout the interwar period (Christison 2001, pp. 
26-60). With the problem of how to provide a safe haven for European Jewry 
fleeing Nazi persecution, immigration into Palestine became an Anglo-
American issue. President Truman, with an essentially Zionist frame of 
reference, and mindful of the Jewish vote, requested the British to allow 
vastly increased Jewish immigration into Palestine (Christison 2001, pp. 61-
94; Smith 2007, pp. 187-93). The British, economically reliant on the United 
States after the war, could not afford to alienate them.  
There was a degree of continuity between British mandate and US policy in 
Palestine, in that both were formed largely on the basis of self-centred 
strategic and domestic political interests. But, if anything, America, the first 
country to recognise the new state of Israel, within a few minutes of its 
declaration in 1948, proved to be even blinder to the situation of the 
Palestinian Arabs than the British had been. At least the British had 
experienced the Palestinian situation first-hand during the mandate 
administration, whereas the Americans had only media images, Zionist 
propaganda, and their own preconceived notions, perceptions and prejudices 
about Arabs to go on (Christison 2001).  
Meanwhile, by the end of the second world war, Palestine’s Arab neighbours 
were achieving their long-awaited status of self-determination, and their new, 
independent regimes were staggering shakily to their feet. King Abdullah of 
Jordan, his eye on the West Bank territory of Palestine, was negotiating with 
the Zionists over its acquisition in exchange for allowing the emergence of a 
Jewish state while, at the same time, telling his Arab brothers he would lead 
the Arab armies into Palestine against the Jewish enemy. In the event, in 
1948, the Jordanians only fought the Jews at Jerusalem, which they wanted 
to acquire for themselves. Iraq, having thrown in its lot with the Axis powers 
at one point of the war, but later retaken by the British, was going through a 
period of political instability, marked by a series of popular uprisings and a 
quick succession of governing regimes. Both Egypt and Syria were equally 
unstable, with coup after coup in Syria, and an increasingly unpopular King 
Faruq on the Egyptian throne until Nasser’s bloodless coup of 1952. The 
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attention and energies of these countries were largely turned inwards during 
the post-war years, though this did not prevent a sense of rivalry between 
them in competition for leadership of the Arab world (Lewis 1995, pp. 348, 
372; Smith 2007, pp.236-9). The ideal of pan-arabism, having peaked during 
the period of struggle against imperial control, was declining in strength and 
appeal, the leaders of these new Arab states being reluctant to surrender any 
of their independence (Lewis 1995, p. 374). 
 
The Cold War 
With the period of the cold war, from the early 1950s to the late 1980s, the 
whole of the Middle East became a theatre for the playing out of US and 
Soviet tensions, fears and anxieties (Berry and Philo 2006, p.43; Gelvin 
2005, pp. 228-30; Harms and Ferry 2005, pp. 88, 104; Lewis 1995, pp. 369-
70; Smith 2007, pp. 282-5). The Suez Crisis of 1956 established the US as a 
major player in the region when, in the interests of cold war containment, it 
stopped British and French action against Nasser’s Egypt. But American 
support was more consistently over time behind Israel, which came to 
represent for the US a bulwark of democratic western values in the region, a 
strategic asset which would maintain a balance in a volatile, but vital, given 
western reliance on middle east oil, part of the world, and which would help 
to moderate both Soviet and radical adventurism. Billions of dollars of 
American financial and military aid poured into Israel over the years, and 
diplomatic support was granted through the numerous US vetoes on UN 
resolutions aimed at reining in Israel’s behaviour towards the Palestinians. 
The USSR, meanwhile, was providing military and economic assistance to 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Egypt, with its strategic control of the Suez Canal, 
benefitted the most, and Soviet support probably contributed to Nasser’s 
confidence in the initial stages of the 1967 crisis that led to the Six Days’ 
War. By the early 1970s, however, both the US and USSR had respectively 
declared their intentions to do nothing to exacerbate the situation in the 
Middle East, and superpower involvement in the region thus simultaneously 
served as containment while preventing any real movement towards a 
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solution. With Sadat’s Egypt now moving along its own separate peace track 
with Israel, the focus of the Arab-Israeli conflict moved in the mid 1970s to 
Lebanon, where both Syria and Israel became embroiled in the long civil war. 
The Palestinians did not figure large in this cold war scheme of things. For 
the Americans, they were mainly an irritant, an annoyance to their Israeli 
protégés, and of negative value in ensuring the security of oil supplies from 
the Middle East. For the Soviets, they came across at best as an ideological 
symbol, a useful representation of armed struggle to inspire the militant 
rhetoric of their own protégé regimes, and a source of motivated guerrilla 
fighters willing to goad the US-backed Israelis and act as a check on Israeli 
expansion.  
Fatah, later the PLO, was largely a pawn of the various Arab regimes. 
Starting off based in Syria, it subsequently moved to Jordan, thence expelled 
by King Abdullah when he felt his own authority increasingly challenged by its 
presence on his soil. Then, ensconced in Lebanon and integrally involved 
with the civil conflict there, the PLO progressively alienated the Lebanese 
people, who felt that their own never-ending troubles were largely attributable 
to the Palestinian parastatal presence in their midst. In 1982, after the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon and its occupation of the south, the PLO was once again 
expelled from its host country, and the leadership moved to Tunis.  
The UN, for its part, had regarded the Palestinian predicament for over two 
decades as basically a refugee issue. Security Council Resolution 242 of 
1967 demanded a just settlement of the problem, along with the withdrawal 
of Israel from the territories occupied during the Six Days’ War. In 1969, the 
UN General Assembly recognised the “inalienable rights” of the Palestinian 
people, and underlined the denial of those rights resulting from Israeli policies 
and practices. This position was reaffirmed over the next few years, and in 
1974 the General Assembly explicitly recognised that the Palestinian people 
were entitled to self-determination, turning the Palestinian question from a 
refugee problem into a political issue. However, whether as political issue or 
refugee problem, the pattern remained the same. The UN would release 
statements and resolutions criticising Israeli policy and action, demanding 
150 
 
Israeli withdrawals and backdowns, insisting on Palestinian rights, but, on the 
ground, these achieved virtually nothing, since the Israelis, with their powerful 
US backers, appeared to simply ignore them.  
The Palestinian losses of 1948 went essentially unrecognised amidst the cold 
war preoccupations of the superpowers and the jockeying for power amongst 
the rival regimes of the region. Moreover, a global community which paid lip-
service to these losses, but failed to back words with meaningful action, 
could only be perceived by the Palestinians as indicative of a hypocritical 
international disinterest in their predicament, or of a toothless UN, powerless 
in the face of western, particularly US, interests and support for an Israel that 
was “essentially .... a rhetorical tool provided by the west to harass the 
Arabs” (Said 1979, p. 88). 
 
The War on Terror 
During the 1980s, two major influences in regional and global affairs came to 
bear on the Palestinian situation. Firstly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 
1979 gave rise to a militant Islam that spread throughout the Middle East, 
and led to the increased popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, and then 
Hamas, in the occupied territories, along with a reinterpretation of the 
Palestinian struggle within an Islamic context. Secondly, the implosion of the 
Soviet Union at the end of that decade ended the cold war and ushered in a 
new era of freedom and hope for many. The Oslo Peace Process, leading to 
the Oslo Agreement of 1993, was initiated within that atmosphere. Global 
public opinion began to reflect greater interest in the humanitarian aspects of 
the Palestinian predicament. Any admiration formerly accorded to the 
Israelis, as part of the Jewish holocaust story, began to decline, as they 
came in for more frequent criticism in the global media for the perceived 
disproportionate heavy-handedness of their actions against the Palestinians 
and their Arab neighbours. 
And then, at the turn of the millennium, in the middle of the second intifada, 
9/11 happened, and a whole new paradigm emerged as a context for the 
151 
 
Palestinian issue: the “war on terror”, pitting the liberal west against the 
muslim east. Israel’s prime minister of the time, Ariel Sharon, was quick to 
identify Israeli security issues with Islamic terrorism of the Al Qaeda variety, 
aiming to strengthen his country’s bonds with the west. Osama bin Laden, in 
his taped messages to the west, invariably had two main requests: the 
departure of westerners from the Islamic holy places, and restitution of justice 
for the Palestinians. The net result was that the Palestinians were now, for 
many in the west unfamiliar with the details of their history, associated with 
Islamic jihad, with the terrorism of some archetypal religious conflict. Once 
again, the Palestinian cause had been hi-jacked and exploited to serve other 
people’s interests, their essential state of dispossession resulting from the 
original losses of 1948 ignored, forgotten, or at best misunderstood by great 
swathes of the world at large. 
 
Summary 
To what extent and in what ways does the history of the Palestinian people 
from 1948 to the present day reflect the features of a collective national grief 
trajectory? Pre-1948, the Arab population of Palestine was not a formal 
nation, but there does seem to be sufficient evidence of a “community-as-
nation”, of a growing sense of collective identity resulting from both the 
spread of education and the press, and from opposition to external 
challenges, including the nineteenth century Egyptian occupation, the 
increasing threat of Zionism, and the pressures of the British mandate. The 
nakba of 1948 seriously damaged this collective identity. Its territorial 
dispossession of the Palestinian Arabs involved not only loss of land, but also 
of the way of life, the fabric of society, the heritage of the past and aspirations 
for the future associated with that land. Moreover, the experience was 
rendered even more traumatic by its unfamiliarity and unexpectedness: never 
before had the people of Palestine been prevented from returning to the 
homes they had left during a time of crisis. 
When it comes to collective emotional response to this loss, evidence is thin 
on the ground, largely due to the rational and fact-focussed nature of the 
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historical writing genre. But there do appear to be indications of a post-loss 
period of inarticulate numbness, bewilderment and disorientation, typical of 
that associated with the grief experience. In its wake, a variety of emotions, 
including sorrow, nostalgia, self-reproach, shame, bitterness, humiliation, 
hatred and anger, can be identified from descriptive statements, 
autobiographical comments, and the specific nature of actions taken at the 
time. 
Intergenerational emotional responses can also be seen in the various ways 
in which the Palestinian people tried to make sense of their post-loss 
predicament. The nostalgic sorrow for what had been lost manifested in the 
collective memory of pre-nakba Palestine as an idyllic rural paradise. Anger 
subsequently transformed this longing for return into armed struggle, a 
determination to regain paradise by force. The combative approach gradually 
gave way, as accommodation was made with reality, to political aspirations 
for statehood. These shifts occurred neither in a straight line nor as unified 
moves, but rather in a constant and contended oscillation between a 
backwards-looking preoccupation with the past and a future-oriented desire 
to move forward. Moreover, although there have been several points over the 
last two decades when it seemed that the forward impetus was in the 
majority ascendant, progress has invariably stalled. 
The regional and global contexts in which the Palestinian story has played 
out have been an important contributory factor to this blockage. The losses of 
the Palestinian people, their subsequent grief and suffering, and, at times, 
their very existence as a community, seem to have been ignored at best, 
exploited at worst. Their grief has been largely disenfranchised by the 
wielders of power and influence in the global community. As a result, it has 
become incremental, with loss piled on loss, and suffering on suffering. Yet 
the Palestinians continue, if anything with an arguably stronger national 
identity resulting from their shared experience of territorial dispossession, 





5.   ISRAEL: A NATION BUILT ON GRIEF? 
     “Fear is uncertainty in search of security.” 
                                                          (J. Krishnamurti, On Fear) 
 
This chapter explores the twentieth century Jewish experience, particularly in 
relation to the holocaust of the Nazi regime and to the creation of the state of 
Israel as a Jewish homeland. That experience is approached from a grief 
trajectory perspective, focussing, as in the previous chapter, on the 
fundamental elements of the grieving experience, namely: the identity-
damaging, grief-triggering loss; the subsequent emotional reaction; the 
attempts at making sense of the post-loss world; and the ongoing interactions 
of the wider context surrounding both the loss and its aftermath. 
Initially, the very notion of a Jewish people is explored with a view to whether 
Jewry can be considered a group with sufficient collective consciousness to 
render meaningful any discussion of communally shared experience. Without 
favouring a definition of Jews in either specifically ethnic or religious terms 
(Sand 2009), the question examined is whether and in what ways, despite 
their geographic dispersal, they might be described as having a collective 
identity, as constituting an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), in the 
earlier part of the twentieth century leading up to the outbreak of the second 
world war. 
The Nazi holocaust of the war years, in which six million Jews are estimated 
to have died in an industrial-scale programme of extermination, and which 
effectively wiped out East European Jewry, is viewed as a culmination of 
previous historical losses, the climax of an ongoing narrative of 
marginalisation and victimisation. On this basis, it can be regarded as 
representing the ultimate loss of the basic right to exist, of any expectation of 
even such a “bare life” (Agamben 1998), in terms of isolation, oppression and 
hardship, as had become the lot of many European Jews. Historical evidence 
is presented for what might be construed as emotional reaction to this loss, 
and as attempts to make sense of it, on both a collective and an 
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intergenerational level, with Israel featuring prominently in the meaning-
making necessary to coming to terms with a post-holocaust world.  
Finally, there is a review of the international and regional contexts in which 
this Jewish experience played out, exploring how and to what extent these 
influenced the specific outcomes and consequences of the interactions 
between, initially, European Jews and the world they lived in, and, 
subsequently, the state of Israel and its neighbours, friends, allies and 
enemies in the twentieth century global village. Tracing these consequences 
up to the present day, it might be concluded that collective grief, in the 
Jewish case, has perhaps served to create a state; but the jury is still out on 
whether it has built a nation.   
 
The Nation 
At the beginning of this century, there were reckoned to be over thirteen 
million Jews in the world. Of these, more than six million live in Israel, six 
million in North America, a million in Western Europe, with the rest distributed 
over a variety of countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and South America (della 
Pergola 2003). A century earlier, world Jewry was assessed at around eleven 
million (Jewish Encyclopaedia 1901-6: 11.2 million; American Jewish Year 
Book 1904-5: 10.9 million). But the distribution of that population was very 
different: Europe accounted for nine million, with five million living in Russia 
and (Russian) Poland, and almost three million in Central and other Eastern 
European regions, including Austria, Hungary, Germany and Romania; one 
and a half million lived in North America; and the remainder were spread 
mainly around North Africa and the Middle East.  
Figures for such globally dispersed populations are notoriously unreliable. 
For instance, the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1881 estimates world Jewry of 
the time at six and a half million. Kimmerling (2001, p.21) authoritatively 
presents a figure twice that for the end of the nineteenth century, noting the 
growth from a population of three million at the beginning of that century. 
While he terms this “one of the most unprecedented demographic increases 
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known to history”, it is perhaps fair to say that it might as easily be 
attributable to the difficulty of retrieving accurate information, and the 
resultant statistical inaccuracy and error. What is indisputable, however, is 
the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century, over 80% of the world’s 
Jews lived in Eastern Europe, and, by the end of it, almost 50% lived in 
Israel, about 45% in North America, and any significant Jewish population 
within Europe now resided in the west rather than the east.  
 
The Jews in Europe 
Such mass movement was not unprecedented for the Jews, who had been 
expelled variously from England, France, Spain and Portugal during the 
course of the preceding three or four hundred years (Gilbert 1987, p.19; 
Smith, 2007 p.32). They had been tolerated in the west as a minority, usefully 
networked throughout Europe, providing vital financial and diplomatic 
services to princely nation-states. In the sixteenth century, however, an 
increasingly urbanised Christian middle class began to view them as 
competition and they were forced into moving to Eastern Europe, where they 
continued to perform the same roles in a society that remained essentially 
feudal and agrarian in nature until capitalist development took hold in the 
nineteenth century. Once again the Jews were rendered economically 
superfluous, also having suffered an increasing loss of functionality in 
diplomatic terms as the emergence of nationalism and imperial competition 
changed the nature of European foreign policy. Their position consequently 
diminished to the point of vulnerability in the new European bourgeois 
societies, where they came to be perceived as a self-preserving marginal 
group, defined by their wealth and their Jewishness. (Arendt 1951, pp.11-53; 
Rubenstein 1982, p.135)  
To some extent the Jews voluntarily detached themselves from their host 
societies, many communities choosing to remain separate and distinct in 
preference to integration. But they were equally “othered” and treated as a 
people apart, traditionally viewed throughout Christian Europe as the deicidal 
Christ-killers, accused from medieval times of killing Christian children and 
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baking their blood into Passover bread (Gilbert 1987, p.19; Gelvin 2005, 
p.57). Isolation, oppression, persecution and expulsion were commonplace 
features of European Jewish history. In Tsarist Russia, Jews were mainly 
confined from the end of the eighteenth century to the Pale of Settlement, a 
frontier zone of the Russian Empire designated as territory for Jewish 
settlement (Gelvin 2005, pp.38-9; Gilbert 1987, p.19; Harms and Ferry 2005, 
p.49; Smith 2007, p.33). In other parts of Europe, they were socially 
organised around exclusively Jewish urban ghettoes (Gelvin 2005, p.36; 
Gilbert 1987, p.19).   
By the nineteenth century, such communities were largely dismantled in 
Western Europe. The influence of the French and American revolutions had 
led to the organisation of Western European nation-states on a more 
voluntaristic basis, with citizenship a civil contract between state and 
individual. In this context, Jews enjoyed a degree of socio-political 
emancipation that enabled fuller integration into society. Their path was 
eased for assimilation, secularisation or even emigration to the economic 
opportunities of North America (Harms and Ferry 2005, p.48; Gelvin 2005, 
p.37; Gilbert 1987, pp.19-21; Kimmerling 2001, pp.20-1; Smith 2007, p.33). 
But the fact that anti-semitism still lurked in this brave new nineteenth century 
world was demonstrated by the infamous Dreyfus case of 1894, involving a 
young Jewish officer blatantly scapegoated by the French military authorities 
for the treasonable passing of official secrets to the Germans (Bredin 2010; 
Gelvin 2005, pp.49-50; Rose 2005, p.113; Sand 2009, p.254; Sternhell 1998, 
pp. 10, 12, 51). 
In Central and Eastern Europe, meanwhile, the enduring national model was 
more organic, based on blood ties, kinship and myths of ancient origin. This  
ethnic bias entailed exclusivity, and the Jews, as the archetypal “other”, were 
denied any level of integration, remaining isolated and discriminated against 
in society (Halper 2008, pp.74-81; Sand 2009, pp.46-7). In the 1880s, there 
began in Russia a wave of popular pogroms against the Jews which would 
continue until the onset of the first world war. Between 1881 and 1914, some 
two and a half million East European Jews, shocked and frightened by these 
latest outbreaks of virulent anti-semitism, transited through Germany to the 
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west, most eventually ending up in the United States, some in South America 
or South Africa, and a small percentage in Palestine (Kimmerling 2001, p.21; 
Smith 2007, p.34; Sand 2009, p.253). 
 
Anti-Semitism  
In the Europe that emerged from the first world war, Jews, who had fought 
against each other within the various European armies involved in the 
conflict, now found themselves under new flags and with new national 
allegiances. But anti-semitism endured across these new frontiers, and the 
persecution and killings of Jews started up afresh in Poland, the Ukraine, 
Lithuania and Galicia in the immediate aftermath of the war (Gilbert 1987, 
pp.22-3). In a defeated Germany, there were murmurings that the Jews were 
to blame for the national humiliation, this viewpoint entering the political 
mainstream, when Hitler, campaigning for his National Socialist party in 
1920, demanded “the removal of the Jews from the midst of our people” 
(quoted in Gilbert 1987, p.24). The subsequent rise of Hitler and the Nazis, 
and German expansion within Europe, led to increased discrimination against 
and persecution of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. The Nuremberg 
Laws of 1935, forbidding Jews any further role in German life and denying 
them any meaningful function as citizens of the German state (Gilbert 1987, 
pp.47-8; Novick 2000, p.21), sanctioned such behaviour as official policy and 
legalised segregation. 
It is clear from the above that, by the earlier part of the twentieth century, 
there was widespread experience of discrimination and persecution amongst 
European, particularly East European, Jews, as well as a collective history of 
separateness and “othering”. Despite the lack of a common culture, language 
(although Yiddish was commonly spoken by much of East European Jewry), 
or national allegiance, this shared history of victimisation and suffering must 
have served to bind together, with ties of vulnerability, fear, and mistrust of 
the non-Jewish world, an otherwise disparate Jewish community. As Herzl, 
one of the founders of Zionism, observed in 1896 “We are one people. Our 
enemies have made us one in our despite” (quoted in Rose 2005, p.26).  
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The vexed issue of whether Jews are to be defined on an ethnic basis, as 
members of a group derived in a direct bloodline from the biblical tribes of the 
Israel of antiquity, and wandering the world in a two-thousand-year divinely 
ordained exile ever since (Gilbert 2008, p.3; Harms and Ferry 2005, pp.13-
19; Kimmerling 2001, pp.17-20); or whether they are to be categorised in 
religious terms as converts to and adherents of a major world belief system 
that itself originated in the Middle East (Sand 2009), is beside the point in this 
context. For the Jews of Europe could be said to have been essentially 
defined by anti-semitism, their collective consciousness to a great extent 
informed and developed by their experience of being distinct and “othered”, 
and by their consequent vulnerability to oppression and persecution. Arendt 
(1951, p.7) would argue that they to some extent even defined themselves in 
terms of anti-semitism, those Jews who were concerned with their people’s 
survival in the face of the threats of “physical extinction from without and 
dissolution from within” seeing it as “an excellent means for keeping the 
people together, so that the assumption of eternal anti-semitism would even 
imply an eternal guarantee of Jewish existence”. 
 
Zionism 
There were different reactions amongst European Jewish communities to 
their precarious and degenerating collective situation. The religious approach 
was to see value in suffering and patiently await redemption (Harms and 
Ferry 2005, p.47; Rose 2005, pp.22-4; Rubenstein 1978, pp.68-77): as God’s 
“chosen people”, the Jews should attend to their spiritual lives and tolerate 
the conditions, however unpleasant, of their material ones. The secular 
approach was adaptation or assimilation, compliance with the norms of the 
dominant society so as to blend in, keeping their “heads below the parapets 
in an osmotic coexistence” (Shindler 2008, p.11). Ahad Ha’am’s cultural 
Zionism proposed the establishment of a spiritual and cultural  base in the 
Land of Israel which would counteract this by reinvigorating the diaspora and 
acting as a bulwark against the dangers of assimilation (Gilbert 2008, pp.39-
40; Rose 2005, pp.99-100). But increasingly, from the end of the nineteenth 
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century, and directly influenced by the rise of European nationalism, there 
was a move towards self-determination, the securing of a homeland, a safe 
haven specifically for Jews. This manifested in political Zionism, which, 
although it professed the dual aims of protecting Jews from oppression and 
of preserving them from assimilation (Lewis 1995, p.347; Pappe 2006, p.10; 
Shindler 2008, pp.10-12; Sternhell 1998, p.12), could be seen as a form of 
assimilation in itself, embodying Jewish aspirations to become a “normal” 
nation like others (Rose 2005, p.70). 
Several locations were proposed over time for this homeland, including 
Argentina, Australia, Uganda, and an area on the Russian-Chinese border 
(Shindler 2008, p.12, p.163), but Palestine became the clear favourite, 
largely due to its associations with the biblical past of Judaism and the 
divinely decreed destiny of the Jews. Several ultra-orthodox Jewish groups, 
mainly from Poland and Lithuania, had already emigrated there in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, well in advance of those Jews who, 
fleeing the Eastern European pogroms, ended up on the shores of Palestine 
between 1881 and 1914 (Gilbert 2008, pp.3-5). The latter were to swell the 
numbers of an estimated Jewish population of about 10,000 residing in 
Palestine in the middle of the nineteenth century (Gilbert 2008, pp.3-4), and 
were to change the nature of that community, as families escaping 
oppression and seeking a better life, along with committed socialists in 
search of opportunities to establish a more just society, began to outnumber 
the original religiously motivated immigrants (Gelvin 2005, p.67; Harms and 
Ferry 2005, pp.61-2; Shafir and Peled 2002, p.38; Shindler 2008, pp.17-19).  
This expanding Jewish community, the Yishuv, organised themselves 
efficiently over the first decades of the twentieth century, becoming almost a 
state-within-a-state during the British mandate period by creating and 
developing strong administrative and community infrastructures, especially in 
the areas of agriculture, industry, education and defence (Gilbert 2008, 
pp.37-57; Karsh 2000, pp.73-179; Kimmerling 2001, pp.65-7; Stein 2003; 
Sternhell 1998). And their numbers kept on growing: a population of between 
60,000 and 80,000 prior to the first world war (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.3-5; 
Harms and Ferry 2005, p.64; Khalidi 1997, pp.94, 96; Smith 2007, p.31) rose 
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rapidly during the British mandate period to over 150,000 in the 1920s (Berry 
and Philo 2006, p.9), and, in a wave of immigration of “what can only be 
described as invasion proportions” (Khalidi 1992, p.33), to some 400,000 by 
the late 1930s (Sternhell 1998, p.79). These numbers, however, were small 
in comparison to the well over two million Jews estimated to have arrived in 
the United States from Europe between 1881 and the end of free immigration 
in the 1920s (Berry and Philo 2006, p.1; Gelvin 2005, p.43; Shafir and Peled 
2002, p.38; Sternhell 1998, p.79). 
 
To summarise on Jewish collectivity, any reference to the Jewish people in 
the early twentieth century cannot be in terms of a nation with a shared 
language, culture, history or territory. Beyond religious belief, and various 
traditions and rituals associated with that belief, such as attachment to 
Talmudic Law, devotion to Jerusalem – “Next year in Jerusalem” being the 
traditional wish expressed at the end of the Passover meal, and the concept 
of deliverance from exile (Sand 2009, p.250), the geographically dispersed 
Jewish communities of the world had little in common. There were universes 
of experience separating the Jews of Baghdad from the Jews of Warsaw, the 
Jews of Morocco from the Jews of Poland, and the Jews of Ethiopia from the 
Jews of the United States of America. What can be said is that the vast 
majority of the world’s Jewish population at the time were European Jews, 
Ashkenazim, living in both Europe and North America; and that the majority 
of those lived in Central and Eastern Europe. This majority, as “the historical 
products of cruelty” (Rose 2005, p.113), shared a collective experience of 
marginalisation, oppression and victimisation over several centuries of 









Collective loss, for the European Jews, had been a long, slow burn of a 
process, taking place over several hundred years. There were many short, 
sharp shocks of major catastrophe along that time-line, such as the 
massacres of Jews in Germany and France during the first crusade (Baron 
1957; Golb 1998); the expulsions from England (Mundill 1998), France 
(Einbinder 2008) and Spain (Perez 2007); the Ukrainian massacres of the 
seventeenth century (Gilbert 1987, p.108); and the Russian and Ukrainian 
pogroms around the turn of the nineteenth century. But, essentially, the 
dispossession and desecuritisation of the Jews was a long-drawn-out, semi-
permanent state of affairs, and one the Jews seemed to have learned to live 
with. “The lesson from history was extreme vigilance” (Shindler 2008, p.23). 
They had developed coping strategies, both physical and spiritual, 
relentlessly regrouped and survived, albeit in a constant state of alertness 
and with a continual awareness of suffering as the basic condition of life, 
“pain”, as Herzl observed, its “basic feeling” (Rose 2005, p.64). 
The rabbinic imperatives to submit to a higher will and endure the tribulations 
of a not-to-be-questioned path to a divinely decreed destiny, may have been 
deeply embedded in the Jewish psyche, but the messianic spark had gone 
out of Judaism to some extent after the failure of Shabtaism, a messianic 
movement of the seventeenth century (Chamish 2005; Rose 2005, pp.2-5; 
Scholem 1976), leaving the Jewish people  “essentially adrift in a world 
whose course no longer made sense” (Rose 2005, p.9). Hence the Jews of 
Eastern Europe responded to the virulent anti-semitism at the turn of the 
nineteenth century in ways that were time-honoured, but also characteristic 
of the secular spirit of the times. Of those who were in a position to do so, 
many chose individual or family redemption as a response to persecution, 
seeking security through emigration in search of a better life, or in 






In the first half of the twentieth century, the cycles of catastrophe which 
characterised “The Jews’ unenviable journey through history” (Shindler 2008, 
p.46), took on a new momentum. If the Jews thought they had endured 
suffering, they had, quite literally, seen nothing yet. For the rise of Nazi 
Germany, and its policies of the eradication, ultimately the extermination, of 
the Jews of Europe, brought centuries of oppression and victimisation to a 
climax. The Jews now faced complete annihilation, carried out with a chilling 
industrial efficiency which only the twentieth century could have produced, 
and aimed at a final, once-and-for-all solution to the apparently interminable 
“Jewish problem” in Europe.   
There are many readily available histories which provide detailed and 
thorough accounts of the holocaust and of the events leading up to it. (eg. 
Berenbaum and Peck 2002; Bergen 2009; Botwinick 2009; Caplan 2008; 
Dwork and Van Pelt 2003; Engel 2000; Gilbert 1987; Longerich 2010; Neville 
1999; Wistrich 2001)  Once Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, 
the way was clear for furthering his National Socialist Party’s aim of 
eliminating Jewish influence from all aspects of German life. The Jews, along 
with gypsies, communists, criminals, mental and physical “defectives”, and 
homosexuals, were seen as superfluous, if not detrimental, to the interests of 
the German state in its drive to build a superior, pure, exclusively Aryan 
society.  
The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 legitimised various forms of discrimination 
against Jews, including their dismissal from public positions and the 
boycotting of Jewish businesses. Official segregation and the expropriation of 
Jewish property and businesses soon followed, and, with German expansion 
in Central and Eastern Europe, an ever-larger population of Jews became 
subject to these policies of inequity, exploitation and general humiliation. 
Jewish emigration from the territories of the Reich was actively encouraged 
during the 1930s, and tens of thousands left each year. But in 1940, when 
the Germans found themselves engaged in full-scale European war, and in 
rapid occupation of much of Western Europe, their policy began to change. 
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The transfer and containment of Jews in ghettos, mass killings of Jews on 
the Eastern front, and trial gassings in the backs of lorries, were to become 
commonplace procedures until the Wannsee Conference of 1942 formalised 
the “final solution” and established the definitive infrastructure for the 
extermination of Europe’s Jews. 
The actual numbers of Jews who died in the Nazi camps, or of Jews who 
survived them, will never be known. Both categories may well be subject to 
“inflationary revision” (Finkelstein 2003a, p.83) for a variety of motives. But 
there is general agreement amongst all major sources that between five and 
six million Jews perished, variously gassed, shot, starved or worked to death, 
as a result of the murderous actions of the Nazi regime. Novick (2000, p.20) 
points out that this figure must be seen in the context of a global conflict that 
ultimately killed between fifty and sixty million people. Gilbert (1987, p. 824) 
estimates that, along with the six million Jews, the Nazis murdered more than 
ten million other non-combatants regarded for a variety of reasons as 
enemies of the Third Reich, arguing that although the Jews may have been 
the primary target of Nazi racial purification policy, they were by no means 
the only victims of Nazi intolerance and cruelty.  
However, when viewed from a specifically Jewish perspective, in the context 
of a world Jewish population standing, only thirty years before Hitler’s rise to 
power, at some eleven million, nine million of these in Europe, the numbers 
are devastating. The extermination of six million represented the annihilation 
of more than half of world, and two thirds of European, Jewry, and involved 
the complete eradication of East European Jewry. Moreover, the German 
defeat had not necessarily brought peace or security for those Jews 
remaining in Europe. The attempts of some camp survivors to go back to 
their pre-war “homes” resulted, particularly in Poland, in anti-Jewish riots and 
the killings of returning Jews. The majority of survivors ended up in the 
“displaced persons” camps, awaiting the opportunity for relocation to the 





Loss of Ontological Security 
The collective history, in Zionist terms, of the two thousand year long period 
of Jewish exile following expulsion from the land of Israel is regarded as “a 
long, dark period of suffering and persecution ....  a recurrent history of 
oppression, punctuated by periodic pogroms and expulsions, of fragile 
existence imbued with fear and humiliation” (Zerubavel 1995, p.18). The 
Jews of Europe had long lived with the insecurity created by such conditions 
and by the lack of a stable base from which to lead their lives. In this, they 
were doubtless helped by the fact that “uprooting and deportation are 
concepts deeply embedded in Jewish tradition” (Sand 2009, p.129), since 
Judaism defines the human condition as a state of exile from the divine 
source in metaphysical terms, homelessness and destitution being the 
natural consequences of a world out of joint with divine order (Rose 2005, pp. 
22-3; Sand 2009, pp.134-5). They had persevered, learning to keep their 
heads down and to move on when necessary, trying to preserve their Jewish 
way of life at whatever level they felt appropriate to maintaining a Jewish 
identity. For some families and individuals, however, the negation of that 
identity, through secularisation, assimilation, or even conversion, may have 
seemed to offer the only route to survival. Collectively, the Jews might be 
regarded as accustomed to the experience of loss, as “a people whose 
history is steeped in loss – of identity, of homeland, of ...  respect  ... for their 
beliefs” (Hirsch 2006, p.18) 
The holocaust, as “the culmination of gentile anti-semitism” (Finkelstein 
2003a, p.52), can be seen as a climax to this history of suffering, since it 
entailed loss of an absolute kind, loss of ontological security in its most basic 
terms. It dispossessed the Jews not only of their intrinsic status as human 
beings, but of any claims to existence, of any expectations of leading even 
the “barest” (Agamben 1998) of lives. Hitler had declared in the middle of the 
second world war that “the result of this war will be the complete annihilation 
of Jews” (Gilbert 1987, p.285). In the process of this annihilation, the Jews 
became less than human, in the words of one survivor “collectively stripped 
of every attribute and, nameless and non-descript  ... tortured and killed – as 
‘Jew X’” (Samuel Gringauz 1947, quoted in Shindler 2008, p.54). Transported 
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like animals, in railway wagons and the backs of lorries; “selected” on arrival 
at camps for either slave labour or immediate destruction on the basis of age, 
strength and ability to work; branded with numbers, like livestock, they had 
lost any perceived status as human beings, let alone citizens, any implicitly 
understood social right to be accorded dignity or treated with respect. “A 
strange brutalisation has taken place regarding the Jews. People ... often do 
not see in the Jew a human being but instead consider him as a kind of 
obnoxious animal that must be annihilated with every possible means, like 
rabid dogs, rats”, Zygmunt Klukowski, a Polish doctor, records in 1943 
(quoted in Gilbert 1987, pp.502-3). 
 
Loss of Trust 
The Jews had long practised caution and circumspection to ensure survival 
in the various countries in which they had lived, their assumptions of any 
social contract with their host societies being necessarily limited. But the 
magnitude of this genocide, executed with all the efficiency and effectiveness 
of modern industrial techniques, and for the most part in the spirit of the 
extermination of loathed and despised vermin, must have surpassed even 
their canny expectations of the extent to which the social order on which they 
depended for existence could break down. “Throughout Europe the hitherto 
apparently natural conventions of human trust were undermined.” (Gilbert 
1987, p.492) 
Moreover, to the Jews of Europe, it must have seemed that they had been 
betrayed not only by their European societies, but by most of humanity. The 
United States and many other countries had put restrictions on Jewish 
immigration in the 1930s as the Nazi persecution was building up and more 
and more Jews, seeing the writing on the wall, tried to flee; Britain had 
restricted immigration to Palestine, trying to appease Arab reaction to the 
recent influx of Jews. Once the second world war started, international efforts 
were concentrated on the global conflict. As Novick (2000, pp.19-59) argues, 
with particular reference to America during the war years and in the 
immediate post-war period, what was happening to the Jews inside Europe 
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was not a particular focus of attention but “just one among countless 
dimensions of a conflict that was consuming the lives of tens of millions 
around the globe” (p.29). The war won, the Jewish element of the Nazi 
atrocities uncovered with the allied occupation of Germany was still regarded 
as one among many. But from the Jewish perspective, the pre-war blocks on 
emigration from Europe, the lack of any wartime rescue plan to get Jews out 
of Europe, and the prolonged post-war confinement of survivors in displaced 
persons camps around Europe, must have contributed to a feeling of 
abandonment, a sense of the Jewish fate as being an “eternal war for 
survival in a world that has always rejected the existence of Jews and will 
continually do so for all eternity” (Warschawski 2004b, p.43).  
Nor could the reactions of those European Jews living in Palestine have done 
much to alleviate that sense. In the 1930s, transfer agreements between the 
Zionists and the German government had permitted many thousands of Jews 
to settle in Palestine, taking a proportion of their capital with them. This 
arrangement served the interests of both parties: the Nazis wanted Jews to 
leave Germany; the Zionists wanted more Jews, preferably with resources, in 
the Land of Israel (Segev 2000, pp.19-22). This move undoubtedly saved 
lives, but the motivation of the Yishuv was the building of its own society, and 
that remained its focus throughout the subsequent war years (Burg 2008, 
p.72; Sternhell 1998, pp.49-50). The Jews of Europe were significant to the 
extent that they could contribute to Zionist aims in Palestine, but “they were 
considered to have no value in themselves” (Sternhell 1998, p.50). 
 
Loss of Self-Trust 
There were also problems with trust nearer home as the circumstances of the 
European Jews deteriorated under the Nazi regime. Survivors of the camps 
and ghettos bore witness against many members of their communities who, 
as camp kapos or block supervisors, ghetto administrators or Jewish police, 
had done their Nazi masters’ bidding and inflicted various torments on their 
fellow Jews. In 1950, the two-year-old State of Israel passed a Nazis and 
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, which was intended to bring any 
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collaborators now living in Israel to justice. None received harsher 
punishment than a few years’ imprisonment, since the courts recognised the 
complexity of the situation being dealt with, but it was felt necessary to 
contribute to a clearing of the air among the survivor population (Zertal 2005, 
pp.60-79).  
For the more elite members of the Jewish Councils, those senior figures who 
had organised, assembled and handed over sections of their communities to 
the transports, thereby co-operating both bureaucratically and politically with 
the Nazis, there seemed to be immunity from this law. But the Kastner case 
(Zertal 2005, pp.80-90), in which a senior Israeli figure was accused of 
wartime collaboration with the Nazis, and subsequently assassinated in a Tel 
Aviv street before he could be acquitted by the courts, demonstrated that a 
great deal of popular resentment was harboured against perceived 
collaborators at all levels. Although many of the Judenrat members may have 
faced impossible decisions, involving the sacrifice of some members of their 
communities in order to save others (Gilbert 1987, pp.483-4), the opinion was 
strongly voiced (Arendt 1977; Hilberg 1985) that less co-operation and more 
resistance from the Jewish leadership would have resulted in the destruction 
of fewer Jewish communities. 
As well as harbouring perceptions of both their leadership and their fellow-
Jews as having a hand in the annihilation of their people, many European 
Jews also questioned their own role in their downfall. Much has been made 
of  general Jewish compliance and passivity in the face of their dispossession 
and subsequent destruction by the Nazi regime, going to the gas chambers 
“like lambs to the slaughter” (Sternhell 1998, p.329; Zertal 2005, p.138), and 
exhibiting “craven submission” (Neslen 2006, p.177) towards their 
oppressors. Bar a few recorded acts of resistance, defiance or rebellion, such 
as the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943 (Gutman 1994; Zuckerman 1993), 
the overall response to the Nazi onslaught appears to have been one of 
fearful acquiescence. 
In his account of mass murders of Jews near Chelmno in Poland, an eye-
witness, put to work in a team digging, under the guns of a few guards, 
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graves that were soon to be inhabited by fellow Jews, voices a concern about 
his own conduct that was to be echoed many times over the post-holocaust 
years in relation to Jewish behaviour in general: “I actually cannot understand 
to this day why strong healthy men who had nothing to lose didn’t do 
anything” (Gilbert 1987, p.276). He proffers the explanation that perhaps they 
wanted to save themselves in order to alert the Jewish population to their 
impending fate, a reasonable justification in retrospect, since that is what he 
himself did after managing to escape. Other testimony implies a wilful 
blindness, a widespread refusal to acknowledge the enormity of what was 
actually happening: “How is it possible that the Jews will be simply taken and 
shot?” (Gilbert 1987, p.194) 
Certainly, the Jews were conditioned to accept rather than question, “to 
submit and endure rather than resist” (Ellis 1990, p.39). This strategy of 
restraint, coupled with a degree of ingenuity, had enabled their survival over 
centuries, and they may have believed, or deceived themselves into 
believing, that it would serve them in good stead now. Gilbert (1987 p.386) 
even suggests that the Nazi deception, particularly in the case of West 
European Jews, that they were being taken for resettlement or to labour 
camps, was designed to fit with this very propensity: “The Jewish will to 
survive and the German policy of deception were linked in what for the Jews 
was a tragic magnetism”. 
Finally, for many Jews, the experiences of the Nazi era served to cast doubt 
on the presumed Jewish relationship to God. Where was God in the shoah? 
How could their traditional God of history permit such atrocity and 
devastation?  They had long endured suffering on the promise of redemption, 
but where was God’s purpose in their extinction? There was a sense that the 
Jews had been abandoned by the historical God of their scriptures in the 
death camps: “Then and there God’s comprehensibility ceased.... his 
omnipotence was put to a severe test, and his benevolence was doubted” 




In summary, it might be argued that the holocaust was the last straw, the 
tipping point, in a long history of cruelties and injustices visited upon the Jews 
of Europe. There is, however, substantial evidence in the preceding pages 
that it was perceived as differing so significantly, in both nature and scale, 
from their previous experiences, that the European Jews were unable to 
place it within their schemes of prior knowledge. They could not believe they 
were facing wholesale dehumanised extermination in a situation which 
neither compliance nor ingenuity would necessarily get them out of, and from 
which no-one seemed willing to rescue them. There were, of course, the 
individual cases of Jews saved by “righteous Gentiles”, but these were the 
exception rather than the norm.  
Given their history, the world-view of the European Jews was unlikely to be 
based on many positively optimistic expectations about their social situation 
or prospects, but the confrontation with mass dehumanisation and 
annihilation that the holocaust entailed must have seriously challenged any 
assumptions about life that they did entertain. The loss of the right to exist, of 
even the most fragile sense of security about being in the world; the loss of 
trust in the social or divine order which had served as a framework for their 
lives and a basis for their history so far; the loss of confidence in their own 
capacities and approach to life, could only have registered as traumatic 
(Fierke 2007, pp.123-43; Freyd 1996), serving to trigger grief amongst the 
remnant of European Jewry still left post-holocaust in what must have been, 
for them, a radically altered world. 
 
 
The Emotional Reaction 
The holocaust is a highly emotive subject in western consciousness, and, as 
such, has inspired a plethora of literature. Finkelstein (2003a, p.6) refers, with 
characteristic scepticism, to “the outpourings of anguish” to be found in “the 
shelves upon shelves of shlock (about the holocaust) that now line libraries 
and bookstores”. Neither the emotional connotations of the holocaust in the 
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western worldview, nor the emotional stances which inform the numerous 
accounts of it, are, however, relevant to the argument of this dissertation. 
Rather, as in the corresponding section of the previous chapter, the aim is to 
scan historical accounts of the post-holocaust period for what might be 
construed as indications of collective Jewish emotional atmosphere, and 
explore to what extent, if any, these fit with the pattern of emotional response 
typically associated with grief: namely, an initial period of disorientation 
followed by a turmoil of emotions surrounding a discernible oscillation over 
time between a backward-looking orientation focussed on the past, and a 
forward-looking concern with the future.  
 
Silence and Shame 
The initial reaction was silence: “It was thirty years before I could bring myself 
to talk about it” (Gilbert 1987, p. 442); “What happened to us was so terrible 
that we tried not to think about it” (Neslen 2006, p.181). A characteristic of 
the survivors’ condition was “the inability to convey their experiences, to utter 
the unutterable” (Zertal 2005, p.55). The first decade and a half after the 
liberation of Nazi Europe “were marked, in Israel and in other countries such 
as France and the US, by public silence and some sort of statist denial 
regarding the holocaust .... an almost concerted effort to disremember  the 
recent, unbearable past ” (Zertal 2005, pp.92-3). 
Novick (2000), recognising this phenomenon, observes that in the United 
States the holocaust seemed to make little impression on American Jewry in 
terms of public interest or discussion (pp.105-8), and that those survivors 
who wanted to speak found few interested or willing listeners for accounts of 
their experiences (p.83). Finkelstein (2003a, p.6) supports this from personal 
experience “I do not remember the Nazi holocaust ever intruding on my 
childhood. The main reason was that no-one outside my family seemed to 
care about what had happened......This was not a respectful silence. It was 
simply indifference”. There was a general need to move on after the second 
world war, and get on with living. Moreover, when the camps had been 
liberated in 1945, there was nothing in the media reporting to suggest that 
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the Jews were any more than one group among many Nazi victims (Kushner 
2008; Novick 2000, pp.64-5). 
Meanwhile, in Israel, it seemed to be more a case of obligation not to talk 
about the holocaust, for to do so was to admit to being a weak, shameful 
survivor, a “savonette” (an allusion to the Nazis making soap from the fat of 
Jews at Auschwitz and Treblinkla ) (Warschawski 2004a, pp.154-5). 
“Nobody..... was talking about what happened to us in those days. It was a 
complete taboo until we were in our 50s and 60s” (Neslen 2006, p.180). The 
Jews of Israel were busy building their state, a preoccupation which might be 
interpreted in terms of problem-focussed coping (Stroebe and Schut 1999) 
with the post-holocaust situation, putting off any need for confrontation with 
its emotional reverberations. 
The silence which characterised the initial emotional response thus seems to 
have been motivated from two directions: from within the traumatised 
individuals themselves, whose numbness, shock and general disorientation 
as a result of their experiences, could find no adequate expression; and from 
society at large, which disenfranchised their grief for a variety of reasons, 
including indifference, the urgency of pressing practical concerns, lack of 
recognition of the loss that had been suffered, and shame. 
The early Zionist movement in Palestine at the beginning of the twentieth 
century had sought to create a new Jew, to reform the image of the exilic 
Jew, abject, weak and suffering, outcast from and persecuted by European 
society, and replace it with that of a strong, proud, independent worker on the 
land. “The disgust and shame the pioneers felt about their people sunk in 
poverty, exposed to the blows of gentiles, or held captive by alien cultures 
are boundless” (Sternhell 1998, p.36). A negative perception of Jewish exile 
had turned to a negative perception of Jews who lived in exile as submissive, 
timid and lacking in self-confidence (Zerubavel 1995, p.19). The Zionist 
contempt for and distancing from the European Jewish reaction to 
oppression grew stronger with the events of the Nazi regime, as these 
statements of Ben Gurion indicate “We are choking with shame about what is 
happening in Germany, in Poland, and in America, that Jews are not daring 
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to fight back. We do not belong to that Jewish people.....We do not want to 
be such Jews” (quoted in Rose 2005, p.108). 
The post-war Jewish community in the United States also distanced itself 
from the victim status of the holocaust. Novick (2000, pp.116-23) points out 
how Jewish organisations often lobbied to ensure that the Nazi atrocities 
were not represented in the media or in political speeches with too narrow a 
focus on the Jewish element of the suffering. While recognising that this 
effort to broaden out the categories of sufferers involved in the holocaust was 
only natural in an era where victim status largely evoked contempt, and did 
not enjoy the popular sympathy it elicits today, Novick also suggests that this 
was a strategic move to normalise the image of the Jew so as to facilitate 
easier integration into American society. 
Certainly, at a point in the twentieth century when John Wayne was a major 
role-model, when heroism and strength were qualities to be admired, and 
courageous action seen as the only way to deal with threat, the traditional 
image of the victim Jew did not cut an impressive figure. It might reasonably 
be conjectured that the Jews, on a collective level, were ashamed of what 
had happened to them, felt a measure of guilt and self-contempt for what 
they had brought upon themselves and allowed themselves to become. 
 
Victors or Victims? 
For most Jews, both within and outside the state of Israel, the initial silence 
was only broken in the sixties, as a result of two major events: the Eichmann 
trial of 1961 and the Six Days’ War of 1967. Adolf Eichmann had been a key 
Nazi figure involved in managing the logistics of the final solution, the 
transportation and extermination of millions of Europe’s Jews. Escaping from 
Germany at the end of the war, he found refuge in Argentina. Israeli Mossad 
operatives tracked him down and in 1960 abducted him to face trial for his 
crimes in Israel, where, in 1962, he was hanged (Gilbert 2008, pp.336-7). 
Burg (2008, p.128) describes the effects of this trial in Israel as “like the cork 
capping a fermented drink in a bottle. Almost thirty years of upheaval turned 
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into an endless flow of talk that wished to express all: pain and trauma, rage 
and frustration, vengefulness and feelings of guilt ........everything that was 
buried with great emotional toil during the years from ... 1933 to......1960 
resurfaced”. As Zertal (2005, p.95) observes, the Israeli capture and trial of 
Eichmann provided the first opportunity for Jews to look at the holocaust from 
a position of power and control, not of helplessness and submission, 
surrounding it with a completely new discourse of strength and retributive 
action. 
A few years later, in the Six Days’ War of 1967, Israel won a victory which 
was perceived as having prevented a second holocaust, since the general 
conviction on the eve of the war, amidst rising tension and anxiety bordering 
on hysteria, was that the Arabs represented a Nazi-like enemy at the gates of 
Israel, intent on the extermination and annihilation of the Jews within (Zertal 
2005, pp.118-21). In addition, the military acquisition of the territories of the 
West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Golan Heights, put Israel in 
control of the ancient lands of Judea and Samaria, the core kingdoms of 
David and Solomon central to Judaic history, and of holy sites such as the 
Wailing Wall in Jerusalem that were at the heart of Jewish scripture. This 
endowed the victory with a redemptive, messianic quality, and, as well as 
reinforcing the sense of a new power and control in worldly affairs, 
persuaded many Jews that their god had not abandoned them, but had 
strengthened their hand in this conflict in order to return them fully to the land 
from which they had been exiled two thousand years before (Ellis 1990, pp.9-
15; Kimmerling 2001, pp.45-6, 109, 216; Novick 2000, pp.149-51; Shindler 
2008, pp.123-5; Zertal 2005, pp.113-26). The Six Days’ War redeemed the 
holocaust: the victim had morphed into the victorious and righteous warrior. 
But if Israel had succeeded in restoring Jewish pride, it was not so successful 
in dealing with the other major emotion dominating post-holocaust Jewry, 
fear. Prior to the Six Days’ War, as mentioned above, the heightened anxiety 
both in Israel and amongst American Jews, for whom “Israel was poised on 
the brink of destruction” (Novick 2000, p.148), was evident from, and 
doubtless intensified by, the recourse to Nazi and holocaust comparisons in 
describing the imminent confrontation. In reality, the Israeli military was vastly 
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superior to the Arab armies in terms of training and equipment. Moreover, 
Arab talk of driving the Jews into the sea could be reasonably regarded as 
rhetorical exaggeration, reflecting a cultural propensity to put emotion before 
logic and use words for primarily affective effect (Nydell 2006, pp.27-32). But 
all the Jews could focus on, as a result of previous experience, was their own 
vulnerability, and Burg (2008, pp.56-7) points out how, to this day, politicians 
and media commentators revert to Nazi associations when describing the 
situation of Israel vis-a-vis Palestinian suicide bombings and cross-border 
rocket attacks, emphasising Israeli susceptibility to attack and abuse. 
The official Israeli position throughout its history as a sovereign state has 
consistently been one of self-defence, the need to protect itself and prevent 
the sort of vulnerability that the Jews exhibited in Europe and that resulted in 
the holocaust. This fear of vulnerability and consequent preoccupation with 
security required the construction of a strong state both internally and 
externally, leading to the creation of “fortress Israel” (Burg 2008, p.203; 
Halper 2008, p.63; Warschawski 2004b, pp.47-8). Comprising a population of 
émigrés from diverse backgrounds and parts of the world, entering the 
country at different points in time, Israel had to unify these disparate 
elements in a melting-pot which would dissolve their old identities and create 
a new Israeli one, thus rendering their variety less precarious in terms of 
building a strong society (Neslen 2006, ps.11-35). One of the unifying totems 
of this society was, and remains, the military, with the military service which 
is compulsory for almost all Jewish Israelis providing a pathway to future 
employment possibilities and acting as the basis of full citizenship (Burg 
2008, p.54; Kimmerling 2001, pp.6, 101, 220; Shafir and Peled 2002, pp. 
126, 290, 346).  
As if a militarised society was not enough to assuage fear and ensure 
security, Israel has also built a “security fence” around itself as protection 
against Palestinian incursion and “terrorist attack” (Shindler 2008, pp.326-32; 
Warschawski 2004b, pp.49-53). For a people who feel the whole world is 
against them (Burg 2008, p.14; Gilbert 2008, p.552), a society almost 
paranoid in its fears, vulnerability is to be prevented at all costs, and security, 
in terms of self-protection, has become the predominant strategy as regards 
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external relations. Hence peace with the Palestinians has been interpreted by 
the Israelis in terms of their own security throughout the various peace 
processes and road-maps to peace, (Kimmerling 2001, pp.223-6; 
Warschawski 2004b, p.72) and military strength, along with military-style 
fortifications, regarded as the primary means of achieving peace and security 
(Kimmerling 2001, pp.208-28).  
But the victor-victim ambiguity persists even within the military. Lerner (1988, 
cited in Ellis 1990, p.82), defining anger in terms of fear, as an over-reaction 
to lack of confidence, suggests that the brutality that has come to be 
associated with some of the actions of the Israeli military is “a rage that ... 
may be understood, in part, as a response to the two thousand years during 
which the world systematically denied their right to exist as a people, a denial 
that culminated with extermination in gas chambers and crematoria”. And 
there is also the victor-as-victim, “purity-of-arms” syndrome, whereby the 
ostensibly reluctant warrior expresses regret and anguish about the actions 
he has to perform in order to carry out his military duty. Recent Israeli films 
like “Waltz with Bashir” and “Lebanon”, illustrate this phenomenon, with 
former soldiers reliving their experiences of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, 
their Lebanese victims seen only through the lens of their memories and 
tormented consciences. Finkelstein (2003b, pp.110-20), with characteristic 
cynicism, draws direct parallels with the Nazis entertaining moral conflicts 
about carrying out the final solution in the interests of their country. But a 
more sympathetic view of this syndrome might see it as an attempt to deny 
the lack of confidence that masks itself in anger, to distance from the fear 
that gives rise to brutality. It might also be regarded as providing a way of 
retrospectively rationalising actions and behaviour at odds with Jewish 
precepts for moral conduct.  
 
Security 
While the Israeli state sought security through the creation of a strongly 
unified and militaristic society, the religious sphere made a considerable 
contribution to the building of “fortress Israel” in a moral sense, given that the 
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essence of Judaism is the equation of faith with security, trust in God being a 
remedy for all worldly fears and anxieties. The religious conviction that the 
Jews are in Israel by pre-ordained divine plan, and that the creation of the 
state of Israel signifies the end of exile and the return of the tribes of Israel to 
their promised land, provides significant justification for the realisation and 
defence of the whole Zionist project. Thus the orthodox and ultra-orthodox 
have increasingly flourished in Israeli society, granted dispensation from 
normal military service while they study in yeshivas (academies for study of 
the scriptures), providing a different,  if less material, source of strength to the 
nation (Shafir and Peled 2002, pp.143-5).  
Meanwhile, those Jews who settled in the United States, moved by the 
equally compelling urges to assimilate into American society and to maintain 
a distinct Jewish identity, also appear to have sought ways to counter deeply 
held fears concerning their perceived vulnerability. The waves of Jewish 
immigration to the United States between the early twentieth century and the 
end of the second world war created a population of American Jews from a 
generation of Jewish immigrants. By the end of the war, that population was 
the largest and most significant Jewish community in the world. And, given 
the success in commerce, industry, science, the media, the arts and politics, 
of so many American Jews, it was also a very powerful community, wealthy, 
influential and resourceful. Nevertheless, it seemed haunted by “the spectre 
of violence and persecution that hung over the heads of their brothers and 
sisters elsewhere” (Diner 2004, p.6), and set about founding, and 
strengthening already existing, organisations aimed at the defence and 
security of the Jewish community. These public relations and advocacy 
bodies included the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, the American Jewish 
Committee, The American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation 
League. As time went on, and American Jewry developed ever closer ties 
with the newly independent and rapidly enlarging Jewish state, similar 
organisations were established to support the relationship between Israel and 
the United States through the lobbying and advising of Congress on Israel-
related issues. Amongst the most influential and better known of these are 
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the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the Jewish Institute for 
National Security Affairs. 
Such single-minded preoccupation with security, both within Israel and in the 
American Jewish community, implies a degree of self-absorption which is 
characteristic of the grief experience and which serves to isolate and 
disengage the griever from his social world (Carlson and Miller 1987). Such 
behaviour traits were not new: Sand (2009, p.50) remarks, in the context of 
Jewish history, on the “communal isolation that eventually became (the 
Jewish communities’) distinguishing mark”; and Lozowick (1997, p.115) 
underlines the predisposition to self-absorption when he observes that, post-
holocaust, the question for the Germans was how such things could have 
happened, but for the Jews it was how such things could have happened to 
them.  
The phenomena of “fortress Israel” in the Middle East and the “fortress-like 
mentality” of Jews in America (Novick 2000, p.180) are arguably 
representative of old fear in new contexts. Indeed, all of the dominant 
collective emotions evidenced in the decades following the holocaust are 
essentially no different from the emotions displayed by Jewish communities 
throughout their long history of loss and suffering in Europe: shame, 
humiliation, fear, anxiety, mistrust, suspicion, only writ large and on a 
grander, more global scale. Israel itself might be regarded as “a colossal 
sublimation of historical pain” (Rose 2005, p.130), the dynamic of the 
European Jewish grief experience diverted to a constant drive for security 
based on the never-ending fear of vulnerability, of susceptibility to further loss 
and suffering.  
In grief theory terms, this situation suggests “complicated”, variously termed 
“traumatic” or “prolonged”, grief, in which the griever, unable to move forward 
and trapped in endless unproductive and maladaptive behaviour patterns, 
extends his grief experience beyond what might be considered a reasonable 
length of time necessary to bring it to a practical conclusion (Boelen and 
Prigerson 2007; Corr, Nabe and Corr 2003, pp.245-7; Prigerson and Jacobs 
2001; Rando 1993; Worden 2009, pp.127-52; Zisook and Shear 2009). 
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Volkan’s notion of “perennial mourning” (2009) comes to mind, with his 
explanation of how both individuals and societies can be stuck in their grief 
for years and generations respectively, indefinitely postponing their 
adaptation to the post-loss world by externalising the hurt which loss has 
inflicted on them. He depicts this condition as “frozen” and “lifeless”, a 
description which chimes with Burg’s observation (2008, p.33) that, as a 
result of feelings of fear and mistrust, Israel has developed muscles, but not 
soul. Many, however, would regard such muscular development as a 
necessary and natural response to what they perceive as the existential 
threats Israel faces from Iran, the Palestinians, Hizbollah, and increasing 
levels of anti-Israeli sentiment in Europe and elsewhere. 
 
 
Making Sense of the Loss 
Post-holocaust, after the events which brought centuries of European Jewish 
suffering to a climax, came the need for those Jews who were left, having 
escaped annihilation by the Nazi regime and now either in displaced persons’ 
camps in Europe or living in the various countries they had fled to prior to the 
final solution, to adapt to the new situation, to a world in which Jews had 
undergone large-scale dehumanisation and extermination. In order to survive 
as Jews, and to repair their abruptly discontinued  European history, they had 
to make some sense of their post-loss situation and find ways of 
incorporating it into a coherent ongoing collective narrative. This meaning-
making was carried out largely with reference to the State of Israel, utilised 
as both a symbol of and site for the redefinition of collective identity. 
 
Building a Strong Nation 
As mentioned above, Jews had been settling in Palestine for many years, 
initially with religious motivation, and then, from the turn of the nineteenth 
century, as refugees from anti-semitism in Eastern Europe. Political Zionism, 
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aimed at preserving the Jewish collective consciousness from dissipation 
through either assimilation or persecution, encouraged this immigration. Land 
was acquired, a social infrastructure established, and, by the end of the 
second world war, the yishuv presented all the features of a state-within-a-
state in British-mandated Palestine. These developments were not 
unanimously welcomed by all Jews, however. The orthodox religious 
regarded Zionism as heresy, since the scriptures ordained that the Jews 
would return to their holy land only after the coming of the Messiah, and 
going there before was seen as an ill-advised and futile attempt to force 
God’s hand, a tempting of providence (Kimmerling 2005, pp.187-8; Neslen 
2006, pp.5-6, 94; Rose 2005, pp.31-3). For many secular Jews, the United 
States and, to a lesser extent, parts of the world such as South Africa or Latin 
America, offered more enticing prospects for living in peace and prosperity 
than the perceived hardships involved in settling a mosquito-infested piece of 
land in a backward Arab region constantly caught up in battles between the 
great powers (Dershowitz 2003, p.14; Gelvin 2005, p.66; Kimmerling 2001, 
p.91; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, pp.22-3; Said,1992, pp.79-81). 
But the holocaust served to sharpen perceptions. “Never again!” could only 
be a meaningful vow of determination to survive if the Jews were in a position 
to enforce it, and not living as dependent minorities in other peoples’ 
countries. The idea of an independent, sovereign Jewish state, a safe haven 
for all Jews, took on a new appeal. The yishuv was in the right place at the 
right time: world sympathy for the Jewish post-war predicament was high; the 
United States pressured Britain into allowing increased Jewish immigration to 
Palestine; and the British realised they were too preoccupied elsewhere in 
their empire to persevere with their troublesome Palestinian mandate 
(Shindler 2008, pp.38-43, 54-61; Smith 2007, pp.187-93). Following the brief 
War of Independence, the State of Israel was declared on May 14th 1948 
(Gelvin 2005, pp.126-34; Harms and Ferry 2005, pp.91-5; Shindler 2008, 
pp.43-9; Smith 2007 pp.199-204). The Jews had secured themselves a place 
in the world and were accepted into the international order. Levels of 
immigration rose as the “ingathering of exiles” (Gilbert 2008, pp.250-78; 
Shindler 2008, pp.62-5) began, aimed at restoring the Jews, the tribes of 
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Israel of antiquity, to what was perceived as their divinely and historically 
rightful land. Orthodox believers could still not accept the hubris involved in 
jumping God’s gun, but for many other Jews, less strict in their interpretation 
of the scriptures, Israel provided a way forward out of the post-holocaust 
predicament, an opportunity to assert the Jewish right to exist. 
From the earliest days of the yishuv in Palestine, assertiveness and 
determination were features of this new Jewish community. The regenerated, 
muscular Jew of Eretz Israel, the tough “sabra” (see p.106 above), was in 
masculine counterpoint to the submissive, timid Jew of Europe (Kimmerling 
2001, pp.91, 230; Shindler 2008, p.91; Zertal 2005, p.170; Zerubavel 1995, 
pp.26-7). Strong, hardy pioneers, the early settlers worked the land to feed 
their families, and stood ready to defend that land and their kin (Kimmerling 
2001, pp.98, 101, 208-11; Zerubavel 1995, pp.148-60).  
Such heroism was illustrated by the popular myth of the 1920 Battle of Tel 
Hai, and its hero, Yosef Trumpeldor, the leader of a small group of Zionist 
settlers in the Galilee who died in defence of their settlement. Trumpeldor 
was reported as, though severely wounded, having urged his comrades to 
fight on and uttering the words “It is worth dying for one’s country” in his last 
minutes (Kimmerling 2001, pp.31-2; Zerubavel 1995, pp.39-47). National 
myths like this were evolving.  A national history was being established, 
based largely on the bible, but also covering recent yishuv events like Tel 
Hai, drawing a direct line from antiquity to the twentieth century, with the 
whole period of exile in between missed out (Kimmerling 2001, pp.17-18; 
Sternhell 1998, pp.49-50; Warschawski 2004a, p.210; Zerubavel 1995, 
pp.13-36). Moreover, well-known historical defeats, such as the fall of 
Masada in AD73, when the Jewish rebels chose suicide over enslavement by 
the Romans (Kimmerling 2001, p.18; Zerubavel 1995, pp.60-76); or the Bar 
Kokhba Revolt of AD132-5, named after the leader of Judea’s final and 
ultimately unsuccessful rebellion against the Roman Empire (Kimmerling 
2001, p.19; Zerubavel 1995, pp.48-59), were now presented in terms of 
heroism and defiance. The new Hebrew, the Israeli, was a person of strength 
and courage, with a national history of heroic acts behind him, unlike the old 
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Jew of Europe, whose weakness and cowardice were evident from his long 
history of persecution and suffering.  
The Zionist version of Israel’s historical origins as aligned with biblical 
scripture was supported by archaeological evidence, a flurry of exploration 
and publication in pre-state and early state days all serving to back up the 
dominant historiographic discourse. Although by the late sixties doubts were 
beginning to be cast on these archaeological findings, generations had 
already absorbed them as part of Israeli collective memory, central myths 
about the origin of their nation and their ancient rights to the land. (Abu-ElHaj 
2001; Sand 2009, pp.107-220; Whitelam 1996) 
The new discourse surrounding the resumption of the Judaic collective 
narrative in Israel and the rediscovered heroic Jewish image, warranted a 
new language as its medium, and Hebrew was revived in the yishuv for the 
purposes of everyday communication, having been reserved for religious 
purposes only in exile (Zerubavel 1995, pp.29-31). It provided a link with the 
past of antiquity, being the language of the ancient Israelites, and also served 
as a unifying factor for immigrants to the new society, as well as another 
feature distinguishing them from the exilic multi-lingual or Yiddish-speaking 
European Jews (Kimmerling 2001, p.93). 
Israel, in both pre-state prospect and fully recognised statehood, represented 
an opportunity for European Jewry to move on from loss and occupy a 
legitimate place in the world within a proper nation, complete with territory, 
history, myths and language. Moreover, this was a nation founded on 
strength and courage: the strength to work and wield the plough, and the 
courage to defend and brandish the gun, both qualities essential for warding 
off any potential future threats. The State of Israel, its creation consequent on 
both the aims of political Zionism and on the exigencies and opportunities of 
the global situation in the aftermath of the second world war and the 
holocaust, can be seen as a response to existential loss and dispossession: 
a strategy for coping with the fear and shame surrounding that loss, and a 




The Cracks Start Showing 
The catharsis of the Eichmann trial and the victory of the Six Days’ War 
served as proof that Israel was successfully fulfilling the above functions. As 
a viable and victorious state, confident in its ability to defend itself, and 
bolstered by a new legitimacy in religious terms derived from the somewhat 
unexpected possession of the entire territory of the land of ancient Israel, the 
young Jewish nation increasingly attracted the interests of Jews in the United 
States. There was a new closeness, a new enthusiasm for and commitment 
to the Israeli cause, together with an admiration for the heroic and brilliant 
military abilities that had been demonstrated (Novick 2000, pp.148-9). For 
many American Jews, the fear preceding the 1967 war, along with the sense 
of triumph at the Israeli victory, created a sense of solidarity, established a 
collective identity they could share with their fellow-Jews in Israel (Christison 
2001, p.119). At the same time, Israel enjoyed popular support and sympathy 
amongst the general American public, and United States policy-makers 
seemed increasingly inclined to see the Middle East through Israeli eyes 
(Christison 2001, pp.119-23), while deeming Israel itself worthy of support as 
a bulwark of western values in a region where Cold War interests were being 
played out (Berry and Philo 2006, p.43; Gelvin 2005, pp.228-30). 
But the confidence inspired by these developments was short-lived, soon 
shaken by the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The initial Egyptian success, the fact 
that the Israelis seemed to be almost taken by surprise, or, at the very least, 
unprepared for attack, and the high number of Israeli casualties, all served as 
reminders of Israel’s vulnerability (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.60-7; Shindler 
2008, pp.144-5). As in 1967, Israel won the war, but the victory this time was 
perceived as defeat (Burg 2009, p.119; Gilbert 2008, pp.460-1; Harms and 
Ferry 2005, p.126; Kimmerling 2001, p.47; Novick 2000, pp.151-3). The 
Arabs had asserted themselves; Israel was increasingly isolated in the global 
community, and becoming ever more dependent on the support of the United 
States. 
The experience of 1973 resulted in two different orientations for Israel 
(Kimmerling 2001, pp.47, 216). One was based on the need for compromise, 
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manifesting in the Camp David Accords of the 1970s which aimed at 
normalising relations between Israel and Egypt; the return to Egypt of the 
Sinai territory occupied in 1967; the historic visit of Egypt’s President Sadat 
to the Jerusalem Knesset in 1977; and the signing in 1979 of a treaty 
between Israel and Egypt, bringing thirty years of conflict to an end (Gilbert 
2008, pp.462-95; Smith 2007, pp.360-5). “Land-for-peace” was the basic 
formula, the Israelis demanding recognition and peace for the return of 
territory they had won in 1967 (Gelvin 2005, pp.174-7, 179-80; Harms and 
Ferry 2005, pp.112-3). The other orientation was based on the need to 
maintain maximum military and political strength and retain as much land as 
possible in order to ensure Israel’s survival. Military capacity was 
demonstrated in exploits like the daring Entebbe raid of 1976, where Israeli 
commandos stormed an aircraft hi-jacked to Uganda by Arab terrorists, 
saving the Jewish hostages on board and striking a victory against such 
forms of protest (Gilbert 2008, pp.471-3). Equal, if less spectacular, 
determination to protect Israeli interests was shown by groups like Gush 
Emunim (the bloc of the faithful) in their establishment of settlements in the 
occupied West Bank (Berry and Philo 2006, p. 73; Gelvin 2005, pp.189-94; 
Gilbert 2008, pp.469-70; Shindler 2008, p.143; Smith 2007, pp.326-8). 
For years, Israel seemed torn between these orientations of might and 
compromise: the need to prevent vulnerability through a show of strength and 
force, and the need to engage in more open and accommodating interaction 
with Arab neighbours in order to establish normalised relations. In grief 
terms, this suggests the oscillation between preoccupation with the past, 
specifically the vulnerability of the pre-holocaust Jewish world, and a more 
forward-looking concern based on an appreciation of the present, in this case 
the normalisation of the post-holocaust sovereign State of Israel. Many, 
however, would see in the concern with strength and vulnerability not so 
much an indicator of clinging to the past as a level-headed response to the 
ongoing existential threats faced by Israel. 
With the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.74-82; 
Gelvin 2005, pp.241-2; Harms and Ferry 2005, pp.131-9; Shindler 2008, 
pp.172-81; Smith 2007, pp.379-81), and the lead-up to and handling of the 
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Palestinian intifada of 1987 (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.82-9; Gelvin 2005, 
pp.212-21; Shindler 2008, pp.203-7; Smith 2007, pp.412-24), the show of 
strength and force was the dominant  orientation, and both events created 
dissension within Israel as well as drawing criticism from outside. With Rabin 
and the Oslo Accords of the early nineties (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.89-100; 
Gelvin 2005, pp.228-37; Shindler 2008, pp.227-36; Smith 2007, pp.450-64), 
compromise appeared to weigh more heavily in the balance. For, although 
settlement building in the Palestinian territories continued apace during this 
period, and, arguably, the most significant Israeli concession might be 
considered their recognition of the Palestinians as a political community for 
the first time, it did seem that attempts were being made to come to some 
form of accommodation with the Palestinians and Israel’s Arab neighbours.  
Rabin viewed this peace-making as the way forward from the Jewish past 
“No longer are we necessarily a people that dwells alone, and no longer is it 
true that the whole world is against us. We must overcome the sense of 
isolation that has held us in thrall for almost half a century” (quoted in Gilbert 
2008, p.552, and Shindler 2008, p.227). But not every Israeli lived in Rabin’s 
world, and in 1994 he was assassinated by one of the many who saw his 
stance of compromise with the Arabs as betraying Israel’s interests and 
inviting vulnerability (Gilbert 2008, pp.587-8; Harms and Ferry 2005, pp.156-
8; Novick 2000, pp.163-5; Shindler 2008, pp. 244-66; Smith 2007, pp.466-8). 
In the protests leading up to his assassination, he was commonly pictured on 
protestors’ banners and placards wearing an SS uniform (Gilbert 2008, 
p.556; Shindler 2008, p.261; Smith 2007, p.466). 
 
A Diverse Society 
Such deep divisions within Israeli society regarding the way forward are 
hardly surprising given its diversity. The original waves of immigration at the 
turn of the nineteenth century were pioneering, East European, Ashkenazi 
Jews. As the twentieth century advanced and the Nazi regime extended its 
sphere of influence, increasing numbers of Jews from both Central and East 
Europe arrived in Palestine. By 1945 most western countries had restricted 
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Jewish immigration, so when Europe was liberated, many displaced 
European Jews, encouraged by the Zionists, sought illegal entry to Palestine,  
despite British reluctance to let them in (Gilbert 2008, pp.124-30; Shindler 
2008, pp.54-61).   
With the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, a legitimate and formal 
“ingathering of the exiles” (Gilbert 2008, pp.250-78; Shindler 2008, pp.62-5) 
began, doubling the population within the following three years. Over a 
quarter of a million more East European Jews arrived, more than half 
“bought” from their communist regimes, largely with funds raised by 
American Jews. Well over another quarter of a million Jews came from a 
variety of Middle Eastern and North African states, the defeat of the Arab 
armies in the conflict with Israel having rendered many of their situations 
untenable, stirring up antagonism towards them even in communities where 
they had lived in relative peace and prosperity for centuries. It has also been 
suggested (Gelvin 2005, p.168; Giladi 1998; Gilbert 2008, pp.257-8) that in 
some of these communities Israeli agents conducted campaigns of 
intimidation to persuade the Jews to leave for Israel. 
The practical challenges, in terms of housing, food, employment and 
education,  involved in absorbing such a vast intake of people from a variety 
of backgrounds, mostly arriving with nothing, to a newly sovereign state 
which had just fought a couple of major wars, were met and overcome with 
the help of generous funding, again mainly from American Jews. But welding 
this kaleidoscope of humanity into a unified society was infinitely more 
difficult, given the range of background cultures, the disparity in resources, 
and the inbuilt sense of superiority displayed by the Ashkenazi founders of 
the state (Gilbert 2008, p.287; Kimmerling 2001, pp.71-2; Neslen 2006, 
pp.11-12; Shafir and Peled 2002, pp.74-87). Moreover, within a decade, the 
Mizrahim, the oriental and maghrebin Jews, accounted for 50% of the Jewish 
component of Israeli society (Kimmerling 2001, p.94; Shafir and Peled 2002, 
p.89). The destruction of European Jewry had considerably altered Jewish 
demographics, so that a state based on European concepts, and established 
largely by European Jews, now began to rely on non-European Jews for the 
bulk of its population. And this population needed to maintain quantity if it 
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was to remain a majority in a Jewish state which also included  Muslim and 
Christian Arab elements, those Palestinians who had remained within Israel’s 
borders at independence. 
During subsequent decades, immigration proceeded apace, albeit in lesser 
volume and at a less dramatic rate. There were increased numbers from both 
South and North America in the sixties and seventies; the eighties saw the 
dramatic airlift of several thousand Ethiopian Jews, the Falasha, from refugee 
camps in the Sudan, following their flight from discrimination and oppression 
under Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime (Kimmerling 2001, pp.149-63; Shafir and 
Peled 2002, pp.320-3); and the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of the 
eighties resulted in a massive influx of over three quarters of a million 
Russian immigrants during the nineties, almost half of whom were reckoned 
to be non-Jewish (Kimmerling 2001, pp.136-49; Shafir and Peled 2002, 
pp.309-20).    
Kimmerling identifies seven major cultures within contemporary Israeli 
society (2001, p.2): the secular Ashkenazi upper middle class; the national 
religious, accommodating religion with Zionism; the traditionalist mizrahim, 
the oriental Jews from the Middle East and North Africa; the orthodox 
religious; the Arabs; the Russians and the Ethiopians. None of these groups 
can be considered completely homogeneous, but each exhibits a distinctive 
collective identity, and they all compete along different parameters of religion, 
class, political affiliation and ethnicity, for social and political influence, and 
for claims on the definition of Israeliness. Shafir and Peled (2002, pp.323-34) 
add to this list of sub-cultures the recent influx of overseas labour migrants 
from Africa, Asia, South America and Eastern Europe, though recognising 
that this group, while resident in Israel, cannot as yet make any claims on the 
basis of being of Israel. 
As originally conceived, Israel was a Jewish nation, a homeland for Jews 
which would also function as a hub and potential refuge for the Jewish 
diaspora. What has actually developed is a diverse Israeli state, with a 
constant tension between its various and radically divergent cultural sub-
groups. The state has employed a number of mechanisms to give some unity 
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to the varied ingredients in the Israeli melting-pot: the universality of Hebrew 
as the national language; the education system and its diffusion of a common 
version of Israeli myth and history; the military service incumbent on all bar 
Arab (excepting the Druze) Israelis, orthodox women and yeshiva students; 
the discourse of self-defence, which necessitates this militarisation, against 
the common Arab enemy; and the promotion and encouragement of respect 
for and devotion to the Jewish religion and the Israeli state. These have all 
served as totems of Israeli identity and ways of integrating newcomers to the 
collective.  
Increasingly, the holocaust has also become one of these totems, despite the 
fact that, as a historic event, it only has direct relevance to European 
Ashkenazi Jews, and that, as an icon for loss, it excludes the different but 
equally valid losses involved in becoming an Israeli citizen for the other 
groups referred to above (Neslen 2006, p.12). The central importance of Yad 
Vashem, the holocaust memorial, and a traditional first stop for all official 
visitors to Israel (Burg 2008, p.22; Gilbert 2008, pp.288-9); the significance of 
Holocaust Memorial Day in the official Israeli calendar, along with religious 
festivals and commemorations of heroic deeds and the achievement of 
independence (Gilbert 2008, p.520); the growing popularity of official school 
trips to the sites of extermination camps in Poland for the inter-generational  
transmission of  holocaust memory on an emotional level through enabling 
students, according to Ministry of Education guidelines, “to feel and try to 
comprehend the loss... the moral depravity... the links to their community 
past” (quoted in Feldman 2008, p.59), are all indicators of the focus put on 
the holocaust by the state.  
The loss suffered by European Jewry appears to have been kept at the 
centre of Israeli collective consciousness as a reminder of what happens to 
Jews when they allow themselves to become vulnerable. Burg (2008) argues 
that it is time for Israel to “forget the holocaust and rise from its ashes”, to 
wake up to “normalcy, the new beginning after what happened to us in the 
middle of the last century” (p.232). He claims that preoccupation with the 
holocaust has created a belligerent, xenophobic, backward-looking society, 
“It is time to leave Auschwitz behind and build a healthy Israel” (p.210). 
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Warschawski (2004b) also perceives Israel as “sick, terribly sick” (p.95), with 
violence, brutality and lack of civility at every level of a deteriorating, paranoid 
society that he sees as on a suicide course unless it confronts its own 
isolationism and militarisation. 
 Collective meaning-making in a post-holocaust world has focussed on 
strength, defined, on the basis of a deep-set fear which has been 
externalised onto the surrounding world, as absence of vulnerability rather 
than as confidence in any innate ability to cope with whatever eventualities 
openness might entail. The need for normalisation, accommodation and 
compromise has been recognised, paid much lip-service, and passionately 
advocated by many individual Israelis, together with Jews in the wider 
diaspora. But, as a nation, Israel seems stuck in patterns of behaviour that 
preclude progress in that direction. This could be regarded as a reasonable 
response to the lessons of experience. Or it could be interpreted as 
maladaptive, complicated grieving, a failure to relinquish the old assumptive 
world and move on (Rando 1993).  
 
 
Context and Consequences 
“The world let Jews be murdered for millennia, culminating in history’s 
greatest genocide. From remorse, it created Israel, but soon hardened its 
heart against this hapless people, cutting it little slack in its effort to survive”.  
(Konner 2006, p.237) Israel is “the ‘Jew’ among the states of the world”, 
subject to international hypocrisy in a continuation of “the world’s long and 
disturbing history of judging the Jewish people by different, and far more 
demanding, standards”(Dershowitz 2003, p.11). Such perceptions of the 
context in which the Jews have had to operate are not atypical. They chime 
with the isolationism that has come to distinguish Jewish communities, with 
the “world is against us” syndrome that resulted in European Jews keeping 
their heads down in a position of compliance, and Israeli Jews – “jews with 
teeth” (Konner 2006) – arming themselves to the teeth and adopting a 
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belligerent pose of “active self-defence” (Warschawski 2004b, pp.21-3). They 
represent an outlook which is understandable when seen from that particular 
Jewish angle, but other perspectives as detailed below permit a different and 
infinitely more complex picture of the ways in which context has influenced 
Jewish, and more recently Israeli, post-holocaust history. 
 
The European Background to Zionism 
When Zionism was born in nineteenth century Europe, as a solution to the 
persecution and assimilation arising from anti-semitism, it was created within 
a framework of the dominant intellectual and cultural paradigms of the time. 
The eighteenth century enlightenment, followed by the French Revolution, 
had unleashed the forces of liberal democracy in Europe, along with the idea 
of the nation-state as a consensual contract between state and citizen, a 
political and legal foundation for individual liberation and self-realisation. 
Avineri (1981, pp.3-13) argues that many Jews who went to Palestine at the 
turn of the nineteenth century were not simply fleeing persecution (this 
motivation could have taken them more easily to the United States), but were 
actually responding to this influence and seeking in Palestine an ideal of self-
determination which post-1789 Europe had failed to provide for them. 
The surge of nationalism in nineteenth century Europe, evolving out of an era 
of empires, led to a liberal democratic model of nationhood in Western 
Europe, but to a more organic, ethnically-based, blood-and-soil model in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Sternhell 1998, pp.10-11). Nations here were 
seen as necessarily homogeneous in culture, language, religion and 
ethnicity, sprung from and linked to the land. Citizens owed allegiance to a 
common state as a result of common descent, and the individual citizen had 
little standing in his own right. Jews in Eastern Europe therefore were “faced 
with the collective difficulty of finding a place in emerging national cultures” 
(Ellis 1990, p.43).  
Meanwhile, socialism was developing from its initial stirrings in the late 
eighteenth century as a reaction to the adverse social effects of capitalism. 
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By the late nineteenth century, Engels and Marx had outlined their influential 
theories, and various offshoots of and counter-movements to Marxism gave 
rise to a wide spectrum of socialist belief, from communism to social 
democracy. Sternhell (1998, pp.7-11) identifies nationalist socialism (so 
called to differentiate it from the negative associations of national socialism 
and Nazism), a product of anti-Marxist socialism and ethnic nationalism, as 
having the greatest influence on early Zionism. Viewing the nation as primary 
and socialism as a nation-building tool, “this form of socialism preached the 
organic unity of the nation and the mobilisation of all classes of society for the 
achievement of national objectives” (Sternhell 1998, p.7). These principles 
characterised the pre-state yishuv and the early years of the State of Israel. 
Another dominant feature of nineteenth century Europe was expansionist 
colonialism. European pioneers advanced and settled throughout the North 
American continent, Victorian Britain sat astride much of the world as a result 
of her history of imperial conquests and colonisation, and many other 
European countries were in long-established possession of colonial territories 
in various parts of Asia and Africa. Whether motivated by exploitative 
material greed, or by a “mission civilisatrice”, or a mixture of both, the 
colonising Europeans presumed a natural right to use other lands for their 
own advancement and to attempt to re-form them in the European image. 
Their assumptions of innate superiority in cultural, technical, intellectual, and 
even religious, terms, over the native inhabitants of the colonised lands, went 
unquestioned.  The Zionists have been consistently criticised for the colonial 
nature of their project and attitudes (eg. Finkelstein 2003b, pp.111-2; Said 
1979, pp.15-37), but these reflected a trend of their times, albeit they had the 
misfortune or lack of foresight to be at the tail-end of that trend (Gelvin 2005, 
p.60; Novick 2000, pp.153-4; Rose 2005, pp.82-4; Said 1979, pp.56-8). 
Nationalism, liberalism, socialism and colonialism, as predominant features 
of the social and intellectual environment of nineteenth century Europe, thus 
influenced the initial conception and execution of the Zionist enterprise, 
informing and colouring pre-state organisation and early state infrastructure, 
and remaining recognisable themes in the development of Israeli society ever 
since. Writing over a century after the birth of Zionism, Shafir and Peled 
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(2002, p.1) identify tensions in contemporary Israeli society between three 
principles, namely: the universalist commitment to western style democracy; 
the particularist commitment to being a Jewish state; and the colonial 
character of the Zionist state. These “partly contradictory political goals and 
commitments” (p.2) of democracy, ethno-nationalism and colonialism, are 
directly traceable to the paradigms of nineteenth century European society. 
 
Powerful Friends 
For most of the twentieth century, the Jews in Palestine and, subsequently, 
the State of Israel, enjoyed a considerable degree of support and protection 
from major global powers, first Britain during the mandate period, and then 
America from the Cold War era. The British had offered the Zionists a 
sympathetic ear from the early days of their project, demonstrated by the 
proposal of territory in British East Africa as a possible settlement option 
(Berry and Philo 2006, p.4; Gilbert 2008, pp. 21-2; Harms and Ferry 2005, 
p.56), and then, by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, later incorporated into 
the mandate for Palestine, giving official British support to “the establishment 
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. Though doubtless 
motivated by sympathy with the Zionist position, this declaration also served 
as a strategic move in terms of gaining support for British aims and interests 
in the Middle East from Russia and America, both of which were against 
imperial hegemony and for national self-determination, and both of which had 
large Jewish populations which might play a part in influencing national 
attitudes to the first world war (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.6-7; Gelvin 2005, 
pp.80-6; Harms and Ferry 2005, pp.68-71; Smith 2007, pp.72-91). 
By the time of the second world war, Britain felt the need to review its policy 
towards the Arabs in the light of Nazi and fascist attempts to garner support 
in the Middle East, and, in the White Paper of 1939, strict controls were put 
on Jewish immigration to Palestine for a five-year period, and the clear 
announcement made that it was never intended for Palestine to become a 
Jewish state against the will of the Arab population (Gelvin 2005, pp.116-8; 
Harms and Ferry 2005, pp.77-81; Shindler 2008, pp.31, 34-5; Smith 2007, 
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pp.124-51). Although the Zionists perceived this as betrayal, they had done 
well out of twenty years of British rule, having been permitted to set up a 
quasi-state infrastructure in the yishuv (Gilbert 2008, pp.45-98; Kimmerling 
2001, pp.65-7; Shindler 2008, pp.30-7), and encouraged to develop a military 
capacity, trained by the British and deployed to help them quell the rebellious 
Arab community during the later stages of the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-9 
(Shindler 2008, p.36; Smith 2007, p.145). They were thus in a good position 
to take advantage of the mandate power’s exhausted and weakened state, 
depleted of resources and beleaguered by problems around its global 
empire, at the end of the war. 
As with the first world war, the second resulted in a major redistribution of 
global power, this time from the European Great Powers of the interwar era 
to the two new superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
Suez crisis of 1956 effectively marked the demise of Britain and France as 
dominant forces in the Middle East (Berry and Philo 2006, pp.41-3; Gilbert 
2008, pp.306-31; Harms and Ferry 2005, pp.106-7; Smith 2007, pp.245-54), 
and thereafter the region became a theatre for the playing out of Cold War 
interests. By the 1960s both United States politicians and the American 
public viewed the Middle East in terms of potential Soviet threat, and began 
to regard Israel as a pro-western bulwark which could counteract Soviet 
influence there (Christison 2001, p.102; Smith, 2007, p.253). The US policy 
of maintaining a balance between Soviet and American interests in the region 
resulted in Israel being supplied with copious amounts of American economic 
aid and military assistance in an effort to counterbalance Soviet aid to Egypt, 
Iraq and Syria (Gelvin 2005, p.180; Harms and Ferry 2005, p.108; Shindler 
2008, pp.155, 170-1; Smith 2007, p.282). In the 1970s, Kissinger’s shuttle 
diplomacy was aimed at marginalising the Soviet Union’s role in the Middle 
East while furthering the American position as a valuable ally mediating in the 
interests of all parties (Gelvin 2005, pp.228-9; Harms and Ferry 2005, 
pp.120-6; Smith 2007, pp. 324-6, 329-31). 
Even after the Cold War came to an abrupt end with the implosion of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s, and the level of Arab-Israeli conflict reduced 
accordingly to leave the Israeli-Palestinian conflict centre stage by the 1990s, 
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the US maintained its supportive role: American economic and military 
assistance continued to pour into Israel (Christison 2001, pp.107-8,132-
3,145-6, 218-9, 261, 266, 281, 284; Gelvin 2005, p.170; Shindler 2008, pp. 
218-9); the US maintained a steady record of voting in Israel’s interests, or at 
the very least not against them, at the United Nations (Christison 2001, pp. 
134, 262-3, 281-2); and it consistently sought to reject or play down any 
international condemnations or criticisms of Israel’s behaviour, while 
simultaneously underwriting such questionable Israeli policies as land 
expropriations and settlements (Berry and Philo 2006, p.125-7; Christison 
2001, p.293). Meanwhile, although generally perceived as significantly 
biased towards Israel as a result of these actions, it continued to put itself 
forward as mediator in all of Israel’s negotiations with the Palestinians.  
Christison (2001, pp.291-3) asks what wars in the region could have been 
avoided over the last half of the twentieth century if America’s approach had 
been less biased and more balanced. Certainly, the US, for a variety of 
reasons, including the crossing by Jews of “the river of power in the US” 
(Burg 2008, pp.194-5) and the American “perceptual predispositions” 
(Christison 2001) to see the Middle East through Israeli eyes, has 
traditionally adopted the Israeli perspective when dealing with issues which 
involve Israel. But, like the British before them, the Americans have ultimately 
acted in their own interests, pursuing policies which have done little to 
pressurise or persuade Israel into the kind of accommodation and 
compromise necessary to realistically and viably sustaining its position as an 
essentially European state in an Arab region. 
 
The Neighbours 
Nor were any checks and balances exerted on Israel’s evolution by its Arab 
neighbours. The emergent Arab states were neither strong enough nor united 
enough to stand up to Israel in its early days, preoccupied as they were by 
domestic problems and engaged in competitive power games with each other 
(Lewis 1995, pp.348, 372; Smith 2007, pp.236-9). Nevertheless, they 
displayed a natural resistance to accept Israel as a permanent fixture, 
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viewing this European invasion as yet another unjustifiable incursion into 
Arab territory on a par with the crusades (Khalidi 1997, pp. 13, 152; 
Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, pp. 318-9; Said 1979, p.10). As a result, the 
Arab states were subject to the same American and Soviet manipulation as 
was Israel during the Cold War decades. With the emphasis on maintaining 
the balance of power in the region, any Arab-Israeli crisis was quickly 
contained, but there was no movement towards any form of long-term 
solution or accommodation. The rise of the PLO, for reasons detailed in the 
preceding chapter, failed to have much effect on the Israeli stance, while a 
series of autocratic regimes, many supported by the west and crumbling only 
now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, served to maintain the 
status quo in the Arab world, a situation alternatively perceivable as stability 
or stagnation.   
Relatively weak and disorganised though the Arabs may have been, they 
presented formidable foes when seen through the Israeli lens. All the talk of 
driving the Jews into the sea, as in the run-up to the 1967 war, was taken 
literally. Any mismatch between Arab rhetoric and Arab capacity may simply 
have been unrecognisable to a European people, ignorant of the Middle 
East, who had learned to their cost in Europe that seemingly exaggerated 
words could be matched, if not surpassed, by deeds. This inability to fully 
recognise the reality of the Arabs as people in their own right persists. Rose 
(2005, p.133) maintains that the Palestinians are, for the Israelis, “symbolic 
substitutes, stand-ins, ‘fall guys’ ...... for something no longer spoken out 
loud, something quite else”. Ellis (1990, p.24) refers to the Arabs existing “as 
highlights for Israeli heroism, not as flesh-and-blood casualties”.  That Israel 
could continue for so long in a bubble of illusion based on largely outdated 
fears and outmoded notions has to be partly attributed to the influence of its 
powerful friends, the effects of whose ongoing support are perhaps to be 
seen not so much in terms of protecting a vulnerable, grief-stricken nation as 
of stifling that nation’s capacity for any confrontation with and 





To what extent can the contours of a typical grief trajectory be traced in 
accounts of the post-holocaust history of the Jews? Although world Jewry at 
the beginning of the twentieth century was too geographically dispersed and 
culturally disparate to be termed a unified people, the vast majority of its 
population could be counted as European, mainly Central or East European. 
These Jews shared a centuries-long collective history of marginalisation, 
discrimination, persecution and expulsion, to an extent that anti-semitism was 
almost a defining characteristic, loss and suffering a feature of their collective 
identity. The holocaust can be regarded as a climax to this history, its 
industrial-scale programme of systematic dehumanisation and extermination 
inflicting upon the Jews of Europe loss of an absolute kind, the loss of basic 
ontological security about having a place in the world. 
Historical accounts of the post-holocaust years indicate an initial silence 
covering a variety of emotional responses: shock, bewilderment and 
disorientation; a problem-focussed preoccupation with post-war practical 
concerns; and a sense of shame at what the Jews had allowed themselves to 
become. By the 1960s, the Eichmann trial and the victory of the Six Days’ 
War in Israel had broken this silence and provided outlets for Jewish anger, 
pride and confidence. But a victor-victim ambiguity persisted, with the 
constant fear of vulnerability fuelling a perpetual drive for security. The State 
of Israel itself can be seen as a manifestation of the collective Jewish attempt 
to make sense of the post-holocaust world by securing for themselves a safe 
place in it. As a nation of and for Jews, it presented an opportunity to move 
on from the holocaust and the centuries of suffering, instability and insecurity 
that preceded it. But “fortress Israel” has proved to be obsessed with security 
and self-defence, exhibiting in a more aggressive and militaristic way the 
same fundamental determination to avoid vulnerability that also inspired the 
“fortress-like mentality” of the American Jewish community in their bid to 
acquire collective power, wealth and prestige in their host society. 
In grief terms, this presents similarities to “complicated” grieving, where the 
griever is stuck in maladaptive behaviour patterns based on his former 
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assumptive world, and seems unable to adjust to what any onlooker would 
perceive as the current realities of his circumstances. Moreover, the 
international political context, rife with self-interest, has not served to support 
Israel’s adaptation to the realities of its situation as a culturally diverse Jewish 
state, based on a nineteenth century European concept, set in a twenty-first 
century Arab world. If the contours of Jewish and Israeli post-holocaust 
history can be accepted as indicative of collective grief, then it is grief gone 
wrong. Not only is there a demonstrable failure to move on from loss, but the 
State of Israel, with its official focus on the holocaust, would seem to have 
placed loss at the centre of collective consciousness and tried to form 










6.  THE PICTURE TODAY: CONTEMPORARY ISRAELI AND  
     PALESTINIAN VISUAL ARTS     
   
“Great nations write their autobiographies in three manuscripts – the book 
of their deeds, the book of their words and the book of their art.” 
                                                                                                 John Ruskin 
    
Chapters one and two established the basic link between history and identity, 
the fact that who an individual is or a people are essentially amounts to what 
they have done in the past and how they have responded to what may have 
happened to them. The aim of this chapter is to ascertain whether any 
evidence can be drawn from current Palestinian and Israeli national identity 
to support the indications of the elements of the grief experience traceable in 
their national histories as outlined in the preceding two chapters. Do current 
Israeli and Palestinian national identities reflect any of the grief-triggering 
losses, reactions to those losses, or the meanings created to make sense of 
their respective post-loss worlds over the past sixty to seventy years? In 
order to seek an answer to this question, the work of nationally and 
internationally recognised Israeli and Palestinian contemporary visual artists 
will be used to supply data on current national identity. 
A general rationale for the use of contemporary forms of visual culture as a 
data source for gathering evidence on the characteristics and preoccupations 
of national identity at any given point in time is presented in chapter three 
(pp.96-100). However, it is perhaps worth noting that a focus on the visual 
arts might also be regarded as particularly pertinent to a study essentially 
concerned with loss. For the founding myth of the visual arts in western 
culture, that of the potter’s daughter, or the maid of Corinth, recounted in 
Pliny’s Natural History (Bettini 1999, p.9; Salzman 2006, pp.1-5), inextricably 
links them with resistance to loss. The daughter of Butades, a potter of 
Corinth, had fallen in love with a man who was about to depart on a long 
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journey overseas. The night before his departure, she traced the contours of 
her sleeping lover’s face on the wall from the silhouette of his shadow cast by 
the candlelight, creating, in anticipation of her loss, something of him to hold 
on to in his absence.  Additionally, her father made a clay relief, which he 
subsequently fired, from the wall drawing. Thus both drawing and the plastic 
arts were born from a desire to nail down and hold on to transient 
experience.  
The particular rationale for using contemporary visual arts in relation to 
Palestinian and Israeli national identity is also outlined in chapter three 
(pp.98-9), and some of the main points bear repetition. Both nations can lay 
claim to a particularly vibrant, rich and internationally-acclaimed visual arts 
scene at the moment. Living in circumstances where the political situation is 
a vital and inescapable facet of everyday life means that many of these 
artists, certainly a large proportion of those whose work is both displayed in 
major galleries at home and exhibited internationally, are “border-crossers”, 
with powerful social messages to convey. Because they are challenging or 
querying the status quo, their work can be regarded as providing sites for 
negotiation, affording an insight into tensions between contending views over 
important collective issues. This similarly applies to those artists who do not 
live full-time in their countries of origin but still feel a sufficiently strong 
Palestinian or Israeli identity to focus a large amount of their work there and 
in so doing offer comment from their own specific and equally valid 
standpoints. 
Bearing in mind the potter’s daughter, the particular wealth and vibrancy of 
the Israeli and Palestinian contemporary visual arts scenes might be put 
down to the existence of a high level of loss, both actual and anticipated, 
within these societies. It could also, however, be partly attributed to the 
relative newness and freshness of the modern visual arts as channels of 
expression for both peoples. Until the earlier part of the twentieth century the 
Islamic and Jewish religious traditions respectively had dictated what were 
acceptable and appropriate forms of visual culture, but as western and 
secular influences increased in both Palestinian and Israeli society, there was 
more experimentation with non-traditional art forms until both cohorts of 
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national artists were working with the media of the global visual arts scene, 
using them to deliver their own unique national messages.  
The traditional Arab culture of the Palestinians was based on the word, as 
both an oral and visual entity, since Islam teaches that “the word of God is 
the only reality in an ephemeral world, and, by implication, that all the works 
of man, including works of art, are vain” (Honour and Fleming 1984, p.334). 
Artistic representation of the worthless material world was viewed variously 
as a pointless exercise, idolatry, or attempted usurpation of creative power. 
Islamic arts traditionally focussed on what western culture might term crafts, 
including architecture, calligraphy, mosaic, weaving, stained glass and wood-
carving, and were largely employed for the glorification of the divine. 
Although Christian Arabs practised icon-making from the seventeenth 
century, such art forms as painting, drawing, sculpture and photography were 
largely nineteenth century European introductions (Boullata 1977, 1997, 
2000). Ankori (2006, pp.23-46) describes how, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, European influences began to creep into Palestinian visual 
culture and several artists managed to interweave or juxtapose them with 
their own long-established traditions of religious art. The nakba of 1948 put a 
stop to any real evolution that might have occurred along these lines and, 
from the 1950s, Palestinian artists, scattered around the world, mirrored the 
fragmentation of their people, working in a variety of styles which reflected 
the influences of their new surroundings as well as their cultural origins. In 
addition, a great many of them used their art as a political weapon in the 
national cause (Halaby 2001).  
Jewish visual culture is perceived as being traditionally influenced by the 
Second Commandment: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image 
or any likeness of anything that is in Heaven above, or that is in the earth 
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth”, to such an extent, Bland 
(2001) would argue, that the “artless Jew” has become almost a 
commonplace of modern thinking for both Jew and non-Jew alike. However, 
as with the Islamic approach, this restriction does not imply a lack of visual 
culture and aesthetic, simply a tradition that did not conform to accepted 
European definitions of artistic form and function. Thus, in tracing the history 
200 
 
of Israeli art back to its relatively recent origins, when the Bezalel Academy 
was established by the Zionists in Jerusalem in 1906 as a school of art and 
design, it initially concentrated on the promotion of what western culture 
might term crafts. But the subsequent arrival of increasing numbers of Jewish 
immigrants from Europe, bringing their secular European influences with 
them, soon led to the greater development of European art forms and the 
beginnings of a uniquely Israeli tradition of visual art. From early works 
depicting glowingly optimistic views of their Biblical-oriental environment and 
its Arab occupants, through the post-1948 international-art-world-oriented 
abstraction of the New Horizons group, to the growing dominance of 
conceptual art from the 1970s on, this tradition consistently responded to the 
situations and events of Israeli history and, in constant tension between the 
local and the global, sought to define the elusive Israeli identity. (Aviv 2010, 
pp.20-2; explanatory video playing in the Israeli Art Gallery of the Israel 
Museum, Jerusalem, October 2010) 
The remainder of this chapter examines the dominant messages and themes 
of the canons of Israeli and Palestinian contemporary visual art side by side. 
This is not necessarily to invite comparison between them, but rather 
because they tend to have topics and motifs in common. Given the unique 
status of Israeli Palestinians, some of whose work can feature simultaneously 
in the Israel Museum and in international exhibitions of Palestinian art, they 
even have artists in common. Although the two bodies of work differ in terms 
of particularities and perspectives, each artistic corpus deals with essentially 
the same physical terrain and with the abnormalities of daily life occasioned 
by the same situation of conflict; each treats the themes of need for a 
homeland and of a vision for the future; and each touches on problems of 
injustice and inequality in society. These will be explored under the general 
headings of the Land, the Life and the Dream. 
 
The Land 
The land is a major theme in contemporary Israeli and Palestinian art. It is 
treated in the abstract, emotionally-loaded sense of homeland, of having a 
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place in the world to belong to, and also as the physical terrain of that 
particular part of the Middle East where both Palestinians and Israelis live. 
For Palestinian artists, especially those in exile, scattered around the world 
far from their geographical point of origin, the lack of homeland is a recurrent 
message. But Israeli artists also serve up reminders that much of Israeli 
society has memories of another home, and that, in addition, Jewish history 
entails centuries of homelessness. With regard to the physical terrain that is 
inhabited by both peoples, there is a distinct divergence of perspective on the 
same landscape. The Palestinian artists describe a place of historic beauty 
and vitality, intricately linked with the Palestinian being, though blotted by the 
marks of Israeli occupation. The Israeli depictions tend in two directions: one 
is of a place not quite real or solid, not quite “theirs”; the other is of an ugly 
landscape, spoiled by the forces of militarisation and commercialisation.  
 
The Palestinian Homeland 
The first time Palestine officially participated in the Venice Biennale, one of 
the world’s foremost international platforms for contemporary art, in 2009, it 
was under the title of “Palestine c/o Venice”, underscoring, as curator Salwa 
Mikdadi (2009) explains in the catalogue text, its chronic impermanence as a 
nation. The postal allusion reflecting a lack of permanent residence was used 
as a metaphor for the Palestinian condition, a nation functioning for over a 
century c/o colonial powers, Israeli occupation and neighbouring Arab 
countries. 
Although this was the first Palestinian participation as a nation in the 
Biennale, there had previously been individual contributions from Palestinian 
artists. In 2003, Sandi Hilal, a Bethlehem-born architect, was asked, along 
with her Italian husband, Alessandro Petti, who had worked extensively in the 
Palestinian territories, to contribute a project representing Palestine. This was 
a significant challenge, given that the Biennale is an exhibition based on 
nation-states and that Palestine was a nation without a state. The chosen 
solution was to mount a display of ten huge travel documents and passports, 
each different, each representing a Palestinian, or, more correctly, lack of 
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Palestinian status, whether in the diaspora, the occupation or the “alienation”, 
as they termed the situation of Palestinians living in Israel. The pieces 
included Lebanese travel documents, a Jordanian passport for Palestinians, 
and Jerusalem’s special ID card, and all ten were scattered on the spaces in 
between the official national pavilions, physically representing the Palestinian 
position of inhabiting the cracks in the international order. (Hilal and Petti 
2003a and b) 
The same motif of citizenship documentation is employed in Rula Halawani’s 
iconic “Palestinian I Am” (2003). An artist born and bred in Jerusalem, 
working at Birzeit University in Ramallah, she had applied at age eighteen for 
an official travel document. This showed her place of birth as Jerusalem and 
gave her nationality as Jordanian. To add insult to injury, the details were in 
English and Hebrew, with no Arabic anywhere on the card. Enlarged and 
printed on canvas, this is now an exhibition piece, usually installed on the 
floor, inviting the spectator to trample on it (d’Autreppe 2008, p.19). 
For Palestinian artists based in Palestine/Israel, the homeland theme is 
expressed largely in such concretely material terms, but for artists in the 
diaspora, its expression tends to be more abstract, and the historic event of 
the nakba assumes greater importance. Steve Sabella, a Jerusalem-born 
artist now based in London, captures the fragmentation of his native city, of 
his people and of the individual Palestinian psyche in his “In Exile” series 
(2008). Using a complex technique of photomontage, whereby he 
deconstructs the familiar in order to recompose it into a new reality, Sabella 
gives visual form to a disorientated and dislocated state of mind, a 
vertiginous condition of fragmentation and alienation which characterises 
exile. In one of the prints from the series (fig.1), he takes photographs at 
different angles of the view of windows from his London flat, then pieces bits 
of the different images together again until he arrives at something that 
reflects his identity, fragmented, yet somehow held together (Ravel 2010). 
Mona Hatoum, an internationally established artist, born in Haifa, raised in 
Beirut, now living and working between London and Berlin, deals with many 
global issues in her work, but the loss of her homeland is a recurrent theme. 
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One of its simplest and most striking expressions, displayed in the “Palestine: 
Creativity in all its States” exhibition at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris in 
2009, combines her abiding motif of maps with her “carpets” series 
preoccupation of the 1990s. Part of her “Present Tense” (1996), a small rug 
with a brightly-coloured map of the world woven into it has a small threadbare 
patch in the middle where the material has been removed from the area that 
would be Palestine/Israel.  
Emily Jacir, born in Baghdad, raised in Saudi Arabia, now holder of an 
American passport living and working between New York and Ramallah, has 
many iconic works to her name, all politically focussed on what it means to 
be a Palestinian in today’s world. Her “Memorial to 418 Palestinian Villages 
Destroyed, Depopulated and Occupied by Israel in 1948” (2001) (fig.2) 
speaks for itself. She set up a tent, of the standard variety issued to refugees 
by the United Nations, in her New York studio and invited people, both fellow-
Palestinians and sympathisers and well-wishers of other nationalities, to 
come by and embroider on the roof and sides of the tent in plain black thread 
the names of the various villages. The embroiderers then signed and dated a 
book kept inside the tent, recreating community in commemoration of the 
communities that had been lost in the nakba. 
Larissa Sansour, born in Jerusalem, now Copenhagen-based, working 
mainly with video and digital photography, devotes a significant amount of 
her work to the exploration of Palestinian diaspora identity. Her video “A 
Space Exodus” (fig.3) treats this theme with a poignant mix of humour, hope, 
pride and despair. In a film sequence reminiscent of “A Space Odyssey” and 
of the first American landing on the moon, the artist, dressed in a spacesuit, 
descends the stairs of her craft to a background track of oriental music and 
plants a Palestinian flag on the surface of the moon with the announcement 
that “This is one small step for Palestinians, but one giant leap for mankind”. 
At the end of the video, trying to make contact with base, “We have a 
problem, Jerusalem”, the artist-spacewoman floats off into space, losing 
contact altogether “Come in, Jerusalem, come in”. The whole metaphor 
brings to mind the account, from the reports of the Israeli Lieutenant Colonel 
Dov Yirmiah during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, of Israeli military guards 
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abusing Palestinian prisoners and shouting at them “You want a state? Build 




       
 
 



















        (Fig.2. Jacir, Memorial to 418 Palestinian Villages, 2001.  






           
 













The Palestinian Physical Terrain 
The land of Palestine prior to 1948 is presented as a place of outstanding 
natural beauty. Samia Halaby, one of an older generation of established 
Palestinian artists, born in Jerusalem now based in New York, demonstrates 
this in her twelve foot long “Palestine, from the Mediterranean Sea to the 
Jordan River” (2003), which she has contributed to several recent 
international exhibitions of Palestinian art. The piece is a composition of 
acrylic painted pieces of canvas and paper in organic shapes which are 
glued or sewn together in long strips. Each installation involves a re-sewing 
and re-gluing of the same pieces to produce a different version of the work, 
though always retaining the same colour palette of sunny yellows and 
oranges, forest greens and dark blues. The title refers to the extent of 
Palestine’s territory before 1948, and serves to remind viewers that “the 
current map of the region, pocked with settlements and ripped with bypass 
roads and the apartheid wall is only temporary” (Zurur 2008, p.51). 
Rula Halawani draws contrasts between the land as it was before 1948, and 
as it is now. Her series “Presence and Impressions” (2010) (fig.4) comprises 
nine diptychs, each coupling a pre-1948 photograph of a Palestinian village 
landscape with her 2009 shot of the same view, the original village having 
disappeared or been destroyed in the interim. In the recent photographs, 
there are fences, lampposts, telegraph poles, modern highways and 
buildings, and vistas of modern agricultural land. The pre-1948 olive trees 
have been replaced by a more European variety of forestation. While the pre-
1948 scenes contain a few human figures, there is no-one to be seen in the 
twenty-first century ones. Moreover, the Arab villages seem to blend in with 
the surrounding landscape, the contemporary shots coming across in much 
harsher contrast, with the features of both vegetation and architecture more 
sharply delineated against their background. “Standing amongst the ruins of 
what was once a beautiful place takes your breath away” (Halawani 2010, 
p.9) 
In earlier work, Halawani featured the landscape as a backdrop for the 
Palestinian people in their everyday lives. Her “Life through a Lens” 
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photographs (1989-2008) capture details and moments of daily life both 
indoors and outdoors, featuring in the latter the olive trees, gardens, 
mountain villages and fishing beaches of Palestine. But increasingly, people 
are absent from her frame, a response to Israel’s attempt “to eradicate 
Palestinian society” (d’Autreppe 2008, p.19) and consume the former 
features of the landscape (Hammami 2008, p.7). The theme of disfigurement 
of the landscape also informs her “Irrational” photographs (2003), a series of 
blurred studies which seek to focus on an olive tree or a contour of the 
landscape and thus avoid the ugliness of the roads and settlements that 
surround and lie behind them: “The landscape of Palestine that I grew up 
with is gone ....... All I can see now are newly developed, ugly constructions” 
(Halawani 2008, p.67). 
Ugly or not, the landscape and its people persist. This is the message of Noel 
Jabbour’s “Palestina” (2007) series. Jabbour, born in Nazareth, now based in 
Berlin, is best known for her interior studies, as in “Palestinian Interiors” 
(1995) and “Vacant Seats” (2000-1). But “Palestina” comprises a variety of 
outdoor shots, mostly with people posing against the landscape or going 
about their everyday business within it. In the catalogue text accompanying 
these photographs in the exhibition “Palestine: Creativity in all its States” at 
the Bahrain National Museum, 2010, she refers directly to Edward Said’s 
statement “There is no getting away from the fact that as an idea, a memory, 
and as an often buried or invisible reality, Palestine and its people have 
simply not disappeared.” (cited on p.27) 
The persistence of Palestine and its people is also a theme of Raeda 
Saadeh’s “Vacuum” (2007) (fig.5). In this 17 minute video, Saadeh, an Israeli 
Palestinian, meticulously works a vacuum cleaner through the desert hills of 
Palestine. She slowly approaches from a distance, the menacing hum of the 
cleaner always audible in the background, in a piece which conveys 
messages about the female role and about human inconsequentiality by 
contrast to nature’s power, but which also states categorically that “this place 
is here and it is inhabited by a Palestinian” (Nasrallah 2010). 
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For many Palestinian artists, the Palestinians and their land are not only 
interdependent but completely integrated in a blood-and-soil relationship. 
Muhammad Hawajri, born and raised in al Burej refugee camp in Gaza, 
created his “Tales of a Tree” series in 2002, at a time when the Israeli 
authorities were uprooting the fruit trees that provided many Palestinians with 
their sole source of income. These abstract works in mixed media of painting 
and photography are based on the physical composition of a tree trunk, and 
anthropomorphise the tree so that the viewer can experience it as a living 
body, albeit an ancient one that has seen many cycles of death and rebirth. 
Meanwhile, Ra’ed Issa, another young artist from the camps of Gaza, in his 
“Martyrs” series (2000) of seven paintings and ninety-nine sketches of the 
mutilated bodies of people killed during the Intifada (Boullata 2004, p.76), 
transforms the serene pose of dead youths into the contours of landscapes. 
The people and their land are one.  
This theme is expanded by the use of the natural resources of the land as 
artistic media. The ubiquitous indigenous cactus, a hardy plant which grows 
where it is thrown and clings tenaciously to existence, features in the work of 
several artists. Rana Bishara, an Israeli Palestinian artist who works with a 
variety of media, is particularly well-known for the use of cactus in her work 
as a symbol of Palestinian endurance and patience (the word cactus means 
patience in Arabic) in the face of hardship. Some of her best-known pieces 
include “Sweetie” (1999), a cactus leaf with its lower half enrobed in 
chocolate, denoting the sweetness of the land that cannot be got at because 
of the Israeli occupation; “Ticktus Palestine” (1998/9) (fig.6), a cactus leaf 
with an eggtimer embedded in it, highlighting the critical passage of time 
since 1948; and “Homage to Palestine” (1998) (fig.6), pieces of chopped 
cactus in a sealed jar, representing the Palestinians trapped in the West 
Bank, Gaza, or refugee camps in other countries (Halaka 2008, pp.90-7; 
Tuqan 2009, pp.34-41). 
And, of course, there is Suleiman Mansour, Palestine’s most renowned artist, 
who, in the late 1980s, after a long career in figurative oil painting, took to 
using earth and straw as an artistic medium. This development was 
motivated partly by a felt need for change on the part of a small group of 
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Palestinian artists forming the “New Visions” movement of the time; partly by 
a decision to find a locally sourced substitute for foreign western art materials 
procured through Israel; and partly by an intuitive desire to create national art 
from the very soil of his homeland (Ankori 2006, pp.60-92). Discarding colour 
from his work in the early 1990s, as his optimism about the Palestinian 
situation dwindled, Mansour went on to create some of his most iconic works, 
such as the reliefs of “Hagar” (1996) and “I, Ishmael” (1997), the revered 
ancestor of the Arab peoples and son of Abraham and Hagar, from wood and 
mud. These mud figures contain an inherent promise of Palestinian rebirth 
from the earth, in the same way as Ishmael was revived in the desert by 
water, but the fact that they are dry and cracked turns them into “emblems of 





             (Fig.4. Halawani, Presence and Impressions, 2010.  











    
 
      
 












(Fig.6. Bishara, Ticktus Palestinus and Homage to Palestine, 1998-9. 







The Israeli Homeland 
Although Eretz Israel was intended as a homeland for Jews, and regarded by 
many as the rightful homeland they had been expelled from prior to their two 
thousand year exile, the work of several contemporary visual artists would 
appear to reflect the fact that there are other concepts of homeland in the 
modern Israeli collective consciousness. Shai Aloni, an established Israeli 
photographer, exhibited in the early 2000s a series of photographs he had 
taken of recent Russian immigrants, part of the influx of the preceding 
decade, in Afula, the capital of his native Jezreel Valley. One of these 
features a giant photograph of a forest view and snowy mountains, a Russian 
landscape of memory,  affixed to the living room wall in a family home. Erez 
Israeli, an interdisciplinary artist working in a wide field of visual media, 
touches on this theme in his photo-etching “Friday Night” (2009) (fig.7). The 
native-born Israeli expresses here a collective memory of the Europeans who 
immigrated to Israel, with a European forest as a backdrop to the dining 
table, and a train running around the table: “I tried to combine the image of 
the dining room table with a real landscape of European forests deeply 
rooted in my consciousness when I think of landscape in the context of 
Jewish identity. It is surprising to me that when one thinks of landscape in the 
context of Jewish identity, one thinks of a European rather than an Israeli 
landscape.” (artist’s comment in Landscape exhibition catalogue, Petach 
Tikva Museum of Art, 2009) 
Yehudit Sasportas, of Moroccan-Jewish origin, brought up in Ashdod, now 
living in Berlin, has used her personal experience of homeland as a basis for 
universalising the themes of displacement and definition of borders. One of 
her earlier works, “The Carpenter and the Seamstress” (2000) (fig.8), an 
abstract room-scale installation more akin to architecture than painting or 
sculpture, refers to the floorplan of the public housing apartment that her 
parents, the characters of the title, were allocated on their arrival in Israel. 
The various coloured panels and three-dimensional features of the piece mix 
austere, angular, geometric spaces with more sensual, flowing, patterned 
decoration, representing the family’s struggle to adapt the culture and visual 
sensibilities of North Africa to the modern, utopian vision of Israel. Sasportas 
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seeks to show that in this context the visual codes of oriental culture are 
emptied of their content and remain on a two-dimensional level of a shell or a 
skin, which itself becomes in turn a new and independent site, a state of 
“synthetic authenticity” (artist’s statements from The Carpenter and the 
Seamstress II exhibition catalogue, Deitch Projects, New York, 2001). 
Building on her own experience of the processes of de-culturisation and re-
culturisation taking place in Israel, her work gives this phenomenon universal 
resonance, questioning the meanings of “home” in a globalised twenty-first 
century of flux and movement (Jacobson 2002; Klein 2006; Schwabsky 
2003).  
The archetypal Jew is the wandering Jew, and video artist Guy Ben-Ner 
references this in his “Elia – A Story of an Ostrich Chick” (2003) (fig.9). 
Filmed in a park outside his flat in New York, and based on the style of Walt 
Disney nature documentaries of the 1960s, this piece sees the artist and his 
family transformed with the aid of costumes into an ostrich family, forever 
wandering around seeking better places to feed. The film was directly 
motivated by the artist’s move from Israel to New York, and he refers to 
himself as the “Eternal Jew”, always on the move in search of better living 
conditions. (Atlan 2008, pp. 85-91)  
Constant movement serves to evoke an existential homelessness in Michal 
Rovner’s multi-channel video installation “Time Left” (2002) (fig.10). Israeli-
born Rovner, now living and working between Israel and New York, uses a 
variety of media, but is best known for her photography and video pieces, 
specialising in degraded images, re-photographed and re-mastered until her 
figures become emblematic, almost abstract forms, more appropriate to 
remembrance than representation (Camhi 2004). “Time Left” is a 
mesmerising projection on the walls of a darkened room of row after row of 
such miniature human figures, hand in hand, marching ceaselessly round the 
perimeter of the room to no obvious destination, with a droning electronic 
soundscape as background. At first glance, they appear more like calligraphy 
or “ongoing endless text” (Tusa 2003), but their procession, once recognised, 
brings to mind diasporas, expulsions and mass movements of people 
(Particles of Reality exhibition catalogue, DHC/ART Foundation for 
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Contemporary Art, Montreal, 2009), or simply humanity trapped in the 













       (Fig.8. Sasportas, The Carpenter and the Seamstress, 2000. 















             (Fig.9. Ben-Ner, Elia – A Story of an Ostrich Chick, 2003. 



















The Physical Terrain of Israel 
The physical landscape of Israel is, for some artists, not quite real. Sigalit 
Landau, one of Israel’s foremost visual arts practitioners, who explores the 
rich and varied symbolism of her environment in her work, describes her 
country as “a kind of non-place....a crystallised chunk of stories more than a 
place” (Camhi 2008). The photographer Ori Gersht, Israeli-born now based in 
New York, in his “Ghost-Olive” series (2003-4) (fig.11), transforms olive trees, 
ancient and sacred symbols of strength on the land, into ethereal images of 
fragile beauty by taking his pictures in the mid-day sun, when contrast is low, 
and by using very long exposures. The resulting image is so delicate it 
almost dissolves before the eyes. (Goodman 2007, pp.25-6; Wecker 2009)  
Yaron Leshem undermines assumptions about the authenticity of the 
landscape with his fifteen-foot lightbox work “Village” (2004) (fig.12). At first 
glance, this appears to be a Palestinian village nestling on a hillside, but 
closer inspection reveals it to be an Israeli Defence Force training installation 
with false building facades and painted figures. (Goodman 2007, p.27) A 
similar trompe l’oeil effect informs Shai Kremer’s “Shooting Defence Wall” 
(2004), a photograph of a section of the separation wall between Gilo 
neighbourhood in Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories, which has been 
painted with trees and walls and houses in order to blend in with the 
surrounding landscape (Cats 2010, pp.104-5). 
For others, the landscape is a temporary phenomenon, on loan. “Borrowed 
Scenery” (2004) (fig.13) by Tel Aviv-based performance and installation artist 
Nelly Agassi, has associations with borrowed finery since it incorporates her 
signature dress motif, and with the borrowed scenery of Japanese gardening, 
whereby the surrounding landscape is utilised as part of the garden design. 
The artist is attached by a series of long white ribbons to a collection of large 
rocks so that they appear to form part of her dress. Hadas Maor (2002), in 
the curatorial text to her exhibition Palace of Tears at Ein Harod Museum of 
Art, observes that her recurrent dress motif is symbolic of the need to strip off 
external layers of protection in order to be open and freely exposed to the 
potential for change. The piece can therefore be interpreted as a reference to 
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the stifling and inappropriate situation of being defined by such a temporary 
feature as the surrounding environment.  
A recognition of the temporary nature of ownership of land also informs Shai 
Kremer’s “Fallen Empires” photographs (2005-10) (fig.14), in which he shows 
Israeli landscapes as historic palimpsests, referring in their titles to the former 
imperial powers who have laid claim to them. “The recycling of these spaces, 
from one conqueror to the next, shows how most of the empires of history 
tried to conquer and rule this land, with one similar outcome: they failed”. 
(artist’s comment in Galerie les Filles du Calvaire catalogue accompanying 












































        (Fig.14. Kremer, Tel Afek, Byzantine, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, 
         Crusader, Mamluk, British then Israeli, from Forgotten Empires  







While some artists see the landscape as unreal or illusory, or lay stress on its 
temporary nature as a defining attribute of its inhabitants, others depict it as 
all too real, but ugly and contaminated, a symbol of the dystopian situation in 
Israel. Trees figure large in such works. The notorious New Year’s greetings 
card for 2006 sent out by David Tartakover, a well-known Israeli graphic 
designer, artist and peace activist, features a picture of hacked-up olive trees 
in evident contradiction to the quotation from Deuteronomy (8.8) below it: “A 
land of wheat, and barley, and vines, and fig trees, and pomegranates, a land 
of olive oil, and honey” (Goodman 2007, pp.22-3). Shai Kremer’s panoramic 
photograph of “Palestinian Olive Trees Beheaded ‘due to Security Reasons’, 
East Jerusalem” (2007) (fig.15) shows a green, fertile landscape with regular 
rows of decapitated olive tree trunks leading the eye towards the horizon, the 
trees having been felled as part of a routine army exercise to render the area 
more  visible. The olive tree is an Israeli icon, one of the traditional seven 
native species of the land of Israel, and an international symbol for peace, 
here destroyed by Israeli military action. Although the regularity of the grid of 
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stumps stems from agricultural practice, the instant visual impression is its 
resemblance to a precisely laid out military cemetery (Cats 2010, pp. 102-3; 
Naveh 2010, pp. 191-2). Photojournalist and artist Miki Kratsman, in his 
black-and-white photograph, “Territory 3306 13” (2007), sets a bare, leafless 
tree against a close-up section of the Abu Dis wall, employing a symbol 
which normally represents life, rootedness and homeland, to create a bleak 
and claustrophobic effect (Atlan 2008, pp.53-5).  
The militarisation of the Israeli landscape is another powerful theme. Shai 
Kremer, much in the tradition of Roi Kuper, a socially and politically engaged 
photographer of the previous generation, addresses the military disfiguration 
of the landscape.in his “Infected Landscapes” series (1999-2007) (fig.16). 
These pictures of training zones, military equipment storage sites, training 
targets and conflict-damaged buildings, aim to demonstrate how the military 
leaves its imprint on the Israeli landscape and on Israeli society. “The scars 
concealed in the landscape correspond to the wounds in the collective 
unconscious of the country. The landscape, infected with loaded sentiments 
of the ongoing conflict, becomes a platform for discussion” (artist’s comment 
in Galerie les Filles du Calvaire catalogue accompanying his exhibit in Paris 
Photo, 2009). Similarly, Gilad Ophir, in his “Works and Days” (2006) series, 
deals with the effects of military residue on the landscape. His photographs 
of the wrecked frames of abandoned Bedouin constructions in the desert 
(fig.17) demonstrate the way in which they use materials disposed of or 
abandoned by Israeli army military camps to build their temporary housing 
and thus continue to live illegally in the Negev Desert in settlements 
unrecognised by the state of Israel. These partially dismantled semi-
structures, like piles of junk in the bleak desert landscape, stand, moreover, 
in sharp contrast to the original Zionist vision of making the desert bloom 
(Atlan 2008, pp.71-7). 
Gal Weinstein, a Tel Aviv-based artist working largely with installation and 
video pieces, takes iconic Israeli landscapes, such as the Jezreel Valley 
(2002) (fig.18), the cradle of early twentieth century Zionist settlement; the 
Hula Valley (2005), a swampy marshland which was dried out in the 1950s in 
a move felt necessary to agricultural development at the time but later 
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recognised as an environmental catastrophe; and Nahalal (2005-6), an 
agricultural community symbolic of the golden age of Zionism, and re-
presents them in a variety of cheap synthetic modern materials, such as 
office carpeting, synthetic lawn, MDF flooring, PVC, steel wool and various 
other household materials. Working from photographs, he reproduces large-
scale perfect imitations of dried-out swampland and birds’ eye view mosaics 
of fields and tracks. While this form of presentation is an explicit recognition 
of these sites as household names in Israeli mythology, he is also showing 
how what was once a fertile natural landscape has been turned into “a 
barren, synthetic and domesticated surface” (Katz-Freiman 2002). 
Some artists have even presented their land as a commodity.  David Reeb’s 
“Holy Places” project of the late 1990s comprises a series of black and white 
acrylic on canvas studies of sites like the Western Wall and the Dome of the 
Rock, all with the recurring motif of the bar code, the electronic imprint used 
for encoding the prices of commodities. Around the same time, Arianne 
Littman-Cohen, in her “Holy Land for Sale” installation, presented 150 bags 
of Israeli soil in easy-to-carry, handy-size packages for export to America. 
(Katz-Freiman 1996) 
Meir Gal, an Israeli artist, now New York-based, who gained prominence in 
the 1990s by using his art to protest Israeli Ashkenazi discrimination against 
the Mizrahim, presents his native land in his “Untitled (Armpit-American)” 
photograph (2002) (fig.19) as a stain in the shape of the map of Israel 
painted in black ink on his armpit. He explains on his website 
(www.meirgal.com, 2010) that this piece “concretises the psychosexual 
relations between the state and its citizens, the internalisation of the state’s 
memories and priorities over personal history. It illustrates how the state 
infiltrates, hides and ultimately brands itself using its citizens’ bodies”. As 
Maor (2003) observes, this armpit map does not represent a “friendly 
landscape-place convenient to live in”, but rather “an identifying mark, a 
stigma, an irremovable stain (that) defines and links the artist/model to his 
native habitat, in the same way that a number or dye are used to brand cows 







(Fig.15. Kremer, Palestinian Olive Trees Beheaded ‘due to Security 










(Fig.16. Kremer. Trench ‘Chicago’ Ground Force Training Zone, 2007, from 












































When Israeli and Palestinian visual artists turn to the life of the people living 
on this land, the major preoccupation appears to be with the absence, in both 
societies, of the opportunity to lead what might be considered a normal life. 
Although some of the Palestinian work deals directly with the conflict situation 
in terms of lives lost and damage inflicted, the majority dwells on aspects of 
the struggle for normal everyday living given the difficulties, obstacles and 
frustrations of the occupation environment. For Israeli artists, meanwhile, the 
focus is on the militarisation ingrained in their society as a result of the 
conflict, and the challenge to survive the brutal realities of a life in which war, 
violence, death and chaos are commonplace. Both bodies of work feature the 
routine presence of social injustice and discrimination as a prevalent theme. 
For the Palestinian artists, this centres on the treatment of Palestinians under 
Israeli occupation and control, while Israeli artists turn the spotlight on their 
own society, on the disregard for the interests of minority groups and on the 
economic inequalities between various cultural sub-groups.  
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Palestinians: Effects of the Conflict 
Rana Bishara’s “Blindfolded History” (2003), first shown at the Made in 
Palestine Exhibition in Houston in 2003, comprises a set of glass panels, one 
for each year since the nakba, suspended precariously from the ceiling on 
monofilament lines. These are silkscreened in chocolate, a material used by 
the artist because of its similarity to dried blood, with iconic images of 
violence, oppression and resistance taken, over years of conflict, from news 
sites such as Al-Jazeera and a selection of human rights websites. (Mikdadi-
Nashashibi 2003; Nasar 2003) This history of death and bloodshed becomes 
more personal in Noel Jabbour’s “Vacant Seats” (2000-1) series of 
photographs (fig.20), large-scale portraits of Palestinian families who have 
lost members to the conflict. The families stand, frozen and formal in their 
grief, their missing member represented by a photograph of the martyr, held 
by another family member or visible in the background (Zurur 2008). 
Suleiman Mansour’s “Garden of Hope” (2002), a large broken clay slab with 
a regular pattern of rows of red roses painted on it, was exhibited in the Made 
in Palestine exhibition directly in front of his six clay and wood reliefs of 
Ismail, son of Abraham and Hagar, and founder of the Arab race. Harithas 
(2003), in his exhibition catalogue introduction, interprets this piece as a 
memorial in which the roses “pay homage to the heroism of the martyrs as 
the foundation of independent Palestine”. Nasar (2003), in his essay in the 
same catalogue, sees them as symbolising “a fruitful Ismail”, and links them 
with his observation that as Ismail’s erection grows in the series of reliefs, the 
cracks in the mud of which he is made seem to diminish. Death and life 
appear to be intricately linked in the same piece. 
Vera Tamari’s “Tale of a Tree” (1999-2006) (fig.21) has a similar format, but 
focuses on the destruction and re-growth of olive trees. A large black and 
white photo-transfer of an olive tree on plexiglass hangs on the wall, and on a 
plexiglass base on the floor in front of it stand hundreds of small ceramic 
trees about three inches high, in a variety of different colours. While 
referencing the destruction of hundreds of olive trees by Israeli settlers and 
military forces, this piece also evokes hope in the prolific sprouting growth on 
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the ground (Harithas 2003; Mikdadi-Nashabishi 2003). A personal angle on 
such destruction is Suha Shoman’s video “Bayyaratina” (Our Groves) (2009). 
Jerusalem-born, brought up and educated in Egypt, Beirut and Paris, now 
living and working in Jordan, Shoman had a distinguished career as a painter 
before moving into installation art in the 1990s and video art from 2005. This 
eight-minute piece remembers her family’s orange groves, bought by her 
grandfather, planted by him, then her father, and laments this “paradise lost” 
(Khazindar 2010, p.35) after the Israelis, in the years following the outbreak 
of the second intifada in 2002, confiscate the land and tear down all the trees 
to facilitate a clear line of vision (Khazindar 2010; Laidi-Hanieh 2009).  
Sansour’s “Land Confiscation Order 06/24/T” (2007), “a requiem for a small 
piece of land and a stone house” (artist’s comment on her website, 
www.larissasansour.com, 2011), deals with the same theme. This ten-minute 
video film centres on a family summer house that belonged to the artists’ 
grandparents, and the imaginative schemes dreamt up by her brother and 
sister to avoid its impending seizure by the Israeli military. At one point, they 
go silent and unfurl a huge roll of black cloth which they then proceed to 
drape all round the small house in a surreal funeral, a ritual acknowledgment 
of their loss at both a personal and collective level (Khazindar 2010, p.33). 
Rula Halawani’s “Negative Incursion” (2002) (fig.22) series of photographs 
captures the death and destruction of the conflict as it actually happens 
during Israel’s March 2002 military invasion of West Bank towns. Her use of 
black and white negative prints serves to highlight the horror of these events 
in a hyperrealistic way, sharpening the viewer’s perception of the terror and 
damage visited on ordinary people and evoking all the negativity and 
darkness that must have surrounded the witness-photographer as she was 
taking these shots (Marcoulesco 2003; Nasar 2003). “I was shocked; 
everything around me looked so different.......It was that night that my hopes 








































Palestinians: Everyday Living 
In the diaspora, the life of the exile tends to be expressed in abstract, 
emotional terms, as in the work of Steve Sabella and Emily Jacir referred to 
in the Palestinian Homeland section above. But the practical implications are 
addressed too, as in Jacir’s “Where We Come From” (2001-3), a comment 
on the disruption in the social fabric of Palestinian life created by the 
conditions of Israeli occupation and control. This project in text, photography 
and video, documents the artist’s fulfilment of requests from over thirty 
Palestinians around the world without the same freedom of access to their 
own people as Jacir’s American passport allows her. In response to her basic 
question “If I could do anything for you, anywhere in Palestine, what would it 
be?” she was charged with a variety of tasks, ranging from playing football 
with the first Palestinian boy she met in Haifa, to laying flowers on a mother’s 
grave in Jerusalem. She duly set out to accomplish these to the best of her 
ability, and the records of her efforts form the bulk of this work. (Where We 
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Come From exhibition catalogue, Debs and Co. Gallery, New York, 2003; 
Demos 2003, pp.68-72; San Francisco Museum of Modern Art FAQ sheet on 
Where We Come From exhibit) 
Similarly, the Palestinian refugee camps around the Arab world present 
problematic features of everyday living that have served as points of artistic 
focus. Hilal’s video “Roofs: ‘public-private’ open spaces” (2008) shows how 
women of the Al Fawwar camp in Jordan have adapted to some of the 
limitations of their situation by recreating the traditional Arab family “hawsh” 
(courtyard) on the roof due to lack of open space at ground level in 
overcrowded conditions, and how the interconnection of adjacent roofs 
establishes a parallel world where women, children and the elderly can 
socialise (Khazindar 2010, pp.24-5). The theme of adaptation to 
circumstances also informs “How Beautiful is Panama!” (2008), an exhibition 
of the work of six young Palestinian photographers from Burj Al-Shamali 
camp in Lebanon which has been widely toured in camps in Lebanon, Syria 
and Jordan. The title refers to a German children’s tale, the moral of which is 
that an actual familiar location can, from a different perspective, turn out to be 
just as beautiful as any exotic land of dreams or fantasies, and the 
photographs feature camp landscapes, interiors and characters. (Eid-
Sabbagh and Lourie 2009)  
But the majority of Palestinian visual artists focus their work on the struggle 
involved in everyday living for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, 
and a major theme of such work is the sense of imprisonment, of being 
trapped in the situation there. The separation wall is a potent symbol of this 
restriction, and Halawani’s series of photographs, “The Wall” (2004-5) 
(fig.23), captures its ugly, menacing bleakness and capacity to intimidate: 
“Like a huge monster, the wall consumes and devours everything under and 
around it.....transforming the environment into a landscape of fear, dissolution 
and imprisonment” (Halawani 2008, p.95). In a similar vein, Taysir Batniji, a 
native of Gaza now living and working in Paris, documents in his “Miradors” 
(2008) (fig.24) the archaeology of control inherent in the Israeli military 
watchtower installations which form a part of the daily landscape for 
Palestinians living in occupied territory. This series of 26 photographs is 
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essentially a typology of the watchtowers, consciously modelled on the work 
of the Belchers, who photographically documented German industrial 
buildings in the 1950s, but the risk involved in even attempting to photograph 
these Israeli miradors puts this work into a completely different category 
(Khazindar 2010, pp.10-11). 
Saadeh’s “Crossroads” (2003) (fig.25) is a photographic self-portrait of the 
artist standing with a suitcase at the door of her house, but unable to leave 
because of a large block of concrete encasing her left leg. Although this 
piece is partially a reference to gender issues imposing restrictions on 
women in Middle Eastern society, it also represents physical immobility as a 
result of the political obstructions placed on daily life by the Israeli occupation 
(Cestar 2010; Humphries 2008). The gap between “the dreams and 
aspirations of the individual Palestinian juxtaposed with the harsh reality they 
have to face” (from press release for Interior Landscape exhibition, 
Fondazione Querini Stampalia, Venice, June, 2009) is also the theme of 
Hatoum’s “Interior Landscape” (2008) (fig.26), a piece which features a steel 
bed with a barbed wire mattress support, and a pillow on it embroidered with 
the map of Palestine in human hair.  The grid of the bed support ties in with 
Hatoum’s recurrent motif of grids and cages, as exemplified by architectonic 
pieces like “Impenetrable” (2009) (an enormous barbed wire cube suspended 
from the ceiling on invisible threads) or “Cube” (2006) (essentially a large iron 
cage) and representing confinement and imprisonment (Mikdadi 2008; 
Spence 2009). The loss of freedom inherent in the Palestinian condition is 
also referenced in Bishara’s “Kuffiyeh” (2009) (fig.27), a large representation 
of the chequered head-cloth traditional to Palestinian peasant garb, and 
famously adopted by Arafat to become a symbol of the PLO’s armed 
struggle, made out of the plastic wire handcuffs used by the Israelis to bind 
prisoners. 
Checkpoints are emblematic of the restrictions on Palestinian movement that 
are a feature of everyday life, and as such form the focal points of several 
iconic visual art works. Jacir’s 130-minute video film “Crossing Surda: a 
record of going to and from work” (2002) is a surreptitious account of her 
daily commute from Ramallah to Birzeit university over the course of eight 
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days while she was working on her “Where We Come from” project referred 
to above. Despite her American passport, she got into trouble when she tried 
filming shots of her feet on her first Surda checkpoint crossing, and an Israeli 
soldier threatened her, threw her passport in the mud and confiscated her 
film. After that, she cut a hole in the bottom of a bag, put her camera in and 
continued filming through the hole in the bag. The resulting film documents 
the difficulties faced by Palestinians on a daily basis crossing Israeli 
checkpoints to get to and from their places of work (Bittar 2004; Demos 2003, 
p.76; Jacir 2009). 
Halawani also features the checkpoint in her “Intimacy” series (2004) (fig.28), 
eighteen photographs of encounters at the Qalandia checkpoint, involving 
close-ups of the Israeli and Palestinian hands involved in the exchanges of 
papers and inspections of personal belongings. The irony of the title lies in 
the impersonal nature, yet the intrusiveness, of each routine interaction. 
What they all have in common, from the handing over of an ID card to the 
lifting of a shirt to expose an explosive-free midriff, is the inequality of the 
power relations: one set of hands is assertive, expansive and demanding, 
while the other remains reticent, self-controlled, waiting (Aperture 27,000 
exhibition catalogue, Selma Feriani Gallery, London, 2009; Hammami 2008). 
A dark humour informs Sharef Waked’s mordant response to the humiliation 
of the checkpoint experience in his video “Chic Point: Fashion for Israeli 
Checkpoints” (2003) (fig.29). Being an Israeli Palestinian, born in Nazareth, 
now living and working in Haifa, Waked’s work has not only represented 
Palestine in international exhibitions worldwide, but also plays in the Gallery 
of Israeli Modern Art at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem (October, 2010). His 
film shows a fast-paced succession of attractive, well-groomed young 
Palestinian men parading down a fashion catwalk, to a heavy, rhythmic, 
almost menacing background beat. They model a variety of outfits, but the 
viewer soon realises they all have one thing in common: a midriff that is bare, 
or that can be easily and conveniently exposed. These clothes are all 
designed “to preempt those daily and prevailing imperatives of Israeli 
soldiers, who order Palestinians to lift clothes and expose their flesh - the 
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hiding grounds for bombs – as they cross the intricate and expanding 































































































The everyday difficulties and frustrations faced by Palestinians, and the 
sense of entrapment inherent in their situation, affects the way in which the 
quality of time is experienced. There is the need for constant alertness and 
readiness for quick action when necessary, as referenced in Hawajri’s video 
“Molokhiya” (2007-8) which, in capturing the speed and dexterity of his 
mother’s hands cutting the herbs and ingredients for this typical Palestinian 
dish, reflects the adroitness necessary to a life shaped by danger (Khazindar 
2010, p.23); or in Jerusalem-based Jumana Abboud’s series of photographs, 
“Tables” (2006), referring to the light-weight portable objects used as tables 
by street vendors who need to be able to move in a hurry when the Israeli 
police make their rounds (Khazindar 2010, p.9). 
But mostly, there is a sense of nothing happening, of time slowly passing with 
no essential change. This is evoked in Batniji’s “Gaza Diary 02” video (2001-
6), where the use of slow motion, the capture of different patterns of light and 
shade, and the constant background buzz of Israeli F16s flying overhead, all 
serve to create a melancholic atmosphere, a sense of being subdued and 
trapped, from a fourteen-minute series of views and scenes from everyday 
life (Khazindar 2010, p.11; /si:n/ Festival of Video Art and Performance 
catalogue, Jerusalem, 2009). It is also a feature of “Dahiet al Bareed, the 
District of the Post Office” (2002), a video work by Rosalind Nashashibi, a 
British Palestinian, which depicts a slow, hot afternoon in a district originally 
built, to her own architect grandfather’s design, as a Utopian suburb of East 
Jerusalem for employees of the Palestine post office. This six-minute film of 
children playing football, young men hanging out at the local barber’s, and 
people being called to prayer, conveys a sense of the melancholic, aimless 
drift of time, but also captures the tensions underlying the actions and 
attitudes of the young men (McKee 2003). “Nothing’s happening at all, but 
there’s always this sense something could happen” (artist’s comment in 
interview with A. Mackay, Scotsman, April 26, 2003).  
Hani Zurob, a Gaza-born painter, now Paris-based, treats the same theme in 
his “Standby” series (2008) (fig.30), originally envisaged as a project of sixty 
paintings, which “refers explicitly to the whole Palestinian people who have 
been placed under such a situation for nearly sixty years now” (artist’s 
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comment of May, 2008, on www.hanizurob.com). These large, dark pictures 
are mainly executed in the medium of bitumen, a material used by the Israeli 
military to cover over razed and bulldozed buildings and roads in the 
occupied territories, as well as for the Israeli prison floors on which the artist 
had occasion to spend some nights. They depict male figures, all of whom 
seem to be stuck in their motion, yet who still - on standby - manage to exude 
“the pent-up energy one feels among young Palestinians” (Kluijver 2009).  
The sense of waiting, and the psychological and physiological changes that 
take place with the passing of the years, is the theme of Gaza-born, now 
Bonn-based, Fawzy Emrany’s installation “Skin and Years” (2007) (fig.31). In 
a small, white-walled room, the floor is entirely taken up with a close-up shot 
of the backs of someone’s clasped hands, skin, pores and hairs all vastly 
magnified. In the background, a voice is slowly counting in Arabic, one of a 
number of refugees from camps in Jordan enumerating the years from their 
birth into the future, the years they have been waiting for some solution to 


















      (Fig.31. Emrany, sketch for Skin and Years installation, 2007. 






A prevalent theme in the Israeli contemporary visual arts is the wholesale 
militarisation of Israeli society. Yael Bartana, Israeli-born, now Amsterdam-
based, deals with military-related national ritual in her “Trembling Time” video 
(2001), which depicts the moment on Fallen Soldiers’ Day when the country 
stops and stands in silence in commemoration of those who have died in 
Israeli wars. She interrogates Israeli reality with this piece, posing the 
question of “whether these rituals strengthen the nation or whether they 
merely increase our loyalty to the state whilst at the same time undermining 
our ability to make an individual judgement” (Bartana 2002). Filmed from a 
bridge above the Ayalon highway, it shows cars stopping, people getting out, 
standing, then getting back in, all in slow motion and with fade effects, and to 
a background din of heavily amplified warning sirens and other ensuing 
noises (Cats 2010, pp.58-61; Goodman 2007, p.30). The seven minutes thus 
stretched from a one-minute silence present some eerie, ghost-like effects: 
Edelstein, in his introductory essay to Bartana’s “Short Memory” exhibition 
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(2009, p.28) compares the cars in the film to coffins from which the dead 
emerge.  
Tel Aviv-based Adi Nes, who works largely with staged photography, asks a 
similar question in his “Soldiers” series (1994-2000), in which he examines 
and subverts Israeli military stereotypes through the motif of homoeroticism 
(Cats 2010, pp.126-7). He recreates an iconic photograph of victorious 
heroes of the Six Days’ War, but with a sensually entangled, ethnically mixed 
male group (Untitled, 1999). He presents, in probably his best-known work 
(another Untitled, 1999) (fig.32), a tableau in the style of Leonardo da Vinci’s 
Last Supper, but comprised of young Israeli soldiers at a routine mess meal, 
the figure in the central Christ position gazing pensively into the middle 
distance while his comrades-in-arms engage in erotically loaded fraternal 
camaraderie around the table. Not only is this piece a challenge to Israeli 
machismo, it is also, in its implication of this possibly being a last supper for 
these young men, a powerful political statement about sacrifice and betrayal 
(Bronner 2008; catalogue notes, Real Time: Art in Israel, 1998-2008 
exhibition, Israel Museum, Jerusalem, 2008). 
Several artists touch on the theme of the reality of death for the younger 
generation in a society where military service in a seemingly never-ending 
conflict is universal. Nir Hod, Israeli-born now living in New York but still 
inspired by images from Israeli life and societal processes, focuses on the 
themes of beauty, youth and death in his paintings, all based on staged 
photographs. In “Lost Youth” (2002) (fig.33), working from a newspaper 
photograph, he depicts a scene at a military funeral, a group of young 
soldiers in mourning, infused with a physical perfection only found in film or 
advertising, viewed through the centre of a huge wreath of flowers which 
creates an explicit connection between the beauty of youth in bloom and 
death. (Atlan 2008, pp.36-41; Cats 2010, pp.72-3; Gal 2009, p.89) Ori Gersht 
approaches the same theme in a more abstract way in his “Pomegranate” 
(2006) (fig.34), a three-minute video set entirely on a grey window-sill, on 
which stand a gourd and a cut-up melon, with a lettuce and a pomegranate 
(one of the seven traditional native fruits and plants of the ancient land of 
Israel) hanging from strings above them, much in the style of a Dutch or 
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Spanish sixteenth or seventeenth century vanitas still-life painting. After a few 
seconds, a bullet enters the screen from the right-hand side and pierces the 
pomegranate, which bursts and sheds its blood-coloured juice and seeds 
over everything else, all in the slowest of slow motions, the whole piece 
evoking the experience of untimely, sudden and violent death. (Caputo 2009; 
Wecker 2009) 
The pain caused by such untimely death for the mothers of fallen young 
soldiers provides another perspective on the lost youth theme. Eli Petel’s 
Untitled diptych (2004) presents a painted collage, based on photographs 
from newspapers in the wake of violent events of the ongoing conflict, in 
which mothers, both Arab and Israeli, are expressing their pain in a variety of 
emotional gestures (Gal 2009, p.89). Erez Israeli, consistently preoccupied 
with images of mourning and commemoration, has two video works 
referencing the pain of mothers by way of the Christian image of the Pieta. In 
“God Full of Mercy” (2004) (fig.35), a mother is attempting to hold up the 
body of her dead son in an allusion to Michelangelo’s Pieta sculpture, but this 
flesh and blood mother lacks the superhuman strength required to support 
him, and is unable to accept his death with the same quiet serenity as Mary, 
who was certain of his resurrection. With the Jewish prayer for the souls of 
the deceased playing slowly in the background, the body slips from her grasp 
time and time again as she struggles to hold on to him (Israeli 2006). In 
Untitled (2006), the artist’s mother, sitting on the front step of her house with 
her son’s body lying across her lap, is plucking feathers which have been 
stuck on to his body with wax. This act, alluding both to the myth of Icarus 
and to the Sacrifice of Isaac, seems to indicate she accepts his death, but 
still cannot bear to part with his body ( Mixed Emotions exhibition catalogue, 
Haifa Museum of Art, 2006). 
Although Israel’s militarisation has been a constant artistic theme over the 
better part of the last twenty years, the focus during the 1990s tended to be 
on the extent to which the militarised state controls and defines the individual. 
Pinchas Cohen Gan, a Moroccan-born Tel Aviv-based mixed-media artist, in 
his “Art is Service” series (1995) uses Israeli Defence Force uniforms as a 
neutral base for comment and decoration, implying their status as a canvas 
240 
 
for life in Israel (Katz-Freiman 1996). Meir Gal presents “Six Hundred and 
Seventy Two Centimeters of War Decorations” (1995), four long horizontal 
boards covered in coloured fabrics to represent blown-up versions of the 
ribbons awarded as military decorations, with individual ribbons often 
elongated to cover more than one war given Israel’s numerous conflicts,  
enlarged to the dimensions of his own body (Glueck 1997). 
But with the new millennium, there is a greater emphasis on Israel’s 
defensive and militaristic stance as the source of self-inflicted damage. In 
Sigalit Landau’s two-minute video, “Barbed Hula” (2000) (fig.36),  the artist’s 
naked trunk, against a background of the Mediterranean shoreline at sunrise, 
gyrates within a hula hoop made of barbed wire, the barbs, though pointing 
outwards, leaving visible marks on the flesh. This piece has obvious religious 
and feminist references, but can also be seen as alluding to borders and to 
the violently protected cultural demarcation line between Israel and Palestine, 
particularly by contrast to the natural border of the sea which forms a 
backdrop to the painful dance. (Cone 2007; Desanges 2010; Rabina 2005; 
Soulez 2010) Erez Israeli, in his “Untitled” video (2003) (fig.37), sews red 
gerberas, the official flower for Israeli Defence Force funeral wreaths, onto 
the skin of his chest, and then with a force verging on violence rips off their 
petals and stamens (catalogue notes for BoysCraft exhibition, Haifa Museum 
of Art, 2008). Hila Lulu Lin’s “Ein Gabot” video (2004), shown within the 
frame of an open bathroom cabinet, is of a woman silently shaving off both of 
her eyebrows, an act of self-mutilation carried out over twenty minutes of 
complete silence and concentration. The fact that the title of the piece is 
misspelled in Hebrew to resemble the name of an Arab town rather than 
directly referring to ‘no eyebrows’ gives it an obvious allusion to the wiping of 
Arab communities off the map, whether semantically or physically. The act 
comes over as essentially a shameful self-defacement and one in which the 
viewer becomes mutely compliant. (Hazan 2004)   
Moving away from the personal body to the body of the nation, Miki 
Kratsman’s iconic “Abu Dis” photograph (2003) (fig.38), shows, from the 
Palestinian side, a section of the separation wall in which its monumental 
dimensions are emphasised, and on which someone has graffiti-sprayed in 
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red paint the words “Abu Dis Ghetto”. This allusion to the methods of the 
Third Reich echoes both Palestinian reproach for and global condemnation of 
Israeli actions, serving to make this piece a mordant comment on the self-
















































































Israel: An Unfair Society 
From the 1970s, art has been used as a channel for protest about inequality 
and discrimination within Israeli society. Pinchas Cohen Gan gave an artistic 
voice to the Mizrahim, the Jews from Arab countries who felt like second-
class citizens in Israel, holding his first one-man show in 1972 in a kibbutz 
cow-shed, with the implication that the indifferent gaze of the cattle was as 
good a reception as a Moroccan-born Jew like himself could expect in a 
society dominated by the European Ashkenazim (Aviv 2010, p.34; Stiles 
1996, p.586). The point was still being made in the 1990s, as demonstrated 
by Meir Gal’s iconic photograph “Nine Out of Four Hundred (The West and 
the Rest)” (1996) (fig.39). This shows the artist holding an Israeli history 
textbook in one hand by a few thin pages, while the covers and the large 
amount of other pages are left hanging down. His point is that of a four 
hundred page official history of Israel, only nine pages, the ones he is holding 
the book by, have been devoted to the Jews from Arab countries: this is clear 
evidence of ethnic discrimination, of how “the State of Israel continues to 
minoritise its non-European majority” (Gal 1997). 
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The 1990s saw some improvement in the citizenship status and political 
power of the Mizrahim, and they were even offered an apology by Ehud 
Barak prior to the 1999 elections for the “mistakes” made in their treatment 
by the governments of the 1950s and 1960s (Shafir and Peled 2002, p.347). 
Nevertheless, social inequality in Israeli society was still rife, and, although 
Vinitzky-Seroussi (2008) characterises the subsequent decade in Israel, 
1998-2008, as one of indifference, marked by boredom and social apathy, 
and a blasé attitude towards the disadvantaged and the victimised, Israeli 
artists have continued to comment on perceived injustice and discrimination 
within their society. Jan Tichy, an Israeli artist of Czech origin now based in 
Chicago, presented his “Cage” installation (2002), in which three Israelis of 
Ethiopian origin, falashas, were locked up in a steel cage on a downtown 
Jerusalem street, in order to bring racism out into the open (Edelstein 2010). 
Israeli kibbutz-born, now New York-based Ohad Meromi’s “The Boy from 
South Tel Aviv” (2001) (fig.40) fulfils a similar function. This huge statue of a 
naked and beautiful adolescent African boy, which now stands in the Upper 
Entrance Hall of the Contemporary Art Gallery of the Israel Museum in 
Jerusalem, is a colossus made of styrofoam and black-painted paper. South 
Tel Aviv being a poor suburb of the city where the immigrant labour force 
lives, the piece directly addresses the dissonance between the poverty of 
these workers and the comfortable, middle-class surroundings of visitors to 
museums and art galleries. The first time it was exhibited, in the Helena 
Rubinstein Gallery in uptown Tel Aviv, it was behind a border-crossing 
barrier-type structure, underscoring the boy’s illegal presence in Israel, and 
implying a contrast with the state’s earlier egalitarian years. (Bronner 2008; 
Mendelsohn 2008, p.85) 
Adi Nes also draws unfavourable comparisons between the socialistic 
ideology on which the state of Israel was built and the widening social gaps 
which characterise contemporary Israeli society in his “Biblical Stories” series 
(2003-2006), which takes economic inequality as its theme. These fourteen 
staged photographs, carefully crafted tableaux of down-and-out characters 
which use neighbourhood acquaintances as the actors, are set in marginal 
areas of Tel Aviv where the rifts in the social fabric are glaringly obvious, and 
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refer in their titles to biblical characters who once embodied the ethos of 
national renewal for Zionist settlers in the land of Israel. They include an 
Abraham and Isaac represented by a scruffy old homeless man pushing 
along a shopping trolley full of empty plastic bottles on top of which a boy is 
sleeping (fig.41); a naked, drunken Noah lying on the ground in front of a 
video rental machine; and a Jacob and Esau sat in a soup-kitchen, engaged 
in an altercation over a plate of food (fig.42). The series, focussing on biblical 
heroes at the lowest points in their lives, deals with the issue of Israeli identity 
at a point when Vinitzky-Seroussi’s “piggish capitalism” (2008, p.68) appears 
to have undermined any sense or ideal of social solidarity. (Cats 2010, 
pp.128-31; Gilerman 2007; Horrigan 2008; Lagnado 2007) 
In her explanation of the Jacob and Esau scene in the catalogue 
accompanying Nes’s Biblical Stories exhibition at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art 
in 2007, Shevlowe states that Nes’s perception views “even the soup kitchen, 
where everyone is wanting, as pervaded by an atmosphere of deceit and 
manipulation”. This theme of deception, already referred to in the context of 
the landscape above, is addressed in some of Jan Tichy’s work, where he 
focuses on exposing and literally bringing to light charged structures of 
political power in Israel. His “Dimona” (2006) is a scaled model of Israel’s 
nuclear reactor in the Negev desert, installed in a dark room with a narrow 
beam of light slowly passing over it. Since it was built in 1956, the purpose of 
this structure has been obscured and kept vague by the authorities. In a 
similar vein, his “1391” (2007) (fig.43) is an architectural paper model of 
facility 1391, “Israel’s Guantanamo”, with a light source casting realistic 
shadows on and around the structure. The existence of this detention camp 
for political prisoners has never been officially acknowledged. With both 
installations, viewers are invited to take home printout do-it-yourself kits of 
the models, and make one themselves, thus becoming complicit in bringing 











   (Fig.39. Gal, Nine out of Four Hundred (The West and the Rest), 1996. 
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                  (Fig.40. Meromi, The Boy from South Tel Aviv, 2001.  














               (Fig.41. Nes, Untitled (Abraham and Isaac), 2005. 










         
                  (Fig.42. Nes, Untitled (Jacob and Esau), 2006. 
















While Palestinian artists have made art out of adversity, using creativity to 
resist and protest their situation, the picture they paint is not without hope. 
The perseverance they portray, the Palestinian sumud (steadfastness) in the 
face of the trials and tribulations of everyday life, rests on an underlying 
belief, albeit held with varying degrees of conviction, that current 
circumstances are temporary and bound to change given time. This permits 
the occasional indulgence in dreams of a normal life, especially for their 
children, and in aspirations to citizenship of a Palestinian state that could 
provide them with an opportunity for normal living.  
The work of the Israeli visual artists does not seem to be imbued with such 
hope. They seem preoccupied rather with the loss of a dream, with the 
disconnect between the original vision of the Jewish State and the realities of 
contemporary Israel, a society rife with inequality and in a constant state of 
military conflict. Faced with these realities, the tendency is towards either 
doomsday visions of a nightmarish apocalyptic world seen as an inevitable 
consequence of the direction Israel is taking; or escapism into ethereal, 
otherworldly fantasies and philosophical musings which are completely 
removed from the actualities of everyday Israeli life. 
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Palestine:  Hopes and aspirations 
Many of the works referred to in the preceding sections of this chapter 
underscore the enduring nature of both the land and the people of Palestine. 
The title piece of the first major international exhibition of Palestinian art to 
tour overseas in the early 2000s, Made in Palestine, was Israeli Palestinian 
Ashraf Fawakhry’s “I am Donkey/Made in Palestine” (1998-ongoing) (fig.44). 
A series of 48 rubber stamps on wood blocks shows the donkey, a symbol of 
obstinacy and toughness for the Palestinians, in many different shapes and 
forms, in a variety of situations and adorned with various motifs in different 
materials. This witty piece encapsulates the philosophy of sumud, underlining 
the persistence and resilience of the Palestinians, and embodying a dogged 
and determined confidence in their capacity to endure (Kerschen 2003; 
Marcoulesco 2003; Mikdadi-Nashashibi 2003).  
And where life endures, hope exists. Suleiman Mansour’s dry, cracked 
figures could be revived, like Ishmael in the desert, with life-giving water 
(Mikdadi-Nashashibi 2003); a way through Mona Hatoum’s “Impenetrable” 
barbed wire cube becomes apparent if the piece is viewed from certain 
angles (Soueif 2009); and Tamari’s destroyed olive trees will always grow 
back again in the Palestinian soil (Harithas 2003; Mikdadi-Nashashibi 2003). 
Suleiman Mansour’s well-known painting on the separation wall of the hands 
of Adam and God (fig.45), in the style of Michelangelo’s famous central 
image for the Sistine Chapel ceiling, has the hands metres apart, rather than 
the inch of the original, indicating the chasm dividing Israelis and Palestinians 
(Hirschfield 2006; Mansour 2008). But the hands are still reaching out to 
each other, regardless of the distance between them. These artistic 
depictions of obstacles and difficulties still retain a modicum of hope, the 
glimpsed possibility of a way through to normality. 
This possibility is also recognised in a couple of works which focus 
particularly on the lives of Palestinian children. Rana Bishara’s widely 
exhibited installation, “Homage to Childhood” (2003-ongoing) (fig.46), refers 
to notions of what childhood should be as well as to the realities of life for 
children in the occupied territories. A child’s bed with a white fluffy cover sits 
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in the middle of a white-walled room suffused with a rosy light. The floor 
space is entirely taken up with translucent white balloons, each one 
containing a photograph of a Palestinian child undergoing some form of 
abuse or hardship associated with the conflict. Suspended from the ceiling 
are a number of pieces of white tulle netting, a material typically used to hang 
over and tuck in round a child’s bed at night, all edged with barbed wire. A 
traditional lullaby plays softly in the background. The juxtaposition of images 
of protection with images of danger in this richly symbolic piece underscores 
the contrast between the normal childhood that everyone wants for their 
children and Palestinian childhood (Khazindar 2010, p.13; Kluijver 2009). 
In a similar vein, Hawajri’s “Children of Fire” video (2006-7), which shows 
children in the Gaza strip, a conflict area, going out to play with flares at 
night, draws a poignant contrast between the normal childhood laughter and 
creativity of their play as they create beautiful patterns in the air with the 
flares, and the tension, uncertainty and danger of their surroundings 
(Khazindar 2010, p.23). 
But it is perhaps Ramallah-based conceptual artist Khalil Rabah who best 
expresses the collective Palestinian desire for normality in his artistic 
realisation of an alternative universe in which Palestine is a normal state, 
complete with all the institutions expected thereof. His “London Office of the 
United States of Palestine Airlines” installation (2007) (fig.47) is an empty, 
silent, airline office. The model plane fronting it boasts a “United States of 
Palestine Airlines” logo composed of individual letters taken from a variety of 
different world airlines. The map on the wall, with its far-reaching mesh of 
pointers, signifies an open world of possibilities, but the clocks on the wall 
indicating the various international time zones have all stopped, frozen in 
time. (Kluijver 2009) Rabah’s other projects along the same lines are his 
nomadic and ongoing “Palestinian Museum of Natural History and 
Humankind” (catalogue notes for Liverpool Biennial International 08 
Exhibition; Craddock 2007, 2009) and his “United States of Palestine Times” 
(2008). (Fadda 2009) While evoking a sense of loss for what might have 
been had Palestine’s national development not been halted in 1948, these 
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pieces equally communicate an aspiration for what yet might be: they are “at 






(Fig.44. Fawakhry, I am Donkey/ Made in Palestine, 1998-ongoing. 









   (Fig.45. Mansour, painting on the separation wall near Ramallah,  











           (Fig.46. Bishara, Homage to Childhood, 2003-ongoing. 









(Fig.47. Rabah, London Office of the United States of Palestine Airlines,  









Israel: Nightmares and Fantasies 
Vinitzky-Seroussi (2008, p.72) characterises Israel’s first decade of the 
twenty first century as “times without dreams or aspirations”. The brief survey 
of the visual arts of the period outlined above, however, indicates something 
more than mere absence of dreams: it reveals an active disillusionment, the 
undermining of national myths, the loss of the dream, the vision that was 
Israel. Shai Kremer titled one of his exhibitions of Infected Landscapes 
photographs “Israel: Broken Promised Land” (2008, Julie Saul Gallery, New 
York; Robert Koch Gallery, San Francisco), and the Israeli contemporary 
visual arts world has documented not only the promises broken in the visual 
landscape but those broken in society as well.  
The debunking of the Zionist pioneer narrative of the new Jew is seen in the 
work of Adi Nes and Nir Hod above, and in pieces like Erez Israeli’s “The 
Young Guard” (2006), a joke figure on a child-sized horse, set on a 
cardboard box podium, with a stuffed sparrow on his head, in ironic dialogue 
with the traditional horse-rider memorial statues to Zionist heroes (Cats 2010, 
pp.78-81). The mordant comment of Gal, Nes, Meromi, and Tichy compares 
current social reality with the original Zionist socialist vision and finds it 
wanting. The perceptions of a stained and spoiled landscape are captured by 
Kremer, Weinstein and Reeb, and in pieces like Jan Tichy’s “Bats” (2007), a 
“paean to the somewhat tarnished aspirations of the ideal dream city” 
(Trainor 2010) in a series of eighty slides showing how the large colonies of 
bats which live beneath the Dizengoff Centre in Tel Aviv come out at night 
and splatter their dark-staining guano all over the white walls of the modernist 
utopian 1930s Bauhaus-inspired area of the city.  
Instead of dreams, artists depict nightmares. London-born, now Tel Aviv-
based, video artist Doron Solomons’ “Hora” (2008) is an eleven-minute film 
which intercuts blurred and digitally manipulated images of a group 
performing this traditional Israeli folk dance, originally from Eastern Europe, 
with symbols and images from military, political and everyday Israeli life.  Its 
“embarrassing and scary demonstration of aggression” (Dorons, cited in Cats 
2010, p.157) expresses apocalyptic fears about the future of Israel. Eliezer 
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Sonnenschein’s large-scale painting “Landscape and Jerusalem” (2007) 
(fig.48), executed in a style which combines images from medieval and 
renaissance doomsday visions with those of late twentieth century comic-
books and advertising, mixes the grotesque, the surreal and the sexual in a 
nightmarish vision of looming catastrophe (Gal 2009, p.88; Mendelsohn 
2008, p.79). Tel Aviv-based multi-media artist Gil Marco Shani’s installation 
“Safari” (2002) features a building, which could be either a school or a hotel, 
set in an artificial forest, with beds in one of the rooms where visitors are 
invited to lie down and flip through booklets of various images. These are 
largely homosexual erotica and pictures of dead, featherless, baby parrots, 
indicating barren, infertile couplings (Ginton 2002), and the whole piece is 
considered as comment on “an idealistic culture with utopian aspirations that 
has collapsed into a world of empty convention rife with concealed barbarity 
and immorality” (Mendelsohn 2008, p.85).  
Sigalit Landau’s papier-mache installation “The Country” (2002) (fig.49), in its 
depiction of the orchard from hell, with its blackened, misshapen fruit, made 
from rolled-up sheets of the Haaretz newspaper containing accounts of the 
most recent events and atrocities of the conflict, and its skeletal, tortured 
figures frozen in the act of picking, transporting and counting this toxic 
produce, is a powerfully bleak distortion of the idyllic orchard images of early 
Zionist paintings (Levine 2006, p.35; Mendelsohn 2008, p.78). Weinstein’s 
installation “Slope” (2007-8) (fig.50) shows a few red-tiled roofs, typical of 
Israeli houses outside the major cities, sticking up out of an enormous pile of 
dark soot, suggestive of the fall-out after a Pompei-like volcanic disaster, and 
representing the failure and submergence of the Israeli utopian dream in the 
Mediterranean environment (catalogue notes from Real Time: Art in Israel, 
1998-2008 exhibition, Israel Museum, Jerusalem, 2008; Gal 2009, p.83). 
South African-born, now Jerusalem-based painter Larry Abramson 
introduces into his work from about 2008, particularly in the Yechiam (2008-
9) and Panic (2009-10) series, two distinct motifs symbolic of impending 
doom (fig.51). The bunch of grapes, signifying arcadian abundance and 
fruitful promise as brought back by the spies sent by Moses to reconnoitre 
the promised land (Numbers 13:21-25), is depicted in various stages of 
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decay or damage by insects. Prominent among these threatening insects, 
and also featuring in a variety of contexts other than grape clumps in 
Abramson’s work, is the hornet, that panic-inducing instrument of God from 
the Book of Joshua (24:12-13): “And I sent the hornet before you which drave 
them out before you .......... but not with thy sword, nor with thy bow. And I 
have given you a land for which ye did not labour, and cities which ye built 
not, and ye dwell in them; of the vineyards and oliveyards which ye planted 
not do ye eat”. (personal conversation with Larry Abramson, 12 October, 
2010, Jerusalem; Ankori 2010, pp.394-5). 
The alternative to such doomsday scenarios is escapism. Miri Segal, a Tel-
Aviv based video artist, chooses the virtual world for her ultimately futile 
escape from Israeli reality. Her 28-minute film “BRB” (2007) (the common 
internet abbreviation for “Be right back”) documents the artist’s journey into 
the Second Life website, its imaginary world disintegrating at the end of the 
film when the camera she is using enters the body of her Second Life avatar-
self and reveals the emptiness inside (Mendelsohn 2008). Meanwhile, 
Avraham Pesso’s painted landscapes stick to Israel. But whether urban, as in 
“Variation” (2008), a meticulously detailed depiction of Tel Aviv as reflected in 
the windows of a circular high-rise building, or rural, as in “Eliot Path” (2005), 
a recreation of the scenery of the hills around Jerusalem executed in 
painstaking detail, they are purely imaginary creations, if hauntingly familiar 
to Israelis. They are “free of politics, free of Zionism” (Cats 2010, p135), and 
completely free of people.   
Sasportas’ more recent work is also characterised by meticulously detailed 
portrayals of nature. Her “Guardians of the Threshold” installation (fig.52), 
exhibited at the 2007 Venice Biennale, reveals in its elaborate depiction of 
forests, caves and marshland her preoccupation with mysterious natural 
landscapes, especially in juxtaposition to architecture, and the obvious 
Japanese influence on their rendition reflects the artist’s desire to achieve 
some distancing from the realities of Israeli life (Lapidot 2006; Mendelsohn 
2008, p. 82). Her work is increasingly focussed on the “illusion of reality”, on 
the relationship between the conscious and sub-conscious mind, and on the 
“intricate interconnectedness among everything” (Scrima 2006) in a 
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philosophical, almost mystical sense (Klein 2006, p.47). A similarly 
philosophical approach, disregarding the specificities of the here and now to 
take an overview of  humanity in the context of the cyclical patterns of time, 
informs Sigalit Landau’s “DeadSee” (2005) (fig.53), a wall-sized video 
projection of the slow uncoiling of a spiral of five hundred strung-together 
watermelons in the Dead Sea, the naked artist floating stretched out in their 
midst, until the whole thing completely unravels and disappears, as if it never 
was (Cats 2010, pp.114-7); and Michal Rovner’s “Data Zone” (2003) (fig.54), 
in which a row of laboratory Petri dishes, normally used for bacterial culture, 
are employed as video screens onto which are projected films of masses of 
tiny human figures engaged in constant movement, “intimately intertwined 
and rhythmically pulsating according to a pattern larger than that of the 
individual” (Coulter-Smith 2007). (Catalogue for Particles of Reality 





              (Fig.48. Sonnenschein, Landscape and Jerusalem, 2007. 















































               (Fig.52. Sasportas, Guardians of the Threshold, 2007.  























        (Fig.54. Rovner, from Data Zone, Culture Plate 4, 2003. 











The Palestinian art work surveyed above would seem to reflect many of the 
elements of the grief pattern discernible in post-1948 Palestinian history. 
There is a clear focus on the loss of the Palestinian homeland and on the 
many other subsequent losses contingent on that original one. Diaspora 
artists, living mainly in North America or Europe, such as Hatoum, Jacir and 
Sansour, tend to express that loss in more generalised or abstract terms, 
with direct reference to the historic nakba of 1948, to the rupture of the social 
fabric of a fragmented people and to the emotional impact on identity created 
by lack of an accessible homeland. Artists still living on the land, or who at 
least have spent a greater part of their lives there before moving away, such 
as Batniji, Bishara, Halawani, Hawajri and Waked, centre their attention more 
on the ways in which the losses consequent on the original loss of homeland 
now affect aspects of everyday life for Palestinians. The loss of freedom of 
movement, the loss of expectations of a normal life for themselves or their 
children, the loss of the opportunity for citizenship of their own recognised 
state, are dominant themes. 
Although the Palestinians may have lost ownership and control of their land, 
they have not lost their connection with it. Mansour’s mud and Bishara’s cacti 
demonstrate a strong, organic, blood-and-soil type bond between the 
Palestinians and their land, and the physical landscape is shown as having 
suffered in the same way as its people since the nakba of 1948, spoiled and 
damaged by Israeli development and militarisation. This sense of connection 
informs the “paradise lost” theme, seen in some of the work of Halaby, 
Halawani, Sansour and Shoman, amongst others, and elaborated upon in 
chapter four as one of the collective strategies employed by the Palestinian 
people for making some sense of their post-nakba world.  
“Armed struggle” was another strategy apparent in the historical evidence, 
but this is not a major theme of the contemporary Palestinian visual arts, 
although the potential for it can be discerned in the sense of pent-up tension 
of Zurob’s “Standby” figures, or in Batniji’s and Nashashibi’s films of everyday 
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life in Gaza and East Jerusalem. More to the fore is “sumud”, the attitude of 
steadfastness and perseverance which is displayed in so much of the work 
described above, depicting Palestinians going about their business with 
patience, and often humour, despite the difficulties, frustrations and obstacles 
of everyday living.  
They persist, but they cannot move forward. The perception of a people 
trapped, blocked, in both space and time, pervades the canon of their visual 
arts work. Checkpoints, barbed wire, gigantic walls, watchtowers, military 
power and control dominate the physical scene; anxious, nervous haste and 
long, melancholic passages of slow-moving time where nothing at all 
changes, characterise the temporal landscape. The Palestinians can 
entertain wistful dreams of normal life for their children and themselves, as 
citizens of a normal state, but, for now, they are impeded from making 
progress towards these. Their art accords with their history: they are stuck 
right where they are. 
The Israeli work also reveals a focus on loss, the loss of the dream, the 
vision that was the State of Israel. The “safe haven” for Jews is depicted as a 
dangerously militarised society in a perpetual state of conflict which exposes 
the nation’s youth to violent and untimely death. Moreover, the socialist and 
egalitarian principles which informed the early days of the Zionist project 
appear to be all but forgotten in a contemporary society portrayed as rife with 
discrimination, racism, and economic inequities. Many of the artists referred 
to above are engaged in a wholesale debunking of what they perceive as the 
myths on which the State of Israel was built, or in forcefully drawing attention 
to how far the reality of contemporary Israeli society has strayed from the 
original vision.  
Nor is the relationship between the people of Israel and their physical 
environment portrayed as a happy one. There is certainly no organic 
connection here. The landscape is perceived as ugly and damaged by 
military activity, or its features are depicted as ethereal and vaguely unreal, 
as borrowed and not really belonging to the Israeli people. A few artists, like 
Aloni and Israeli, even hint that a European landscape is more suggestive of 
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“home” for many Israelis, while others like Rovner and Sasportas touch on 
existential homelessness, a theme of particular relevance to the Jewish 
religion and the archetype of the wandering Jew. 
The canon of contemporary Israeli visual art reveals a bitter disillusionment 
with the State of Israel, and no real strategy for coming to terms with this loss 
bar the doomsday pronouncements of apocalyptic visions, or escapism into 
imaginative fantasy worlds or the higher reaches of philosophical and 
metaphysical thought. There is a sense of going round in circles, getting 
nowhere. Vinitzky-Seroussi (2008) suggests that Israeli apathy in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century can partly be attributed to a repetitiveness 
of events, a seen-it-all-before-ness more characteristic of cyclical than linear 
time. Solomons’ “Hora” dance, Landau’s “DeadSee” spiral, and Rovner’s 
patterns of movement in her “Data Zone” Petri dishes, all seem to refer to 
exactly this phenomenon. 
And where does the holocaust and its attendant losses figure in the 
contemporary Israeli visual arts scene? Not very large, would seem to be the 
answer. Heller (2006, p.64) underlines its “sparse treatment in Israeli art”, 
and notes how the subject has been dealt with largely at international 
exhibitions outside Israel and then only since the 1990s. Within Israel, from 
the turn of the millenium, a few works have been produced that refer directly 
to the holocaust. Roee Rosen’s text and image installation “Live and Die as 
Eva Braun” (1997) attempts to inhabit Hitler’s mistress on her last day on 
earth, humanising both her and Hitler. Boaz Arad’s video “Hebrew Lessons” 
(2000) cleverly manipulates authentic audio documents to present Hitler, in 
typical animated speech-giving mode, apologising to the Jewish people in 
Hebrew (Hazan 2004). In her 2002 “Collectio Judaica” exhibition (Rosenfeld 
Gallery, Tel Aviv), Zoya Cherkassky presents a piece of jewellery featuring 
the yellow star in its design (Mendelsohn 2008, pp.82-3). Yael Bartana’s 
video “Mary Koszmary” (2007) features the exhortations of a radical Polish 
politician, in the language of the propaganda films of the 1930s, for three 
million Jews to return to Poland (Mytkowska 2008). And Erez Israeli’s “My 
eBay Collection” (2009) is a display of holocaust memorabilia purchased on 
ebay along with certificates confirming their authenticity, underscoring the 
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commodification and desacralisation of the holocaust (Shelf Life exhibition 
catalogue, Haifa Museum of Art, 2010).  
In addition, some pieces, though not obviously referencing the holocaust, are 
open to holocaust-linked interpretations, for example: Ori Gersht’s “The 
Forest” video (2006), where the falling trees can be seen as holocaust 
victims (Wecker 2009); Landau’s “DeadSee” video (2005), in which the 
unravelling and disappearance of the spiral can be taken as a reference to 
the holocaust trauma of the artist’s parents’ generation (Cats 2010, pp.114-
7); or Orit Raff’s “Insatiable” series of photographs (2001-4) from an Israeli 
bakery, containing images redolent with holocaust associations (Goodman 
2007, p.37). 
There would seem to be two main reasons for this relative dearth of 
holocaust-related art. Firstly, public sensitivity over many years dictated that 
art dealing with the holocaust belonged exclusively to the “survivors” and the 
domain of Yad Vashem, the national memorial museum to the holocaust.  
The durability of this sensitivity was demonstrated by the controversy 
surrounding Rosen’s 1997 Eva Braun installation at the Israel Museum and 
resulting in its being closed down. Secondly, holocaust-related art was 
perceived as part of diaspora Jewishness, and Israeli artists were more 
concerned with Israeliness and the need to normalise their art to international 
standards.  From the late 1970s a few artists began to approach the topic, 
but those who focused their work on holocaust themes never really belonged 
to the artistic mainstream. (Heller 2006; Katz-Freiman 2003)  
As discussed in chapter five, the holocaust is a central totem of the Jewish 
State, the event on which Israel is built. However, it does not figure large in 
the canon of the contemporary Israeli visual arts, which point rather to 
another, newer loss competing for attention: the loss of the dream that was 
Israel, the vision that was itself a response to the losses of the holocaust and 
a way of making sense of the post-holocaust Jewish world. In grief terms, this 
might be interpreted as a sign of the desire to move on and adapt to current 
realities. For the artists are displaying a concern with the problems of Israeli 
society as it is now, and are challenging the status quo which they perceive 
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as having given rise to these problems. This status quo can itself be seen as 
a collective grieving for the losses suffered in the holocaust, pathological in 
Freud’s (1917/1961) terms in that the internalised image of the old doomed 
European Jew has collectively fused with that of the Israeli survivor to the 
extent that the latter tends to see the world through the attitudes, fears and 
insecurities of the former. The artists whose work is surveyed above are 
seeking to provide a different viewpoint, and in so doing their work might be 
regarded as contributing to the tension between hanging on to the past and 
moving on into a future based on a realistic appreciation of the present that is 
at the heart of the grief experience.  
The fact that this alternative viewpoint is itself focussed on loss might, of 
course, be interpreted negatively as fitting in with an ongoing cycle of 
complicated grief, maladjustment and persistent loss. But perhaps the 
important point to be noted is that the art work underscores an authentically 
Israeli loss in terms of disillusionment with the Zionist dream, as opposed to 
Israel’s dominant national focus on the essentially European Jewish loss 









7.    NATIONS AND GRIEF 
      “The only constant is change.” 
                                              Heraclites 
                       
The primary aim of this final chapter is to draw together the threads of the six 
preceding ones and to examine what conclusions about national grief can be 
arrived at on the basis of the Palestinian and Israeli case studies. The main 
findings from grief theory’s interrogation of the historical trajectories of both 
peoples over the course of the twentieth century, along with the insights on 
current early twenty-first century Palestinian and Israeli identity provided by 
their respective canons of contemporary visual art, are summarised  in order 
to furnish an answer to the basic research question of whether nations 
grieve, whether the pattern of behaviour they exhibit in the wake of loss could 
be said to constitute grief.  
As well as summing up the conclusions to the study, this chapter also 
provides an assessment of its overall strengths and weaknesses as a piece 
of research, in addition to offering suggestions for further directions that 
similar or linked investigative inquiries might take. Finally, the chapter closes 
with a series of reflections on what this study’s grief theory perspective can 
tell us about nations, and on what its application at a large-scale collective 
level would seem to reveal about grief. 
 
National Grief 
Evidence for the operation of grief at a national level in the cases of both the 
Israeli and Palestinian peoples has been sought from two main sources. 
Firstly, an examination was made of the histories of the Palestinians and of 
the European Jews, subsequently the Israelis, surrounding and consequent 
on events which can be deemed to have inflicted significant damage on their 
respective collective identities, namely, the nakba of 1948 in which the 
Palestinians lost their land to the creation of Israel; and the holocaust of the 
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second world war years which resulted in the annihilation of the vast majority 
of European Jewry. Secondly, on the basis of history’s essential link with 
identity, the contours of current national identity, as defined and presented in 
the contemporary visual arts canons of both peoples, were explored with a 
view to how they might accord or not with the patterns emerging from these 
histories. 
Accepting that both the Palestinians and European Jewry in the earlier part of 
the twentieth century merit collective status as peoples enjoying a degree of 
unity, albeit attributable to completely different factors in each case, their 
histories from then on do appear to fit into the basic pattern associated with 
the trajectory of loss and subsequent reaction outlined in grief theory. For 
both peoples, a shared loss with substantially damaging impact on collective 
identity is immediately followed by a period of bewildered disorientation and 
emotional confusion, and then by attempts to repair and recreate the 
shattered collective identity and to pick up the broken threads of an ongoing 
collective narrative in the light of the changed circumstances of the post-loss 
world. The Palestinians appear to have made some accommodation over 
time with the realities of their post-nakba situation, but are blocked from 
moving forward on their path towards a normal level of functioning as a 
nation by forces largely outwith their control and resulting from long-term 
disenfranchisement of their grief by influential powers in the international 
community. Israel presents a more complicated picture. Its original raison 
d’etre was as a way of making sense of European Jewry’s post-holocaust 
world by providing an independent safe haven and homeland for all Jews that 
could take its rightful place within the community of nations, but things have 
not turned out quite as originally envisaged. Israel also seems to be impeded 
on its progress along any grief trajectory towards normalisation as a nation, 
for reasons partly of its own making and partly of the self-interest practised 
by various world powers whose support would appear to have served not so 
much to aid Israel’s adjustment to, as to stifle its capacity for accommodation 
with, changing realities. 
The evidence on current national identities, sourced from the contemporary 
visual arts, would seem to largely support these findings. Palestinian art is 
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preoccupied with loss, the original loss of homeland, and the losses of the 
social fabric and of everyday normal freedoms resulting directly from that.  
But the aspirations for a state of their own and the opportunity to live a 
normal life shine through. Israeli art deals with loss of a different kind, the 
loss of the vision that was Israel. Disillusionment with a militarised state in a 
permanent conflict situation and with a society rife with discrimination and 
inequity is the predominant theme, and no real way out of the dilemma is 
identified. The holocaust may loom large in Israeli state ritual and symbolism, 
but the evidence from the art works points to cross-currents in Israeli society 
attempting to focus attention on the problems of the here and now. If the 
contemporary visual artists of both nations are viewed as providers of sites 
for negotiation in which various elements of the status quo are up for 
questioning, then the Palestinians can be regarded as challenging an 
international status quo which has long kept them in an anomalous and 
unjust position of statelessness and occupation, while the Israelis are 
challenging the status quo of their own society which, in its preoccupation 
with the horrors of a European Jewish past, seems blind to the realities of its 
own Near Eastern Israeli present. 
 
Palestine 
Much has been made of whether the Palestinians could be regarded as a 
nation before 1948, as a collective with sufficient unity to register the events 
of that year as a shared, common loss, and the arguments are dealt with in 
some detail in chapter four above (pp.112-8). But Palestinian artists have 
highlighted what most historians and commentators appear to have missed, 
or at least underplayed: the importance of territory as a basis for collectivity. 
Their representations of the organic, blood-and-soil relationship between the 
Palestinian people and the land they lived on for centuries underscore the 
life-sustaining and life-ordering significance of physical space and its function 
as a locus for collective consciousness (Grosby 1995). 
To lose that space, as the Palestinians did in 1948, is to lose the 
underpinnings of social existence: it is a mode of dispossession fundamental 
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to the collective sense of identity of the people who have been living in it. 
Such a loss fits with Marris’s (1974, p.32) definition of bereavement as a 
“loss of self”, a shattering of identity, a disruption of continuity and 
invalidation of purposes learned and consolidated not through just, as for the 
bereaved individual, a lifetime’s experience, but in the case of a bereft 
people, generations of experience. The grief-triggering events of the nakba 
also fit with definitions of traumatic loss (pp. 26-9 above), in that the 
Palestinians had no frame of reference for it. As outlined above (pp. 120-4), 
they had fled from problems and conflicts in their land before, but there had 
never been any question of their being permanently separated from it. The 
Israeli ban on their return this time was something completely new in their 
experience. 
The trajectory consequent on this traumatic loss would appear to follow a 
fairly normal pattern in grief theory terms. There was the initial period of 
disorientation, characterised by bewilderment, silence, and the practical 
distractions of everyday survival. There was the turmoil of sorrow, guilt, self-
reproach, bitterness and shame over the situation the Palestinians found 
themselves in. At first, the primary orientation was to the past, with the focus 
on the “Paradise Lost” they had been dispossessed of, and a yearning for 
“The Return”, but little in the way of action. Over a decade after the nakba, 
this orientation began to alternate with a more future-oriented one, re-
establishing Palestinian agency and manifesting in the “Armed Struggle” and 
the rise of Fatah and the PLO. In characteristic “dual-process” (Stroebe and 
Schut 1999) style, there is an oscillation between these two orientations over 
the ensuing years. And, to an extent, they still figure in Palestinian collective 
consciousness today: a large amount of the visual art described in chapter 
six has a “Lost Paradise” theme (eg. Halawani’s Presence and Impressions 
and Life through a Lens photographs, Jabbour’s Palestina photographs, 
Shoman’s Bayyaratina video, Sansour’s Land Confiscation Order video), 
while some, if relatively fewer, works suggest the potential for struggle is still 
there (eg. Batniji’s Gaza Diary video, Nashashibi’s Post Office District video, 
Zurob’s Standby paintings). 
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As greater accommodation was made with the realities of their post-nakba 
world, purposeful Palestinian action moved from the military field to the 
political one. Arafat made significant concessions (p.141 above), a move 
which may not have been universally popular with his people but which was 
seen by many at the time as a realistic step forward towards a future of self-
determination in a sovereign Palestinian state. But the history of the various 
subsequent accords and roadmaps to peace reveals a pattern of one step 
forward, two steps back as far as the Palestinians were concerned, and their 
path to collective renewal as a nation has seemed perpetually blocked. This 
obstruction is confirmed by the prevalence of images of walls, barbed wire, 
checkpoints, watch towers and concrete blocks in the work of contemporary 
visual artists (eg. Batniji, Bishara, Halawani, Hatoum, Saadeh, Waked). As a 
result, some sixty-odd years after their loss, the Palestinian people are still 
fragmented between the West Bank and Gaza, under Israeli authority and 
control, in the state of Israel itself, as Arab Israelis, in refugee camps around 
the neighbouring Arab countries, and in the diaspora.  
Progress towards “recovery”, to a normal level of collective functioning in 
some renewed structure of meaning, appears to have been impeded despite 
the attempts of the Palestinians to arrive at some level of accommodation 
with the realities of their situation. They have until relatively recently received 
little support or sympathy from the international community. Rather, their grief 
was for a long time disenfranchised (Doka 2002), their “right to grieve” 
unacknowledged either because, perceived as Arabs who should be happy 
to live anywhere in the Arab world, their loss was deemed insignificant; or 
because, given an “orientalist” (Said 1978) view of Arabs as inferior beings, 
or, even more extreme, a Joan Peters-type Zionist view of the Palestinians 
as non-existent (pp.114-6 above), they were not considered capable of grief. 
Meanwhile, their grief has become incremental (Cook and Oltjenbrun 1998) 
as the chain of losses sparked off by the original loss of land has grown: loss 
of the social fabric and access to family and friends; loss of freedom of 
movement; loss of expectations of normal day-to-day living; loss of dignity; 
loss of the opportunity for what might be considered a normal childhood; loss 
of time; loss of aspirations to the sort of national development that other Arab 
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peoples have enjoyed. The canon of contemporary Palestinian visual arts 
outlined in chapter six vividly brings home the stark reality of these various 
losses. 
Given this exacerbated and prolonged grieving, and given that the social 
support recognised as critical to the effective resolution of grief (p.40-1 
above) has been conspicuously unforthcoming from the international 
community, the Palestinian people might well be expected to have developed 
a pathological response by now, or to have given up altogether and 
individually faded into the backgrounds of their various new environments. 
But their collective grief trajectory displays many of the signs associated with 
“healthy” grieving. They have demonstrated, and continue to demonstrate, a 
remarkable resilience, the “sumud” which seems to enable them to cope with 
their grief (p.40-1 above). This attitude of steadfastness and perseverance 
emanates from Bishara’s cactus pieces, from Fawakhri’s “I am Donkey/ 
Made in Palestine” images, from Jacir’s “Crossing Surda” film, from Waked’s 
“Fashion for Israeli Checkpoints” video, and from the general determined 
persistence of ordinary Palestinians going about their everyday business. In 
addition, the retention of “continuing bonds” (Goss and Klass 2005; Klass, 
Silverman and Nickman 1996) with their previous Palestinian identity in the 
form of keys to the original Palestinian houses, plants from the original 
Palestinian gardens, and a detailed, intimate knowledge of the original 
Palestinian village geography, all passed down through the generations, 
serves to maintain a relationship with their past, with who they once were, 
that can serve as a foundation for who they are going to become. 
It is a tenet of grief theory that who we are informs how we grieve (pp.20-1,81 
above), and the Palestinian grieving style, the way in which they have gone 
about dealing with their loss, reflects aspects of their collective social and 
cultural location. In terms of Doka and Martin’s (1998) spectrum of grieving 
styles, the Palestinians might be considered as grieving at the more intuitive 
and feeling-based end of the scale, given the initial post-nakba passivity, the 
tendency to lamentation, and the overwhelming expression of injustice and 
victimisation. This is hardly surprising when the social and cultural resources 
available to them at the time are taken into consideration. 
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It is beyond the scope of this study to enter into a discussion of Arab national 
character, a topic which has given rise to so many sweepingly categorical 
statements and evaluatively loaded cross-cultural comparisons (Moughrabi 
1978). But a non-judgemental reading of Barakat’s (1974, cited in Moughrabi, 
1978, p.109) description of Arab society as more spontaneous than 
calculating, more socioemotionally than task oriented, more preoccupied with 
status than achievement, and more taken up with the past than the future, 
would certainly indicate a culture which privileges feeling-based values. As 
Doka and Martin point out, this end of the spectrum tends to be associated in 
western culture with the female response, as opposed to the more logical 
and instrumental approach typically correlated with masculinity. As such, it 
does not represent a mode of reaction likely to garner much sympathy on a 
world stage regulated according to western, ‘masculine’ norms of rationality 
and purposefully-directed agency, particularly during an era when an all-
action John Wayne was a role-model.  
Moreover, the Palestinians had experienced little opportunity for self-
determined action in their history. For centuries, they had been subject to 
imperial rule by some great power or other, the Mamluks, the Ottomans, the 
British, and were accustomed to any major decisions affecting their lives 
being taken by someone else, based elsewhere. In addition, although there 
was a Christian element to the Palestinian population, largely urban and 
reckoned at less than 10% during the period of the British mandate (British 
Government Report to the League of Nations on Palestine and Transjordan, 
1937, www.ismi.emory.edu), the vast majority adhered to Islam, a religion 
based on the concept of submission.  
Nothing in the social and cultural background of the Palestinians at the time 
of the nakba indicated an action-oriented, problem-solving response to their 
loss. But, as a largely peasant people who had endured the hardships of 
making a living from the land and who had persisted through centuries of 
conquests and various imperial masters, they did possess resilience, a 





The history of the European Jews, the holocaust and the creation of Israel 
presents a very different picture in terms of loss and grief. As discussed in 
chapter five (pp.156-62 above), world Jewry at the beginning of the twentieth 
century could scarcely be considered a people in the usual sense of the term, 
scattered around various parts of the world as minority groups in different 
countries, with no common territory, language or culture, bound only by 
religious beliefs, and various traditions and rituals associated with those 
beliefs. However, the vast majority of world Jewry, which lived in Europe, in 
particular Eastern Europe, shared, in addition to their religion, a centuries-
long history of marginalisation, repression and persecution which had 
resulted in a perpetual quest for security by means of a variety of strategies. 
Given this history, the holocaust cannot be viewed as a one-off event but has 
to be seen rather as the climax to and culmination of centuries of insecurity 
and dispossession. Nevertheless, it was so different in scale and scope, as 
well as in the chilling industrial efficiency of its manner of implementation, 
that it must still have registered as traumatic, as outside the European Jewish 
frame of reference up till that point and thus resistant to meaningful 
interpretation. Earlier pogroms and massacres had been relatively localised; 
compliance, ingenuity or money had previously proven useful in times of 
trouble; and, when the worst came to the worst, whole communities had been 
able to move from one part of Europe to another and start life afresh.  
But this time, except for those who had reacted quickly in anticipation of 
events and left Europe by the late 1930s, there was no way out. Nothing 
would save them from a policy of annihilation that so completely 
dehumanised the Jews it essentially amounted to an extermination 
programme, involving systems and procedures more usually reserved for the 
treatment of vermin. Not only did the holocaust entail the loss of up to six 
million Jewish lives, representing more than half of world Jewry and some 
two thirds of European Jewry at the time, it dispossessed the Jews of any 
sense of ontological security in its most basic terms: the claim on or 
expectation of even the barest level of existence as human beings. In 
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addition, it brought about a loss of trust, both the elementary trust in others 
on which the operation of society depends, and, since their capacities and 
abilities had so clearly proved unequal to the task of preventing what had 
befallen them, the fundamental trust in themselves necessary to the 
individual and collective self-confidence required for normal functioning in the 
world. 
In the wake of these holocaust-related losses, the collective reaction appears 
to follow a regular grief pattern. There was the initial period of silence, 
motivated by feelings of shame and self-reproach to such an extent that it 
can be considered indicative of a degree of self-disenfranchisement of grief 
(Kauffman  2002). The full gamut of emotion underlying this silence was only 
allowed release and expression with the catharsis of the Eichmann trial in the 
early 1960s. Meanwhile, the State of Israel was being created, not just as a 
safe haven, a territorial containment to ensure future Jewish security along 
with a legitimate place in the world of nations, but also as a locus for the 
renegotiation of Jewish national identity, the refashioning of the collective 
consciousness so badly damaged by the events of the holocaust. The new 
muscular Israeli, pioneer, worker and fighter, complete with new homeland, 
new language and a new history of heroic deeds and sacrifices, was 
replacing the weak, submissive, exilic, and ultimately doomed, European 
Jew. This morphing of the European Jewish victim into the Israeli victor was 
complete with Israel’s triumph in the Six Days’ War of 1967. 
In terms of the spectrum of grieving styles (Doka and Martin 1998), the 
Jewish/Israeli reaction to the losses of the holocaust is right up at the 
instrumental, rationally-based and action-oriented end of the scale. Feelings 
were suppressed for the better part of twenty years, while active problem-
solving took priority. The strategies employed were essentially no different 
from the ones the Jews of Europe had been using for centuries, except 
enacted on a global rather than a European stage. Those left in Europe after 
the holocaust moved on, some to North America and some to Palestine. 
Starting afresh, they set about carving out niches of wealth and influence, 
both on an individual level in the case of North American immigrants, and on 
a collective level in the case of the State of Israel. This seemingly logical, 
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independently-minded move to make sense of their post-holocaust world by 
standing on their own two feet and sorting out their problems, epitomised in 
the strong, self-sufficient image of the new Israeli Jew, attracted a great deal 
of international support, particularly from the west. And however much this 
support may have been due to factors of self-interest, or even of guilt that the 
holocaust should have happened on European soil, it has to be said that the 
Jewish/Israeli grieving style was completely in tune with the rational and 
action-based ‘masculine’ values predominant in western society at the time, 
and, as such, bound to garner western sympathies. 
However, as time went on and the State of Israel developed, its population 
enlarged by the ‘ingathering of exiles’ from Jewish communities around the 
world, its relations with the Palestinians and its Arab neighbours engulfing it 
in endless rounds of conflict, any discernible grief trajectory appears to veer 
from what might be considered a regular path of progression and displays a 
consistent failure to accommodate changing realities. The holocaust, rather 
than gradually fading into the past, became an increasingly central totem of 
the Jewish State. Yad Vashem, the memorial museum to the holocaust 
founded in 1953, assumed an increasingly significant role in public life, 
becoming the mandatory first port-of-call, straight from the airport, for any 
visiting foreign dignitary of any note. In the national calendar, Holocaust 
Remembrance Day, established in 1953, was to become the first of the three 
major commemoration days, falling shortly before Memorial Day and the 
almost immediately subsequent Independence Day, the clear message being 
that military sacrifice redeemed the holocaust and enabled the creation of the 
state. More recently, an official programme of school trips has been set up for 
Israeli teenagers, a year or two away from leaving school and undertaking 
their military service, to the sites of the extermination camps in Poland in 
order to better appreciate what happened there (Feldman 2008). 
Although not directly relevant to the experience of those non-European Jews 
soon to form the majority of the Israeli population, the holocaust has been 
retained in the memory of the state as emblematic of what can happen if 
Jews allow themselves to become vulnerable. It has been used as a means 
of holding a disparate nation together through fear of vulnerability, 
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underscoring the need for security through constant vigilance and assertive 
self-defence. History reveals an oscillation within Israeli society between a 
clinging to these old fears and an accommodation of new realities, with 
Rabin’s policies, for example, tending towards the latter. Fear, however, 
seems to unfailingly win out, as demonstrated by the building of the security 
wall, the lock-down on Gaza, and the disproportionate responses to 
provocation from the West Bank, Gaza or South Lebanon.  
In grief theory terms, this behaviour, based on the circumstances of a former 
assumptive world, would be considered maladaptive (Rando 1993). It brings 
to mind Freud’s (1917/1961) original description of melancholia, or grief gone 
wrong, in its attachment to the void left by loss (Leader 2008) and in its 
projective identification in terms of the old, weak European Jew (Klein 1940, 
1946). Moreover, it displays all the signs of trauma (Jacobs 1999; Mitchell 
and Everly 2001; Raphael and Martinek 1997): the predominance of fear 
over sorrow in relation to the role of the holocaust in the national memory; the 
obsession with the event itself and the scene of its happening, evident in Yad 
Vashem and in the school trips to Poland; the replaying of the original 
traumatic event (Van der Veer 1998) in intergenerational terms, with an 
emotional appreciation of the events of the holocaust being the stated aim of 
the school trips to Poland; the setting apart from society of the trauma 
sufferer as a result of loss of trust (Freyd 1996), seen in Israel’s relative 
isolation and literal walling in of itself; and the experience of living in a 
“dissociated traumatic present” (Fierke 2006), where current challenges are 
seen in terms of past situations and met on the basis of outdated 
assumptions and attitudes.  
There is no resilience to grief (p.40 above) here, but rather a defensiveness 
against further loss, demonstrated in the heightened sensitivity to perceived 
insult or provocation, the excessive retaliation, and, certainly since the Yom 
Kippur War, the apparent lack of confidence in or incredulity as regards their 
own strength and capability to defend themselves. Concurrent stressors 
(p.41 above), in the form of building a nation from scratch and dealing with a 
largely hostile Arab environment, may have served as inhibitors of Israel’s 
progress in coming to some accommodation with changed realities. But even 
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the availability of a high level of social support (pp.40-1 above), in the form of 
the backing of powerful international friends and allies, first Britain, then 
America, does not seem to have helped, although, to be fair, such patronage 
may often have been motivated more by self-interest than by any concern for 
Israel’s. 
What the Israeli contemporary visual arts seem to be presenting is a 
challenge to this status quo in the form of an alternative viewpoint fixed firmly 
on present-day issues. Chapter six describes in some detail a canon of early 
twenty-first century work that centres on dissatisfaction with a militarised 
society that puts its younger generation at mortal risk and with an unfair 
society marked by racism, discrimination and economic inequities. This work 
exudes a profound disillusionment with what Israel has become, especially 
by contrast to its founding vision of security and equality for all Jews. Nor 
does it offer any prospect, bar doomsday scenarios, escapist fantasy or 
metaphysical philosophising, of a way forward out of Israel’s current 
dilemma. What is being grieved here is the loss of the dream that was Israel, 
the vision that was once seen as a way of reconstructing European Jewish 
collective identity in the post-holocaust world. 
Given the above evidence from both historical and visual arts sources, two 
major points can be made. If post-holocaust Jewish/Israeli history presents 
the contours of a grief trajectory, then it is very much a case of ‘complicated’ 
grieving or grief gone wrong. For what can be discerned is not so much a 
process of accommodation with a post-loss world, but rather a failure to 
adjust, resulting in a persistent experience of loss, a permanent state of 
dispossession not dissimilar to that which characterised the centuries-long 
history of the Jews in Europe. Equally, the evidence points to a degree of 
contention in society over this state of affairs. The contemporary visual arts 
highlight the problems of Israel’s here and now, focussing on the need to see 
the realities of the current situation. The grief of the European Ashkenazim 
who founded Israel, but now represent a minority in its population, has been 
used to galvanise a disparate population, formed by the ‘ingathering of the 
exiles’ from non-European backgrounds over several decades, into a 
collective unity: the state has consistently used the holocaust to try to bind its 
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population together as a nation through a common fear of vulnerability. But 
Israel’s contemporary visual artists would appear to be saying there is a need 
for some negotiation here, that the loss in current Israeli terms represented in 
their work merits as much attention as the essentially European Jewish loss 
of the past allocated pole position in Israeli collective consciousness. Their 
work reflects a tension in Israeli society between a clinging to that past and a 
desire to move on with the future on the basis of a realistic appreciation of 
the present, the very tension which lies at the heart of the grief experience. 
 
Do Nations Grieve? 
On the basis of the two case studies above, the answer to the question of 
whether nations grieve has to be in the affirmative, but it is a tentative, it-
looks-like-it type of yes, rather than an absolute and categorical one based 
on unambiguously clear evidence. The case of the Palestinian people seems 
convincingly straightforward: their history presents the distinct contours of a 
collective grief trajectory, and their contemporary visual arts demonstrate to 
what extent the fundamental elements of that grieving experience have 
impacted on current collective identity. The influence of their social and 
cultural background within the global community on their approach to 
accommodating the losses of the nakba is clearly visible in their grief 
reactions, and the part played by various powerful members of the 
international community in attempting to regulate those reactions by 
essentially disenfranchising Palestinian grief is equally evident. Despite their 
continued fragmentation as a people from the shattering of their world in 
1948 to this day, their grief appears in many ways to have made them even 
stronger and bound them more closely in nationhood. 
The case of the European Jews, the holocaust and Israel, although it fits the 
pattern of the grief trajectory, is far less straightforward. In the first place, the 
Jews of the early twentieth century were a people without common territory 
or culture, and, although common faith, conviction and ritual, along with a 
shared experience of being ‘othered’ in society, may qualify as features 
capable of informing collective identity in an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 
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1991) whose members are widely distributed in physical terms, it is arguable 
whether they can be regarded as sufficient basis for the formation and 
development of a fully operational collective consciousness. Consideration 
has to be given, however, to the shared experience of the holocaust itself as 
inspiring the latter by imbuing a to some extent latent collectivity with the 
energy necessary to its manifest unfolding and effective functioning.  
Secondly, the loss suffered by the Jews of Europe was not so much an event 
as a long-term condition, the holocaust marking the climax and culmination of 
centuries of dispossession rather than being a one-off occurrence. 
Nevertheless, although dispossession may have been a feature of everyday 
existence for the Jews of Europe, the holocaust was still so significantly 
different in scale, scope and style from what had gone before that it can 
feasibly be understood as outwith their frame of reference, hence registering 
as traumatic loss. 
Thirdly, the European Ashkenazi Jews whose post-holocaust grief gave rise 
to the founding of the State of Israel ultimately became a minority in its 
population, their grieving experience having no direct personal relevance for 
the non-European majority. This does not in any way, however, diminish the 
authenticity of Israel’s ongoing national grief trajectory, since the Ashkenazim 
remained a powerful and influential group whose control of state policy and 
conduct would have ensured that their collective grief coloured the overall 
national stance and attitudes. Moreover, this transference of grief from the 
European minority to the non-European majority, and from one generation to 
the next, need not be written off solely as cynical political manoeuvring, but 
could just as conceivably have taken place on a less than conscious level. 
After all, the ability to see the world from any perspective other than one’s 
own, a challenge for most of humanity at the best of times, is acknowledged 
as particularly difficult for those whose energies are wholly taken up with 
grieving. 
And fourthly, the Israeli contemporary visual arts as surveyed in chapter six, 
in their preoccupation with loss and highlighting of disappointment and 
disillusionment with a society that has turned out differently to the way in 
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which it was originally envisaged, might seem to indicate a continuing cycle 
of persistent loss, similar to that of the history of the Jews in Europe. But the 
fact that this work represents current issues of collective loss in a context of 
challenge to the dominant holocaust-related focus of Israeli society reflects 
the central dynamic of the normal grief experience, the tension between 
holding on to the past and moving on into a future determined on the basis of 
a realistic appraisal of the present.  
Thus, despite the very complex picture presented by the history of the 
European Jews, the holocaust and Israel, a grief trajectory is discernible. The 
climax of loss in the holocaust, the emotional response, the drive to make 
some sense of the post-holocaust Jewish world by recreating Jewish identity 
in the form of the new Israeli, equipped with new homeland and new useable 
heroic past, the very antithesis of the weak, submissive European Jew, all 
correspond to the fundamental elements of the grieving experience. But this 
grief is complicated grief, seemingly not quite able to leave the old, fearful, 
assumptive world of the European Jew behind and progress towards a level 
of normalisation in the community of nations. The complication may be down 
to the traumatic nature of the loss, ultimately dispossessing the Jews of 
Europe of the right to exist; to the concurrent stressors of trying to build a 
nation and defend its people while simultaneously coping with grief; to an 
international order which did little to exert checks and balances on Israel’s 
grieving experience, but exploited and manipulated it out of self-interest; to 
an innate defensiveness, born of centuries of marginalisation, that prevented 
the openness to future possibility that any effective resolution of grief 
requires; or to a mixture of any or all of these factors.  
To add to the complexity, while this complicated European Jewish grief 
experience has been influencing ongoing official Israeli policy and behaviour, 
the diverse, largely non-European Israeli nation has been simultaneously 
attempting to establish the architecture of its own collective consciousness 
and engaging in intense negotiation over its collective identity. And this 
nation, to judge from the messages of the  contemporary visual art works 
surveyed in chapter six, might well be on the brink of its own national grief 
trajectory, triggered by the loss of the founding dream of Israel. 
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Limitations, Innovations, Further Research Suggestions 
The fact that of only two case studies used for this research one can be 
considered unusual and highly complex, might be perceived as a limitation. 
However, it can equally be viewed as adding depth and richness to the study. 
Certainly the cases of Israel and Palestine, although based in the same 
region of the world and intricately interconnected to the extent that both 
peoples seem locked in an almost symbiotic embrace, feeding off each 
other’s grief, are significantly different. One involves an Arab, the other a 
European background. One involves a territorially-based people, the other a 
territorially-scattered community of faith. One’s predicament has been largely 
ignored by the global community, while the other’s has received a great deal 
of support from international powers. There appears to be sufficient variation 
in the two cases selected to compensate for the paucity in number. 
Similarly, variation has been a major criterion in selection of the secondary 
data sources for the histories in both case studies, so as to achieve as wide a 
range of perspectives as possible on the relevant events, behaviours and 
motivations. The appended references to this dissertation bear witness to the 
spread, in both chronological and political terms, of the sources utilised for 
each study. With regard to the primary sources employed to furnish data on 
current national identities, the contemporary visual arts may not seem an 
immediately obvious choice, but in these particular contexts, where the 
political situation is an unavoidable factor of everyday life, and artists ipso 
facto use their art to make political comment, they work well as indicators of 
the central issues around which national identity is currently being 
negotiated. Any charge that artists tend to derive from a particularly oriented 
segment of society, mainly highly-educated and inclining towards the liberal 
left, springs from a distinctly western perspective on art and artists which is 
not necessarily universally applicable. Moreover, no focus group or set of 
interviewees could easily or practicably be assembled for research purposes 
that would even begin to cover the range of backgrounds, orientations and 




Since the use of the visual arts in a study of this nature, though relatively 
innovative, has proved effective in revealing societal issues and processes, a 
plea is perhaps warranted for sociologists and social historians to take them 
into more serious consideration as research data sources. Chapter three  
(pp.96-100) outlines the arguments for the social nature of artistic production, 
with the artist as a participant in the social construction of reality and the work 
of art as a site where collective values can be negotiated and critical 
consciousness developed. Moreover, the particular significance of the visual 
arts lies in their capacity for cutting through the stale perceptual habits and 
ingrained routine cognitive associations of language to permit a more direct 
apprehension, a more immediate grasp of the idea that is being given form.  
These many benefits should commend the use of the visual arts in social 
research, although a warning note has to be sounded that problems of 
interpretation can often serve to render them almost inaccessible to the 
researcher. My own experience during this research exercise was that many 
art critics and commentators use such obfuscatory, dense and abstract 
language when discussing or describing works of art that they can actually 
impede rather than enable understanding. The artists themselves in talking or 
writing about their work are often remarkably clear on the intentions of their 
artistically-formed messages, but equally likely to purposefully leave 
interpretation open to the viewers. 
Finally, whatever sources are employed to provide data on current social 
realities, there is clearly a need for further research on national grief 
trajectories through examination of the histories and current collective 
identities of nations or peoples which can be deemed to have undergone 
significant loss two or three generations ago. The latter half of the twentieth 
century can supply an embarras de richesses in terms of research subjects 
which fit this particular bill: partition in the Indian sub-continent and in Cyprus; 
genocide in the Cambodian civil war, in the Bangladesh liberation war and in 
Ethiopia’s Red Terror; a plethora of civil wars in Africa, Asia and the Middle 
East. And that is before even taking into consideration for future investigation 
later events like the genocides in Rwanda and the Balkans, or the invasions 
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and occupations of Afganistan and Iraq that have not yet had time to impact 
beyond a first generation. 
It might be particularly interesting, however, having traced two national grief 
trajectories, one essentially European, one Arab, from a background of the 
Abrahamic religions, to look at national grief against an entirely different 
cultural background with a different perspective on loss. Turning to the 
Buddhist world, Tibet, in the wake of its military defeat by and loss of 
sovereignty to China in 1950; and Cambodia, reacting to the heinous 
atrocities of its civil war of the early 1970s, would be good candidates. In 
addition, further to tracing the overall grief trajectories and the contours of 
grief apparent in current national identity, more detailed research might 
usefully be conducted in areas like the various mechanisms whereby grief is 
transferred from one generation to the next in different national settings; or 
the repertoire of strategies employed by different grieving nations for making 
sense of their post-loss world and reconstructing national identity; or the role 
and indicators of emotion at a collective level in the national grieving 
experience. The possibilities are many and varied: if the study of individual 
grief could take a century to develop through several refinements of both 
psychologically and sociologically-based theory and numerous practical 
research projects, then the study of large-scale collective grief may well have 
some way to go. 
 
Nations 
The studies of Palestine and Israel from a grief theory perspective serve to 
highlight several noteworthy points about nations.  
 
Territoriality 
Firstly, they underline the importance of territoriality. In chapter two above 
(pp.64-9), reference was made to the ubiquity of Anderson’s “imagined 
community” concept (1991) in current academic discussion of the nation and 
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to similar theories positing a deterritorialised ‘post-national’ world of the 
future. However, an appreciation of the historic grief trajectories of both the 
Palestinians and the European Jews, subsequently Israelis, lends support to 
Grosby’s view (1995) of territory providing more than mere physical space to 
live in, but a vital structure of meaning and memory for the people who 
inhabit it, a framework of bounded containment necessary to the functioning 
of collective life and experience (pp.68-9 above). 
The extent and endurance of Palestinian grief over the loss of their territory 
indicates its significance to their sense, at both a collective and an individual 
level, of who they are. For more than sixty years, the Palestinians have 
tenaciously retained their relationship with their land, their visual art reflecting 
the close integration, the near indivisibility of land and people (pp.208-12 
above). This is clearly easier for that section of the population that has 
remained in one way or another, as Arab Israelis or as West Bank or Gaza 
Palestinians, on their territory. But equally, in the refugee camps in other 
Arab countries there has been the intergenerational transfer of intimate 
geographical detail of the original Palestinian villages and landscapes along 
with physical plants from the original Palestinian gardens; and in the diaspora 
artists like Halaby and Jabbour, who have long been living away from the 
land of their origins, still display a strong connection with it in their work. The 
blood-and-soil connection between land and people seems to have 
strengthened Palestinian resilience, imbuing them collectively with a terra- 
firma-type stability, the capacity to persevere and weather difficulties. 
Meanwhile, world Jewry until the mid-twentieth century, if considered a 
community at all, any communal status resting largely on shared religious 
belief, tradition and ritual, has to be regarded as a deterritorialised one, the 
Jews existing as minority groups within a variety of largely European host 
nations. The twentieth century European Jewish drive for security and 
normalisation within the world order, motivated by their history of 
marginalisation and persecution in Europe, was defined in terms of 
acquisition of territory, and aimed at the Jews becoming a territorialised 
people. And the physical space that they acquired for this purpose, the land 
of Israel, swiftly had all the normal territorial attributes of collective memory 
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and meaning, the language, culture, myth and history normally developed 
over centuries, tacked on to it. But what the contemporary visual arts 
surveyed in chapter six demonstrate is a disappointment and disillusionment 
resulting from this exercise: they depict a lack of harmony in the relationship 
between the Israeli people and the territory they inhabit (pp.217-25 above). 
The question the artists appear to be posing is whether territoriality, as a 
fundamental, constitutive element of society, can be created either artificially 
or overnight. 
 
The International Community  
What comes out very clearly from the two case studies is the influence of the 
international community on the grieving experience of any particular nation, 
much in the same way as society impacts on any individual’s grief. 
Interconnectedness has its effects at both levels. The grief of the Palestinian 
people was essentially disenfranchised for decades in that their territorial loss 
was not fully acknowledged on the world scene: it suited the global powers of 
the time to regard them as Arabs who could make a home for themselves 
anywhere in Greater Syria and to refuse to see any real problem involved in 
their moving on to give the Jews some space. This initial and basic 
disenfranchisement coloured the entire subsequent grief trajectory for the 
Palestinians. At first, they had no voice, until, through violence, they forced 
the world to pay some heed. Later, during the course of the various peace 
processes, they made sizeable concessions which were never fully 
appreciated or even recognised by Israel and the West because the 
foundations on which each side’s perspectives, viewpoints and approaches 
depended, differed in this one crucial respect: the Palestinians had 
experienced a hugely damaging loss in 1948, but the influential western 
powers on the world stage simply did not recognise this as a fact.  
The Jews of Europe, meanwhile, undergoing their own grieving experience in 
the wake of the holocaust, made sense of their post-holocaust world by 
constructing their safe haven on someone else’s territory, with the full support 
and encouragement of the western powers, almost as a last cheer for 
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European colonialism.  This stance might seem understandable in the light of 
the attitudes, knowledge and perspectives of the period when Israel was 
founded. But the essentially unconditional support, particularly as provided by 
the US during its era of sole global superpower status, continued even when 
understandings of and standpoints on the situation had changed and Israel 
was increasingly perceived around the world as an aggressor. The Jewish 
State, it seemed, could defy international opinion and flaunt United Nations 
resolutions with impunity as long as it had the support of its powerful 
American friend and ally. Ultimately, however, this support, lacking in checks 
and balances, would do Israel no favours, serving not so much to shield it 
from but to blind it to any recognition of the realities to which it needed to 
adjust if normalisation was to be achieved. 
Essentially, both case studies point up the ways in which national grief has 
been exploited in the self-interests of powerful forces on the international 
scene: long-term refusal to acknowledge legitimate loss in the case of 
Palestine; blind support of a runaway and fundamentally self-destructive 
course of grief gone wrong in the case of Israel; and the calculated 
manipulation of both by opposing sides during the Cold War. There is no 
evidence at an international level of either long-term thinking about or 
responsibility taken for the consequences of inflicting loss, or allowing it to be 
inflicted, upon particular members of the global community, nor for how a 
grieving nation might be supported in a genuinely helpful and non-exploitative 
manner to recover from such loss. The thought, care, compassion and 
support lavished on the grieving individual in society, in terms of both 
research and practice, appear to be signally lacking at the international level. 
 
National Identity 
National identity emerges from the case studies as a feature subject to 
change and evolution, particularly with regard to its order of salience 
amongst multiple identities held by the individual and to its relative degree of 
passivity or agency (pp.50-1 above). With reference to Melucci’s (1989, p.34) 
definition of collective identity as process rather than property, it is interesting 
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to note how this process engages with grief in both cases. For the 
Palestinians, the sense of being Palestinian or coming from Palestine 
appears to have been of a fairly low order of salience amongst their various 
multiple overlapping identities until disaster struck in 1948, their subsequent 
territorial dispossession shifting it to a more prominent position. A strong 
correspondence between this national identity, affected by the shared loss of 
land in the nakba, and personal identity, affected by all or any of a variety of 
related losses, of home, family, livelihood, and so on, would have served to 
reinforce its prominence. Promoted in the salience order of multiple identities, 
and strengthened by its convergence with personal identity, the sense of 
being Palestinian became, perhaps for the first time, a primary self-
identification, with intrinsic common goals and the quality of self-direction 
characteristic of collective identity. Grief can thus be seen as infusing an 
apparently passive national identity with the energy necessary to activating 
collective agency. Certainly, if there was ever any question of the 
Palestinians being regarded as a nation before 1948, there has been little 
doubt of the strength of their collective self-perception since. 
In the case of the European Jews, with a history of keeping a low profile in 
order to survive, their identity as Jews was given increasing prominence 
during the Nazi era. This primary positioning of Jewishness in their salience 
order of identification would have been to some extent self-imposed, 
particularly in cases of communities where segregation had been a matter of 
choice. But for many, especially those who had chosen assimilation, it would 
have been imposed by the society they lived in and not by the Jews 
themselves. At that point in time, given the universes of difference between 
the lives and backgrounds of Jews from different parts of Europe, 
Jewishness could not perhaps be regarded as an overarching collective 
identity, with the agency that implies, but rather a social one, an externally 
attributed, and to varying degrees internally accepted, marker of 
identification. It certainly seemed to take the full horror of the holocaust, and 
the subsequent correspondence between collective Jewish loss and the 
associated large-scale personal losses of individual Jews, to galvanise a 
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collective identity, the intrinsic “we-ness” of that identity centred on and 
developed in Israel as part of the post-holocaust grief process. 
National identity can thus be seen from these cases as covering a spectrum 
from externally imposed and internally accepted marker of identification to 
enthusiastically embraced self-identification. At the latter end of the scale, it 
is a collective identity which is more fluid process than fixed attribute, its 
inherent potential for self-directed agency triggered by the threat inherent in 
shared loss, which promotes it in the salience order of the multiple identities 
held by the individual while simultaneously creating a powerfully binding 
convergence between personal and national identities. 
 
Grief 
Equally, the application of grief theory to large-scale national groupings 
raises some important points about grief. 
 
Agency 
In both case studies, responsibility for the respective collective losses is 
attributed to another group: for the European Jews, the Nazis were the 
culprits; for the Palestinians it was the Jews, subsequently the Israelis.  Other 
groups came in for a share of blame, largely as a result of their support for or 
inability to foresee or prevent the actions of the perpetrators, but overall 
causative responsibility for loss and suffering was squarely pinned on one 
distinct group in each case. As discussed in chapter two above (pp.72-3), this 
factor of human agency would seem to be a characteristic of grief at a 
national level, where the loss and suffering resulting from natural catastrophe 
does not seem to pose the same threat (Van der Veer 1998; Zinner and 
Williams 1999). Natural disaster, of course, does not directly affect a whole 
nation, rather certain localised communities within it. Moreover, national 
identity is essentially a social marker, differentiating one group from another, 
and there is no social contract with nature to be broken or betrayed, no 
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assumptions or expectations that it should behave with respect or 
consideration for human beings. 
At the level of the individual, grief is triggered by bereavement through death 
by natural causes, by dislocation as a result of natural disasters, by loss of 
physical capacity as a natural result of ageing, or by loss of an occupational 
role at a default retirement age, just as much if not more than equivalent 
losses brought about by direct human intervention. But it appears to make no 
fundamental difference whether human agency is involved in the loss which 
triggers grief or not. Despite the statement in the opening lines of Victim 
Support’s report on the needs of people bereaved by homicide (2006) that 
“The traumatic grief that follows homicide is unlike the grief that accompanies 
a death by natural causes”, an examination of descriptions of such grief 
(Acker and Karp 2006; Harris 2001; King 2004; Schlosser 1997) indicates 
only a difference in degree or intensity rather than nature. The grieving 
experiences of relatives of murder victims tend to register a more traumatic 
loss and to run a more complicated course as a result of several factors: the 
suddenness of the death; the pressures of grieving while in the public 
spotlight of media and courts; the stresses imposed by having to deal with 
the legal system; the attitudes of society, with reference to a certain 
glamorisation of killers in the entertainment media, or as related to the 
specific nature of the case; and a perceived lack of closure, with regard to 
unmet needs for information or for justice, and particularly where no 
perpetrator is ever identified. 
Moreover, when cases of bereavement through death from natural causes 
are taken into consideration, it is a generally acknowledged facet of human 
nature to want to attribute blame. The doctors, the hospital staff, the 
government, god, the deceased person himself, can all be variously held 
responsible, with self-reproach also figuring large in descriptions of the 
grieving experience.  
Such scapegoating, the casting around for some agentive force to which 
responsibility for suffering can be attributed, appears to be a common feature 
of significant loss, a tendency which betokens a somewhat simplistic and 
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superficial view of happenings in the world as governed by  straightforward 
rules of cause and effect. A more sophisticated slant on agency as located in 
the interinvolvement of humans and multiple non-human actants (Bennett 
2010) would be less quick in apportioning blame to specific human agents. 
And yet another perspective, which would remove the notion of agency in 
these terms altogether from our understanding of worldly events and 
phenomena, seeing them as arising from an acausal connecting principle 
based on attraction or synchronicity (Jung 1972), would view the roles 
typically designated victim and perpetrator in any loss scenario, whether 
collective or individual, as bearing joint responsibility for both the occurrence 
and outcome of their interaction. 
 
Shame 
One emotion which does not figure large in the grief theory literature, yet 
which stands out in both the Palestinian and European Jewish/Israeli 
narratives, is shame. The whole conceptualisation and development of Israel, 
with the new muscular Hebrew and his history of heroism and sacrifice in 
counterpoint to the old, weak, persecuted and compliant European Jew, can 
be seen as an exercise in erasing the shame of the “savonettes” who went 
“like lambs to the slaughter” in a series of events which brought centuries of 
oppression and persecution to a climax. For the Palestinians, the sense of 
honour which is such a central value of Arab society was bound up with 
possession of land and defence of kin, and the shame and humiliation they 
experienced after the nakba stemmed from their loss of the former and 
evident inability to fulfil the latter (pp.126-7 above). The PLO later used this 
shame as a motivator for encouraging collective military action. 
The fact that shame does not seriously feature in accounts of individual 
grieving, but is so clearly crucial to at least these two narratives of large-scale 
collective grief bears further examination. Arab society sets a higher value on 
honour than modern western society, but the centrality of shame to the 
Jewish post-holocaust experience would seem to indicate that this is not just 
a cultural factor. Nor would it seem justifiable to assume that pride and 
291 
 
shame function more strongly as aspects of collective than of personal 
identity. Does the collective shame in the two case studies perhaps stem 
from a negative self-evaluation resulting from dispossession and consequent 
diminishment at the hands of others in the course of inter-group interaction 
(pp.73-4 above), i.e. the European Jews with the Nazis and the Palestinians 
with Israel? But the concept of agency in association with loss and grief, as 
discussed in the preceding section, would appear to be less straightforward 
than such an analysis permits. Perhaps the whole notion of shame, although 
an unfamiliar direction for the late twentieth century western moral compass, 
deserves consideration at both the collective and individual level as a 
possible indicator of diminished self-evaluation consequent on significant loss 
in general. 
Kauffman (2010, p.3) observes that “There is broad sociocultural support in 
the belief that shame is not central to grief”. However, where the nature of the 
death being grieved or the manner of grieving itself warrants, or even hints 
at, social disenfranchisement of the grief for any reason (Doka 2002), the 
operation of shame, functioning as an indicator of compliance with society’s 
norms, is acknowledged. Thus the potential for shame is recognised in those 
bereavement situations which the griever perceives as humiliating (Parkes 
1972, p.34) and involving social stigma.  It features prominently in studies of 
bereavement through suicide (Harwood et al. 2002; Hawton and Simkin 
2003), or through AIDS (Allen 2009; Balk and Corr 2009, pp. 104-6; Nzioka 
2000), and also shows up in grief surrounding homicide victims (Schlosser 
1997) and perinatal death (Barr 2004). It likewise marks the griever’s 
questioning of his own reactions to loss and their appropriacy in the light of 
accepted social norms: for example, a woman’s shame over expressing her 
overwhelming sorrow at the death of a much-loved pet in a society that 
reserves such depth of feeling for human death; or a man’s shame over his 
perceived unmanliness in expressing or even feeling grief at any great depth 
or for any protracted period.  
Kauffman (2010) underlines to what extent these aspects of grief can serve 
to isolate the griever from society, and how this “disconnective nature of grief 
is shameful” (p.3). He thus recognises the important role of shame in the 
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grieving experience, but by characterising it as pervasive, diverse and many-
faced in nature and by focussing primarily on social disconnection, he 
appears to miss the point of its absolute centrality. In the case studies of 
Palestine and Israel, shame appears on cue right after the period of 
bewildered disorientation immediately following the loss, and prior to the 
attempts to make sense of the post-loss world, essentially informing these 
efforts at reconstruction of the collective identity. This is a critical point in the 
grief trajectory, when the dispossession involved in loss is apprehended as 
diminishment and devaluation, as a lessening or weakening of the socially 
constructed self which is perceived in terms of threat to that self’s intactness 
and integrity. And, in the interests of self-preservation, the apparent threat 
needs to be addressed (Dickerson et al. 2004; Gruenewald et al. 2004). 
Shame, as “the focal emotion experienced under conditions of threat to the 
social self” (Gruenewald et al. 2007, p. 69), might therefore be considered 
pivotal to the grief experience, serving to alert the self to the threat posed by 
loss and to the need to do something about it. 
Certainly, at the national level, there would appear to be some evidence for 
shame’s pivotal position in the collective grief experience to be drawn from 
the case studies in focus in this piece of research. At the individual level, 
however, such evidence, bar in those specific cases centring on social 
disenfranchisement as referenced above, would seem to be signally lacking. 
This fact might indicate a difference in the way shame operates in the grief 
trajectory between the two levels, or it might simply support Lewis’s (1971) 




This study emphasises the fact that grief, at the individual and the group 
level, is about change and how people, both alone and together, cope with it.  
Why the changes involved for an individual suffering bereavement through 
death should ever have been singled out as some kind of anomaly in human 
experience (Wierzbicka 2004, p. 582), perhaps says more about  twentieth 
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century western attitudes towards death than about grief itself. And while 
almost a century’s worth of grief theory and research have served to make 
finer and finer distinctions between individual experiences of grief with their 
various findings on complicated grief, traumatic grief, and post traumatic 
stress disorder, a more recent trend (pp.18-9 above), which this particular 
study follows, has worked at extending the applicability of grief to a wider 
range of contexts than the traditional bereavement.  
The far-reaching relevance of grief would seem to indicate a quality of 
universality, an experience intrinsic to the human condition. And perhaps this 
is because grief centres on identity. Change is welcome if it is perceived as 
bringing about a set of circumstances that will enhance our self-identity, our 
conception of who we think we are. It is unwelcome when it seems to strip us 
of elements of our self-image that we had hitherto taken for granted and in so 
doing damages that image, posing a threat to the integrity of the self we 
purport to be. The two cases on which this study centres demonstrate how 
collective grief comes into play where membership of a group is considered 
to be an important defining element of identity.  
Identity is a cobbled-together affair, dependent on an endless collection of 
props, both shared and personal, but all inherently social in nature. The 
protection and preservation of this essentially fluid and makeshift self-image 
and the maintenance of its continuity would seem to be at the heart of grief, 
implying an assumption that permanence of identity is essential to any sense 
of stability or security. Whether such an assumption is either well-founded or 
wise in a world which is so clearly organised on principles of change and 
impermanence is a question more perhaps for philosophers and Buddhists 
than for this study to answer. 
But perhaps a final word on the issue might come from two artists who 
address it directly in their work, a Jew and an Arab who both come from 
Israel, a part of the world where the insistence on and the claims of identity 
have created such a turmoil of conflict and confusion. Michal Rovner’s “Time 
Left” and “Data Zone”, detailed in chapter six (pp. 216, 262), present human 
figures stripped of all identity and specificity, in an almost abstract,  generic 
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and emblematic form. In her BBC Radio Three interview with John Tusa 
about her exhibition at the 2003 Venice Biennale, she explains that her whole 
technical approach of re-photographing and re-mastering images until she 
has produced such figures is essentially “a strategy of removing something 
away from its identity, its locality or specificness”. Viewing one of her “Data 
Zone”  culture plates for any length of time, with the tiny dark figures cutting 
across each other, forming interlocking circles, contracting into small clusters 
or bursting out and scattering across the white background, as if engaged in 
some elegant but enigmatic dance, emulates “the  gaze of an ancient, 
indifferent deity” (Skene 2009). The piece might have been made to illustrate 
the Buddha’s words “To watch the birth and death of beings is like looking at 
the movements of a dance” (cited in Rinpoche 2002, p.25). 
Asad Azi is an Arab Israeli and a member of the Druze community, a minority 
group within the underprivileged Arab minority of the Jewish State. His work 
is characterised by a cultural hybridity or eclecticism, incorporating motifs 
from and references to a variety of sources, both oriental and occidental, 
both high and low in artistic terms. His major focus is the issue of identity, 
and although this might seem a natural corollary of his relatively liminal status 
within Israel, Ankori (2006, pp.178-96) argues that his work reflects an 
oscillation between biography and ontology and a conscious choice on the 
part of the artist to try to free himself from the sort of categories of identity 
that divide people. His “Self-portrait” (1997) comprises a large canvas of 
fifteen black and white portraits of the artist, in varying resolutions, each of 
his fifteen selves identified by an externally imposed sign of identity. These 
include the various combinations of numbers or letters society has allocated 
to him in the form of ID card number, date of birth, telephone number, car 
licence plate number and so on, and various names, in Arabic and English, 
by which he is known. A more recent work, “Wanderer (Good Day, Mr Azi)” 
(2003), is another self-portrait, but this time of the artist as a naked nomad 
carrying his few bundled possessions on a stick over his shoulder, a man not 
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